CHAPTER 2 – ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 2024 ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS[1]

Achieving transparency in the international trade in conventional arms is a stated purpose of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and is fundamental to realizing its object and purpose.[2] Transparency among States Parties engaged in the arms trade is essential to fulfilling these goals and to the effective implementation of the Treaty. It also serves as an indicator of States Parties' commitment to monitoring, oversight and accountability under the ATT.

As per Article 13.3, ATT States Parties are obligated to submit an annual report detailing their authorized or actual arms exports or imports by 31 May each year.[3] These reports are critical for enabling States Parties and other stakeholders to assess whether Treaty commitments are being fulfilled. Timely and transparent reporting of arms exports and imports is not only an obligation under the ATT, but is also foundational to building trust among States Parties and ensuring cooperation and accountability among arms-trading States. When governments report accurately and openly, they contribute to global security and demonstrate their commitment to the responsible trade in conventional arms.

Conversely, delays, omissions or vague reports weaken the ATT's credibility and make it difficult to assess whether obligations are being met. Submitting detailed, disaggregated and public reports ensures meaningful oversight and helps identify risks or patterns in arms transfers. For these reasons, compliance with Article 13.3 is a practical necessity for the ATT to work effectively.

The analysis of 2024 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and lists States Parties that have met meaningful and higher standards of transparency in their reports. The methodology by which each category is assessed is explained below.

The 2024 reporting year saw an increase in States Parties that submitted annual reports by the 1 February cut-off date, marking a positive development in annual reporting rates. Despite this improvement, analysis of 2024 annual reports reveals persistent challenges in achieving accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. Several States Parties submitted overdue reports for previous years. When overdue reports are taken into account, both the overall submission rate and the proportion of annual reports considered meaningfully transparent for 2024 were the lowest recorded since the Treaty entered into force. This underscores the continued insufficiency of progress on both indicators.

KEY FINDINGS

- For the 2024 reporting year, only 77 States Parties (68 per cent) required to submit an annual report did so. This is the lowest reporting rate since the process began in 2015, but the number and percentage are higher compared to last year's percentage as of 1 February. Among these, 50 States Parties (44 per cent) submitted their reports on time, a proportion in line with 2023.
- Twenty-four States Parties (31 per cent of submitted reports) submitted a confidential annual report for 2024. The number and share of confidential reports rose from three (6 per cent) in 2015 to a peak of 26 (34 per cent) in 2020, before beginning to decline. While 2024 marks an increase from 2023, which saw the submission of 21 (27 per cent) confidential reports, it remains below the peak levels observed between 2020 and 2022.
- Only 26 States Parties (23 per cent) required to submit an annual report submitted one that was meaningfully transparent. This proportion is the lowest recorded since the Treaty's entry into force. In particular, the percentage of annual reports that disaggregated data by trading partners has dropped to 59 per cent, the lowest rate on record.
- Thirty-eight States Parties (34 per cent) provided descriptions for some or all transfers reported, while 30 of the reports (27 per cent) contained comments covering some or all transfers.
- Sixteen States Parties (14 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2024 complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.

1 For a country-by-country assessment of the 2024 annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat, see the Country Profiles in the Annex.

2 One of the purposes of the ATT is 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'. Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

3 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu. Article 13.1 of the Treaty asks each State Party to provide within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty 'an initial report to the Secretariat of measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures'.

METHODOLOGY

Annual reports were downloaded from the ATT Secretariat website for analysis on 1 February 2026. Reports later submitted by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. Each year the ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the deadline for annual reports to be included in this chapter to ensure adequate time for an in-depth analysis as well as the possibility to compare findings and trends across years.

This chapter examines annual reporting trends that indicate whether States Parties' reporting practices are becoming more or less transparent. It examines ATT annual reporting on three levels to evaluate whether (and to what degree) the reporting obligations and transparency objectives of the ATT have been fulfilled. ATT Monitor analysis considers whether annual reports:

1. Are compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations.
2. Are meaningfully transparent, contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty.
3. Contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

For each level, the ATT Monitor established specific criteria upon which annual reports are evaluated. These criteria are provided below.

Distinct evaluation exercises were undertaken for each level of reporting to distinguish between (1) Treaty obligations (Article 13.3 reporting requirements), (2) the minimum amount of information the ATT Monitor has determined is needed for reports to be meaningfully transparent and to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty, and (3) additional information that, when provided, contributes to a higher standard of transparency (for example, comments on the nature of reported transfers). The analysis of each category separately allows the examination of different levels of commitment to transparency.

