

STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW, JUNE 2025 – MAY 2026

This review covers the period between 1 June 2025 and 31 May 2026, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores key events and milestones over the past year and assesses impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first presents ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the abovementioned period. Second it examines compliance with the core ATT principle of transparency and reporting. It then reviews the work of the ATT's intersessional process, including discussions held within the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). The latter comprises two sub-working groups: one on exchange of national implementation practices and another on current and emerging implementation issues.

The chapter concludes by assessing how ATT States Parties are meeting their ATT obligations, while global events such as a growth in the number of conflicts, increased human suffering and a persistent detachment from multilateral instruments seem to jeopardise and hinder the achievement of the three main purposes of the Treaty.

UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2026, the ATT Secretariat listed 118 countries as States Parties, accounting for 60 per cent of all United Nations (UN) member states.¹ It listed a further 25 countries as Signatories. Two States, Vanuatu and Ecuador, became ATT States Parties between 2025 and 2026. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties per year between 2015 and 2026.

Table 1 – New ATT membership by 31 May of each year

Year	Acceptance	Accession	Ratification	States Parties
2025–2026	0	1	1	118
2024–2025	0	1	2	116
2023–2024	0	0	0	113
2022–2023	1	0	1	113
2021–2022	0	0	1	111
2020–2021	0	3	1	110
2019–2020	0	3	1	106
2018–2019	0	0	7	102
2017–2018	0	2	1	95
2016–2017	0	1	6	92
2015–2016	0	2	14	85

The geographical spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2026, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 47 per cent (seven of 15 countries) and Africa at 57 per cent (31 of 54 countries).² Europe at 93 per cent (40 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 83 per cent (29 of 35 countries) have the highest proportions of States Parties.


The ATT enjoys particularly strong support in certain subregional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with all 12 members being States Parties

¹ Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN members, they are not counted in this share.

² Analysis based on the UN Statistics Division website, 'Methodology. Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (M49)'. tinyurl.com/3usm3kk9. For more information on Treaty membership, see ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'Treaty Status'. tinyurl.com/mwkdnsps.

MAP OF STATUS OF ATT PARTICIPATION (AS OF 31 MAY 2026)



STATES PARTIES (118): Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia.

SIGNATORIES (25): Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Eswatini, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America*, Zimbabwe.

NOT YET JOINED (52): Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.

* Signed but no longer intends to become a State Party.

UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

2025 saw the ninth funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the Informal Preparatory meeting for the Twelfth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP12) in May 2026, 30 States Parties had made voluntary contributions for a total of approximately US\$13.5m over the course of the fund's lifespan.³ An additional US\$160,000 has been allocated to the VTF Outreach Programme.

The ATT Secretariat received 23 applications from 25 States Parties for the 2025 VTF cycle,⁴ and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for 10 projects with a total budget of approximately US\$950,000.⁵ This marks a decrease from the 27 project applications received for the 2024 VTF cycle.⁶ Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, demonstrating the importance of partnerships in advancing ATT implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF's first year of operation.

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation continued this year, including the EU ATT Outreach Programme. Other initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

Government representatives and CSOs from around the world met at national and regional training workshops to learn more about the ATT and discuss lessons learnt from national implementation efforts in different States. Discussions included technical challenges, legal requirements and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts for implementing ATT provisions.

Table 2 – Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year⁷

Year	Applications	Projects approved	Total budget for approved projects
2025	23	10	US\$952,000
2024	27	18	US\$1.6m
2023	28	14	US\$1.2m
2022	15	6	US\$612,000
2021	21	13	US\$1.3 million
2020	26	10	US\$964,000
2019	39	19	US\$1.9m
2018	23	9	US\$735,000
2017	21	15	US\$1.1m

Examples of activities that have taken place:

On 20 and 21 November 2025, Expertise France, in collaboration with the Small Arms Survey, organized a training-of-trainer workshop on the intersection between the ATT and gender-based violence. Participants from Liberia, Mexico and Sierra Leone brainstormed how to translate provisions in the ATT related to gender-based violence into concrete risk assessment processes and national transfer control practices.⁸

From 4 to 5 February 2026, the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) organized a national assistance workshop in Colombia. The purpose of the event was to convene representatives from key national institutions and enhance their technical understanding of Article 13 of the Treaty with regards to reporting obligations. Together with experts from Spain and Chile, participants produced a national step-by-step guide to formulate a coordinated, consistent and sustainable ATT reporting procedure.⁹

3 Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP12 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2026. Presentation on file with the ATT Monitor.

4 ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Report on the Work of the ATT. Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2024 to August 2025'. ATT/VTF/2025/CHAIR/830/Conf.Rep. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2s3r4cy2, p. 3.

5 ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF): Projects'. tinyurl.com/2sxxrpjh. ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2024 to August 2025'. ATT/VTF/2025/CHAIR/830/Conf.Rep. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2s3r4cy2, p. 3.

