

STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW, JUNE 2024–MAY 2025

This review covers the period between 1 June 2024 and 31 May 2025, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some key events and milestones over the past year and assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the above-mentioned period. Second, it examines compliance with a core principle of the ATT which is transparency and reporting. It then reviews the work of the ATT's intersessional process, including discussions held within the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR), and Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). The latter comprises two sub-working groups: one on the exchange of national implementation practices and another on current and emerging implementation issues.

The chapter concludes by focusing on the challenges the ATT is facing, vis-à-vis an increasing number of conflict regions in the world, a general climate of distrust and a decreased engagement with multilateral instruments.

UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2025, the ATT Secretariat listed 116 countries as States Parties, accounting for 59 per cent of all United Nations (UN) Member States.¹ It listed a further 26 countries as Signatories. Three States, The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia, became ATT States Parties between 2024 and 2025. This is the highest number of new States Parties after three years when membership of the ATT stagnated. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties per year between 2015 and 2025.

Table 1 – New ATT membership by 31 May of each year

Year	Acceptance	Accessions	Ratifications	States Parties
2024-2025	0	1	2	116
2023-2024	0	0	0	113
2022-2023	1	0	1	113
2021-2022	0	0	1	111
2020-2021	0	3	1	110
2019-2020	0	3	1	106
2018-2019	0	0	7	102
2017-2018	0	2	1	95
2016-2017	0	1	6	92
2015-2016	0	2	14	85

The geographical spread of the States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2025, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 40 per cent (six of 15 countries) and Africa at 57 per cent (31 of 54 countries).² Europe at 93 per cent (40 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 80 per cent (28 of 35 countries) have the highest proportions of States Parties.

The ATT enjoys particularly strong support in certain sub-regional blocs, such as:


- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with all 12 members being States Parties³
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 13 of 15 members (86.7 per cent) being States Parties

¹ Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN Members, they are not counted in this share.

² Analysis based on UN Statistics Division website, 'Geographic Regions': <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>. For more information on Treaty membership, see the ATT Secretariat website: <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html?templateId=209883#>.

³ On 29 January 2025, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger—withdrawed from the ECOWAS, bringing the number of ECOWAS Member States to 12.

MAP OF STATUS OF ATT PARTICIPATION (AS OF 31 MAY 2025)



● 116

STATES PARTIES: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, State of Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zambia.

● 26

SIGNATORIES: Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Eswatini, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

● 53

NOT YET JOINED: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.

UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
ACTIVITIES

This year saw the eighth-funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the Informal Preparatory meeting for the Eleventh Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP11) in May 2025, 29 States Parties had made voluntary contributions. An additional US\$159,597.65 was allocated to the VTF Outreach Programme, totalling US\$12.9m over the course of the fund's lifespan.⁴

The ATT Secretariat received 27 applications from 25 States Parties for 2024 VTF-funded projects and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for 18 projects⁵ with a total budget of US\$1.6m.⁶ This marks a small decrease from the 28 project applications received for the 2023 VTF funding.⁷ Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, which demonstrates the importance of partnerships in achieving universalization and implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF's first year of operation.

Table 2 – Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year⁸

Year	Applications	Projects Approved	Budget for Approved Projects
2024	27	18	US\$1.6m
2023	28	14	US\$1.2m
2022	15	6	US\$612,184
2021	21	13	US\$1.26m
2020	26	10	US\$963,728
2019	39	20	US\$2m
2018	23	10	US\$834,803
2017	21	17	US\$1.3m

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation also continued this year. Mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), the EU ATT Outreach Programme and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

“

OTHER ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ALSO CONTINUED THIS YEAR. MECHANISMS SUCH AS THE UN TRUST FACILITY SUPPORTING COOPERATION ON ARMS REGULATION (UNSCAR), THE EU ATT OUTREACH PROGRAMME AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE INITIATIVES CONTINUED TO COMMIT RESOURCES TO CHANNEL ASSISTANCE TO STATES PARTIES AND TO COUNTRIES IN THE PROCESS OF RATIFYING OR ACCEDING TO THE TREATY.

4 Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP11 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2025. Information on file with the ATT Monitor.

5 VTF approved 18 projects for funding, but Benin's application was withdrawn, see ATT Secretariat website (n.d.). 'Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF). 2024 Projects'. <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/voluntary.html?tab=tab2>.

6 ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2023 - August 2024'. 19 July 2024. ATT/VTF/2024/CHAIR/804/Conf Rep. <http://bit.ly/3FfAAMA>, pp. 3 and 27.

