

CHAPTER 2 – ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 2023 ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS¹

Transparency in arms transfers is a central component of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and fundamental to achieving its object and purpose.² Accurate, comprehensive and timely reporting allows confidence building, cooperation and concrete analysis of the Treaty implementation, and is an indication of a government's commitment to monitoring, oversight and accountability.

Article 13.3 of the ATT includes clear obligations for all States Parties to submit an annual report on their authorized or actual arms exports and imports by 31 May each year.³ The annual reports are crucial in enabling States Parties and other ATT stakeholders to examine whether Treaty commitments have been fulfilled. Timely and transparent reporting of all arms exports and imports is not just a formal requirement of the ATT – it is the foundation for building trust, accountability and cooperation among States Parties. When countries report accurately and openly, they contribute to global security and demonstrate their commitment to responsible arms trade. Conversely, delays, omissions or vague reports

weaken the Treaty's credibility and make it harder to assess whether obligations are truly being met. Submitting detailed, disaggregated and public reports enables meaningful oversight and helps identify risks or patterns in arms transfers. This is why compliance with Article 13.3 is a practical necessity for the ATT to work effectively.

The analysis of 2023 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and an analysis of the States that have meaningful and higher standards in terms of transparency and detailing of their reports. The methodology by which each category is assessed is explained below.

The analysis of 2023 annual reports reveals a persistent struggle to achieve accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. In particular, the percentage of due annual reports submitted and the proportion of meaningfully transparent reports declined and progress on these two indicators remains insufficient.

KEY FINDINGS

- Only 69 States Parties (62 per cent) required to submit a 2023 annual report did so. This is the lowest reporting rate since the process began in 2015. Among these, 49 States Parties (44 per cent) submitted their reports on time. While the overall submission rate declined, the proportion of on-time submissions rose compared to 2022, returning to levels seen in 2020–2021.
- Sixteen States Parties (23 per cent of the submitted reports) submitted a confidential annual report for 2023. The number and proportion of confidential reports steadily increased from three (5 per cent) in 2015 to a peak of 24 (33 per cent) in 2020. This trend began to reverse as of 2021. The number and percentage of confidential reports for 2023 is the lowest level in the last five years.
- Only 27 States Parties (24 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2023 submitted one that was meaningfully transparent. This proportion is the lowest recorded since the Treaty's entry into force.
- Thirty-eight States Parties (34 per cent) provided descriptions of some or all transfers, while 27 of the reports contained comments covering some or all transfers.
- Fourteen States Parties (12.5 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2023 complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.

¹ This chapter provides an analysis of 2023 annual reports. For a country-by-country assessment of the 2023 annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat, see the Country Profiles in Annex.

² One of the purposes of the ATT is to 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'. Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

³ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 and Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>. Additionally, Article 13.1 of the Treaty asks each State Party to provide within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty 'an initial report to the Secretariat of measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures'.

METHODOLOGY

Annual reports were downloaded from the ATT Secretariat website for analysis on 1 February 2025. Reports later amended or submitted by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. Each year the ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the deadline for annual reports to be included in this chapter to ensure adequate time for an in-depth analysis as well as the possibility to compare findings and trends across years.

This chapter examines annual reporting trends which indicate whether States Parties reporting practices are becoming more or less transparent. It examines ATT annual reporting on three levels to evaluate whether (and to what degree) the reporting obligations and transparency objectives of the ATT have been fulfilled. ATT Monitor analysis considers whether annual reports:

- Are compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations.
- Are meaningfully transparent, contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty.
- Contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

For each level, the ATT Monitor established specific criteria upon which annual reports are evaluated. These criteria are provided below.

Distinct evaluation exercises were undertaken for each level of reporting to distinguish between (1) Treaty obligations (Article 13.3 reporting requirements), (2) the minimum amount of information the ATT Monitor has determined is needed for annual reports to be meaningfully transparent and to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty (for example, public reporting) and (3) additional information that, when provided, contributes to a higher standard of transparency (for example, comments on the nature of reported transfers). The analysis of each category separately allows the examination of different levels of commitment to transparency.

Using all these criteria in one exercise to evaluate annual reports would not have produced a clear and understandable analysis regarding transparency. For example, even though an annual report submitted after the reporting deadline does not meet Article 13.3 obligations, it may still contain information that is meaningfully transparent.

The submission of 'nil' reports for exports and/or imports may also fulfil Article 13.3 reporting obligations and the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Even without transfer data and descriptions, the affirmative act of reporting

'nil'—indicating there were no imports or exports in the year—still provides a transparent view of States Parties transfer activities. By providing such a window, those that submit 'nil' reports may still have an equivalent commitment to transparency.