Using all of these criteria in one exercise to evaluate annual reports would not have produced an easily understood analysis regarding transparency. For example, even though an annual report submitted after the reporting deadline does not meet Article 13.3 obligations, it may still include information that is meaningfully transparent and contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

The submission of 'nil' reports for exports and/or imports may also fulfil Article 13.3 reporting obligations and the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Even without transfer data, the affirmative act of reporting 'nil'—indicating there were no exports or imports in a given year—still provides transparency on States Parties' transfer activities. By providing such a window, those who submit 'nil' reports may still have an equivalent commitment to transparency.

The analysis considers annual reports for all years, including those submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, the numbers presented in this report concerning annual reports covering the years 2015 to 2023 differ slightly from those presented in previous ATT Monitor Reports.

This analysis only evaluates information provided by States Parties in annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat. It does not seek to determine whether all transfers are reported or to independently verify the accuracy of that information. As such, this analysis is not a general measure of transparency for all arms transfers.

STATES PARTIES' COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Article 13.3 of the Treaty requires States Parties to submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports during the previous calendar year by 31 May of each year. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if:

1. It is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
2. It is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).[4]
3. Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or relevant 'nil' reports indicating that no arms were transferred.

ARTICLE 13.3

Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1). Reports shall be made available and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

4 ATT annual reports are due by 31 May each year. However, States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat, translating into a de facto deadline of 7 June.

In total, 113 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on exports and imports for 2024 by 31 May 2025. Only 77 (68 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2026 cut-off date for analysis.[5]

SUBMITTING REPORTS TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT

The number of annual reports submitted for 2024 represents a slight decrease compared to prior years. The number of annual reports submitted for 2024 totalled 77, compared to 78 submitted for 2023 and 79 for both 2022 and 2021, when considering late reports submitted for these years. As the number of States Parties has increased, the reporting rate has declined—from 87 per cent in 2015 to 68 per cent for 2024 (see Figure 2.1). This marks the lowest percentage of due annual reports submitted since the ATT came into force. Both the number and percentage of submitted reports are higher compared to 2023 annual reports at last year's ATT Monitor cut-off date of 1 February 2025, which was respectively 69 and 62 per cent.

The number of annual reports due for 2024 (113) is higher than that for 2023 (112). Andorra was due to report for the first time on 31 May 2025, but did not do so. The Bahamas and Guyana submitted a report for the first time, after not having done so in previous years. Thirteen States Parties did not submit a 2024 annual report by 1 February 2026, even though they had submitted an annual report in one or more previous years.[6] An additional 23 States Parties have never submitted an annual report.[7]

FIGURE 2.1 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



5 The following States Parties have submitted an annual report for 2024 by 1 February 2026: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay. Samoa submitted an annual report for 2024 after the 1 February cut-off date and as of 7 June 2026; therefore, its report is not included in the count of submitted reports. The analysis presented in this chapter also considers reports from previous years that have been submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, numbers presented here for reports covering the years 2015 to 2023 may differ from those presented in previous ATT Monitor reports.

6 Austria, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Zambia. Of these, four States Parties (Austria, Kazakhstan, Republic of Moldova and Suriname) did not submit a 2024 annual report by 1 February 2026, after having submitted one for 2023.

7 Afghanistan, Andorra, Belize, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Principe and Togo.

Four States Parties have a mixed record of reporting and submitted a 2024 annual report.[8] Seventy-one States Parties have submitted an annual report for every year that one was due.[9]

Between 1 February 2025 and 1 February 2026, the following States Parties submitted previously overdue annual reports: Antigua and Barbuda (2022 and 2023), Austria (2023), Botswana (2020), Brazil (2019), Cameroon (2021, 2022 and 2023), Greece (2023), Guatemala (2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022 and 2023), Iceland (2022 and 2023), Malta (2023), Panama (2021 and 2022), Paraguay (2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023), Philippines (2023). The ATT Monitor commends these States Parties for fulfilling their reporting obligations, particularly those that were able to clear their entire backlog.[10] Late reporting remains valuable and contributes to the goals of transparency and accountability under the Treaty.

SUBMITTING ANNUAL REPORTS ON TIME

Fifty States Parties (44 per cent of due reports) complied with the Treaty obligation to submit an annual report by the 31 May deadline.[11] The remaining 27 States Parties (24 per cent of due reports) submitted their report between the reporting deadline and the ATT Monitor's cut-off date for analysis.[12] It is worth noting that the ATT Monitor bases its calculation of on-time reporting on the information posted by the ATT Secretariat on its website by the de facto deadline of 7 June, operating under the assumption that reports were posted promptly on the ATT Secretariat's website. The percentage of annual reports submitted on time for 2024 is the same as in 2023. The rate of on-time reporting has plateaued at 44 per cent after dipping to 35 per cent in 2022.[13]

REPORTING BOTH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS COVERED BY ARTICLE 2.1

All States Parties that submitted a public annual report complied with the Article 13 obligation to report on arms exports and imports. Costa Rica submitted a 'nil' report for exports but did not tick the relevant box on the first page of the reporting template to make such an indication. Panama submitted a 'nil report' for exports, but also retained the export section of the reporting template and inserted the word 'zero' in the relevant fields. Ten States Parties submitted 'nil' reports only for exports and recorded this information accordingly in the front-page box related to the contents of the report.[14]

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2024, which is equivalent to the number and share of States Parties having done so for 2023 (Figure 2.2).[15] These States Parties submitted public annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline, which included data on arms exports and imports or 'nil' reports.