6 ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2024 to August 2025'. ATT/VTF/2025/CHAIR/830/Conf.Rep. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2s3r4cy2, pp. 2–3.

7 Table 2 shows projects and funding approved by the VTF Selection Committee, based on Ibid. pp. 2–3.

8 EU P2P ATT IV—OP—Expertise France (2025). 'Une Session "Train the Trainers" Sur les Violences Fondées sur le Genre dans le Cadre du TCA' [A "Train the Trainers" Session on Gender-Based Violence within the Framework of the ATT] [LinkedIn post]. LinkedIn. December 2025. tinyurl.com/5hfmhvhv; and EU P2P ATT (2025). 'Newsletter'. November-December 2025 | Phase IV, pp. 3–4. Newsletter on file with the ATT Monitor.

9 EU P2P ATT (2026). 'Newsletter'. January-February 2026 | Phase IV, p. 2. Newsletter on file with the ATT Monitor.

Since April 2025, Saferworld and the Security Research Information Centre, with Canadian funding, have been implementing a project entitled 'Promoting Accession to and Implementation of the ATT in East Africa'. East Africa is among the regions with the lowest ATT participation, with States facing a range of challenges exacerbated by the proliferation and misuse of illicit arms. Through research, stakeholder dialogue and expert consultations, the initiative is working to: address States' questions and concerns relating to Treaty accession and membership; strengthen understanding of how ATT implementation can support efforts to reduce armed violence, insecurity and illicit arms proliferation across the region; and raise awareness of the wide range of assistance that is available for States that are seeking to join the Treaty.¹⁰

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

ANNUAL REPORTS

States Parties are required to submit annual reports by 31 May each year detailing their arms exports and imports during the previous calendar year.¹¹ However, they are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2026, 115 of the 118 States Parties were required to submit their 2025 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 46 submitted an annual report by the deadline—a compliance rate of 40 per cent.¹² This rate is lower compared to last year's on-time reporting rate of 44 per cent.

Of the 46 annual reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat website, 13 States Parties made their 2025 reports confidential, representing 28 per cent of on-time submissions.¹³ This marks an increase in private, on-time reporting compared to 26 per cent of 2024 reports submitted on time.

The Gambia and Malawi, which were required to submit their annual report for the first time this year, had not done so by the 7 June deadline. Andorra has not submitted either its first annual report, due on 31 May 2025, nor its 2025 annual report.

INITIAL REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each State Party to submit an initial report to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty within the first year after its entry into force.¹⁴ As of 7 June 2026, 116 of 118 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 94 (81 per cent) had done so.¹⁵

One State Party—Colombia, whose report was due by January 2026—submitted an initial report since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report. The Gambia and Malawi had to submit their initial report by 10 September 2025 and 8 October 2025, respectively, but had not done so as of 7 June 2026. The two newest States Parties—Vanuatu and Ecuador—are required to submit their initial reports by 3 December 2026 and 25 May 2027, respectively.



AS OF 7 JUNE 2026, 115 OF THE 118 STATES PARTIES WERE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR 2025 ANNUAL REPORTS, IN LINE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 13.3. OF THESE, 46 SUBMITTED AN ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DEADLINE—A COMPLIANCE RATE OF 40 PER CENT. THIS RATE IS LOWER COMPARED TO LAST YEAR'S ON-TIME REPORTING RATE OF 44 PER CENT.

10 Saferworld (2025). 'ATT Expert Group: Conflict, Illicit Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty in East Africa'. Briefing no. 10. August 2025. tinyurl.com/237ce6wb.

11 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

12 The ATT Monitor was able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the ATT Secretariat.

13 Albania, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lesotho, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Senegal, Seychelles and State of Palestine.

14 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

15 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Initial Reports. Status: as of 12 February 2026'. tinyurl.com/2sewmav7.

Initial reporting compliance remains low for the Treaty's newest members. Of the six States Parties for whom the Treaty entered into force over the past five years and that had been required to submit an initial report by June 2026, only 50 per cent (Andorra, Colombia and the Philippines) have done so. In August 2025, the United Kingdom submitted an updated version of its initial report, becoming the seventh State Party to do so since the adoption of the Treaty, despite Article 13.1 requesting that 'each State Party shall report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate'.¹⁶ An in-depth analysis of initial reporting is provided in Chapter 3.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Eleventh Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP11) was conducted from 25 to 29 August 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland. Ambassador Carlos Foradori, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, served as President of CSP11. Representatives from 116 countries, comprising 94 States Parties, 18 Signatories and four Observer States attended.¹⁷ Other attendees included representatives of ten international and regional organizations, including UN agencies and 46 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing the industry.¹⁸ The President's thematic focus was 'Universalization as a Priority'. Participants in the thematic discussion underscored the relevance of universalization to the overall success of the Treaty, including its effective implementation, encouraging 'the sharing of experiences, best practices and innovative strategies for promoting adherence' to the Treaty.¹⁹

Decisions adopted included:²⁰

- The endorsement of a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom for CSP11 agreeing to a mandate to elaborate elements of a draft five-year strategy.

