COVER PHOTO:

HMAS ARUNTA’S FLIGHT DECK TEAM CONDUCT DECK-LANDING QUALIFICATIONS WITH AN MH-60 ROMEO HELICOPTER DURING THE SHIP’S RETURN TO AUSTRALIA.

CREDIT: © AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
HMNZS TE MANA AT THE PORT OF NAPIER.

CREDIT © NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The ATT Monitor and Control Arms wish to thank the governments of Canada and the Netherlands for their generous financial support.

The 2023 ATT Monitor Report was coordinated and edited by Carina Solmirano. All of the chapters and data sets were drafted by an expert team of researchers and analysts including Conflict Armament Research, Ryan Fletcher, Nicolas Marsh, Sol Nottage, Carina Solmirano and Rachel Stohl. Research support was provided by Helena Belzer and Natalie Bramlett.

Peer reviewers provided extensive comments, feedback and suggestions during the drafting stage. They include Katherine Aguirre, Martin Butcher, Conflict Armament Research, Kelsey Gallagher, Roy Isbister, Elizabeth Kirkham, Stephen Mwachofi Singo and Emma Soubrier. Final review and comments were provided by Cindy Ebbs.

The ATT Monitor would also like to thank those collaborators who provided feedback and peer reviews anonymously.

The 2023 ATT Monitor Report was produced with support of fact checkers Micaela Bergman and Deborah Tasselkraut, copy editor Nicolas Bouchet, and translators Sonia Murray (French) and Marc Alba (Spanish). Art and graphic design provided by Collected Pros Limited.
**CONTENTS**

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4

**CONTENTS** .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5

**ACRONYMS** ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6

**THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT** ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 7

**STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW JUNE 2022-MAY 2023** ................................................................. 9

**CHAPTER 1: CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION AND THE ARMS TRADE TREATY** ................................................................................................................................. 23

**CHAPTER 2: ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS – ASSESSING 2021 ANNUAL REPORTS**

2.1: Annual Reports Analysis .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 39

2.2: Country Profiles .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 53

**CHAPTER 3: ATT REPORTING UPDATES AND INSIGHTS FROM 2022**

3.1: Preliminary Review of 2022 Annual Reports .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 196

3.2: Updates on ATT Initial Reports and Monitoring Treaty Implementation .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 205
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT-BAP</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Conflict Armament Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Conference of States Parties to the ATT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIEF</td>
<td>Diversion Information Exchange Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>Man-portable Air-defense System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Center on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN PoA</td>
<td>United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNROCA</td>
<td>United Nations Register on Conventional Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTF</td>
<td>ATT Voluntary Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGETI</td>
<td>ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGTR</td>
<td>ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGTU</td>
<td>ATT Working Group on Treaty Universalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UKRAINIAN VOLUNTEER FIGHTERS FIRING A BRITISH ARMY AS90 IN THE UK.**

**CREDIT: © NATO**
THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor is the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The project was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Austria, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

The ATT Monitor meets the research needs of ATT stakeholders by:

• Synthesizing information and analysing trends and developments on ATT compliance to advance the Treaty’s universalization and implementation
• Assessing standards of national reporting (Article 13) and relevant transparency commitments
• Providing country-by-country analysis on reporting and transfer practices
• Identifying patterns and trends of exports/imports of conventional weapons and reporting them against ATT criteria
• Making research findings available in print and online, in user-friendly formats, and translating key publications into languages other than English
• Maintaining a global network of experts who contribute to ATT Monitor outputs through the International Reference Group (IRG), and contributing to development of ATT Monitor content through the Editorial Board

This information is used to:

• Advance the ATT’s universalization and implementation
• Identify key challenges in advancing global acceptance of the ATT’s norms and its full implementation, and propose steps to address these challenges
• Provide recommendations for government policy planning and decision-making
• Provide a research-based tool to civil society for use in developing advocacy campaigns and capacity-building and training programs
ATTlegates during CSP 8 in Geneva.
Credit: © Control Arms
STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW JUNE 2022-MAY 2023

This review covers the period between 1 June 2022 and 31 May 2023, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some of the key events and milestones during the past year, and it assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first looks at compliance with the ATT’s core provisions and assesses whether States Parties are complying with their obligations under the Treaty in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. Second, it takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the above-mentioned period. It then considers the decisions and outputs of the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), which includes three sub-working groups on risk assessment (Articles 6 and 7), diversion (Article 11) and transit and transshipment (Article 9).

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Ten years after the Arms Trade Treaty was adopted, its main aims and objectives of reducing human suffering continued to be tested. More than a year since the Russian Federation unlawfully invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the humanitarian crisis caused by the war has resulted in severe consequences for civilians, with widespread displacement, food and medical shortages, and a devastating impact on the overall well-being and safety of the affected populations.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine created in March 2022 has collected evidence that Russian authorities have engaged in numerous violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law across various regions of Ukraine as well as within the Russian Federation. Many of these violations amount to war crimes, encompassing deliberate killings, attacks on civilians, unlawful detentions, torture, rape and forced displacements, particularly affecting children. The commission also determined that Russian armed forces conducted indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks using explosive weapons in populated areas, which violate international humanitarian law. Furthermore, the commission has found that the series of attacks by Russian armed forces on Ukraine’s energy-related infrastructure since 10 October 2022, along with the use of torture by Russian authorities, may constitute crimes against humanity, warranting further investigations.1

Since February 2022, the war has inflicted immense devastation upon the civilian population of Ukraine. As of early May 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights had documented the deaths of 8,792 civilians and the injuries of another 14,815 in the country since 24 February 2022.2 Furthermore, the war has triggered a scale of population displacement unparalleled in Europe since the Second World War. As of 21 February 2023, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had reported approximately eight million Ukrainian refugees scattered across Europe, around 90 per cent of them women and children. Approximately 5.4 million people are currently displaced from their homes because of the war.3

...THE WAR HAS TRIGGERED A SCALE OF POPULATION DISPLACEMENT UNPARALLELED IN EUROPE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. AS OF 21 FEBRUARY 2023, THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES HAD REPORTED APPROXIMATELY EIGHT MILLION UKRAINIAN REFUGEES SCATTERED ACROSS EUROPE, AROUND 90 PER CENT OF THEM WOMEN AND CHILDREN. APPROXIMATELY 5.4 MILLION PEOPLE ARE CURRENTLY DISPLACED FROM THEIR HOMES.

Following the start of the war, Western countries and their allies imposed several sets of sanctions on the Russian Federation. The European Union also closed a legal loophole that allowed the transfer of weapons to the Russian Federation despite the arms embargo in place since 2014. Based on the information provided in 2022 ATT annual reports, there was a deep decline in the number of States Parties reporting authorized or actual arms exports to the Russian Federation compared to previous years. This observation presents an optimistic indication that certain States Parties are taking steps to enforce and modify their national policies, aligning them with the obligations outlined in the ATT. Additionally, it suggests that some States Parties may have reinforced their dedication to upholding the principles and objectives of the ATT.

Only one State Party (Serbia) reported transfers of SALW to the Russian Federation for 2022 in their ATT annual report. While media reports indicate that the People’s Republic of China has provided equipment and materials critical for military uses, such as transport vehicles and semiconductors, that enable provided equipment and materials critical for military uses, media reports indicate that the People’s Republic of China has transferred conventional weapons to the Russian Federation during 2022. It appears that Iran and North Korea have also provided ammunition to the Russian Federation.