8 Burkina Faso, Iceland, Paraguay and Seychelles.

9 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

10 Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Greece, Guatemala, Malta, Panama and the Philippines.

11 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

12 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Nigeria, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

13 Control Arms Secretariat (2025). ATT Monitor Report 2025. Geneva. 25 August 2025. tinyurl.com/yyhtbn2p, p. 55.

14 Benin, Botswana, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Lesotho, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Information on States Parties that submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports is provided later in the chapter.

15 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

FIGURE 2.2 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS FULLY COMPLIANT WITH ARTICLE 13.3



MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent and to contribute to the object and purpose of the ATT, an annual report should, at a minimum:[16]

1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.
2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.
4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).[17]
5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

States Parties can submit 'nil' reports indicating they did not export or import any arms, while still contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Therefore, the ATT Monitor also considers that an annual report can be meaningfully transparent if the State Party has clearly submitted a 'nil' report for exports or imports (or both).

IDENTIFYING MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

Based on the ATT Monitor's methodology, only 26 annual reports for 2024 (23 per cent of all reports due) met the above criteria and were therefore considered meaningfully transparent.[18] Figure 2.3 shows the number and percentage of meaningfully transparent annual reports by year. The highest percentage of annual reports deemed meaningfully transparent was in 2015 (46 per cent), the first year that States Parties were obligated to submit annual reports detailing arms transfers.

16 These criteria were earlier presented in: Control Arms Secretariat (2021). 'ATT Monitor 2021'. New York. 30 August 2021. tinyurl.com/4765rd3u.

17 An authorized export or import has been approved by national authorities, while an actual export or import concerns the physical movement of weapons across a national border or a change in ownership. Authorizations are generally granted before the actual export takes place, sometimes years in advance. For more information, see Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep. 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, pp. 11-13.

18 Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

FIGURE 2.3 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS THAT WERE MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT



Meaningful transparency in reporting has generally declined as the number of States Parties required to submit annual reports has increased, due to the accession of new States Parties to the Treaty. In the last five years, the number of meaningfully transparent reports has remained consistently around 30. Importantly, as of the annual ATT Monitor 1 February cut-off date over the last five years, only 10 States Parties have consistently submitted meaningfully transparent reports,[19] while a further 35 have done so for at least one (but not all) of these years.[20] This illustrates that a large number of States Parties that have reported publicly in the last five years have the capacity to submit meaningfully transparent reports, and have done so—although not consistently—in the past.

However, 2024 saw the lowest percentage of annual reports deemed meaningfully transparent by the ATT Monitor since annual reporting began. This percentage highlights persistent gaps in accurate and comprehensive reporting by States Parties.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

For the 2024 reporting period, a driver in the decrease of meaningfully transparent annual reports was an increase in confidential reporting.

Whereas ATT States Parties are obligated to submit annual reports to the ATT Secretariat, they may choose to submit annual reports confidentially, meaning that reports are only available to the Secretariat and other States Parties. Article 13 of the Treaty does not specify that reports should be made public, but that they 'shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat',[21] without clarifying to whom they shall be made available.[22] Public reporting is critical to enhancing transparency and provides a public record of annual arms transfers available to civil society, media, academia and the broader international community.[23]

19 Canada, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru and Sierra Leone.

20 Albania, Argentina, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

21 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

22 For further discussion, see Marsh, N. and Karim, A. (2015). 'Article 13: Reporting'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds). 'Weapons and International Law: The Arms Trade Treaty.' Brussels: Larcier, pp. 213-231; and Casey-Maslin, S. et al. (2016). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 386-387.

23 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024). 'Impact of Arms Transfers on Human Rights: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'. A/HRC/56/42. tinyurl.com/y5aw37y8.

FIGURE 2.4 - NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CONFIDENTIAL ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



As reflected in Figure 2.4, 24 States Parties submitted a confidential report for 2024, representing 31 per cent, or nearly one-third, of all annual reports submitted.[24] While this is higher than the 21 (27 per cent) confidential reports submitted last year, it remains lower than the three preceding years, which saw 25 (32 per cent), 26 (33 per cent) and 26 (34 per cent) confidential reports submitted in 2022, 2021 and 2020, respectively.