7 ATT Secretariat. (2023). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2022 - August 2023'. 21 July 2023. ATT/VTF/2023/CHAIR/770/Conf.Rep. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSPg_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202022-2023_EN_corrected/ATT_CSPg_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202022-2023_EN_corrected.pdf, p.3.

8 Table 2 shows projects and funding that were approved by the VTF Selection Committee.

Government representatives and CSOs from around the world met at national and regional training workshops to learn more about the ATT and how to implement it in their respective countries. They discussed technical challenges, legal requirements and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts for implementing ATT provisions.

Examples of activities include:

From 25 to 27 March 2025, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) held its first workshop under the EU ATT Outreach Project IV with Ecuador, the newest partner country of the initiative. The event took place in Guayaquil and brought together over 30 delegates from both Guayaquil and the capital, Quito.⁹

From 17 to 18 December 2024, Expertise France organized a hybrid Training of Trainers (ToT) capacity building workshop to promote effective implementation of the ATT in Liberia,

focusing on preventing diversion. A second part of the capacity building workshop was held in-person in Monrovia on 29 to 30 May 2025. It provided participants with practical knowledge to prevent diversion of conventional arms and promote the effective implementation of the ATT.¹⁰

The ATT Secretariat reported on the regional practical reporting workshops it had held for Southern African States in Namibia and for Caribbean States in the Bahamas. The October 2024 Regional Workshop in the Bahamas provided practical training to 17 participants from ten Caribbean countries, with low reporting rates to increase reporting obligations and strengthen the compliance capacity of ATT States Parties.¹¹ CSOs also conducted some activities to promote reporting in the ATT. For example, on 27 May 2025, the ATT Monitor and the Stimson Center organized an online clinic on 'Everything You Need to Know about ATT Reporting' to support State officials with the preparation and submission of initial and annual reports.



⁹ Newsletter, March – April 2025 | Phase IV – Vol. 1 EUP2 ATT Newsletter.

¹⁰ EUP2P ATT IV – OP – Expertise France, 13 June 2025, *Libéria | Mise en œuvre du TCA : renforcer les compétences nationales pour prévenir le détournement*. [Liberia | Implementation of the ATT: Strengthening national skills to prevent diversion]. [Photo with links] [Post] LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eup2p-att-iv-op-expertise-france_tca-att-armscontrol-activity-7339205476653424641-TvG1?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_ios&rcm=ACoAAAMgaSYBH_4ulb1JayFXD-SVGf7zEcFoDJ4 and Newsletter, May – June 2025 | Phase IV – Vol. 1 EUP2 ATT Newsletter.

¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas (2024). 'Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Regional Workshop on Practical Reporting for Caribbean States held in Nassau, The Bahamas', 7 October 2024 <http://bit.ly/4jTSOMO>.

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

ANNUAL REPORTS

States Parties are required to submit annual reports by 31 May each year detailing their arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year.¹² However, they are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2025, 113 of the 116 States Parties were required to submit their 2024 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 50 submitted an annual report by the deadline – a compliance rate of 44 per cent.¹³ This rate is equal to last year's on-time reporting rate.

Of the 50 annual reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat, 13 States Parties made their 2024 reports confidential, representing 26 per cent of on-time submissions.¹⁴ This marks an increase in private, on-time reporting compared to 22 percent of 2023 reports submitted on time.

Andorra, which was required to submit its annual report for the first time this year, has not done so by the 7 June deadline. The Philippines, which was required to submit its first annual report on 31 May 2024 and had not done so by last year's deadline, has submitted an on-time report for 2024 and a late report for 2023. A preliminary analysis of the contents of the 2024 annual reports can be found in Chapter 3.

INITIAL REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each State Party to submit an initial report to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty within the first year after its entry into force.¹⁵ As of 7 June 2025, 113 of 116 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 93 (82 per cent) had done so.¹⁶

Two States Parties have submitted overdue initial reports since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report: the Bahamas and Andorra, which were due to report in December 2015 and March 2024, respectively. No new ATT State Party had to submit its initial report between 7 June 2024 and 7 June 2025. The three newest States Parties—The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia—are required to submit their initial reports by 10 September 2025, 8 October 2025 and 12 January 2026, respectively.