Over the past year, Ukraine has been the recipient of weapons and military assistance from at least 29 States Parties. This has included aircraft, helicopters, tanks and armoured vehicles, missile and rocket systems, air defence systems, artillery, ammunition and munitions, and a wide range of SALW. Based on available information from open sources, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the States Parties that provided the largest amount of military aid to Ukraine, totalling an estimated €20.8 billion. A preliminary analysis of ATT 2022 annual reports shows some interesting trends that could be related to the war in Ukraine and the challenges that States Parties could be facing in implementing their obligations under the Treaty. Of note, the on-time reporting rate for 2022 was the lowest since 2016 (see Chapter 3.1) and a group of States Parties that have regularly submitted their annual reports on time or a few weeks late, did not do so this year. On the positive side, other States Parties have shown their commitment to reporting and used a variety of mechanisms to submit information on their arms transfers to Ukraine – from reporting publicly the types of weapons transferred to indicating whether they were donations or aid or disclosing that the number of weapons in specific categories transferred were withheld due to national security reasons. These are all practices that promote the transparency aims and objectives of the ATT.

BETWEEN THE LINES

Based on available information from open sources, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the States Parties that provided the largest amount of military aid to Ukraine, totalling an estimated €20.8 billion.

8 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. See Forum on the Arms Trade (2023). ‘Arms Transfers to Ukraine.’ https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ukrainearms.html#Timeline.
UNIVERSALIZATION
As of 31 May 2023, the ATT Secretariat listed 113 countries as States Parties, accounting for 58 per cent of all United Nations (UN) member states.\(^\text{10}\) It listed a further 28 countries as Signatories. Gabon and Andorra, which ratified the Treaty on 21 September 2022 and 2 December 2022 respectively, were the only countries to become a State Party to the ATT between 1 June 2022 and 31 May 2023. This represents a continuation of the trend of a low annual rate of ATT accessions and ratifications. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties per year between 2015 and 2023.

Table 1: New membership to the ATT by 31 May of each year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
<th>Ratifications</th>
<th>Total Number of States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022–2023</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021–2022</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019–2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019–2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018–2019</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017–2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016–2017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015–2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A consequence of this slow rate of universalization is that the geographic spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2023, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 43 per cent (six of 14 countries) and Africa at 54 per cent (29 of 54 countries).\(^\text{11}\) Europe at 93 per cent (40 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 77 per cent (27 of 35 countries) have the highest proportion of States Parties.

The ATT continues to enjoy particularly strong support in certain sub-regional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with 14 of its 15 members (93 per cent) being States Parties
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 13 of its 15 members (86.7 per cent) being States Parties.

\(^{10}\) Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN members, they are not counted in this share.

RATIFIED/ACCEDED: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, Russian Federation, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia.

SIGNED: Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe

NOT YET JOINED: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen.
UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

This year saw the sixth funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions for its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the first Working Group and Informal Preparatory meetings for the Ninth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP9) in February 2023, 28 States Parties had made voluntary contributions totalling US$11.5 million over the course of the fund’s lifespan, increasing the VTF budget by US$0.7 million compared to the previous year. An additional US$70,231.51 was allocated to the VTF Outreach Programme.

The ATT Secretariat received 15 applications from 13 States Parties for 2022 VTF-funded projects and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for six projects with a total budget of US$612,184. This marks a notable decrease from the 21 project applications received for the 2021 VTF funding, despite the slight increase in the VTF’s disbursement budget. Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, which demonstrates the importance of partnerships in achieving universalization and implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF’s first year of operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Projects Approved</th>
<th>Total Budget for Approved Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>US$ 612,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>US$ 1.26 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>US$ 963,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>US$ 2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>US$ 834,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>US$ 1.3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ATT Secretariat received 15 applications from 13 States Parties for 2022 VTF-funded projects and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for six projects with a total budget of US$612,184. This marks a notable decrease from the 21 project applications received for the 2021 VTF funding, despite the slight increase in the VTF’s disbursement budget. Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, which demonstrates the importance of partnerships in achieving universalization and implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF’s first year of operation.

Table 2: Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year

Table 2 shows projects and funding that were approved by the VTF Selection Committee.
The COVID-19 pandemic continued to have an impact on the implementation and completion of VTF-funded projects in 2022. While a majority of projects in the 2019 and 2020 funding cycles were completed within a 12-month period, only one was completed in the 2022 cycle. Similarly for the 2021 funding cycle, only three of the 13 funded projects had been successfully completed by February 2023.

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation also continued this year. Mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, the EU ATT Outreach Project and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

Government representatives and CSOs from around the world met at national and regional training workshops to learn more about the ATT and how to implement it in their countries. They discussed the technical challenges, legal requirements and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts to implement ATT provisions.

Examples include:

- From 7 to 9 June 2022, the Subregional Small Arms and Ammunition Field Identification and Tracing (SAAFIT) Dialogue and Training took place in Nairobi, Kenya. It was jointly conducted by the African Union Commission, the Regional Centre on Small Arms, the Kenyan National Focal Point on Small Arms, the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies and the Bundeswehr Verification Centre. Delegations from six East African countries, along with experts from Interpol, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, Conflict Armament Research, and the Sub-Regional Arms Control Mechanism, participated in the training, whose objective was to equip the delegations with technical and policy knowledge related to the identification, marking, record-keeping and destruction of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. The training was part of the project ‘Supporting small arms and light weapons (SALW) control in Africa’ that seeks to support the implementation of international and regional small arms control instruments, including the ATT, and is funded by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany.
• From 25 to 26 October 2022, Rwanda’s Ministry of Interior, the ATT Secretariat and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) held a two-day sensitization workshop for the country’s CSOs on its ATT accession. The permanent secretary in the Ministry of Interior, Mr Sesonga Benjamin, highlighted that the illicit trafficking in SALW is a major cause of insecurity in the RECSA region and recalled that full implementation of the ATT would reduce this problem in the region.20

• On 1 June 2023, Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the EU, through France’s cooperation agency Expertise France and Germany’s Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), held the third phase of the EU Partner to Partner ATT program. During the regional conference, titled ‘The importance and usefulness of the ATT’, authorities from more than 20 countries shared cases and key aspects of how they have prevented the diversion of conventional weapons. The EU-Mexico program, which began in 2020, seeks to promote international cooperation, legal assistance, and shared responsibility to address gun violence in Mexico and the region.21

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

ANNUAL REPORTS

States Parties are required to submit by 31 May each year annual reports detailing their arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year.22 However, they are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2023, 110 of the 113 States Parties were required to submit their 2022 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 35 submitted an annual report by the deadline – a compliance rate of 32 per cent. This was the lowest on-time annual reporting compliance rate in the ATT’s history – the previous record low being when the initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a rate of 38 per cent for the 2019 annual reports. It is likely, however, that more than these 35 States Parties submitted their 2022 annual reports on time. In past years, all reports submitted on time were uploaded on the ATT Secretariat’s website and made available by the 7 June deadline. This year, as of 20 June 2023, an additional ten reports had been published after the deadline, increasing to 45 the number of reports available.

Of the 35 annual reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat website by the 7 June deadline, nine were kept confidential, nearly 26 per cent of on-time submissions.23 This represents a positive development: a decrease in confidential on-time reporting compared to 32 per cent of the 2021 annual reports submitted by 7 June 2022 being kept confidential last year.