The analysis considers annual reports for all years, including those submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, the numbers presented in this report concerning annual reports covering the years 2015 to 2022 differ slightly from those presented in previous ATT Monitor Reports. The analysis only evaluates information provided by States Parties in annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat. It does not seek to determine whether all transfers are reported or to independently verify the accuracy of that information. As such, this analysis is not a general measure of transparency for all arms transfers.

STATES PARTIES' COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Article 13.3 of the Treaty requires that States Parties submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports for the previous calendar year by 31 May of each year. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if:

- It is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
- It is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).⁴
- Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or relevant 'nil' reports indicating that no arms were transferred.

ARTICLE 13.3

Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

⁴ ATT annual reports are due by 31 May each year. However, States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

In total, 112 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on their exports and imports for 2023 by 31 May 2024. Only 69 (62 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2025 cut-off date for analysis.⁵


SUBMITTING REPORTS TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT

Annual reports submitted for 2023 continued a steady downward trend in reporting. When reports submitted late for previous years are considered, the total number of annual reports submitted for 2023 (69) is the lowest since 2018. As the number of States Parties has grown, the reporting rate has declined – from 87 per cent in

2015 to 62 per cent for 2023 (see Figure 2.1). This marks the lowest percentage of annual reports due that were submitted since the ATT came into force.

The number of annual reports due for 2023 is higher than the number of those due for 2022. Gabon and the Philippines were due to report for the first time on 31 May 2024, but did not do so. Suriname submitted a report for the first time, after not having done so in previous years. Eighteen States Parties did not submit a 2023 annual report by 1 February 2025, even though they had submitted an annual report in one or more previous years.⁶ A further 25 States Parties have never submitted an annual report.⁷

FIGURE 2.1 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



⁵ The following States Parties have submitted an annual report for 2023 by 1 February 2025: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay. Five other States Parties (Austria, Greece, Guatemala, Paraguay and Philippines) submitted an annual report for 2023 after the 1 February cut-off date and as of 10 June 2025, and are thus not included in the count of submitted reports. Analysis presented in this chapter has also considered reports from previous years that have been submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, numbers presented here for reports covering the years 2015 to 2022 are different to those presented in previous ATT Monitor reports.

⁶ Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Cameroon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Mali, Malta, Niger, Paraguay, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Zambia. Of these, six States Parties (Austria, Greece, Malta, Republic of North Macedonia, Seychelles and Trinidad and Tobago) did not submit a 2023 annual report by 1 February 2025, after having submitted one for 2022.

⁷ Afghanistan, Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo.

Five States Parties have a mixed record and submitted a 2023 annual report, despite not having done so for one or more previous years.⁸ Sixty-four States Parties have submitted an annual report for every year that one was due.⁹

Between 1 February 2024 and 1 February 2025, the following States Parties submitted previously overdue annual reports: Brazil (2020 and 2021), Kazakhstan (2022), Malta (2018), Nigeria (2022), Republic of Moldova (2020, 2021 and 2022), and Trinidad and Tobago (2020 and 2022). The ATT Monitor commends these States Parties for fulfilling their reporting obligations. Late reporting remains valuable and contributes to the goals of transparency and accountability under the Treaty.

SUBMITTING ANNUAL REPORTS ON TIME

Forty-nine States Parties (44 per cent of due reports) complied with the Treaty obligation to submit an annual report by the 31 May deadline.¹⁰ The remaining 20 States Parties (18 per cent of due reports) submitted their report between the Treaty deadline and the ATT Monitor's 1 February cut-off for analysis.¹¹ It is worth noting that the ATT Monitor considers on-time reporting based on the information posted by the ATT Secretariat on its website by the de facto deadline of 7 June, acting on the basis that reports were posted promptly on the ATT Secretariat's website. The number and percentage of annual reports submitted on time increased for 2023 after the lowest percentage of on-time reporting recorded in 2022, returning to the numbers and percentages of on-time reports for 2020–2021.¹²

REPORTING BOTH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS COVERED BY ARTICLE 2.1

Most States Parties that submitted a public annual report complied with the Article 13 obligation to report on arms exports and imports. Chile only reported exports and did not report imports, without submitting a 'nil' report for imports. Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports. It reported some imports of arms, but also submitted a 'nil' report for imports, indicating both a 'nil' import report and a report for imports in the box related to the contents of the report. The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports and imports, but it indicated in the box related to the contents of the report that it had also submitted annual reports for exports and imports. Finland submitted only its exports report publicly. Some States Parties submitted 'nil' reports only for exports or imports and recorded this information accordingly in the box related to the contents of the report.¹³

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2023, compared to 35 States Parties (32 per cent) for 2022.¹⁴ They submitted annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline, and reports that were made public included data on arms exports and imports or were 'nil' reports. The 33 per cent compliance rate represents a small increase compared to 2022 (Figure 2.2).