Two States Parties (Burkina Faso and Slovakia) submitted confidential reports in 2024 after submitting public reports for 2023. The Seychelles submitted a confidential report after failing to submit a report the prior year. The Bahamas submitted a confidential report for 2024 after not submitting either public or private annual reports in any years since it joined the Treaty in 2014.

Finland submitted a public annual report covering its arms transfers in 2024. This follows Finland reporting its arms exports publicly and its imports confidentially for 2023, marking the first time a hybrid report was submitted to the ATT Secretariat. The ATT Monitor commends Finland for submitting a public report covering all transfers in 2024.

Among the States Parties that submitted an annual report for 2024, ten States Parties have consistently submitted confidential annual reports for all years when these were due.[25]

Four States Parties submitted 'nil' annual reports, clearly indicating that they had neither exported nor imported any arms in 2024.[26] The remaining 49 annual reports, which contain data on arms transfers for 2024, are assessed in the remainder of this section.[27]

DISAGGREGATING BY WEAPON TYPES AND BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER

Aggregating arms transfers by trading partner or weapon types prevents case-by-case analysis of exports and imports, thereby weakening the utility of the data presented and ultimately undermining transparency. As such, for annual reports to be considered meaningfully transparent, States Parties must clearly provide information disaggregated by the type of arms transferred and by importing and exporting States.

24 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia and State of Palestine.

25 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte D'Ivoire, Guatemala, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Philippines and State of Palestine.

26 Madagascar, Monaco, Palau and Sierra Leone.

27 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

Disaggregating transfers by category of arms

For 2024, 46 States Parties (94 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) submitted annual reports that provided information that was adequately disaggregated by categories of arms.[28] Three States Parties (Australia, Belgium and Norway) aggregated some of their reported arms transfers and not others. Belgium reported some exports and imports under national categories, aggregating transfers of arms corresponding to category ML1 of the European Common Military List, which includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (0.50 inches) or less.

Disaggregating transfers by importer/exporter

Twenty-nine States Parties (59 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) provided fully disaggregated information by importer/exporter.[29] An additional 14 States Parties included adequate disaggregation by importer/exporter for some but not all categories of arms.[30] For example, Germany aggregated the temporary import of portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems from 'EU Member States', and Hungary reported the import of six manned attack helicopters from 'Germany/France'.

The annual reports of six States Parties did not provide any meaningful disaggregation by trading partner (Botswana, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Iceland, Ireland and Panama). In its annual report, Botswana reported the import of 815 rifles and carbines and 467 shotguns, but listed the exporters simply as 'Various States'. Both Iceland and Panama did not identify any trading partners. Costa Rica and El Salvador provided the total number of items imported in different categories of arms and an aggregated list of small arms exporters, with Costa Rica appearing to have made an error by listing these in the 'State of origin' column. Ireland reported both arms exports and imports but, for each category of exported or imported arms, it provided only total numbers and an aggregated list of importing/exporting States.

SPECIFYING WHETHER TRANSFERS CONCERN AUTHORIZATIONS OR ACTUAL TRANSFERS (OR BOTH)

Annual reports should also indicate whether transfers are actual or authorized, meaning whether reported transfers refer to the actual physical movement of goods or an authorization that an export or import may take place. States Parties typically base their annual reports on one or other types of data—for example, on authorizations (licenses or permits) issued by relevant officials, or on data on the physical movement of goods occurring in the reporting year that are collected by custom authorities. It is important for an annual report to indicate the type of data because there are important differences between the two. An authorized export may never take place if the order is cancelled or reduced, or the authorization is later revoked. Similarly, when authorized arms are actually transferred, they may cross national borders during a different reporting period than when the authorization was granted, even perhaps several years later. In addition, knowing whether arms transfers are authorized or actual is vital to understanding apparent discrepancies between reports produced by different States Parties.[31] States Parties can decide to use different approaches in reporting authorized or actual transfers. However, the ATT Secretariat advises for the sake of consistency and continuity, States Parties should maintain their chosen reporting approach over time.[32]

In 2024, thirty-seven annual reports (76 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) adequately indicated whether the data reported concerns authorized or actual transfers.[33] Nine annual reports provided an indication for some or most of the reported transfers,[34] with three annual reports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Finland) not providing information for any reported transfers.

28 Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

29 Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

30 Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

31 Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. New York. 11 September 2017. tinyurl.com/b9xrcr8p, pp.45-51.

32 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, p. 13.