A preliminary analysis of the contents of the 2022 annual reports can be found in Chapter 3.1.

INITIAL REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each State Party, within the first year after its entry into force for that State Party, to submit to the ATT Secretariat an initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty.24 As of 7 June 2023, 110 of 113 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 87 (79 per cent) had done so.25

Two States Parties submitted overdue initial reports since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Report: Brazil, which was due to report in 2019 and Lesotho in 2017. Based on dates of Treaty accession, no new States Parties were required to submit a report by 7 June 2023.

Article 13.1 requires States Parties to provide the ATT Secretariat, in addition to initial reports, with relevant updates or changes to their national arms-transfer control systems.26 As of 7 June 2023, none of the initial reports that are public appear to have been updated since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Annual Report.

An in-depth analysis of the contents of newly submitted initial reports is provided in Chapter 3.2.


23 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Croatia, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Latvia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Spain and State of Palestine.


SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Eighth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP8) was conducted in person between 22 and 26 August 2022. Representatives from 108 countries, comprising 87 States Parties, 20 Signatories and one Observer State attended.26 Other stakeholders also attended, including representatives of ten international and regional organizations, including the EU and UN agencies, and 40 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing industry.27 The thematic focus of CSP8 was post-shipment controls and coordination, effective export verification and good-faith cooperation between exporters and importers.28

Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany served as the President of CSP8. Procedural decisions adopted included the following:

- Endorsement of the extension by one additional year of the work of the sub-working group on Article 11 to enable focus on post-shipment delivery cooperation
- Endorsement of the revised ‘FAQ’-type guidance document on the annual reporting obligation
- Endorsement of the mandate for the WGTR in the period between CSP8 and CSP9
- Appointment of Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as members of the VTF Selection Committee from CSP9 to CSP10
- Election of the permanent representative of the Republic of Korea to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Yoon Seong-mee, as the President of CSP9
- Election of Australia, Latvia, Uruguay and South Africa as Vice-Presidents of CSP9
- Scheduling of CSP9 for 21–25 August 2023 in Geneva, Switzerland29

---

27 Ibid.
THE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69), RIGHT, REPLENISHES FROM THE FAST COMBAT SUPPORT SHIP USNS SUPPLY (T-AOE 6) IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

CREDIT: © US NAVY / MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST 2ND CLASS MERISSA DALE
NINTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES – INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD


The WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Ignacio Sánchez de Lerín, permanent representative of Spain to the Conference on Disarmament, addressed the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on Articles 6 and 7 (prohibitions and export assessment), Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment) and Article 11 (diversion).

The WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7, facilitated by Ambassador Sánchez de Lerín, reviewed the list of possible draft elements (developed from discussions held in the CSP8 cycle) for Chapter 2 (Article 6 – prohibitions) of the proposed Voluntary Guide to assist States Parties in implementing Articles 6 and 7. The sub-working group further highlighted the need to complement the Voluntary Guide with an exchange of concrete practical experiences of States Parties, and it discussed arms transfer mitigation measures regarding the implementation of Article 7.4 on gender-based violence.30

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 11 (diversion), also facilitated by Ambassador Sánchez de Lerín, considered in its February meeting the topic of post-delivery cooperation, particularly with regard to the potential utility of creating further guidance to enhance information sharing among importers and exporters. During its second meeting in May, State Parties explored challenges of post-shipment verification, diversion prevention and disconnects between exporting actors and industry. As it has reached the end of its multi-year plan, the sub-working group will be concluding its work this year.31

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment), facilitated by Mr Rob Wensley of South Africa, focused on the Draft Voluntary Guide on the Implementation of Article 9,32 a resource for States Parties seeking to strengthen their transit and trans-shipment controls, in its February meeting. The draft received positive feedback without objections, and there were discussions on the importance of regional cooperation and the need for further exploration of implications for free trade areas, competing jurisdictions and industry stakeholders. States Parties further explored state practice regarding the implementation and relationships among Articles 6, 7 and 9. During the second meeting of the sub-working group in May, inputs were collected from delegations to continue improvements to the Draft Voluntary Guide, which concluded the final work of this sub-working group.33

The WGTR, facilitated by the ATT Secretariat, continued to pursue an agenda containing substantive work to support reporting by States Parties in the CSP9 preparatory meetings. Along with an update on compliance with reporting obligations, WGTR discussions focused on challenges concerning reporting and transparency issues, the decrease in report submission, and the rise in confidential reporting. Proposals to address these challenges included the identification of regional champions on reporting that could assist States Parties facing obstacles.34

The WGTU, co-chaired by President of CSP9 Ambassador Yoon Seong-mee of the Republic of Korea and by Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany, discussed the activities of the Republic of Korea to promote universalization of the ATT, efforts to promote universalization by the WGTU co-chairs and States Parties (particularly stressing the utility of a regional approach) and by civil society, and the status of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty.35

---

31 Ibid., pp. 49–55.
32 Ibid., pp. 28–43.
33 Ibid., pp. 25–27.
The first Informal Preparatory meeting for CSP9 was held on 17 February 2023 and the second one on 12 May 2023. Ambassador Yoon Seong-mee of the Republic of Korea opened the first meeting by introducing the priority theme for the Korean Presidency – The Role of Industry in Responsible International Transfers of Conventional Arms – and outlined how this would be taken forward during the CSP9 cycle. Other updates provided overviews of the implementation of CSP8 decisions and progress reports of ATT subsidiary bodies. The second meeting saw an update on the informal consultations conducted regarding this priority theme, including the suggested utilization of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, along with progress reports from all ATT subsidiary bodies. The ATT Management Committee provided updates on the status of ATT finances and a proposal to review the ATT programme of work. The proposed review includes a reduction in the number of in-person meetings of the ATT Working Group from eight to five days, in an effort to optimize the support process and address the congested disarmament calendar and the limited capacity of delegations. It is also proposed that these streamlined meetings would be supported by informal consultations, either virtual or hybrid, to increase flexibility and inclusivity. The proposal aims to enhance practical implementation, avoid repetition and duplication, and adapt the process to the evolving needs of the Treaty.

The WGETI had the most ambitious agenda of the CSP9 cycle, which included in May 2023 the presentation of a proposal to explore future options to configure its work. The draft paper seeks to address the need for improved communication and cooperation among States Parties. It proposes nine topics for the WGETI to examine, which would follow a sequential order from the ATT process, from ratification and accession through to post-delivery measures and international assistance. The WGETI will also seek to cooperate with other working groups, such as the WGTU, to develop implementation support for new States Parties. A new multi-year work plan will be elaborated over the course of 2024. The aim of these proposals is to boost the exchanges between States Parties and with other international instruments, such as the UN Programme of Action and the Human Rights Council. By approaching these subjects jointly and drawing from national experiences, the WGETI hopes to improve the implementation of the ATT and to make the Treaty more effective in preventing the illicit trade in arms.

The other Working Groups set expectations low in their agendas for intersessional work, some perhaps due to the absence of a Chairperson and Facilitators. Almost nine years since the entry into force of the Treaty, the pressing urgency for concerted and unwavering efforts to enforce every provision has become even more evident. Regrettably, States Parties persist in unwarranted hesitancy when it comes to engaging in meaningful dialogues concerning compliance.