- The establishment of gender focal points under the ATT to mainstream gender perspectives across ATT processes and implementation activities.
- The request for the WGTR to conduct an assessment of the Information Exchange Platform and the online reporting tool.
- The welcoming of a working paper submitted by Panama on strengthening youth participation in the ATT.
- The decision to hold one in-person four-day session of the ATT Working Group meetings and one in-person informal CSP preparatory meeting of up to two days per CSP cycle, both with a livestream option, instead of offering a hybrid option for the preparatory meetings.
- The election of Ms. Tsholofelo Tsheole, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the UN Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland, as President of CSP12.
- The election of Latvia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and Uruguay as the four vice-presidents of CSP12.
- The appointment of Latvia, Lesotho, Paraguay, the People's Republic of China and Spain to serve a two-year term as Members of the ATT Management Committee.
- Scheduling of CSP12 for 24–28 August 2026 in Geneva, Switzerland.

TWELFTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES – INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP12 included meetings of the Working Groups on 16 to 19 March 2026²¹ and an Informal Preparatory Meeting on 27 to 28 May 2026.²²

The WGETI, chaired by Colonel Philippe Lejeune from France, addressed the implementation of specific ATT articles in the dedicated sub-working group on exchange of national implementation practices, and other aspects pertinent to the implementation of the Treaty in the sub-working group on current and emerging implementation issues.²³

16 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

17 The ATT Monitor captures attendance at CSPs as indicated by the CSP Final Report each year. See ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Final Report'. 29 August 2025. ATT/CSP11/2025/SEC/834/Conf.FinRep/Rev. tinyurl.com/2pgj6z3j, p.3.

18 Ibid., pp. 3–4.

19 Ibid., p. 5.

20 Ibid., pp. 5–12.

21 ATT Secretariat. (n.d.). 'CSP12–Twelfth Conference of States Parties Working Group Meetings'. tinyurl.com/mtym7dix.

22 ATT Secretariat. (n.d.). 'CSP12–Twelfth Conference of States Parties Informal Preparatory Meeting'. tinyurl.com/343xcfs3.

23 ATT WGETI (2026). '16–18 March 2026 WGETI Meeting: WGETI Chair Introductory Letter'. 18 February 2026. ATT/CSP12/WGETI/2026/CHAIR/835/LetterSubDocs/Rev. tinyurl.com/yxew6bgk.

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices was facilitated by Ms. Essate Weldemichael and Mr. Edward Kawa of Sierra Leone. The sub-working group primarily focused on the Treaty's implementation by addressing two topics in the multi-year workplan: 'National control system relating to brokering' and 'Risk assessment (covering Articles 6 & 7)'.²⁴ Under the first topic, States Parties discussed the different measures undertaken to regulate arms brokering under their jurisdiction. Mr. Robert Hunter-Perkins from Conflict Armament Research highlighted, inter alia, some definitional challenges and understandings surrounding arms brokering and emphasized that, as of mid-2024, only 44 States Parties 'reported that their national legislation contains a definition of a broker or brokering'.²⁵ Canada and Liberia presented their national practices on brokering before States Parties engaged in a wider discussion on key aspects of their brokering controls, common challenges and emerging issues.²⁶ The second topic explored 'Risk assessment (covering Articles 6 & 7)', discussing States Parties' national practices related to prohibitions and export assessment. Mr. Michal Karczmarz from the European External Action Service, Chair of the EU's Working Group on Conventional Arms Export (COARM), explained the criteria of the EU's legally binding Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on Arms Exports and how the accompanying non-binding User's Guide provides coherence, shared standards, converging interpretations and best practices.²⁷ Chile and South Africa also presented their respective approaches to risk assessments, and several States Parties contributed to the discussion by sharing their national experiences.²⁸

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues addressed four different topics, in accordance with CSP11 decisions: challenges related to the scope of the Treaty and the establishment and maintenance of a national control list; the role of industry in responsible international arms transfers; the risk of conventional arms being used for gender-based violence and violence against

women and children; and developing or strengthening inter-agency cooperation.²⁹ The discussions on the scope of the ATT included contributions from El Salvador, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Saferworld. There were also focused presentations on the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) from the United Kingdom and on the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).³⁰ The session on gender included presentations from the newly appointed Gender Focal Points of Mexico, Spain and Togo on their mandate and initial workplan. It also featured discussions among delegations on proposed additional guidance on the implementation of Article 7 (4) of the Treaty for integration into the Voluntary Guide on Implementing Articles 6 & 7.³¹ Three ad hoc discussions also took place: on maritime security and the ATT (raised by the Small Arms Survey, in collaboration with Panama and UNIDIR); on risk assessment of arms exports to Sudan (raised by Maat for Peace, Development, and Human Rights); and implementation of Article 7 (7) on the reassessment of granted authorizations, raised by Control Arms.³² The focus on the topics of the WGETI workplan, combined with the addition of topics and issues taken forward since the CSP11 cycle, created a rich agenda with numerous presentations. At times, this created some difficulties for attending delegations to fully follow and contribute to the wide range of topics.