8 Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Panama and Suriname. Among these States, Panama and Suriname are the only States Parties that submitted an annual report for 2023, but did not submit one for 2022. Panama resumed reporting after two years, making its first public submission since 2019.

9 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.


10 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

11 Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, South Africa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

12 Control Arms Secretariat (2024). ATT Monitor 2024. Geneva. 19 August 2024. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_Monitor-Report-2024.pdf, p. 201.

13 Benin, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Lesotho, Peru, Republic of Moldova and Sierra Leone reported imports and submitted a 'nil' report for exports. Sweden reported exports and submitted a 'nil' report on imports. Information on States Parties that submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports is provided later in the chapter.

14 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

FIGURE 2.2 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS FULLY COMPLIANT WITH ARTICLE 13.3

MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent, a report should allow its public analysis and contain minimum significant details, as listed below:¹⁵

1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.
2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.
4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).¹⁶
5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

States Parties can submit 'nil' reports indicating they did not export or import any arms, while still contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Therefore, the ATT Monitor also considers that an annual report can be meaningfully transparent if the State Party has clearly submitted a 'nil' report on exports or imports.


IDENTIFYING MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

Based on the ATT Monitor's methodology, only 27 annual reports for 2023 (24 per cent of all reports due) met all the above criteria and were thus meaningfully transparent.¹⁷ Figure 2.3 shows the number and percentage of annual reports that were meaningfully transparent since 2015. As the number of reports due increased over the years—from 61 for 2015 to 112

¹⁵ These criteria were earlier presented in: Control Arms Secretariat (2021). 'ATT Monitor 2021', New York. 30 August 2021. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN_ATT_Monitor-Report-2021_Online.pdf.

¹⁶ An authorized export or import has been approved by national authorities, while an actual export or import concerns the physical movement of weapons or a change in ownership. Authorizations are generally granted before the actual export takes place, sometimes years in advance. For more information, see Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP5/WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. <https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k>, pp. 11-12.

¹⁷ Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Suriname and Uruguay. In addition, Finland (exports) met the criteria for meaningful transparency. However, one of the criteria for meaningful transparency is that a State Party submits and makes its whole report public on the ATT Secretariat website. Since Finland only made its report on exports public, the ATT Monitor did not include Finland in the count of meaningfully transparent reports.

FIGURE 2.3 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS THAT WERE MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT

for 2023—the proportion of reports meeting the ATT Monitor's criteria for meaningful transparency decreased. The figure shows the percentage of reports that were meaningfully transparent has declined from 46 per cent for 2015 to 24 per cent for 2023. This is the lowest percentage of meaningfully transparent reports recorded since the Treaty's entry into force. The continued decrease in transparency reflects a persistent challenge in achieving accurate and comprehensive reporting among States Parties.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

As noted above, a factor for the drop in meaningfully transparent reporting is the decline in the proportion of submitted due annual reports. Another element to consider is the proportion of States Parties that do not make their reports public (these reports are only distributed among States Parties). Article 13 of the Treaty does not specify that reports should be made public, but that

they 'shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat',¹⁸ without clarifying to whom they shall be made available.¹⁹ However, publicly available reports create a record that civil society, media and the international community can monitor.²⁰

Sixteen States Parties submitted a confidential annual report for 2023 (23 percent of submitted reports).²¹ Since 2021, both the number and proportion of confidential reports have declined, indicating a shift toward greater public transparency among ATT States Parties submitting annual reports. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the number and proportion of confidential reports steadily increased from three (5 per cent) in 2015 to a peak of 24 (33 per cent of the reports submitted) in 2020. However, this trend has reversed, with confidential reports declining to 30 per cent in 2022, followed by a further decrease to 16 reports (23 per cent) in 2023. The number and percentage of confidential reports for 2023 is the lowest in the last five years.


¹⁸ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

¹⁹ See for further discussion Marsh, N. and Karim A. (2015). 'Article 13: Reporting'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'Weapons and International Law: The Arms Trade Treaty'. Brussels: Larcier, pp. 213-231; Casey-Maslin, S. et al. (2016). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 386-387.

²⁰ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024). Impact of arms transfers on human rights: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/56/42). <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/impact-arms-transfers-human-rights-report-office-united-nations-high-commissioner-human-rights-ahrc5642-enarruzh>.