“ALMOST NINE YEARS SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, THE PRESSING URGENCY FOR CONCERTED AND UNWAVERING EFFORTS TO ENFORCE EVERY PROVISION HAS BECOME EVEN MORE EVIDENT. REGRETTABLY, STATES PARTIES PERSIST IN DISPLAYING UNWARRANTED HESITANCY WHEN IT COMES TO ENGAGING IN MEANINGFUL DIALOGUES CONCERNING COMPLIANCE.”

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
Chapter 1 summarizes how conventional ammunition is covered by the ATT and provides a brief analysis of the main gaps in how the Treaty addresses ammunition. It then focuses on one specific area of control – conventional ammunition diversion – by presenting several case studies that highlight some ways in which ammunition may be diverted. It also explores some of the measures that States Parties could take to attempt to prevent or mitigate such diversion. The chapter concludes with recommendations for how to address conventional ammunition within the current Treaty architecture, including the recently established Diversion Information Exchange Forum.

Chapter 2.1 provides an in-depth look at 2021 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties’ compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as to a higher standard of transparency. It shows that, while some States Parties have shown themselves to be committed to public reporting, the lack of meaningfully transparent reporting by many others is a matter of concern as reporting is vital to the implementation of the Treaty.

Chapter 2.2 includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2021 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting-practice metrics (public reporting, on-time reporting, withholding security information) as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners.

Chapter 3.1 includes a summary assessment of 2022 annual reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline. It is anticipated that more States Parties will submit their report between the legal deadline of 31 May and the beginning of CSP9. Therefore, this analysis will be expanded in next year’s ATT Monitor report.

Chapter 3.2 includes a summary assessment of initial reports and updates to them submitted by States Parties as of 7 June 2023. From this assessment comes an analysis of reporting non-compliance, highlighting challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations and the efforts of the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to address them. The chapter also presents some examples of how States Parties have described in their initial reports their relationship with arms industry, the theme of the CSP9 Presidency.
A UKRAINIAN SOLDIER AIDS A TRAINING VERSION OF THE NLAW (NEXT-GENERATION LIGHT ANTI-ARMOUR WEAPON) DURING TRAINING OVERSEEN BY NORWEGIAN INSTRUCTORS.

CREDIT: © NATO
CHAPTER 1 - CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
CONTROLS AND THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

INTRODUCTION

On 1 March 2018, Iraqi security forces apprehended a vehicle as it headed west along a major highway in the city of Mosul. Upon inspection, they discovered more than 300 tins, each containing hundreds of rounds of small-calibre ammunition. The vehicle was also carrying almost a thousand rockets, projectiles and propelling charges, as well as 28 rocket launchers. In all, the vehicle contained more than 234,000 units of diverted ammunition, almost a quarter of which had been produced in the previous decade.¹

Conventional ammunition – which ranges from small-calibre cartridges to larger items like mortars, rockets, and precision-guided munitions – can be extremely vulnerable to diversion and highly attractive to criminals, terrorists and violent non-state actors. Moreover, conventional ammunition may pose several safety and security concerns that are distinct from those related to their associated weapon systems. These include risks arising from unsafe handling or inadequate storage at munitions sites. Ammunition and explosives are designed to detonate or combust, and therefore they have a degree of inherent instability.² Researchers have recorded 636 unplanned explosions at munitions sites between 1979 and 2021, resulting from factors such as inappropriate working practices, poor security and a lack of surveillance leading to ammunition deterioration. More than 30,000 people were killed or injured in these incidents, an average of 718 per year.³ Ammunition lost, stolen or otherwise diverted from its legitimate state or private custodians can also be repurposed by non-state actors for use in improvised weapons or in improvised explosive devices.

Ammunition is, furthermore, a consumable item. In environments affected by armed violence, conflict and crime, demand for it increases and supplies need to be replenished fast. Evidence from the field consistently shows far higher proportions of recently manufactured ammunition in illicit supply than of weapons.⁴ Strict ammunition controls could therefore have an outsized impact on stemming insecurity, armed violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. During the negotiations that established the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), ammunition was the category most frequently nominated for inclusion, with 62 states calling for it to be included in the Treaty’s scope.⁵ Despite this, ammunition is imperfectly addressed in the Treaty and by international arms control initiatives as a whole.

This chapter is divided into three sections. First, it summarizes how conventional ammunition is covered by the ATT and provides a brief analysis of the main gaps in how the Treaty addresses it. Second, it focuses on one specific area of controls – conventional ammunition diversion – and presents case studies that draw on field data collected by the independent investigative organization Conflict Armament Research, as well as a judicial case in Brazil that was first reported by Instituto Sou da Paz. These case studies highlight some ways in which ammunition may be diverted, such as capture in battle or leakage from security forces. The section also explores some of the measures that States Parties could take to attempt to prevent or mitigate such diversion, specifically ammunition marking and tracing as well as the implementation of pre-export controls and risk assessments. Third, this chapter considers how such cases may be further addressed within the current Treaty architecture, including the recently established Diversion Information Exchange Forum.

¹ This case was documented by Conflict Armament Research field investigators on 13 and 14 March 2018. Further information is available at www.itrace.com.
Article 3 of the ATT sets out the central obligations of States Parties with respect to conventional ammunition/munitions. It reads:

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.

Conventional ammunition types covered by Article 3 are those that can be either ‘fired, launched or delivered’ by any of the seven categories of major conventional weapons in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as well as by small arms and light weapons. The term ‘fired, launched or delivered’ presents a broad basis for inclusion of a range of different ammunition by focusing on how the items are to be used rather than by identifying prescriptive technical criteria.

The purpose and effect of Article 3 is to link its scope to that of the Treaty as a whole and to establish that anything deployed by the weapon systems listed within Article 2.1 should be treated by States Parties as necessary to subject to export controls.

States Parties are required to include conventional ammunition in their national control lists under Article 5.2. However, while Article 5.3 gives an indication of the minimum requirements for such a list as regards conventional weapons, and it encourages each State Party ‘to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms’, no such guidance is provided for ammunition. A large number of States Parties have declared that their national control lists go beyond the minimum requirements established by the Treaty text. Analysis of ATT initial reports shows that, as of May 2023, 57 States Parties had a national control list that covers ammunition (See Table 1). Only eight States Parties said that they did not include ammunition.

### Table 1 - National control lists including conventional ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The national control list includes ammunition/munitions for the conventional arms covered in Article 2.1 for the application of Article 3</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No report due</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No report submitted</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private report</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not completed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6 The Treaty text uses the term ‘ammunition/munitions’, implying that these are two interchangeable designations. As these are in fact two distinct and separate terms with different technical definitions from an operational perspective (see, for instance, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines), this chapter use ‘conventional ammunition’ throughout to refer to the scope of material covered in the ATT.