The WGTU was co-chaired by the President of CSP12, Ms. Tsholofelo Tsheole from South Africa, and the President of CSP11, Ambassador Carlos Foradori from Argentina. The meeting welcomed Ecuador as the most recent State Party to the ATT. Then, the ATT Secretariat provided a presentation on the status of ATT universalisation, highlighting how participation remains low in Asia, in particular. Co-chairs, different delegations and stakeholders provided updates on their universalisation efforts. Regional perspectives on the status of the Treaty were shared by the Pacific Islands Forum for the Pacific region; the Regional Centre on Small Arms for the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region; Maat for Peace, Development, and Human Rights

24 Ibid., pp. 1–2 and p. 5.

25 Hunter-Perkins, R. (2026). 'Regulating Brokering'. Presentation at ATT WGETI, Geneva, 16 March 2026. tinyurl.com/4ff5fndb, p. 13. The data is also included in Giezendanner H. et al. (2025). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Regulating Brokering to Reduce the Risk of Diversion'. ATT Issue Brief No. 5. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). tinyurl.com/4pxyemgm, p. 45.

26 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12/WGETI/2026/CHAIR/838/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/35jv5yre, p. 3. The presentations are available at: ATT Secretariat. (n.d.). 'Working Group Meetings CSP12 Preparatory Process'. tinyurl.com/bde4yapy.

27 See: Council of the European Union. (2025). 'Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment'. Brussels. 15 April 2025. tinyurl.com/ykfhwt6; and Council of the European Union. (2025). 'User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (as Amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/779) Defining Common Rules Governing the Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment'. No. Doc. 6881/25. Brussels. 14 April 2025. tinyurl.com/2va8ba95.

28 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12/WGETI/2026/CHAIR/838/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/35jv5yre, p. 4.

29 Ibid., pp. 5–10.

30 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

31 Ibid., p. 9.

32 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

for the Middle East and North Africa region; and the Forum on Disarmament and Development in Sri Lanka for South Asia.³³ Further discussions on ratification/accession and national domestication practices included presentations from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Gambia, the Philippines and Angola.³⁴

The WGTR, chaired by Ms. Milagros Winkelried Salazar from Peru, focused on the implementation of ATT reporting obligations.³⁵ The ATT Secretariat presented data on the status of reporting and provided updates on its initiatives conducted under the EU-funded Implementation Support Project. The Working Group discussed and assessed the use of the online reporting tool for submitting initial and annual reports and the information exchange platform, and were provided with some preliminary findings of a survey conducted by the Secretariat on the use of the two tools.³⁶ Under the agenda item of 'Substantive ATT reporting issues', Paraguay (as a State Party) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (as an assistance provider) presented their experiences and recommendations on data collection and decision-making on substantive reporting issues. France recalled the joint Brazil and France working paper on regional and sub-regional meetings on diversion information exchange to support information exchange among States Parties. The Working Group then addressed the agenda item from its multi-year workplan, 'Reports to Cabinet and/or Parliament'. Following presentations from Transparency International Defence and Security, Nigeria, Norway and France, several States Parties' delegations shared their national practices on reporting to national parliaments.³⁷

The CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting was held on 27 to 28 May 2026. The chairs and co-chairs of ATT subsidiary bodies—WGETI, WGTU and WGTR—provided updates on the discussions held during the March sessions and proposed next

steps. The WGETI proposed the endorsement and integration of the additional guidance on the implementation of Article 7 (4) of the Treaty into relevant sections of the Voluntary Guide on Implementing Articles 6 & 7 of the ATT. The Working Group also requested to involve logistical actors in future discussions on enforcement and on the regulation of actors involved in arms transfers and considered the potential utility of an informal group to advance discussions on scope and national control lists. The WGETI Chair proposed to continue discussions and encouraged consideration of a wide range of topics, including the role of industry, the application of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, inter-agency cooperation and maritime-security related aspects.³⁸ The wide range of topics covered brought some delegations to lament a lack of prioritisation and coherence, with the risk of overstressing the resources of the WGETI. The WGTU discussed its way forward, and the WGTR considered, among other topics, the possible creation of an informal 'sounding-board' group of interested stakeholders to support the Secretariat's efforts in facilitating reporting compliance.³⁹ The Management Committee presented its proposal to update the Sponsorship Programme's Administrative Guidelines.⁴⁰ The Chair of the VTF Committee proposed some amendments to the Terms of Reference of the VTF, and the ATT Secretariat provided updates on the status of operations of the VTF.⁴¹

The second day included an overview of the status of implementation of decisions taken by CSP11. The ATT Secretariat also provided an update on the development of a five-year strategy for the ATT, based on consultations held with ATT States Parties and different stakeholders in the preceding months.⁴² A report with draft elements of the strategy will be submitted for consideration at CSP12; further consultations will continue until CSP13, when the strategy will be considered by States Parties.