33 Australia, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

34 Argentina, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia and Spain.

Four States Parties (Dominican Republic, Mexico, Montenegro and Peru) included some transfers that were categorized as both 'actual' and 'authorized' transfers. For example, apart from certain small arms imports (which were not specified), Mexico reported all its transfers were both authorized and actual. Three other States Parties also included some transfers that were categorized as both authorizations and actual transfers (Dominican Republic, Montenegro and Peru). The ATT reporting template allows for this approach, which may accurately reflect the situation if reports are based on two different data sources, one for authorizations and another for actual movements of arms, without discrepancies between the two. However, categorizing transfers as both limits the ability to obtain information about arms exports and imports from an annual report. To prevent potential misunderstandings, States Parties could clarify the data source through additional comments or, as suggested by the ATT Secretariat, submit two separate tables—one for authorizations and another for actual transfers.[35] In this regard, for cases when it ticked both boxes, Denmark explicitly specified the number of authorized and the number of actual transfers in the 'number of items' column of the ATT reporting template.

INDICATING THE NUMBER OF ARMS OR THEIR FINANCIAL VALUE

The ATT reporting template includes columns for States Parties to record the number of arms transferred or their financial value. This information is crucial to understand the magnitude of an arms transfer. All 49 of the annual reports containing data on transfers included the number of units or their financial value, although seven reports excluded data for specific transfers.[36] Of these, three States Parties (Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden) explicitly stated that information had been withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security. For instance, the Netherlands clearly classified the quantities of F-16 manned combat aircraft, air defense systems, and .50 calibre heavy machine gun exports to Ukraine, indicating in two cases in the comments column that the information was being withheld due to national security regulations. Similarly, Sweden classified the quantities of exports of RBS 70 MANPADS to Latvia, as well as 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless multi-role weapon systems and AT4 anti-armour weapons to an aggregate number of recipients. This practice conforms to Article 13.3 of the Treaty, stating that annual reports 'may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information'.[37]

REPORTING BOTH NUMBERS AND VALUES OF ITEMS

As per a guidance document issued by the ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting, States Parties must—at a minimum—report 'the number of items or the financial value of the exported and imported conventional arms' in their annual national reports.[38] The standardized ATT reporting template, which was most recently revised in 2021, includes two columns—one each for reporting the number of items transferred and for the financial value thereof.

Most States Parties that submit public annual reports choose to complete one of the columns, but not both. This is likely a result of whether their national control systems capture the number of units per transfer or the value of each transfer. In 2024, of the States Parties that submitted non-nil public reports, ten (20 per cent) provided both numbers and values for at least some of their reported transfers.[39] However, only four of these States Parties (8 per cent) did so consistently for each transfer: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Peru and Uruguay.

Providing both the numbers of items transferred and their declared value is not required but constitutes good practice and contributes to a higher standard of transparency. This approach can also offer insight into the monetary value of certain major conventional arms, small arms and light weapons, and in other cases, ammunition and parts and components. This can inform a broader understanding of arms flows among arms trade monitors and civil society.

35 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, p. 13.

36 Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

37 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

38 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, p. 17.

39 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Japan, Malta, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia and Uruguay. Belgium reported numbers of units for transfers of the eight categories of arms of the ATT, and value for transfers of items covered in national categories.

CHANGES IN COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY

Table 1 shows the share of public annual reports since 2015 that meet the ATT Monitor's criteria for meaningful transparency. The data highlights mixed trends in transparency of arms trade reporting.

- The number of reports disaggregated by category of arms has fluctuated over the years. In 2024, the percentage reached 94 per cent, which is the highest level since reporting began.
- The proportion of States Parties that disaggregated data by trading partners has sharply dropped since the peak of 83 per cent in 2020. In 2024, both the total number and overall share of States Parties doing so, just 29 (59 per cent), hit the lowest figure on record.
- There has been a decrease in the number of reports specifying whether data represents authorizations or actual transfers, declining from 96 per cent in 2015 to 76 per cent in 2024. The rate rebounded from 70 per cent in 2023, which was the lowest figure on record.
- The share of reports that include the number of units or financial value of transfers remained consistently high across the years. However, in 2024, the figure modestly dipped to an all-time low of 92 per cent, compared to 94 per cent in 2023.
- Overall, while improvements are evident in areas such as disaggregation by category of arms, the limited information on authorized versus actual transfers and, particularly, the decline in disaggregation by trading partners reflect significant challenges in maintaining transparency standards.