²¹ Albania, Barbados, Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Senegal and State of Palestine. In addition, Finland submitted a confidential report for imports and a public report for exports.

FIGURE 2.4 - NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CONFIDENTIAL ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



One State Party returned to submitting a confidential annual report for 2023, after submitting a public report for the previous year (Cyprus). Conversely, three States Parties submitted a public report after their 2022 annual reports were confidential (Botswana, Madagascar and Slovenia). Finland made only its 2023 annual report on exports public, after submitting a confidential annual report for 2022. Among the States Parties that submitted an annual report for 2023, six States Parties have consistently submitted confidential annual reports for all years when these were due.²²

Seven States Parties submitted 'nil' annual reports, indicating that they had neither exported nor imported any arms in 2023.²³ The remaining 46 annual reports, which contain data on arms transfers for 2023, are assessed in the remainder of this section.²⁴

DISAGGREGATING BY WEAPON TYPES AND BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER

To be meaningfully transparent an annual report must clearly

provide information disaggregated by type of arms and by importer/exporter. Excessive aggregation of exports and imports by weapon type or by source/destination in annual reports can be an obstacle to determine what type of arms transfers have taken place.

Disaggregating transfers by category of arms

For 2023, 42 States Parties (91 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) submitted annual reports that provided information that was adequately disaggregated by categories of arms.²⁵ Four States Parties (Australia, Belgium, Denmark and Republic of Moldova) included aggregation concerning some types of arms and not others. For example, Belgium reported some exports and imports under national categories, aggregating transfers of arms corresponding to category ML1 of the European Common Military List, which includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (0.50 inches) or less.

²² Barbados, Côte d'Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, People's Republic of China and State of Palestine.

²³ Botswana, Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Monaco, Palau, Suriname and Uruguay.

²⁴ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

²⁵ Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Disaggregating transfers by importer/exporter

Thirty-four States Parties (74 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) provided fully disaggregated information by importer/exporter.²⁶ An additional seven States Parties included adequate disaggregation by importer/exporter for some but not all categories of arms.²⁷ For example, Denmark reported small arms exports and some small arms imports to and from 'Multiple States'.

Five States Parties' annual reports did not include any meaningful disaggregation (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Norway, Panama and Republic of Moldova). El Salvador and the Republic of Moldova provided the total number of items imported in different categories of arms, and a list of exporting states. For instance, El Salvador reported a total authorized import of 435 rifles and carbines from two exporters, the United States and Israel, without indicating the numbers of arms authorized by each of the two trading partners. Costa Rica appears to have made an error by listing and aggregating trading partners for some categories of arms in the 'state of origin' column. Both Norway and Panama did not include any trading partner for their reported exports and imports (Norway reported exports and imports, while Panama only reported imports).²⁸

SPECIFYING WHETHER TRANSFERS CONCERN AUTHORIZATIONS OR ACTUAL TRANSFERS (OR BOTH)

Annual reports should also indicate whether transfers are actual or authorized, namely if transfers refer to the actual physical movement of goods or if an authorization that an export or import took place (see box). States Parties usually base their annual reports on one or other types of data – for example, on licenses issued by export control authorities or on movements of goods collected by customs authorities. It is important for an annual report to indicate the type of data because there are often important differences between the two. An authorized (licensed) export may never take place if the order is cancelled or reduced before transfer. Similarly, if authorized arms are actually transferred, these arms may cross national borders during a different reporting period to that of the authorization, even perhaps several years later. Knowing whether authorized or actual transfers are reported is vital to understanding apparent discrepancies between reports produced by different States Parties.²⁹ States Parties can decide to use different approaches in reporting actual or authorized transfers. However, the ATT Secretariat advises that, for the sake of consistency and continuity, States Parties should maintain their chosen reporting approach over time.³⁰



THIRTY-FOUR STATES PARTIES (74 PER CENT OF PUBLIC ANNUAL REPORTS THAT CONTAIN EXPORTS OR IMPORTS DATA) PROVIDED FULLY DISAGGREGATED INFORMATION BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER. AN ADDITIONAL SEVEN STATES PARTIES INCLUDED ADEQUATE DISAGGREGATION BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER FOR SOME BUT NOT ALL CATEGORIES OF ARMS.

26 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland.

27 Burkina Faso, Denmark, Ireland, Jamaica, Montenegro, Sweden and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom subsequently updated its report and provided disaggregated data for all its transfers.

28 Norway indicated that it excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons but did not specify if the names of the trading partners was the information that was withheld.

29 Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. New York. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/EN-ATT_Monitor-Report-2017_ONLINE-1.pdf, pp.45-51.

30 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. <https://bit.ly/45xWaEP>, p. 13.