33 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Treaty Universalization. Co-chairs' Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTU/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/mspz8buj, p. 4.

34 Ibid., p. 5.

35 ATT WGTR (2026). 'Draft Annotated Agenda for Meeting of 19 March 2026'. 17 February 2026. ATT/CSP12CSP12.WGTR/20262026/CHAIR/836/DrAnnAgenda. tinyurl.com/bdeyd5a6.

36 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTR/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/58y23e27, pp. 3–5. The presentation is available at: ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'WGTR. Assessment of the Online Reporting Tool and the Information Exchange Platform. Secretariat's Survey: Initial Findings'. tinyurl.com/5n7j2u3s.

37 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTR/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/58y23e27, pp. 5–7.

38 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGETI/2026/CHAIR/838/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/35jv5yre, pp. 13–14.

39 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTR/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/58y23e27, pp. 11–13.

40 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting (27–28 May 2026): Proposed Amendments to the Administrative Guidelines of the ATT Sponsorship Programme'. 30 April 2026. ATT/CSP1.MC/2026/MC/844/IPM.SponAdminGuide.Prop. tinyurl.com/3nk4cmn5.

41 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting (27–28 May 2026): Proposed Amendments to the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) Terms of Reference (TOR)'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.VTF/2026/CHAIR/843/IPM.ToR.Prop. tinyurl.com/yzdhakb2.

42 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Development of Elements of a Draft Five-Year Strategy for the Arms Trade Treaty: Summary Report of Contributions and Key Elements'. tinyurl.com/bxwc3be6.

The Gender Focal Points briefed ATT stakeholders on the survey conducted on their preliminary workplan, and the ATT Secretariat provided a presentation on the status of gender participation in ATT meetings, followed by an overview on the status of ATT finances⁴³ (see next section).

STATUS OF ATT FINANCES

States Parties to the ATT, as well as Signatory and Observer States attending CSPs, contribute to the costs of ATT conferences and of the ATT Secretariat. In-kind support from Switzerland has slightly increased and included a refund of conference room costs. As of 18 May 2026, the percentage of the budget contributions received for 2026 was 89 per cent. The proportion of States Parties that made their payments in 2026 dropped to 56 per cent, with outstanding contributions from 61 States. As of May 2026, the total outstanding contributions were more than US\$443,000, signalling a small improvement of around US\$20,000 compared to 2025. The adoption of some cost-saving measures by the ATT Secretariat lowered the annual deficit to 4 per cent, compared to 5 per cent in 2025. The operational budget remains reduced, but there are sufficient funds to operate until the end of 2026. While guidelines for making financial arrangements were adopted by CSP7, no formal requests for financial arrangements had been submitted until May 2026.⁴⁴

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Article 1 of the ATT identifies three main purposes for the Treaty: 'Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; Reducing human suffering; [and] Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'.⁴⁵

While events until May 2025 'tested the Treaty, in a way that has rarely happened in previous years',⁴⁶ developments from June 2025 to May 2026 were equally turbulent and perhaps even more challenging for the ATT and the effective achievement of its three purposes. Regional peace, security and stability were at their lowest levels: in 2025, the Peace Research Institute Oslo recorded 'the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946', with 65 conflicts in 35 countries and an increase in the number of interstate conflicts.⁴⁷ Human suffering did not reduce: data released by the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner in June 2025 showed that civilian deaths in conflict increased 40 per cent in 2024.⁴⁸ Likewise, a survey of 23 armed conflicts conducted by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights warned that the threat to international humanitarian law, which aims to limit the effect of war, was at 'a critical breaking point'.⁴⁹ Transparency and confidence among States has not improved either: the general distrust and decreased engagement in multilateralism continued, although it has, so far, had a limited impact on the ATT. Five ATT States Parties, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, withdrew from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention between December 2025 and February 2026, in accordance with the provisions for withdrawal contained in the Convention and in response to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, while Ukraine decided to suspend the implementation of the Convention in July 2025.⁵⁰

43 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Draft Annotated Agenda CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting'. 24 April 2026. ATT/CSP12/2026/SEC/841/IPM.DrAnnAgenda/Rev. tinyurl.com/2w237hb7.

44 Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP12 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2026. Information on file with the ATT Monitor.

45 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

46 Control Arms Secretariat (2025). ATT Monitor Report 2025. Geneva. 25 August 2025. tinyurl.com/yyhtbn2p, p. 17.

47 Rustad, S.A. (2026). 'Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2025'. PRIO Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). tinyurl.com/4kdun24w, p. 7.