Initial reporting compliance remains low for the Treaty's newest members. Of the eight States Parties that joined the ATT and have been required to submit an initial report since 2021, only 50 per cent (Andorra, Namibia, People's Republic of China and Philippines) have done so. An in-depth analysis of the contents of initial reports is provided in Chapter 3.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

TENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Tenth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP10) was conducted in-person from 19 to 23 August 2024. Ambassador Răzvan Rusu, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, served as President of CSP10. Representatives from 113 countries, comprising 93 States Parties; two States that had acceded and ratified the Treaty, but for which the Treaty had not yet entered into force; 17 Signatories and one Observer State attended.¹⁷ Other attendees included stakeholders, representatives of ten international and regional organizations, EU and UN agencies, 56 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing the industry.¹⁸ The President's thematic focus was interagency cooperation, and discussion highlighted the relevance and role of interagency cooperation for the effective implementation of the ATT provisions.¹⁹

¹² Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

¹³ This year the ATT Monitor was able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the ATT Secretariat.

¹⁴ Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia and State of Palestine.

¹⁵ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

¹⁶ ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Initial Reports. Status: as of 3 June 2025'. <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/initial-reports.html?templateId=209839>.

¹⁷ The ATT Monitor captures attendance at CSPs as indicated by the CSP Final Report each year. See ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Final Report'. 23 August 2024. ATT/CSP10/2024/SEC/807/Conf.FinRep. <https://bit.ly/3HoYJRB>, p.3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

Decisions adopted included:²⁰

- The endorsement of the proposed Voluntary Guide to implementing Articles 6 and 7 and welcoming of the draft multi-year workplan for the Sub-working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices.
- The adoption of the updated Terms of Reference for the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF).
- The welcoming of a Political Declaration for the next decade of the Arms Trade Treaty, introduced by the United Kingdom and endorsed by 72 States Parties and one State for which the ATT entered into force after CSP10.
- The decision to extend the revised ATT programme of work for an additional year, maintaining current working arrangements.
- The request to the Management Committee to conduct a formal assessment of the revised ATT programme of work.
- The request to the ATT Secretariat 'to collect gender-disaggregated attendance data during ATT Working Group and Preparatory meetings, in addition to the data collected at CSPs'.²¹
- The election of Ambassador Carlos Foradori, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN Office and other international organizations in Geneva, as President of CSP11.
- The election of Australia, Latvia, Namibia, and Republic of Korea as the four vice-presidents of CSP11.
- The selection of members of the VTF Selection Committee for two years: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
- The approval of the appointment of Mrs. Carina Solmirano as Head of the ATT Secretariat, effective from 1 December 2024.
- Scheduling of CSP11 for 25 to 29 August 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland.

ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES – INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP11 included meetings of the Working Groups on 25 to 28 February 2025 and an Informal Preparatory Meeting on 20 to 21 May 2025.²²

The WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Markus V. Lacanilao, addressed the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on exchange of national implementation practices and current and emerging implementation issues.²³

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices was facilitated by Mr. Edward Kawa and Ms. Essate Weldemichael of Sierra Leone. The sub-working group primarily focused on the Treaty's implementation by addressing the first two topics in the multi-year workplan: 'National control system relating to import', and 'Scope / national control list'.²⁴ Under the first topic, measures taken by States Parties to regulate arms imports were discussed, with a focus on Article 8(2), highlighting a variety of national approaches. The second topic explored how States Parties establish and maintain a national control list, its legal basis, and how it applies to the different types of arms transfers: export, import, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering. As part of the presentations, Dr. Paul Holtom from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research outlined how a considerable number of ATT States Parties do not have national control lists. He also examined the scope of these lists, showing how these do not always include all categories of conventional arms in Article 2(1), ammunition/munitions and/or parts and components.²⁵ and highlighting how the scope of the ATT is not periodically reviewed, compared to other instruments such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).²⁶ The discussion highlighted the importance of regularly updated national control lists to ensure that they cover all relevant items and reflect technological advancements or evolving security considerations.

20 Ibid., pp. 5-13.

21 Ibid., p. 11.

22 ATT Secretariat. (n.d). 'Eleventh Conference of States Parties (CSP11) Preparatory Process'. <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/csp-11-preparatory-proces.html>.

23 ATT WGETI (2025). '25 – 26/27 February 2025 WGETI Meeting: WGETI Chair Introduction Letter'. 03 February 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/808/LetterSubDocs. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGETI_CSP11_1_Chair%20Letter%20and%20Sub-WG%20Documents_EN%201/ATT_WGETI_CSP11_1_Chair%20Letter%20and%20Sub-WG%20Documents_EN%201.pdf.

24 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

25 On how ATT States Parties implement controls on transfers and exports of parts and components, see also Chapter 1 of this Report.