AUTHORIZED AND ACTUAL TRANSFERS

What is an authorized transfer?

Authorized exports and imports imply that (the competent authorities of) the State Party in question in some way permitted the export or import to take place. This generally happens in the form of an export or import licence. An authorization or licence does not oblige the importer or exporter to actually conduct the export or import in question, the conventional arms which are the object of the authorization might subsequently not (all) be physically moved from or into the national territory of the State Party during the same reporting period, and this might even never take place.

What is an actual transfer?

Actual exports and imports are those that have effectively taken place. Depending on the definitions of export and import of the State Party in question, this entails that the arms have been actually physically transferred across the national border and/or the title and control over the arms has been actually transferred.

Source: Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. <https://bit.ly/45xWaEP>, p. 12-13.

Thirty-one reports (67 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) adequately indicated whether the data reported concerns authorizations or actual transfers.³¹ Ten annual reports provided an indication for some, but not all transfers³² and five did not provide information for any transfers included in their annual reports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Panama, Poland and Sweden).

Some States Parties selected both actual and authorized for the same transfers, indicating that they categorized the same transactions under both classifications. For instance, Costa Rica reported that every transfer listed was both an authorization and an actual transfer. Other States Parties also included some transfers that were categorized as both authorizations and actual transfers.³³ The ATT reporting template allows for this approach, which may accurately reflect the situation if reports are based on two different data sources—one for authorizations and another for actual movements of arms—without discrepancies between the two. However, categorizing transfers as both an authorization and an actual transfer limits the ability to obtain information about these transfers from an annual report. To prevent potential misunderstandings, States Parties could clarify the data source through comments or, as suggested by the ATT Secretariat, submit two separate tables – one for authorizations and another for actual transfers.³⁴

INDICATING THE NUMBER OF ARMS OR THEIR FINANCIAL VALUE

The ATT reporting template includes columns for States Parties to record the number of arms exported or imported, or their financial value. This information is crucial to understand the magnitude of an arms transfer. All 46 of the annual reports containing data on transfers included the number of units or their financial value, although seven reports excluded data for specific transfers.³⁵ Four States Parties explicitly stated that this information had been withheld (Belgium, Canada, Netherlands and Sweden). For instance, Sweden classified numbers of exports of recoilless rifles and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, and Canada did not disclose the specific number of AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles imported from the United States, explaining that missile numbers were classified and that a multi-year procurement is in progress to upgrade and recapitalize part of the existing AIM-9 missile inventory. Similarly, the Netherlands reported the number of its donations of heavy machine guns to Ukraine as 'not declared'. This information conforms to Article 13.3 of the Treaty, which states that reports 'may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information', and these States Parties have clearly indicated what data/type of information was withheld.

31 Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

32 Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland.

33 Denmark, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Peru, Romania and South Africa.

34 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. <https://bit.ly/45xWaEP>, p. 13.

35 Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, South Africa and Sweden.

CHANGES IN COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY

Table 2.1 shows the percentage of public annual reports since 2015 meeting the ATT Monitor criteria for meaningful transparency. The data highlights mixed trends in transparency of arms trade reporting.

- Reports disaggregated by category of arms fluctuated over the years. In 2023, they reached 91 per cent, an increase of 10 percentage points compared to 2022.
 - The proportion of annual reports providing disaggregated data by importer/exporter increased from 65 per cent in 2015 to 84 per cent in 2020. However, it has declined since then, and the value of 74 per cent in 2023 is the fourth highest value recorded.
- There has been a decrease in reports specifying whether data concerns authorizations or actual transfers, declining from 96 per cent in 2015 to 67 per cent in 2023. This is the lowest percentage ever recorded.
 - Reports including information on units or financial value remained consistently high across the years. The percentage decreased from 96 per cent in 2022 to 93 per cent in 2023.
 - Overall, while improvements are evident in some areas such as disaggregation per category of arms, the decline in clarity on authorized versus actual transfers reflect some challenges in maintaining transparency standards.

Table 2.1: Percentage of public annual reports (excluding 'nil' and early submissions) that meet the criteria for meaningful transparency

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Provided information disaggregated by weapon type	90%	86%	87%	85%	88%	93%	83%	81%	91%
Provided information disaggregated by importer/exporter	65%	65%	64%	71%	76%	84%	80%	72%	74%
Indicated whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both)	96%	94%	91%	92%	84%	87%	74%	85%	67%
Provided the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type	96%	96%	98%	94%	98%	98%	98%	96%	93%



FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE ATT MONITOR MEANINGFUL TRANSPARENCY CRITERIA

Twenty-one States Parties (19 per cent of all reports due) required to submit an annual report for 2023 submitted a meaningfully transparent report on time.³⁶ This rate is higher than the previous year when 14 per cent met these criteria.