48 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2025). 'Human Rights Count: Delivering Insights with UN Human Rights Data'. June 2025. tinyurl.com/5a8xjne3.

49 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2026). 'War Watch: IHL in Focus Report – 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2025'. February 2026. tinyurl.com/47yw7hcz, p. 1. See also: Sabbagh, D. (2026). 'International Law Meant to Limit Effects of War at Breaking Point, Study Finds'. The Guardian. 2 February 2026. tinyurl.com/yc4ekjkh.

50 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (n.d.). 'Membership'. tinyurl.com/yypfguv7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2025). 'Statement of the MFA of Ukraine on the Decision to Suspension from the Ottawa Convention'. 29 June 2025. tinyurl.com/5h6fu6b3; and Docherty, B. and Wareham, M. (2025). 'Ukraine 'Suspends' Vital Mine Ban Treaty: Respect Global Prohibition on Antipersonnel Landmines'. Human Rights Watch. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/3vc6xd3x. Another ATT State Party, Lebanon, joined the Convention in May 2026. See MAG (Mines Advisory Group) (2026). 'Lebanon Joins the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention'. 6 May 2026. tinyurl.com/47zh6ac7.

The US President issued, in January 2026, a Memorandum stating the intention to withdraw from a number of international organizations, conventions and treaties, including the transparency instrument, UNROCA.⁵¹ At the same time, world military expenditure, which was already at the highest level ever recorded in 2024, rose for the 11th consecutive year in 2025 by a further 2.9 per cent to US\$2,887b.⁵² Similarly, the global volume of major arms transferred between States in 2021–25 recorded its biggest increase since 2011–15 and reached its highest level in the last 35 years.⁵³

Conflicts continued or started in many regions and countries throughout the world. A border dispute erupted between Cambodia and Thailand in 2025. At the same time, tensions and conflict continued in Myanmar and Ukraine, intensified in Sudan, and escalated into a regional war in the Middle East.

Israel's military campaign in Gaza in response to Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 continued. In September 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel reported that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.⁵⁴ Although a ceasefire was announced in October 2025, the situation in Gaza and in Palestine remained unstable and the human toll on civilians continued to increase. UN Women reported that more than 38,000 women and girls, an average of at least 47 per day, were

killed in Gaza between October 2023 and December 2025.⁵⁵ In January 2026, Israel Defense Forces 'accepted the estimate of the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry that approximately 71,000 Palestinians were killed during the Israel-Gaza war'.⁵⁶ The same Ministry of Health, however, estimated that 591 Palestinians were killed and 1,578 injured between the ceasefire of October 2025 and mid-February 2026.⁵⁷ Israel announced a ban on some humanitarian non-governmental organizations working in Gaza,⁵⁸ and 21 States—all States Parties to the ATT—released a joint statement calling for humanitarian access in Gaza.⁵⁹

Instability and conflict did not remain limited to the State of Palestine but spread across the whole Middle East. In February 2026, the United States and Israel started a war against Iran, which responded by attacking US bases in the region and regional allies. Concerned by the actions of the United States, which included the strike on Minab Primary School resulting in the deaths of 168 people, many of them children, over 100 US-based international law experts signed an open letter stating that American strikes on Iran may amount to war crimes.⁶⁰

At the same time, Israel continued and intensified its bombing campaign in Lebanon against the Iranian-backed armed group Hezbollah. It conducted numerous airstrikes and ground attacks, particularly in the South of Lebanon, that caused a humanitarian crisis, displaced hundreds of thousands of people and damaged critical civilian infrastructure.⁶¹

51 The White House (2026). 'Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States'. Presidential Memoranda. 7 January 2026. tinyurl.com/3fjzchhr.

52 Liang, X. et al. (2026). 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). April 2026. tinyurl.com/4a8w7fsj, p. 1.

53 George, M. et al. (2026). 'Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). March 2026. tinyurl.com/mryww453, p. 1.

54 Human Rights Council (2025). 'Legal Analysis of the Conduct of Israel in Gaza Pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel'. 16 September 2025. A/HRC/60/CRP.3. tinyurl.com/m2jtk8dt; and United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2025). 'Israel Has Committed Genocide in the Gaza Strip, UN Commission Finds'. Press Release. 16 September 2025. tinyurl.com/4fezywfp.

55 UN Women (2026). 'Advocacy Brief: The Cost of the War in Gaza on Women and Girls'. 17 April 2026. tinyurl.com/mnn8j8wz; and Le Poidevin, O. (2026). 'Average of 47 Women and Girls Killed Daily During Gaza War, UN Says'. Reuters. 17 April 2026. tinyurl.com/yjrpdk5n.

56 Kubovich, Y. and Hasson, N. (2026). 'IDF Accepts Gaza Health Ministry Death Toll of Over 71,000 Palestinians Killed During the War'. Haaretz. 29 January 2026. tinyurl.com/4pbk9pna.