Table 1: Percentage of public annual reports (excluding 'nil' and early submissions) that meet the criteria for meaningful transparency

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Provided information disaggregated by weapon type	90%	86%	87%	85%	88%	93%	83%	82%	90%	94%
Provided information disaggregated by trading partner	65%	65%	64%	71%	76%	83%	79%	69%	70%	59%
Indicated whether transfer data reflects authorized or actual transfers (or both)	96%	94%	91%	92%	84%	87%	74%	86%	70%	76%
Provided the number of units or financial value (or both) for each transfer	96%	96%	98%	94%	98%	98%	98%	100%	94%	92%

“

OVERALL, WHILE IMPROVEMENTS ARE EVIDENT IN AREAS SUCH AS DISAGGREGATION BY CATEGORY OF ARMS, THE LIMITED INFORMATION ON AUTHORIZED VERSUS ACTUAL TRANSFERS AND, PARTICULARLY, THE DECLINE IN DISAGGREGATION BY TRADING PARTNERS REFLECT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE ATT MONITOR MEANINGFUL TRANSPARENCY CRITERIA

Twenty States Parties (18 per cent of all reports due) required to submit an annual report for 2024 submitted a meaningfully transparent report on time.[40] This rate is slightly lower than in the previous year, when 19 per cent of States Parties required to submit a report met these criteria.

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

The previous sections outlined the minimum reporting requirements for compliance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty and the criteria for meaningfully transparent annual reports as defined by the ATT Monitor. However, the Treaty encourages States Parties to provide additional information, thereby contributing to a higher standard of transparency. For example, Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including those on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms.[41] The FAQ-type guidance document on annual reporting obligations, endorsed by the ATT Conference of States Parties, outlines possible ways for States Parties to include information on a wider range of items in their annual reports than those set out in the eight categories in Article 2.1.[42]

Similarly, the reporting template provides the possibility for States Parties to include comments on each transfer and descriptions of the arms being exported or imported. In doing so, a report can provide additional context which can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, when reporting the import of 42 rifles and carbines from Germany, Serbia commented that these were defective goods which were being returned.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if States Parties do at least one of the following:

1. Include descriptions of reported transfers that provide details on the make, model and/or calibre of transferred conventional arms.
2. Include comments on reported transfers that provide details on the nature of the transfer, including information on end-use/end-user.
3. Include '0', 'nil', '/' or any other indication that no transfers in relevant categories and sub-categories of arms were made.
4. Clearly indicate whether commercially sensitive or national security information was withheld, and if so, what information was withheld.
5. Report information via voluntary national categories that includes arms categories covered by Article 2.1, but not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (shotguns, etc.).
6. Report information via voluntary national categories that includes categories not covered by Article 2.1 (ammunition, parts and components, gas-powered firearms, etc.).
7. Include any other type of additional information, including national reports, detailed tables or annexes with information on categories of arms not covered by Article 2.1 (other types of aircraft, vessels and vehicles that fall outside the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) categories, or imaging, communications and radar items).
8. Include national definitions of reported categories of conventional arms.

TWENTY STATES PARTIES (18 PER CENT OF ALL REPORTS DUE) REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2024 SUBMITTED A MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT REPORT ON TIME. THIS RATE IS SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR, WHEN 19 PER CENT OF STATES PARTIES REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A REPORT MET THESE CRITERIA.

40 Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uruguay.

41 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

42 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, pp. 14-15.

DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTS

The ATT reporting template includes a column in which States Parties can provide a more detailed description of the item(s) transferred. Fifteen States Parties included descriptions for all the transfers they reported,[43] while an additional 23 States Parties included descriptions for at least some transfers.[44] This combined total (38 annual reports) is slightly lower than last year's figure (39 annual reports). Descriptions provide important contextual information that can help clarify the nature of a transfer. Panama, for example, used the column for 'descriptions' to indicate the calibres of its small arms imports.

The ATT reporting template also includes a column for States Parties to provide comments on the transfer. Ten States Parties provided comments on every transfer.[45] An additional 20 States Parties included comments on some transfers.[46] The combined figure of 30 annual reports that included comments on transfers is slightly higher than the number of annual reports from the previous year (28 reports). Comments can provide important information that further contextualizes a transfer. Hungary, for example, added comments to specify the end-users and end-use of its transferred arms. It also declared when arms were being transferred for the purposes of testing, demonstration or re-sale.

FILLING IN BLANK SPACES

While Article 13.3 of the Treaty allows States Parties to 'exclude commercially sensitive or national security information' (see next sub-section), leaving sections blank creates ambiguity. If a State Party leaves parts of its report blank, it is not possible to discern whether there were no transfers or if information has been withheld. Seventeen States Parties used symbols such as '0', '/' or '-' to indicate that no transfers of specific categories and/or sub-categories of arms had taken place during 2024.[47] In addition, Canada, Greece, Netherlands and the United Kingdom used the UNROCA template for their reports, which does not include rows for categories of arms for which no transfers are reported. This figure is lower than in 2023, when 23 States Parties (including those that used the UNROCA reporting template) made such indications.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

The ATT reporting template provides a checkbox for States Parties to indicate whether information has been withheld for commercially sensitive and/or national security-related reasons in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty. Forty-eight States Parties either checked 'yes', 'no' or used other means to indicate whether information was withheld in their 2024 annual reports.[48] This number is lower than in the previous year, when 52 States Parties provided this information. In contrast, five States Parties did not provide any such indication in their 2024 annual report, making it unclear whether information was withheld.[49] This is in line with the previous year, when five States Parties did not provide this clarification.