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

The previous sections outlined the minimum reporting requirements for compliance with the Treaty under Article 13.3 and the criteria for meaningfully transparent annual reports as defined by the ATT Monitor. The Treaty encourages States to provide more information, thereby contributing to a higher standard of transparency. For example, Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms.³⁷ The 'FAQ-type guidance document on annual reporting obligations', endorsed by the ATT Conference of States Parties, explains how States Parties are encouraged and could include in their annual reports information on a wider range of items than those set out in the eight categories in Article 2.1.³⁸ Reports could include information on, for example, ammunition/munitions and parts and components (including exports or imports of complete conventional arms that are transferred in disassembled parts and components).³⁹

Similarly, the reporting templates provide the possibility for States Parties to include comments on each transfer and descriptions of the arms being exported or imported. In doing so, a report can provide additional contextual information which can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, the United Kingdom reported the export of two armoured combat vehicles to Canada and used comments to clarify that they were destined to a private museum.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if States Parties do at least one of the following:

1. Include descriptions of reported transfers that provide details on the make, model and/or calibre of transferred conventional arms.
2. Include comments on reported transfers that provide details on the nature of the transfer, including end-use/end-user information.
3. Include 'o', 'nil', '/' or any other indication that no transfers were made in relevant arms categories and sub-categories.
4. Clearly indicate whether commercially sensitive or national security information was withheld or not, and, if so, what information was withheld.
5. Include information reported in voluntary national categories that includes arms categories covered by Article 2.1, but not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (shotguns, etc.).
6. Include information reported in voluntary national categories that includes categories not covered by Article 2.1 (ammunition, parts and components, gas-powered firearms, etc.).
7. Include any other type of additional information, including national reports, detailed tables or annexes with information of arms categories not covered by Article 2.1 (other type of aircraft, vessels and vehicles that fall outside the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) categories, or imaging, communications and radar items).
8. Include national definitions of reported categories of conventional arms.



TWENTY-ONE STATES PARTIES (19 PER CENT OF ALL REPORTS DUE) REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2023 SUBMITTED A MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT REPORT ON TIME. THIS RATE IS HIGHER THAN THE PREVIOUS YEAR WHEN 14 PER CENT MET THESE CRITERIA.

³⁶ Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Suriname and Uruguay.

³⁷ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.

³⁸ Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep. 22 July 2022. <https://bit.ly/45xWaEP>, pp. 14-15.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 15. See Chapter 1 for a comprehensive overview on how States Parties implement controls on parts and components, and on the relevance of these measures in current arms control debates.

DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTS

The ATT reporting template includes a column in which States Parties can give a more detailed description of the item(s) transferred. Twelve States Parties included descriptions for all the transfers they reported,⁴⁰ while an additional 26 States Parties included descriptions for at least some transfers.⁴¹

This combined total (38 annual reports) is slightly lower than last year (39 annual reports). Descriptions provide important contextual information that can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, Bulgaria reported the export of 30 portable anti-tank guns to the Czech Republic, disaggregating by type and quantity in the descriptions (10 pieces of one-shot disposable anti-tank rocket launcher Bulspike-AT, cal. 72.5 mm; 10 pieces of one-shot disposable anti-tank rocket launcher Bulspike-AP, cal. 72.5 mm; and 10 pieces of one-shot disposable anti-tank rocket launcher Bulspike-TB, cal. 72.5 mm).

The ATT reporting template also includes a column for States Parties to provide comments on the transfer. Six States Parties provided comments on every transfer.⁴² An additional 21 States Parties included comments on some transfers.⁴³ The combined figure of 27 reports containing comments on some or all transfers is equal to the previous year. Comments can provide important information that can help explain a transfer. For example, Mexico uses comments to designate its arms imports based on end users, differentiating between military, security and civilian uses.

FILLING IN BLANK SPACES

While Article 13.3 of the Treaty allows States Parties to 'exclude commercially sensitive or national security information' (see next sub-section), leaving sections blank creates ambiguity. If a State Party leaves parts of its report blank, it is not possible to discern whether there were no transfers or if information has

been withheld. Twenty States Parties used symbols such as '0', '/' or '-' to indicate that no transfers of specific categories and/or sub-categories of arms had taken place during 2023.⁴⁴ This number is an improvement from 2022, when 16 States Parties included such indications.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

The ATT reporting template provides a checkbox for States Parties to indicate whether information has been withheld for commercially sensitive and/or national security-related reasons in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty. Forty-eight States Parties either checked 'yes', 'no' or used other means to indicate whether information was withheld in their 2023 annual reports.⁴⁵ This number was higher than the previous year, when 43 States Parties indicated that information was being withheld. In contrast, five States Parties did not provide any such indication in their 2023 annual report, making it unclear whether information was withheld.⁴⁶ This is an improvement compared to the previous year when seven States Parties did not provide this clarification.