57 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2026). 'Gaza Humanitarian Response | Situation Report No. 67'. 13 February 2026. tinyurl.com/4pfe79ty.

58 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2026). 'Israel: Ban on 37 Aid Groups Makes Life Unbearable for Genocide Survivors in Palestine, Say UN Experts'. Press Release. 15 January 2026. tinyurl.com/mtzpz4cu.

59 Government of the Netherlands (2026). 'Joint Statement on Humanitarian Access in Gaza and the Registration Law Affecting INGOS'. Diplomatic Statement. 8 June 2026. tinyurl.com/yjnrsvr. The statement was also signed by the European Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management.

60 Dannenbaum, T. et al. (2026). 'Over 100 International Law Experts Warn: U.S. Strikes on Iran Violate UN Charter and May Be War Crimes'. Just Security. 13 April 2026. tinyurl.com/ms45xd3b; and Singh, K. (2026). 'US Experts Say American Strikes on Iran May Amount to War Crimes'. Reuters. 2 April 2026. tinyurl.com/yb56p2d6.

61 Christou, W. (2026). 'Vision of Destruction: Israel's Assault on Southern Lebanon in Video, Maps and Charts'. The Guardian. 11 May 2026. tinyurl.com/4bn7stw6; and Ward, E. (2026). 'Nearly 700,000 Displaced by War in Lebanon, U.N. Says'. The New York Times. 10 March 2026. tinyurl.com/2y89tey.

The conflict in Sudan continued unabated. In February 2026, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that the scale, severity and impact of the acts of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) presented 'indications pointing to genocide in and around El-Fasher', as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁶² Reports published by non-governmental organizations and research institutes indicated that military materiel used in the Sudan war also included equipment originating from ATT States Parties such as Bulgaria, China, France, and Serbia.⁶³ In particular, some military materiel, including materiel from European States, appeared to have been originally exported to the United Arab Emirates and, from there, allegedly transferred to the RSF.⁶⁴

Facing an extremely volatile and challenging global situation characterised by an increasing number of global conflicts, several States, including ATT States Parties, have taken measures and policy decisions to stop or limit transfers of military materiel to belligerent parties. Switzerland decided that, in line with its principle of neutrality, the export of war materiel to countries involved in the international armed conflict with Iran, including exports of war materiel to the United States, 'cannot be authorised for the duration of the conflict'.⁶⁵ Other States Parties stopped or suspended arms transfers to Israel. For instance, Spain approved an arms embargo on Israel,⁶⁶ Slovenia banned arms trade with Israel,⁶⁷ and Canada suspended new export authorizations for arms transfers that could be used in Gaza.⁶⁸ Following court decisions and efforts from civil society organizations, the Netherlands halted the export of F-35 aircraft

components to Israel and Belgium prohibited the transit of military equipment destined for Israel.⁶⁹ Similarly, Colombia and South Africa co-chaired a meeting of States in The Hague Group that presented a series of measures to ensure accountability and the enforcement of international law in Palestine. These included 'prevent the transfer, transit, or carriage of arms, munitions, military fuel, and dual-use items to Israel—including through export restrictions, port controls, and flag-state responsibilities—in full compliance with international law'.⁷⁰

The decisions of some States to ban or suspend arms transfers are in line with the object and purpose of the Treaty and with States Parties' Treaty obligations, although they were not all primarily and explicitly motivated by the ATT. As States Parties are developing a five-year strategy for the ATT, it is important that they continue to debate arms transfer decisions and cases of practical application of Articles 6 and 7 under the framework of the ATT and particularly in the WGETI. These discussions can help demonstrate how the Articles of the Treaty and their related legal obligations shape arms transfer decisions in practical terms. Such discussions will also give States Parties an opportunity to prove that, in their day-to-day export and transfer decisions, they are fulfilling obligations under the ATT to uphold 'the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms'.⁷¹ In doing so, States Parties can provide illustrations of how they are striving to achieve the object and purpose of the Treaty, through practical case studies that can be utilised in the ATT strategy to demonstrate the Treaty's effectiveness and impact.

62 United Nations Human Rights Council (2026). 'Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher'. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan. 17 February 2026. [A/HRC/61/77. tinyurl.com/3c3ewb33](https://tinyurl.com/3c3ewb33), p. 18. See also: United Nations Human Rights Council (2026). 'Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher Reveals Genocidal Campaign, Targeting Non-Arab Communities. UN Fact-Finding Mission Says'. 17 February 2026. tinyurl.com/428vedxy; and Townsend, M. (2026). 'Heroism, Horror and the 'Pits of Hell': Inside the Last Days of El Fasher'. The Guardian. 25 March 2026. tinyurl.com/7rys78uv.

63 Brabant, S. (2025). 'Who is Fuelling the Sudan 2023 Civil War?'. Focus Paper 56. Royal Higher Institute for Defence. Brussels: Belgium. tinyurl.com/2x66jbe3; and Devoto, M.P. (2026). 'Sudan's Forgotten Catastrophe'. SANE Policy Institute. 12 May 2026. tinyurl.com/4uessdt9.