26 Holtom P. (2025). Scope of items & national control lists. Presentation at the ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. 25-26 February 2025. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/20250224_ATT%20WGETI_SCOPE_UNIDIR/20250224_ATT%20WGETI_SCOPE_UNIDIR.pdf. ATT Secretariat (2025). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP11. Draft'. 2 May 2022. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/811/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN.pdf, pp. 2-4.

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues was facilitated by Mr. Jason Robinson of Ireland. The sub-working group addressed the role of industry in responsible international arms trade, with a focus on stronger due diligence practices.²⁷ The second issue addressed during this session was the risk of conventional arms being used in violations of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT, including in cases of gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against women and children (VAWC).²⁸ Delegations considered and discussed proposals to strengthen the implementation of Article 7(4), including the introduction of gender focal points.²⁹ Despite some opposition, an ad hoc discussion took place on how rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and findings of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (HRC) are taken into account in the application of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, along with discussions on arms transfers to Myanmar and Sudan.³⁰

The WGTU, co-chaired by President of CSP11 Ambassador Carlos Foradori from Argentina, and President of CSP10 Ambassador Răzvan Rusu from Romania, focused on the implementation of the universalization workplan adopted at CSP10, with updates on efforts to expand ATT membership.³¹ Discussions covered the current status of participation, strategies for increasing membership—particularly among

Asia-Pacific and Signatory States—and national experiences with ratification, accession and domestication practices.³² Delegations discussed the draft working paper of the CSP11 President 'Universalization as a priority', and the progress in the implementation of the WGTU workplan.³³

The WGTR, chaired by Ms. Andrea Quezada from Chile, delved into the practical implementation of ATT reporting obligations.³⁴ Discussions addressed the current state of compliance, strategies to support States Parties facing reporting challenges and national practices related to arms transfer reporting. Delegations reviewed key reporting challenges, including low submission rates and the limited use of the online reporting tool. The ATT Secretariat presented measures to improve compliance with ATT reporting obligations, highlighting initiatives such as peer-to-peer support and the role of regional reporting champions in assisting States facing reporting challenges, and the 'Voluntary Guidance on the Practice of Annual Reporting'.³⁵ The chair invited the ATT Monitor to deliver a presentation on its Arms Transfers Dashboard, which provides a graphical representation of the distribution, dimensions and dynamics of the arms trade derived from publicly available ATT Annual Reports.³⁶ In addition, the low usage of the ATT Information Exchange Platform raised questions about its relevance and future.³⁷

27 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

28 Ibid., pp. 4 and 7-8.

29 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

30 For a summary of discussions taking place during that session, see Varella, L. (2025). 'ATT Monitor, Vol. 17, No. 1. Troubling Times Require Courage in the ATT and Beyond.' Reaching Critical Will. 28 February 2025. <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/att/csp11/att-monitor/17317-att-monitor-vol-17-no-1>.

31 ATT WGTU (2025). 'Co-chair Letter and draft annotated agenda for Meeting of 27 February 2025'. 29 January 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTU/2025/CHAIR/810/DrAnnAgenda. <https://bit.ly/4i93n2T>, pp. 1-2.

32 Ibid.

33 ATT WGTU (2025). 'Working Group on Treaty Universalization Co-Chairs' Report to CSP11. Draft'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTU/2025/CHAIR/813/PM.DrConf.Rep. <https://bit.ly/4iKIJ9q>, pp. 1-4.

34 ATT WGTR (2025). 'Chair Letter and draft annotated agenda for Meeting of 28 February 2025'. 29 January 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/809/AnnAgenda. <https://bit.ly/42fsCdH>, pp. 1-6.

35 ATT WGTR (2025). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP11. Draft'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/812/PM.DrConf.Rep. <https://bit.ly/3GEW1Hj>, p. 2-3.

36 ATT WGTR (2025). 'Chair Letter and draft annotated agenda for Meeting of 28 February 2025'. 29 January 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/809/AnnAgenda. <https://bit.ly/42fsCdH>, p. 1.

37 ATT WGTR (2025). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP11. Draft'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/812/PM.DrConf.Rep. <https://bit.ly/3GEW1Hj>, p. 4.

The CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting was held on 20 to 21 May 2025. The chairs and co-chairs of ATT subsidiary bodies—WGETI, WGTR and WGTU—provided updates on the discussions held during the February sessions and proposed next steps. Following the ad hoc discussion in the Working Group WGETI meeting in February, States Parties discussed the possibility not to allow anymore CSOs to propose and raise topics for the ad hoc discussions. The current instructions, adopted at the Ninth Conference of States Parties (CSP9), stated that 'at the beginning of each CSP cycle and ahead of the in-person WGETI meeting, the WGETI Chair will invite States Parties and other stakeholders to raise any current implementation issue on which they seek an *ad hoc* discussion in the WGETI'.³⁸ States Parties will likely take a decision on the matter at CSP11. The ATT Secretariat also presented updates on the operations of the VTF, emphasizing that the VTF can only function when adequate funding is secured and that a solid base of donors remains essential. In addition, the Management Committee (MC) and delegations discussed the assessment of the revised ATT programme of work. With informal consultations underway, the MC invited feedback from delegations to assist on the assessment and to indicate their preferred approach for subsequent CSP cycles.³⁹

The second day included discussions on the Working Paper on the priority theme of the Argentinian Presidency on 'Universalization as a Priority', followed by an overview of the implementation of the CSP10 decisions. A presentation on the status of gender participation in ATT meetings was followed by an overview on the status of ATT finances⁴⁰ (see next section).

STATUS OF ATT FINANCES

States Parties to the ATT, as well as Signatory and Observer States attending CSPs, contribute to the costs of ATT conferences and of the ATT Secretariat. In-kind support from Switzerland has remained consistent. The percentage of the budget received, however, declined to 85.69 per cent in 2025 (as of 15 May). Similarly, the proportion of States Parties that made their payments dropped from an average of 87.47 per cent in the years 2015/16–2021 to 56.49 per cent, with outstanding contributions from 57 States, for 2025 (as of 15 May). As of May 2025, the total of outstanding contributions was more than US\$466,000. With a 5 per cent annual deficit, future operations are threatened. While guidelines for making financial arrangements were adopted by CSP7, no formal requests for financial arrangements had been submitted until May 2025.⁴¹

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

At CSP10, ATT States Parties welcomed 'A Political Declaration for the next decade of the Arms Trade Treaty'. Introduced by the United Kingdom and endorsed by 72 States Parties and one State for which the ATT entered into force after CSP10,⁴² the Declaration recognized the significance of the Treaty ten years since its entry into force, recalled the object and purpose of the Treaty, and recognized the ATT as the first and 'only international treaty creating legally binding international standards to regulate the international trade in conventional arms'.⁴³ The Declaration also acknowledged that 'there is still work to be done'.⁴⁴ States Parties committed to promote universalization, to report on time, regularly, and, wherever possible, publicly, and to 'working tirelessly to fulfil the Object and Purpose' of the ATT, including 'to implement the prohibitions and obligations of this Treaty relating to international law, including assessing the potential risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law'.⁴⁵

38 ATT WGETI (2023). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Draft Report to CSP9'. Annex D: Draft Proposal: WGETI Configuration and Substance. Paragraph 11 (g). https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP9_EN.pdf.

39 ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Draft annotated agenda for CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting 20 – 21 May 2025, 10:00 –18:00 (Geneva Local Time)'. 17 April 2025. ATT/CSP11/2025/CHAIR/814/PM.DrAnnAgenda.Rev1. <https://bit.ly/3FroLD6>.

40 Ibid.

41 Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP11 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2025. Information on file with the ATT Monitor.

42 The following States Parties endorsed the Political Declaration at CSP10: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zambia and The Gambia (for which the ATT entered into force on 11 September 2024). See ATT Secretariat (2024). 'Final report'. 23 August 2024. ATT/CSP10/2024/SEC/807/Conf.FinRep. <https://bit.ly/3HoYJRB>, p.10. The text of the Political Declaration can be accessed in Annex 2, Ibid., pp. 15–16.

43 Ibid., p. 15.

44 Ibid., p. 16.

45 Ibid.

The events from June 2024 to May 2025 tested the Treaty, in a way that has rarely happened in previous years. Conflicts in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine continued unabated and new conflicts and tensions started or intensified during the year in several areas of the world, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen. Growing geopolitical tensions meant that world military expenditure rose to US\$2.718tn (US\$2,718bn) in 2024, the highest level ever recorded, with increases in all geographical regions of the world.⁴⁶ In parallel, the world experienced a progressive erosion of global norms. This resulted in general distrust in and decreased engagement (including financial) from multilateral instruments that brought some States, including States Parties to the ATT, to withdraw or express the intention to withdraw selectively from some international instruments such as the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴⁷

Israel's response to the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 resulted in a conflict in Palestine and several Israeli strikes in other countries in the region, including Lebanon, the other ATT State Party of the region. Israeli conduct during the conflict is estimated to have caused over 54,000 deaths among Palestinians in Gaza, the destruction of essential civilian infrastructure and included the limitation or blockade of humanitarian aid.⁴⁸ In September 2024, the UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human

Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories concluded that 'the policies and practices of Israel during the reporting period are consistent with the characteristics of genocide'.⁴⁹ In October 2024, the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 denounced that 'Israel has systematically and flagrantly violated international law' and required urgent action to 'ensure the full application of the Genocide Convention and full protection of the Palestinians'.⁵⁰ On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for the former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and the former Hamas commander Mohammed Deif, 'citing allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity'.⁵¹ In May 2025, Israel approved a plan to capture Gaza, while the UN warned of a 'growing humanitarian catastrophe'.⁵²

Several ATT States Parties and Signatories transferred arms to Israel in recent years. During the period 2020 to 2024, the United States, an ATT Signatory State, was the main exporter of major arms to Israel.⁵³ European countries such as Germany and Italy were also among the main exporters of major conventional arms to Israel during this period.⁵⁴ In addition, several ATT States Parties participate in the US-led 'Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program', providing parts and components for the production of the aircraft, which, according to independent sources, has been used by Israel in Gaza.⁵⁵

46 Liang, X. et al. (2025). 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. April 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf, p. 1.

47 See, for instance: Paternoster, T. (2025). 'Hungary approves bill to withdraw from International Criminal Court'. Euronews. 20 May 2025. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/20/hungary-approves-bill-to-withdraw-from-international-criminal-court>; Sytas, A. and Erling, B. (2025). 'Poland and Baltic nations plan to withdraw from landmine convention'. Reuters. 18 March 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-baltic-nations-pull-out-landmines-convention-2025-03-18/>; and Deconinck, C. (2025). 'Lithuania officially pulls out of international convention banning cluster bombs'. Brussels signal. 7 March 2025. <https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/03/lithuania-officially-pulls-out-of-international-convention-banning-cluster-bombs/>.

48 See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2025). 'Humanitarian Situation Update #294 | Gaza Strip'. 5 June 2025. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-294-gaza-strip>; and Bennet, T. (2025). 'At least 27 Palestinians killed by Israeli fire near aid centre, Gaza authorities say'. BBC. 3 June 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2lkwz0y5n00>.

49 United Nations General Assembly (2024). 'Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories'. 20 September 2024. A/79/363. <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/363>, p. 25.

50 United Nations General Assembly (2024). 'Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967'. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese. Genocide as colonial erasure'. 1 October 2024. A/79/384. <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/384>, p. 31.

51 UN News. (2024). 'ICC issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and Hamas commander'. 21 November 2024. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157286>.

52 See Gritten, D. (2025). 'Israel security cabinet approves plan to 'capture' Gaza, official says'. BBC News. 5 May 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy04km1zk00>; and UN News (2025). 'UN warns of growing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza'. 4 May 2025. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1162886>.

53 George, M. et al. (2025). 'Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.

54 Ibid.

55 Gallagher, K. (2025). 'Global Production of the Israeli F-35 Joint Strike Fighter'. Project Ploughshares. January 2025. <https://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/F35-Report-Jan.25.pdf>, p. 13 and Gjerding, S. and Andersen, L. S. (2024). 'Danskudstyrede kampfly deltog i angreb i Gaza med store civile tab [Danish-equipped fighter jets participated in attacks in Gaza with heavy civilian casualties]'. Information. 1 September 2024. https://www.information.dk/indland/2024/09/danskudstyrede-kampfly-deltog-angreb-gaza-store-civile-tab?check_logged_in=1&kupon=eyJpYXQiOiE3MjUyNTUwMjE5IiwiaWF0IjQ3Mjg3NjQ0MjM1NzYifQ.7k2QM_MAdcaUS-pePhgxtQ.

During October 2024 in Sudan the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that the belligerent parties, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, 'and/or their allied militias', were 'responsible for large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law'.⁵⁶ For both sides, the Fact-Finding Mission considered that there were 'reasonable grounds' to believe that they 'have committed the war crimes of violence to life and person'.⁵⁷ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded 'over 28,700 reported fatalities by the end of November 2024, including over 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks'.⁵⁸ At the same time, weapons and equipment also produced by companies registered in ATT States Parties have been used by belligerent parties.⁵⁹ These also included materiel originating from European States, exported to the United Arab Emirates, a Signatory State, and reportedly re-exported to Sudan.⁶⁰

According to the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2024 was 'the deadliest year for civilians' in Myanmar.⁶¹ A Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar published in October 2024 reported 'the failure by the Security Council to take

action to stop the flow of weapons into Myanmar and reduce the capacity of the military junta to commit probable war crimes and crimes against humanity'.⁶² The report praised the Government of Singapore, whose actions 'led to a 90 per cent reduction in the transfer of weapons and military supplies to the junta by Singapore-registered companies' and called for 'halting the sale, transfer or transshipment of weapons, dual-use technologies and aviation fuel to Myanmar'.⁶³