Eighteen States Parties indicated that information had been withheld for commercial or security reasons. Among these, four explicitly specified the type of information withheld by marking it as 'Classified' or using other explanatory notes such as 'not declared', either in relation to specific numbers, categories or sub-categories of arms, final importing or exporter states, or in the comments section (Belgium, Canada, Netherlands and Sweden). For example, Sweden classified the quantities of exports of recoilless rifles to Hungary and the United States, as well as the quantities of portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems exported to Brazil, France, Lithuania and United States, clearly marking these entries as 'Classified' in the 'numbers' column.

⁴⁰ Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland (exports), Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

⁴¹ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁴² Canada, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Panama and Peru.

⁴³ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁴⁴ Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Canada, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland used a UNROCA template for their reports. These reports did not include rows for certain categories of arms for which no transfers were made.

⁴⁵ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. Canada and the Netherlands used a UNROCA template that does not provide a box to indicate whether information has been withheld but included this information in the text of the report.

⁴⁶ Botswana and Spain. In addition, Chile, France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland used either a national template or a UNROCA template that does not provide a box to indicate whether information has been withheld. Since these States Parties have not specified this information using other means, the ATT Monitor includes them among the States that have provided no indication on withheld information.

VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Some annual reports contain information on a wider range of conventional arms than those explicitly specified in the ATT reporting template. This information is provided under the 'others' sub-categories for both small arms and light weapons, in a section for voluntary 'National Categories', or in additional supplementary tables of data.

- Twenty-six States Parties included in their 2023 annual report information on arms that are covered within the scope of Article 2 of the Treaty but are not explicitly specified in the reporting template.⁴⁷ This is higher than the previous year, when 21 annual reports contained such information. For example, South Africa reported exports and imports of shotguns to and from several countries in the 'others' small arms sub-categories, including the authorization of an export of 500 shotguns to the headquarters of the Zimbabwe Republic Police General. New Zealand also reported exports and imports of shotguns in its national categories.
- Eight States Parties reported a wider range of military equipment.⁴⁸ Such equipment is not directly covered in Article 2.1 of the ATT, which covers the scope of the Treaty, but is relevant to Article 5(3), which states that each State Party 'is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms'. For example,
 - Chile reported it authorized the export of spare parts and metallic magazines for small arms to Canada. While these items are related to small arms, they are parts and components and not complete arms, and therefore not covered under Article 2.1 of the ATT. The number of States reporting such data is lower than the previous year, when eleven States Parties reported this information.
 - Six States Parties (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) included supplementary tables containing additional data. Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom used a UNROCA template and included data on national military holdings (reported to UNROCA). Australia provided additional tables on aggregated small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports and on the volumes of firearms commercially imported into Australia. Japan provided additional data on its exports and imports of small arms. The number of States Parties is higher than the previous year, when five States Parties reported such information.
 - Thirteen States Parties included descriptions of national definitions of arms or terms for exports and imports in their annual reports.⁴⁹ For example, Hungary states it does not have a single criterion to define exports and imports, as it depends on the transfer and destination (transfer of control, delivery verification date, leaving Hungary's territory, etc)

**AN EX-COMBATANT HOLDS UP
MUNITIONS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE
AFTER A DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION (DDR) OPERATION
CONDUCTED BY UNOCI IN 2012.**

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⁴⁷ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁴⁸ Chile, Costa Rica, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Moldova, Sierra Leone, Slovakia and South Africa.

⁴⁹ Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Italy, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Poland and the Republic of Korea.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TRENDS

The following key findings summarize major trends in arms exports and imports reported by ATT States Parties that submitted a public annual report containing exports and/or imports in 2023.

Exports of major conventional arms: 113,964 major conventional arms exports were reported in 2023.

Of these, 102,849 were actual transfers and 4,279 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main exported arms were missiles and missile launchers (84.6 per cent, of which 80.9 per cent were 'missiles etc.' and 3.7 were 'MANPADS'), and armoured combat vehicles (1.9 per cent).

Exports of SALW: 1,456,779 SALW exports were reported in 2023.

Of these, 668,274 were actual transfers and 669,942 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main sub-categories reported were revolvers and self-loading pistols (37 per cent), assault rifles (22.7 per cent), and rifles and carbines (14.9 per cent).