Article 3 obligations focus primarily on export controls. The article obligates States Parties to apply the provisions of Article 6 and 7 prior to authorizing the export of ammunition/munitions. States Parties are therefore required to follow an identical process for assessing prospective ammunition exports as for conventional weapons and to base this assessment on the same risk criteria. This includes a clear requirement not to export ammunition if there is deemed to be an overriding risk of any of the negative consequences identified in Article 7.1, such as the potential for use to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian or human rights law. States Parties must also take into account the risk of ammunition being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.9 Therefore, the transfer prohibitions listed in Article 6 and the risk-assessment criteria enumerated in Article 7 apply equally and fully to all transfers envisaged by the ATT, whether for conventional arms, ammunition or parts and components.10

While Article 3 makes it clear that the same provisions of the ATT apply to exports of conventional ammunition as to the conventional weapons listed in Article 2.1, it does not so explicitly for any of the other operative articles of the Treaty. No specific connections are established between Article 3 and Articles 8 (import), 9 (transit or trans-shipment), 10 (brokering), 11 (diversion) or 12 (record-keeping). Nor is any connection established in relation to reporting on export and import activity (Article 13). The inconsistency in the ATT’s treatment of conventional ammunition may, in theory, contribute to significant uncertainty among States Parties were they to adopt a narrow reading of the Treaty’s obligations.

In some contexts, the obligations faced by States Parties under the Treaty are clear. In a situation, for example, where a consignment of conventional ammunition is transiting a State Party’s jurisdiction and the transit authority has knowledge that it would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, then Article 6 unambiguously applies to any transfer of items covered under Article 3. This therefore negates the explicit absence of reference to ammunition in Article 9 on transit or trans-shipment controls.11 As noted in a legal briefing prepared in 2015 for the Expert Group on ATT Implementation, ‘a transit State Party that permits a transfer of covered items that falls within the ambit of Article 6.3 has more than just a secondary responsibility as a complicit party under Article 16 of the Articles of State Responsibility [...] the transit State commits a direct violation of a primary rule of international law under the ATT’.12 In other cases, the obligations are less clear. The ATT does not establish the requirement for States Parties to apply transit and trans-shipment controls to ammunition transfers even if they might violate the criteria of Article 7, such as a risk of their use in serious violations of international human rights law. Here an approach based on a narrow reading of the Treaty would, however, be difficult to frame as consistent with its stated purpose of reducing human suffering and contribution to peace, security and stability. Several States Parties have stated during a discussion of the implementation of Article 9 in the sub-working group on transit and trans-shipment measures that their control regimes apply ‘exactly the same assessment criteria to transit and trans-shipmen as they do to export, referring to both Article 6 and 7’.13

The ATT clearly has gaps in the way it addresses ammunition and, particularly, in the way that the provisions relating to diversion (Article 11) are not explicitly applied to ammunition. However, States Parties have the opportunity to address this and other lacunae through their national arms and ammunition transfer control systems. A recent international process, the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Conventional Ammunition, worked to establish norms and best practices for through-life management of ammunition. This includes the tracking of ammunition from production to disposal, as well as the prevention of its diversion and misuse. The OEWG made significant progress in addressing these issues and its work was an important step towards strengthening the global regime for the control of ammunition (See Box 1).

---

9 The same formulation is used to reflect States Parties’ obligations regarding parts and components in Article 4.
11 Casey-Maslen, S., et al (2016). para 3.04, p. 138. Certain international instruments may provide further support to transit and trans-shipment States Parties in this regard. For example, Article 10.2.b of the UN Firearms Protocol states that, before issuing export licenses or authorisation for the transfers not only firearms, but also their parts and components and ammunition, State Parties must ensure that ‘without prejudice to bilateral or multilateral agreements or agreements favouring landlocked States, the transit States have, at a minimum, given notice in writing, prior to shipment, that they have no objection to the transit’. Protocol Against the Ilicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, (2001). https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/recenttexts/18-12_c_e.pdf.
13 With some exceptions, such as forms of transit without trans-shipment, such as overflight, in which cases the prohibitions in Article 6 serve as the legal basis for ad hoc transit controls. See ATT Secretariat (2023). ‘Elements of a Voluntary Guide to Implementing Article 9.’ ATT/CSP/WGETI/2023/CHAIR/148/M2.LetterSubDocs, 3 April 2023. Paragraph 5. https://bit.ly/3NhARmN.
BOX 1: THE OEWG ON CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION

On 24 December 2021, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 76/233. The resolution established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management. The OEWG completed its work in June 2023 and adopted, without a vote, a final report to the General Assembly at its 78th session in September 2023. The final report consists of 15 objectives for safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management. While the nature and scope of the frameworks differ, the purpose and objectives of the ATT and the OEWG final report align in the following ways to promote responsible international transfers of conventional ammunition.

Reducing human suffering resulting from ineffective management of conventional ammunition: Article 1 of the ATT defines the purposes and objectives of the Treaty, which include to prevent eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion, to contribute to international peace and security, and to reduce human suffering. Similarly, Participating States of the OEWG expressed serious concern over the risks posed by the diversion of conventional ammunition of all types to unauthorized recipients and the threat these pose to international peace and security. To this end, they stressed the importance of addressing the safety and security risks emanating from ineffective through-life management of conventional ammunition and the need to reduce human suffering, including through effective management of conventional ammunition in international transfers.

Promoting effective management of conventional ammunition to reduce diversion risks at the pre-transfer, in-transfer and post-transfer stages: While the OEWG does not seek to establish legal frameworks to regulate the international transfer of conventional ammunition, Participating States recognized that pre-transfer risk assessments on diversion form an essential security element for evaluating risks of diversion along the supply chain, and they acknowledged the value of taking measures to ensure that only authorized users have custody of the ammunition at the post-transfer stage. Key elements under consideration by Participating States to promote the effective management of the transfer of conventional ammunition to prevent diversion include: diversion risk assessments, the use of end-user certificates and equivalent documents at the pre-transfer stage, and post-transfer measures including encouragement for parties involved in the transfer to undertake cooperative post-delivery activities and to facilitate voluntary information sharing on diverted and trafficked ammunition.

Facilitating international cooperation and assistance in the through-life management of conventional ammunition: One of the primary purposes of the ATT is to promote cooperation and responsible actions among States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among them (Article 1). This is reinforced specifically under Article 15 (international cooperation) and measures that States Parties may undertake to assist each other under Article 16 (international assistance) in promoting the effective implementation of the Treaty. Similarly, the primary purpose of the OEWG was to elaborate a set of political commitments that serves as an enabling framework to facilitate cooperation and assistance for states to strengthen the through-life management of conventional ammunition, thereby reducing safety and security risks associated with ineffectively managed ammunition. To this end, states may consider cooperation and assistance activities that benefit the implementation of both frameworks, including in the areas of record keeping, diversion risk assessments, post-transfer measures such as physical security and stockpile management, and voluntary information-sharing on conventional ammunition diversion and trafficking, including to support national tracing, investigations and criminal justice responses related to the diversion of conventional ammunition.

CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION DIVERSION

The absence of ammunition from Article 11’s provisions on diversion, unless subject to prohibitions under Article 6, in particular is significant, especially in light of the heightened vulnerability of much of this materiel to diversion. Indeed, it can be argued that measures taken to control unauthorised access to ammunition – such as its acquisition by insurgent or terrorist forces – can have a greater immediate impact on conflict intensity than measures enacted to control weapons alone. This section presents three case studies that illustrate some recent instances of ammunition diversion. They have been selected to highlight not only how diversion may occur, but also how States Parties have attempted to prevent or mitigate it. The cases describe the introduction of pre-export controls to reduce the risk of diversion of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), attempts to trace mortars recovered in northeastern Syria from a suspected Islamic State cell and how the discovery of marked small-calibre ammunition cases helped identify individuals responsible for a homicide in Brazil. The section begins with a brief analysis of data collected by field investigators documenting illicit conventional ammunition in conflict zones.