Seventeen States Parties indicated that information had been withheld for commercial or security reasons.[50] Among these, three explicitly specified the type of information being withheld by marking it as 'classified' or adding explanatory notes to the comments, either in relation to the specific number of units transferred or to the value thereof.[51] For example, Belgium withheld the number of AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles exported to Ukraine and declared that the 'number [was] withheld for security reasons' in the column for comments.

43 Benin, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa and Uruguay.

44 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

45 Botswana, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Panama, Peru and Romania.

46 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

47 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Estonia, France, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Jamaica, Japan, Malta, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Sweden.

48 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. The Netherlands used the UNROCA reporting template, which does not provide a dedicated box to indicate whether information has been withheld, but clarified where information was withheld for security reasons using the column for comments.

49 South Africa. In addition, Canada, France, Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland used either a national template or the UNROCA template which does not provide a box to indicate whether information has been withheld. Since these States Parties did not specify whether information was being withheld through other means, the ATT Monitor includes them in this figure.

50 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania and Sweden.

51 Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden.

VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Some annual reports contain information on a wider range of conventional arms than those explicitly defined in the ATT reporting template. This information is provided under the sub-categories for 'other' small arms and 'other' light weapons, in a section for voluntary national categories, or in additional supplementary tables of data.

- Twenty-nine States Parties included information on arms that fall within the scope of Article 2 of the Treaty but are not explicitly specified in the reporting template.[52] This is in line with 2023, when 29 annual reports contained such information. Estonia, for example, reported the export of 67 smooth-bore guns to Finland, Italy, and Latvia under 'other small arms'. New Zealand reported exports and imports of shotguns using voluntary national categories.
- Nine States Parties reported on a wider range of military equipment.[53] Such equipment is not directly covered in Article 2.1 of the ATT, which delineates the scope of the Treaty. However, Article 5(3) states that each State Party 'is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms'.[54] The Dominican Republic, for example, reported the import of armoured windows from Colombia, tear gas from the United States, and ammunition from Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United States. South Africa authorized the import of 2,061 barrels. While these items are related to small arms, they are parts and components and not complete arms, and thus not covered under Article 2.1 of the ATT. The number of States Parties reporting such information is slightly higher than the previous year, when eight States Parties reported this information.
- Five States Parties included supplementary tables, which contained additional data.[55] Three of these States (Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom) included data on military holdings, which constitutes a dedicated section in the UNROCA reporting template.[56] Japan provided additional information on transfers of SALW using Harmonized System (HS) codes. Australia included a table on SALW export permits approved during 2024. This figure is slightly lower than the previous year, when six States Parties provided supplementary information through annexes.
- Thirteen States Parties included definitions of national categories of arms and/or definitions of the terms 'exports' and 'imports' in their annual reports.[57] For example, New Zealand outlined some of its national regulations pertaining to small arms and light weapons and provided a disclaimer that reporting on shotguns 'serves to advance the object and purpose of the Arms Trade Treaty.' Germany further elaborated on the nature of its export licenses.

TWENTY-NINE STATES PARTIES INCLUDED INFORMATION ON ARMS THAT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY BUT ARE NOT EXPLICITLY SPECIFIED IN THE REPORTING TEMPLATE. THIS IS IN LINE WITH 2023, WHEN 29 ANNUAL REPORTS CONTAINED SUCH INFORMATION. ESTONIA, FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTED THE EXPORT OF 67 SMOOTH-BORE GUNS TO FINLAND, ITALY, AND LATVIA UNDER 'OTHER SMALL ARMS'. NEW ZEALAND REPORTED EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SHOTGUNS USING VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES.

52 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

53 Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa.

54 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

55 Australia, Canada, Japan, Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

56 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland also provided information on national procurement, which constitutes a section of the UNROCA reporting template.

57 Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama and the Republic of Korea.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TRENDS

The following findings summarize major trends in arms transfers reported by ATT States Parties that submitted a public annual report for 2024 containing data on exports and/or imports.

Exports of major conventional arms: 476,825 major conventional arms exports were reported in 2024.[58] Of these, 89,172 were actual transfers and 113,012 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The category which saw the most exports was large-calibre artillery systems (68.5 per cent), followed by missiles and missile launchers (24.3 per cent) and combat aircraft (6.4 per cent).