64 Gadeva, E. and Peschard, Q. (2025). 'European Weapons in Sudan (1/5): Bulgarian Mortar Shells in Darfur's Desert'. France 24. 17 April 2025. tinyurl.com/48br82ub. See also: Amnesty International (2025). 'Sudan: Advanced Chinese Weaponry Provided by UAE Identified in Breach of Arms Embargo – New Investigation'. 8 May 2025. tinyurl.com/3zt55dcg; Amnesty International (2024). 'Sudan: French-manufactured Weapons System Identified in Conflict – New Investigation'. 14 November 2024. tinyurl.com/2zctknzh; and Kaamil, A. (2024). 'French Military Systems in Sudan May Break UN Arms Embargo, Says Amnesty'. The Guardian. 14 November 2024. tinyurl.com/2s48ut5v.

65 The Federal Council (2026). 'Iran Conflict: Impact on War-relevant Exports'. Press Release. 20 March 2026. tinyurl.com/4tufj5nb.

66 Le Monde with AFP (2025). 'Spanish Parliament Approves Israel Arms Embargo'. Le Monde. 8 October 2025. tinyurl.com/5axa5nnu.

67 Zerdin, A. (2025). 'Slovenia Bans Arms Trade with Israel over Its Actions in Gaza'. AP. 1 August 2025. tinyurl.com/hsdv9b49.

68 Cecco, L. (2024). 'Canada to Halt Arms Sales to Israel after Non-Binding Vote in House of Commons'. The Guardian. 19 March 2024. tinyurl.com/2ukbp965. The decision does not influence indirect transfers and purely defensive goods. Germany also halted arms exports to Israel that could be used in Gaza from August to November 2025. See Knolle, K. and Alkousaa, R. (2025). 'Germany Halts Arms Exports that Israel Can Use in Gaza'. Reuters. 8 August 2025. tinyurl.com/5ecc5rs3; and Al Jazeera Staff and News Agencies (2025). 'Germany Lifts Curbs on Arms Exports to Israel, Citing Gaza Ceasefire'. Al Jazeera. 17 November 2025. tinyurl.com/5xp5hbbt.

69 Fuller, H. (2026). 'Belgium Halts UK Military Shipment Bound for Israel Amid Legal Scrutiny'. Military.com. 18 April 2026. tinyurl.com/4xsemcsv; Mulla, I. (2026). Belgium Seizes Arms Shipment Sent from Britain to Israel'. Middle East Eye. 15 April 2026. tinyurl.com/2pd42bbv; and PAX (2025). 'Crucial Victory: Export of F-35 Parts to Israel Remains Prohibited'. 14 November 2025. tinyurl.com/5agbh57h. In November 2025, the Netherlands government decided that the export of F-35 parts to Israel remained prohibited. In June 2026, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reassessed and confirmed this decision, see PAX (n.d.). 'Rechtszaak Tegen Nederlandse Staat: Stop Levering Voor F-35's' [Lawsuit Against Dutch State: Halt Delivery of F-35s]. tinyurl.com/452wtcc.

70 The Hague Group (2026). 'Co-Chairs' Statement: The Hague Group Meeting on Accountability and the Enforcement of International Law in Palestine—The Hague, 4 March 2026'. Emergency Meeting, March 2026 The Hague. tinyurl.com/4yej9e5j.

71 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

THE 2026 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 focuses on the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) and the ATT. The chapter highlights synergies between both instruments and explores how the use and humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas can and should inform and shape arms export risk assessments. It analyses how commitments to the EWIPA Political Declaration can strengthen ATT implementation in practice, identifying practical entry points for enhancing coherent implementation of the two frameworks.

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth look at the 2024 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties' reporting practices that contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty, as well as to a higher standard of transparency. Despite an increase in the number of annual reports submitted compared with the same time last year, both the overall reporting rate for 2024 and the proportion of States Parties submitting meaningfully transparent reports hit their lowest levels.

Chapter 3 conducts a summary assessment of 2025 annual reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline of 31 May. The chapter includes an overview of the United Kingdom's experience in updating its initial report, providing valuable lessons for States Parties that plan to update their initial reports.

The Annex includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2024 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, on-time reporting and withholding information for commercial sensitivity or national security-related reasons), as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number of transfers and status of export/import partners.



**A CC-130J HERCULES STATIONED
ON THE AIRFIELD IN SUPPORT OF
AIR TASK FORCE PRESTWICK PRIOR
TO FLIGHT ON 31 JANUARY, 2023,
IN SCOTLAND, UNITED KINGDOM.**

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BOURDON, CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

**SOLDIER IN TACTICAL GEAR DURING
MILITARY EXERCISES IN ARGENTINA.**

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