Imports of major conventional arms: 78,117 major conventional arms imports were reported in 2023.⁵⁰


Of these, 77,856 were actual transfers and 148 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main imported arms were missiles and missile launchers (88.5 per cent), and large-calibre artillery systems (10.5 per cent).

Imports of SALW: 560,811 SALW imports were reported in 2023.

Of these, 398,392 were actual transfers and 58,752 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main sub-categories reported were revolvers and self-loading pistols (30.8 per cent), assault rifles (28.1 per cent), and rifles and carbines (15.2 per cent).

For information disaggregated by State, please refer to the Annex: Country Profiles.

Since 2024, the ATT Monitor provides a graphical and interactive representation of the distribution, dimensions, and dynamics of the arms trade, as reported by States Parties' annual reports, in its ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard. Please consult the Dashboard at: attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard. Data on transfers reported in 2023 annual reports will be included in the Dashboard by 31 December 2025.




⁵⁰ One of the main differences between reported exports and imports can be attributed to the fact that some major importers are not States Parties to the ATT.

MOST TRANSPARENT REPORTS

Similarly to previous years, no State Party submitting a 2023 annual report used all transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Fourteen States Parties complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information

that supports a higher standard of transparency.⁵¹ Of these, two States Parties (Canada and Peru) provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency. Canada provided comments and some descriptions and stated whether information had been withheld for commercial or national security reasons. Peru included comments and descriptions for all its transfers and stated it had not withheld any data.

FIGURE 2.5 – CLASSIFICATION OF ATT STATES PARTIES BY ANNUAL REPORTING PRACTICE (2023)



⁵¹ Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania and Serbia. The list excludes States Parties that have submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports.

CONCLUSION

Transparent reporting is critical to achieve the ATT's aim of promoting a responsible arms trade. This chapter has presented and analyzed the main trends in reporting for 2023. It has highlighted some positive aspects. For example, the proportion of annual reports submitted on time increased to 44 per cent in 2023 (49 States Parties) after a drop in 2022, returning to numbers and percentages of on-time reports for 2020–2021. Confidential annual reports decreased from a peak of 33 per cent in 2020 (24 reports) to 23 per cent in 2023 (16 reports). Reports that provided information disaggregated by categories and sub-categories of arms increased since 2022, reaching 91 per cent in 2023. Lastly, the percentage of states submitting public, meaningfully transparent reports on time increased from 14 per cent in 2022 to 19 per cent in 2023. However, only 62 per cent of States Parties required to submit an annual report submitted one for 2023, the lowest proportion since 2015. The overall proportion of meaningfully transparent reports dropped significantly from 46 per cent in 2015 to 24 per cent in 2023, the lowest level recorded. Finally, full compliance with all Article 13.3 obligations remains very close to the lowest compliance level recorded historically.

The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) continues to play a pivotal role in promoting transparency and strengthening reporting practices under the ATT. The 'outreach strategy on reporting' called for the identification of challenges States Parties face in reporting.⁵² Additionally, it encouraged States Parties and civil society organizations to organize regionally tailored informative sessions to assist national authorities responsible for reporting.⁵³ Recently, the ATT Secretariat also undertook several initiatives to support States Parties in their reporting obligations. These initiatives include regional practical reporting workshops, the introduction of a 'Voluntary Guidance on the Practice of Annual Reporting', and the identification of some 'regional reporting champions'—Benin, France, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Romania and Sierra Leone—which agreed to share their reporting focal points' details with States Parties from their regions that face reporting challenges.⁵⁴ The ATT Monitor welcomes the initiatives of the WGTR and the ATT Secretariat. In particular, supporting regional leadership and assistance in reporting transparency and facilitating peer exchanges among States would contribute to a broader culture of transparency, promote harmonization of reporting practices and support States Parties that may lack the technical or institutional capacity to meet their reporting obligations. This would enhance implementation of the Treaty, strengthen mutual trust among States Parties and contribute meaningfully to the achievement of the Treaty's objectives.



⁵² ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR). Outreach Strategy on Reporting (Annex A of WGTR Co-Chairs' Report to CSP4). Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. August 2018. <http://bit.ly/3TX95uJ>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ ATT WGTR (2025). 'WGTR Chair's Draft Report to CSP11'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/812/PM.DrConf.Rep. <https://bit.ly/3GEW1Hj>, pp. 2-3.

**ARMADA DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA
(ARA) ALMIRANTE BROWN SAILS BEHIND
HMCS MARGARET BROOKE AS PART OF
SHIP MANEUVERS DURING OPERATION
PROJECTION 25-01 ON 15 FEBRUARY 2025.**

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CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

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