Since 2011, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) field investigators have documented more than 618,000 units of conventional ammunition that have been diverted into conflict zones. One of the most notable features of the information in CAR’s global dataset is that almost half of this diverted conventional ammunition was produced after 2010. By comparison, just 15 per cent of the documented illicit weapons with an identified age were made in the same period. Almost half of CAR’s documented weapons were produced in the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 1). This finding is consistent across diverse operational contexts and highlights several challenges particular to conventional ammunition. CAR’s field experience demonstrates that conventional ammunition is prone to rapid diversion to illicit armed actors. This may be due to several factors, including elevated demand because existing stocks have been used or have become unsafe, the relative ease with which ammunition may be stolen or trafficked based on its size, different stockpiling or management practices for ammunition compared to weapons and the ways through which small-calibre ammunition in particular may be available to non-state actors (that is, through commercial sales, including online).

FIGURE 1- PERCENTAGE OF CAR - DOCUMENTED ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (GREY) AND AMMUNITION (RED) BY PRODUCTION YEAR (BETWEEN 1910 AND 2019).

16 A 2020 study of the ATT’s obligations on diversion noted that ‘all States Parties are required to consider the diversion of ammunition/munitions, and parts and components, in relation to the overarching prohibitions contained in Article 6 of the ATT. For example, Article 6(1) requires that States Parties respect Security Council arms embargoes, the scope of which is usually wider than Articles 2(1), 3 and 4 of the ATT. In addition, the ATT prohibitions under Article 6(2) may also require anti-diversion measures covering transfers of ammunition/munitions or parts and components where those measures are required in order to fulfil the obligations which many ATT States Parties have also accepted under the Firearms Protocol’. See Wood, B. (2020). ‘The Arms Trade Treaty: Obligations to Prevent the Diversion of Conventional Arms’. ATT Issue Brief No.1. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Conflict Armament Research (CAR), Stimson Center. Small Arms Survey. https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treaty-obligations-prevent-diversion-conventional-arms.


18 Investigators work in partnership with national and local security forces to physically document illicit weapons, ammunition and other military materiel that has been recovered from armed actors, including terrorists. CAR then traces the supply chain for these items to try and establish how it was diverted. For more information, see https://www.conflictarm.com/itrace/.
Figure 2 shows the countries where CAR field investigators have documented conventional ammunition manufactured since the ATT entered into force in 2014 and then subsequently diverted and recovered from non-state armed actors. It shows that non-state armed actors have been able to access recently produced ammunition in almost every country where CAR field investigators are active.¹⁹

Each location in which investigators documented the presence of post-2014 ammunition is highlighted with a red circle. The size of the circle is based on the quantity of ammunition observed at each location. Larger circles, such as in the case of South Sudan, are often associated with single documentations of large quantities of small-calibre ammunition recovered in their original packaging.

---

¹⁹ Ukraine is the sole exception within CAR’s active operations. CAR field investigators have worked in the country since 2018 to document illicit weapons, ammunition and related military materiel recovered from armed formations of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics.’ During its operations in Ukraine between 2018 and 2021, CAR did not document any conventional ammunition that post-dated 2014, which was the year in which the conflict began. Since resuming field investigations following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, CAR’s investigations have focused on documenting advanced weapon systems deployed by Russian Federation forces in the conflict.
The following case studies illustrate some of the common dynamics concerning conventional ammunition diversion, especially relating to armed conflict. They include instances documented in Ukraine, Syria and Niger by CAR field investigators, as well as the outcome of a judicial investigation into an extrajudicial killing in Brazil that involved tracing the marked small-calibre ammunition used.20 These cases do not only highlight modalities through which ammunition is often diverted; they also touch on important measures that States Parties may take to help to strengthen ammunition controls in general.

**PRE-EXPORT CONTROLS**

**Case 1: MANPADS lost in battle**

Conducting diversion risk assessments prior to export is a vital preventive measure that States Parties can take to protect potential exports of conventional ammunition.21 Article 11.2 requires States Parties to assess the risk of diversion only of exports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1. In so far as the Treaty requires that States Parties extend the risk assessment process to exports of ammunition, this is limited to the risk criteria elaborated under Article 7.1; that is, for example, that the diversion of an item might be involved in the commission or facilitation of an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism.

Technologically advanced conventional ammunition systems, such as ammunition for MANPADS, are considered by states to be particularly sensitive and to require heightened transfer controls, including enhanced risk assessments and the introduction of mitigation measures where appropriate.22 On 27 September 2018, CAR field investigators documented two Polish-made Grom MANPADS launch tubes – one with a battery coolant unit and one with a missile – that had been recovered by security forces in Ukraine.23 The Polish company MESKO SA manufactured the tubes in 2007. In response to a trace request issued by CAR, the Polish authorities stated that the Ministry of Economy had authorized the export of the launch tubes and gripstocks to the government of Georgia as part of an agreement between the two governments brokered in November-December 2007. The items were part of a delivery of 100 Grom MANPADS launch tubes and missiles, shipped with non-sequential serial numbers. These items were part of an export licence issued by the Polish Ministry of Economy on 22 October 2007 for export to the end-user, the Georgian Ministry of Defence.24

---

20 CAR does not have field operations in Brazil and this case is not related to the physical evidence collected by the organization.
24 On 31 October 2018, the government of the Republic of Poland responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR on 4 October 2018. This response confirms that: 1) the Polish Ministry of Economy authorized the export of the Grom E2 MANPADS launch tube with lot number E2-07-21 and serial number 1134, subject to CAR’s trace request, to the government of Georgia as part of an agreement between the two governments brokered in November and December 2007; 2) the Polish Ministry of Economy issued an export licence dated 22 October 2007 for export to the end-user, the Georgian Ministry of Defence; 3) in 2006 and 2007, prior to issuance of the export licence, representatives of the Polish Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy visited Georgia. These meetings were arranged to provide support to the Georgian army in fulfilling the additional requirements of the Wassenaar Arrangement and in particular, preparing the physical protection for the MANPADS storage and stockpile management; 4) the MANPADS launch tube was part of a delivery of 100 Grom MANPADS launch tubes and missiles (serial numbers 996, 1012-1016, 1023-1032, 1034, 1036-1069, 1072, 1073, 1075-1081, 1083-1091, 1093-1096, 1098, 1099, 1101-1124, 1134) and 16 gripstocks (serial numbers 169-174, 176-185); 5) the Georgian Ministry of Defence stored the equipment in a military base in Senaki (western Georgia); 6) the Polish authorities conducted a post-delivery verification assessment and confirmed that all requirements for secure storage and stockpile management were fulfilled at that time; and 7) during the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 many of the missiles were used in battle and at least 26 remained in the possession of the Georgian army. However, some were abandoned on the battlefield and taken over by Russian forces. Polish authorities provided the same information regarding the Grom E2 MANPADS with the serial number 1016.
The Polish authorities also informed CAR of several measures taken to prevent the diversion of this sensitive equipment. Before the licenses were issued, representatives of Poland’s Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy visited Georgia to provide support to the Georgian army in preparing the physical protection for the storage and stockpile management of the MANPADS. These were equipped with individual starting codes to prevent their use by unauthorized users. After the transfer, the Polish authorities also conducted a post-delivery verification assessment and confirmed that all requirements for secure storage and stockpile management were fulfilled at that time.25

Many of the MANPADS transferred under this license were used in battle during the war between Georgia and the Russian Federation in August 2008. While at least 26 of the original shipment remained in the possession of the Georgian army after the war, some were abandoned on the battlefield and taken by Russian forces. CAR sent a trace request for these items to the government of Georgia, which confirmed that the Georgian authorities had not granted any permit for the export of these items.26

Battlefield capture is a commonly observed diversion type. A 2018 analysis by CAR of its global dataset found that, where a point of diversion could be identified, this was the cause of 30 per cent of documented cases of diversion. While this type battlefield capture can occur up to decades after an initial legal transfer, 16 per cent of such cases documented by CAR concerned items manufactured between 2010 and 2018 – meaning that diversion occurred within a few years of initial export, or even sooner as in the case of the Grom MANPADS.27 This case shows that the implementation of diversion mitigation measures can help to target and address vulnerabilities, especially regarding the transfer of sensitive materiel, but that it may not be able to eliminate the risk of diversion.