Exports of SALW: in 2024, a total of 1,809,668 SALW exports were reported. Of these, 1,471,254 were actual transfers and 251,199 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The sub-category which saw the highest number of exports was hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (45.0 per cent), followed by rifles and carbines (15.1 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (11.4 per cent).

Imports of major conventional arms: 27,103 major conventional arms imports were reported in 2024.[59] Of these, 25,966 were actual transfers and 1,103 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The category with the most imports was missiles and missile launchers (95.4 percent), followed by large-calibre artillery systems (1.9 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (1.7 per cent).

Imports of SALW: in 2024, 629,991 SALW imports were reported. Of these, 318,766 were actual transfers and 209,405 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The sub-category with the most imports was revolvers and self-loading pistols (40.2 per cent), followed by rifles and carbines (33.4 per cent) and other small arms (7.3 per cent).

For information disaggregated by State Party, please refer to the Annex: Country Profiles. Since 2024, the ATT Monitor is providing a graphical and interactive representation of the reported arms trade via its ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard. Please consult the Dashboard at: attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard*. Data on transfers reported in 2024 annual reports will be included in the Dashboard by 31 December 2026.*

CF-18 HORNETS TAKE OFF FROM MIHAIL KOGALNICEANU (MK) AIR BASE IN ROMANIA, TO RETURN TO CANADA DURING OPERATION REASSURANCE.

CREDIT: © CORPORAL ERIC CHAPUT, CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

58 Approximately half of this figure (240,750 or 50.5 per cent) is made up of large-calibre artillery systems exported from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United States. However, based on the large quantity of units reported and the accompanying descriptions, the ATT Monitor believes these transfers may include projectiles in addition to the artillery systems themselves.

59 One of the main reasons for the difference between reported exports and imports is the fact that some major importers are not States Parties to the ATT.

MOST TRANSPARENT REPORTS

Like previous years, no State Party submitting a 2024 annual report used all transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Sixteen States Parties complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.[60]

Of these, one State Party, Peru, provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency. Peru provided all required information in its annual report, included comments and descriptions for all its transfers and clearly stated that it had not withheld any data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security.

GOOD TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES IN STATES PARTIES' 2024 ANNUAL REPORT SUBMISSIONS



60 Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa and Uruguay. The list excludes States Parties that have submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports, as well as States Parties that met only one of the criteria for contributing to a higher standard of transparency.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of 2024 annual reports underscores the continued challenges facing the ATT in achieving its core transparency objectives. While a majority of States Parties submitted annual reports covering 2024, the overall reporting rate is below 70 per cent, continuing a long-term downward trend as the ATT community grows with new States Parties joining the Treaty.

Levels of full compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations remain low, with approximately only one-third of States Parties meeting all requirements. While on-time reporting has remained stable, with 44 per cent of States Parties submitting reports on-time, the share of confidential reporting increased to nearly one-third of all submitted reports, reversing the decreasing trend recorded in recent years. The growing reliance on confidential reporting limits the ability of civil society, media, academia and international institutions to assess arms transfers and determine compliance with Article 13, all while undermining the broader transparency purpose of the Treaty.

At the same time, the quality of transfer data reported also faces significant challenges. Only 26 States Parties submitted reports that meet the ATT Monitor's criteria for meaningful transparency, representing the lowest proportion recorded since the Treaty's entry into force and since data collection began, with a sharp decrease in reports that disaggregate data by trading partners. This shows how comprehensive, detailed and openly accessible reporting remains difficult to achieve by ATT States Parties.

Taken together, these trends mark persistent challenges toward achieving meaningful transparency that is necessary to realizing the Treaty's objectives. Without accurate, comprehensive and publicly accessible reporting, it becomes increasingly difficult to assess compliance with the Treaty and ensure accountability in the global arms trade.

In contrast, the first annual report submissions by the Bahamas and Guyana, the fact that some States Parties submitted their past due reports and cleared their backlog, an increased number of reports submitted by the 1 February cut-off date compared to 2023 reports and examples of stronger reporting practice by some States Parties demonstrate that progress remains possible. Strengthening both the quantity and quality of reporting should therefore remain a priority for States Parties, the Secretariat and the wider ATT community. Ensuring that annual reports are timely, detailed, disaggregated and public is essential to reinforcing confidence amongst States Parties and maintaining credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty.

CAPTAIN STEVEN MORRIS STANDS AT THE DOOR OF A CH-148 CYCLONE HELICOPTER FLYING OVER JUNO BEACH IN FRANCE DURING A TRAINING FLIGHT AS PART OF OPERATION REASSURANCE.

CREDIT: © CPL LAURA LANDRY, CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

CLOSE-UP OF INDIAN SOLDIERS IN UNIFORM HOLDING RIFLES, STANDING IN FORMATION.

CREDIT: © DEVANSH BOSE