Analysis from the ATT Monitor 2024 annual report illustrated how some ATT States Parties have used transparency instruments like ATT annual reports to report their arms transfers to Ukraine in response to the Russian Federation invasion of February 2022.⁶⁴ At the same time, some parts and components produced in the civilian sector for commercial uses have been incorporated in military materiel produced by Russian Federation, Iran, and North Korea and used in the conflict, highlighting a new challenge for arms control.⁶⁵ Other conflicts intensified during the year. For instance, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the armed group M23 has advanced into the provinces of North and South Kivu since January 2025. Overall, the fighting has deteriorated the humanitarian situation in the region.⁶⁶

56 Human Rights Council (2024). 'Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023'. 23 October 2024. A/HRC/57/CRP.6. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, pp. 78-79.

57 Ibid., p. 67.

58 ACLED. 'Foreign meddling and fragmentation fuel the war in Sudan' (12 December 2024). <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2025/sudan/>.

59 Human Rights Watch (2024). 'Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access to New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment'. September 2024. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/09/sudan_weapons_0924_briefing-FINAL-web.pdf.

60 See Gadeva, E., and Peschard, Q. (2025). 'European weapons in Sudan (1/5): Bulgaria mortar shells in Darfur's desert'. France 24. 17 April 2025. <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20250417-investigation-european-weapons-sudan-part-1-mortar-shells-bulgaria>; Euronews (2024). 'UAE accused of fueling war by providing weapons to Sudan's paramilitary rivals'. 19 June 2024. <https://www.euronews.com/2024/06/19/uae-accused-of-fueling-war-by-providing-weapons-to-sudans-paramilitary-rivals#:~:text=Over%2014%2C000%20people%20have%20been,to%20a%20rival%20paramilitary%20force;and> Levinson, R., and Lewis, D. (2025). 'Exclusive: UN panel investigates Emirati links to seized weapons in Darfur'. Reuters. 29 April 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/un-panel-investigates-emirati-links-seized-weapons-darfur-2025-04-29/>.

61 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2025). 'Update on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar. Overview of developments in 2024'. January 2025. <https://bangkok.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025-02/AnnualUpdateontheHumanRightsSituationinMyanmar2024.pdf>, p. 2.

62 United Nations General Assembly (2024). 'Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews'. 25 October 2024. A/79/550. <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/550>, p. 20.

63 Ibid., pp. 2 and 22.

64 Control Arms Secretariat (2024). 'ATT Monitor 2024'. Geneva. 19 August 2024. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_Monitor-Report-2024.pdf, p. 46.

65 See Chapter 1 of this Report for additional information on this topic.

66 Blondel, P. (2025). 'Armed groups install 'parallel administration' in DR Congo, Security Council hears'. UN News. 27 March 2025. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/03/1161621>.

In today's increasingly volatile and insecure global landscape, the ATT remains a vital international instrument. The ATT aims to 'establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms' and 'prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion', for the purpose of 'contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; reducing human suffering'; and 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'.⁶⁷ States Parties shall not authorize transfers of conventional arms, ammunition/munitions, and parts and components if they have knowledge that these would be used 'in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party'.⁶⁸ Prior to an export, States Parties to the ATT shall assess the potential that their conventional arms or items could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.⁶⁹ They are also encouraged to reassess export authorizations if they become aware of new relevant information and, in the past, some States Parties suspended arms transfers to belligerent parties in Yemen.

Some ATT States Parties have reconsidered some export authorizations to and imports from some belligerent States, also based on the prohibitions and export assessment criteria of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.⁷⁰ For instance, Spain issued a

communiqué in February 2024 stating it has not authorized any sale of arms to Israel since 7 October 2023, denied in some cases docking permissions to some vessels carrying arms to Israel, and cancelled a contract to receive 15 million rounds of ammunition from an Israeli military firm.⁷¹ The ATT, however, does not have a mechanism to assess compliance of States Parties with their Treaty obligations, particularly in relation to the application of Articles 6 and 7 in export licensing decisions. CSOs have often filled this void. For example, in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom they have initiated legal proceedings to halt transfers of arms and parts and components to Israel.⁷² In the Netherlands, the direct supplies of components to Israel have been stopped after an Appeals Court order (with a final decision from the Supreme Court pending), but not the transfers of parts and components via other countries 'with Israel as the final destination'.⁷³