25 This measure is recommended by the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines for transfers of ammunition, such as MANPADS, subject to strengthened procedures.

26 On 21 December 2018, the government of Georgia responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR on 1 November 2018. This response confirms that the Ministry of Defence of Georgia, in its capacity as the licensing agency for military materiel, has not granted a permit for the export of the Grom gripstock with serial number 182, the object of CAR’s trace request. On 21 December 2018, the government of Georgia responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR on 1 November 2018. This response confirms that the Ministry of Defence of Georgia, in its capacity as the licensing agency for military materiel, has not granted a permit for the export of the Grom E2 MANPADS launch tube with lot number E2-07-21 and serial number 1134, the object of CAR’s trace request. On 21 December 2018, the government of Georgia responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR on 1 November 2018. This response confirms that the Ministry of Defence of Georgia, in its capacity as the licensing agency for military materiel, has not granted a permit for the export of the Grom E2 MANPADS launch tube with lot number E2-07-21 and serial number 1016, the object of CAR’s trace request.

TRACING

Case 2: Mortar packaging in northeastern Syria

Tracing, while not explicitly referenced in the text of the ATT, has been consistently demonstrated to be a necessary measure to respond to instances of diversion. It not only shines a light on diversion sources as well as previously unknown vulnerabilities in national control systems; it is also a valuable confidence-building tool between parties to a transfer. Diverted items that are marked with lot numbers can be successfully traced to a specific custodian: often a purchase will be in such large quantities that it encompasses an entire lot. Loose rounds of small-calibre ammunition are effectively untraceable, unless recovered in their original packaging.28

In December 2021, CAR field investigators in northeastern Syria documented weapons and ammunition that local security forces had recovered following a raid against a suspected Islamic State cell in November. The cell had reportedly been preparing a large-scale attack on a local prison. The seizure included a large wooden crate containing fragmentation hand grenades. These grenades were not originally part of the packaged contents, according to markings on the crate itself, which indicated that it had originally contained Serbian-manufactured M87P1 120 mm illumination mortar rounds. These mortar rounds were not recovered with the crate and CAR does not have information on whether the contents were diverted alongside the crate, diverted separately or remain in the possession of the original authorized custodian.

CAR field investigators submitted a formal trace request to the government of Serbia, which responded promptly on 8 August 2022. The response confirmed that the Serbian company Krušik had manufactured the M87P1 120 mm illumination mortar rounds and the related crate bearing the lot number ‘KV Lot 02/18’, the subject of CAR’s trace request, in 2018. Krušik had sold the materiel, as part of a larger consignment, to ‘Jugoimport SDPR’ Belgrade, for export to the United States Department of the Army. Transfer documentation for this export stated that the mortar rounds would be either used directly by the US government for defence purposes ‘which include direct use by or for the United States Government by means of grant aid, International Military Education and Training programs, Foreign Military Sale V7-B-AAD, and other security assistance and Armaments cooperation programs’.29

On 5 August 2018, the consignment was delivered to a logistics base in Croatia operated by the US government. CAR field investigators have submitted trace requests to the US government in an effort to further clarify the onward chain of custody of this crate but they are yet to receive a formal response and therefore cannot determine the onward legality of the transfer of the items in question. The information provided by the government of Serbia shows that the crate and, potentially its contents, were lost from the custody of an authorized recipient at some point between 5 August 2018 and 8 November 2021. This case is representative of the short time frame for diversion that is commonly observed with conventional ammunition. While the exact circumstances of the diversion have not yet been ascertained, this case demonstrates that it is possible to conduct tracing for some types of diverted conventional ammunition. It also shows that effective tracing depends on the cooperation and transparency of the transfer parties.

A second related example comes from southeastern Niger where in October 2019 CAR field investigators documented 165 weapons and 6,448 rounds of ammunition that national defence and security forces had recovered from militants associated with Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lid-da’awati wal-Jihad (commonly referred to as Boko Haram) and Islamic State West Africa Province.30 CAR field investigators documented several instances of small-calibre ammunition being recovered in its original packaging and traced it with the cooperation of the manufacturing countries to transfers to national security and defence forces in Nigeria. This includes 200 rounds of armour-piercing incendiary ammunition found inside an open metal box. Marks on the exterior of the box refer to a contract number and the intended consignee: Nigeria’s Ministry of Defence. There is no indication of intent to supply militant groups directly: unauthorized actors could have acquired this ammunition as lost on the battlefield or via raids on ammunition storage facilities, for example.31

---

29 On 8 August 2022, the government of Serbia responded to a formal trace request issued by CAR on 20 June 2022. This response confirms that 1) Krušik manufactured the M87P1 120 mm illumination mortar rounds and the related crate bearing the lot number ‘KV Lot 02/18’, the subject of CAR’s trace request, in 2018; 2) Krušik sold the materiel, as part of a larger consignment, to ‘Jugoimport SDPR’ Belgrade, for export to the US; 3) the sale was supported by an export permit dated 10 December 2017 and an end user certificate signed by the Department of the Army (which stated that the listed items were to be used by the US government for defence purposes ‘which include direct use by or for the United States Government by means of grant aid, International Military Education and Training programs, Foreign Military Sale V7-B-AAD, and other security assistance and Armaments cooperation programs’); 4) on 5 August 2018, ‘Jugoimport SDPR’ delivered the consignment to the US government organisation in Croatia, a logistics base operated by the US government in agreement with the government of Croatia; and 5) Alliant Techsystems Operations, LLC, brokered the deal. The government of Serbia included a copy of the supporting documentation letter and end-user certificate in its response to CAR.  
31 Formal trace investigations are underway with the Nigerian authorities to determine whether the ammunition belonged to the Nigerian army prior to its diversion.
MARKING

Case 3: Small-calibre ammunition used in extrajudicial killings

Conventional ammunition is manufactured in production runs that range from thousands to millions of units and, as such, are invariably marked with collective identifiers. Each individual unit within a run is marked with the same lot number (for larger-calibre items) or headstamp (for small-calibre cartridges). Unique markings are only typically applied to strategically sensitive ammunition like for MANPADS. Collective identifiers typically contain information that can help to determine the provenance of an item, such as the manufacturer, the year of production, the calibre or the specific lot. They do not uniquely identify an individual unit, and efforts to promote the unique marking of small-calibre ammunition have historically met with some resistance, with the large scale of production being cited as a barrier on the grounds of cost and capacity.32 Instances where governments and industry have taken this step, or have pursued alternative approaches to enhancing the traceability of small-calibre ammunition, show the great potential for such solutions to increase accountability and to prevent diversion.33

On 18 October 2020, five people were shot and killed in an extrajudicial killing in the city of Quiterianopolis, Brazil.34 Police investigations confirmed the involvement of five military police officers who were off duty and out of uniform at the time of the attack. A key factor behind the identification of the culprits was the discovery of marked ammunition casings that had previously been sold to the police forces of the state of Ceará, where the deaths occurred.