The cases illustrate the importance of discussing how the application of Articles 6 and 7 remain at the forefront of the topics debated by the WGETI, and that CSOs remain able to contribute to these debates. The Working Group could also discuss how ATT States Parties apply Articles 6 and 7 in the transfers of parts and components, and new challenges emerging in the regulatory landscape, such as the integration of parts and components produced for civilian use in military materiel.⁷⁴ Only in this way can States Parties ensure, as stated in their Political Declaration, 'the Arms Trade Treaty will continue to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability, reduce human suffering, and promote cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms'.⁷⁵

67 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

68 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 6 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

69 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 7 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

70 In addition to national and, where existing, regional regulatory frameworks. For instance, for ATT States Parties from the European Union, the framework includes the EU 'Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP'. See Zubillaga, M. M. (2024). 'Spain–Israel: The complexity of arms trade when a conflict is underway'. Universidad de Navarra – Global Affairs. 29 November 2024. <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/spain-israel-the-complexity-of-arms-trade-when-a-conflict-is-underway>.

71 See González, M. (2024). 'El Gobierno deniega la escala en Algeciras de dos buques con armamento para Israel' [The Government denies the stopover in Algeciras of two ships carrying weapons for Israel]. El País. 7 November 2024. <https://elpais.com/espana/2024-11-07/el-gobierno-deniega-la-escala-en-algeciras-de-dos-buques-con-armamento-para-israel.html>; Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación de España (2024). 'Comunicado sobre la venta de armamento a Israel' [Statement on arms sales to Israel]. 12 February 2024. https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/Comunicacion/Comunicados/Paginas/2024_COMUNICADOS/20240212_COMU006.aspx; Starcevic, S., and Hernández-Morales, A. (2025). 'Spain terminates Israeli ammo contract after uproar threatened to topple coalition'. Politico. 24 April 2025. <https://www.politico.eu/article/spanish-government-terminates-israeli-weapons-contract-amid-uproar/>; and The Guardian (2024). 'Spain denies port of call to ship carrying arms to Israel'. 16 May 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/16/spain-denies-port-of-call-to-ship-carrying-arms-to-israel>.

72 Arms Trade Litigation Monitor. (n.d). 'Case overviews'. <https://armstradelitigationmonitor.org/case-overviews/?jur=&loc=&rpt=84>.

73 Arms Trade Litigation Monitor. (n.d). 'Dutch Arms and Palestine'. <https://armstradelitigationmonitor.org/overview/dutch-arms-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territories/>.

74 See Chapter 1 of this Report for additional information on this topic.

75 ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Final report'. 23 August 2024. ATT/CSP10/2024/SEC/807/Conf.FinRep.<https://bit.ly/3HoYJRB>, p. 16.



**A MEMBER OF THE AUSTRALIAN
DEFENCE FORCE INTERACTS WITH
OLD EXPLOSIVES DISCOVERED IN THE
JUNGLE IN MUNDA, NEW GEORGIA,
SOLOMON ISLANDS DURING OPERATION
RENDER SAFE ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2024.**

CREDIT: © MCPL GENEVIEVE LAPOINTE/
CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA,
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

(ID: 20240910ISA0030D061 - SOURCE:
[HTTPS://COMBATCAMERA.FORCES.GC.CA](https://combatcamera.forces.gc.ca))

THE 2025 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 is dedicated to parts and components. This chapter analyses the obligations and implementation challenges of Article 4 of the ATT, which focuses on parts and components. It reviews ATT requirements and how States Parties have implemented Article 4 and presents case studies on integration and re-export of parts and components and the use of civilian parts and components in military equipment. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations to improve interpretation, implementation and cooperation under the ATT.

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth look at 2023 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties' compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as to a higher standard of transparency. Despite an increase in on-time reporting and a decrease in the number of confidential reports in 2023, the chapter shows that the proportion of meaningfully transparent reports fell.

Chapter 3 includes a summary assessment of 2024 annual reports and initial reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline of 31 May. The assessment also provides an analysis of reporting non-compliance, providing some recommendations to address challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations.

The Annex includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2023 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting-practice metrics (public reporting, on-time reporting and withholding security information) as well as a summary of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners.



GRIPEN E CARRYING FOUR METEOR MISSILES AND TWO IRIS-T MISSILES. AIR TO AIR, HEAD ON.

CREDIT: © SAAB AB / JÖRGEN ERICSSON

A LINE UP OF HELLENIC
REPUBLIC AIR FORCE F-16S
PREPARE FOR TAKE-OFF.

CREDIT: © NATO