Brazilian Federal Law No. 10,826 dictates that small-calibre ammunition must be marked with a ‘traceability code’ when it is sold to national police and armed forces.35 The law entered into force in 2005. Manufacturers are required to apply a different mark for every 10,000 rounds of ammunition produced. This code is made up of three letters and two digits, in the format AAA11. Markings are applied to the headstamp and to the extractor groove.
Inspection of spent casings at the scene in Quiterianopolis identified .40 S&W calibre ammunition with the code CLH60, and 5.56 x 45 mm calibre ammunition with the code CLB75. These codes established that the ammunition used in the killings had been delivered to a police training academy in Ceará in the second semester of 2018 for two training courses due to take place the following year. Based on this information, investigators were able to identify and confirm the participation of three military police officers in securing the ammunition used in this attack.

These cases illustrate some of the ways in which conventional ammunition is diverted, and how States Parties may address this. The implementation of pre-export measures, the marking of ammunition with unique identifiers and the sharing of information between transfer parties, including in response to formal trace requests, are just a few examples of the types of measures that States Parties can take in support of the effective through-life management of conventional ammunition. These cases also show that such measures are not panaceas to the challenges in preventing diversion and controlling conventional ammunition during and after transfer. For example, the effectiveness of tracing depends on the quality of the information shared by transfer parties in response to requests. This in turn typically relies on detailed, comprehensive and accessible record-keeping.

Ammunition marking has been a contentious issue in the past and few manufacturers apply marks to small-calibre ammunition that would facilitate investigations in the case of diversion. As noted in Box 1, these measures were part of a group of holistic and interconnected measures discussed within the OEWG on Conventional Ammunition that seeks to elaborate a set of political commitments that will form a global framework to address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management. The ATT, which remains the only global and legally binding framework to address conventional ammunition transfers, also plays a critical role in creating a platform for discussion of responsible actions to ensure effective transfer controls and in promoting international cooperation and assistance among States Parties. The following section identifies several approaches through which ATT States Parties could explore conventional ammunition controls within the ATT platform.
HOW THE ATT CAN ADDRESS CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION CONTROLS

There are several opportunities for enhancing conventional ammunition controls within the current scope of States Parties’ discussions. These include: exploring post-shipment cooperation measures applicable to conventional ammunition, sharing operational information relating to ammunition diversion cases with the Diversion Information Exchange Forum and engaging industry and private-sector entities to share information about new initiatives to reinforce and strengthen supply-chain security for transfers of conventional ammunition.

POST-SHIPMENT COOPERATION MEASURES

The work plan of the ATT sub-working group on Article 11 in advance of the Ninth Conference of States Parties (CSP9) in 2023 is focused on exploring post-shipment measures. Several States Parties either have recently introduced or are actively exploring post-shipment cooperation efforts within their national export control system. As noted in a working paper presented by the President of the Eighth Conference of States Parties in 2022 on this topic, post-shipment measures may take various forms but typically constitute a bilateral exercise between exporting and importing states that enable an exporter to ‘perform checks on military equipment after it has been exported and delivered to the end-user to ensure that exported military equipment remains in the possession of the authorised end-user’. Such measures are broadly envisaged within the stipulation under Article 11.2 that States Parties consider mitigation measures to prevent diversion.

As conventional ammunition is a consumable item and stocks of it are purchased with the intent of being expended and replenished, it poses a particular challenge for existing models of on-site inspections that seek to establish that 100 per cent of transferred supplies are still in the custody of the end-user. However, given the persistent observation of recently supplied ammunition in illicit circulation, States Parties should focus particular attention on how to implement post-shipment measures that are suitable and relevant to conventional ammunition. In addition to the security dimension, there is a vital safety dimension to the management of conventional ammunition. With this safety dimension in mind, one way to implement post-shipment measures in the ammunition context could be to link on-site inspections with wider assistance for enhanced management and accountability practices in respect of recipient states’ ammunition stockpiles.

As conventional ammunition is a consumable item and stocks of it are purchased with the intent of being expended and replenished, it poses a particular challenge for existing models of on-site inspections that seek to establish that 100 per cent of transferred supplies are still in the custody of the end-user.

Post-shipment measures are both a mitigation and preventative measure against ammunition diversion, but they do not compensate for a heightened risk that ammunition may be lost or improperly stored by a recipient. It is therefore critical that States Parties, when considering ammunition exports, conduct detailed assessments of the prospective recipient’s track record with regard to ammunition safety and security. Where a prospective recipient has an identified challenge regarding its structural capacity and accountability systems, the supply of new ammunition will only exacerbate underlying security and diversion risks.

---


37 Switzerland, one of the countries to first introduce such a system, focuses only on ‘finished products’ such as small arms and light weapons. See UNIDIR, CAR, Stimson Center (2022). ‘Post-shipment measures.’ Responding to Diversion: Issue 0.1. conflictarm.org/postshipmentmeasures.

38 As noted in a 2022 SIPRI policy brief, while on-site inspections and assistance relating to physical security and stockpile management are two distinct interventions with different objectives, both practices may be informed and strengthened by each other. See Lewis, M. and Maletta, G. (2022). ‘Post-shipment on-site inspections and stockpile management assistance: bridging gaps.’ SIPRI Policy Brief. August 2022. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/pb_2208_post-shipment_on-site_inspections_and_stockpile_management_assistance.pdf.
THE DIVERSION INFORMATION EXCHANGE FORUM

The Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) was established in 2020 during the Sixth Conference of States Parties. It is a sui generis body within the ATT framework and provides a space for States Parties and Signatories to have informal discussions on concrete cases of suspected or detected diversion. Meetings of the DIEF are restricted to States Parties and Signatories, although they can invite non-state experts to present relevant information on concrete diversion cases. The establishment of a dedicated operational forum to discuss concrete examples of diversion offers a unique opportunity for multilateral information sharing between States Parties. Other similar forums are restricted to regional groups or blocs of states with similar types of engagement in the arms trade — for example, the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports, a forum open only to EU member states, and Project DISRUPT, which seeks to develop the capacity of member countries in Central and South America as well as in West and Central Africa to identify trends, routes and patterns in firearms trafficking. With participation open to 141 countries at the time of writing, the DIEF is a space to inform a broader cross-regional group of states about concrete, operational diversion-related concerns regarding specific arms transfer activities including corruption, international arms-trafficking routes and common points of dispatch, illicit arms brokers, methods of concealment and sources of illicit supply. The DIEF’s effectiveness as a confidence-building forum relies on the extent and nature of interactions between States Parties; if substantive inputs are not brought forward for open discussion within the forum it will struggle to fulfill its potential to inform and prevent diversion. It is therefore important that States Parties and Signatories take advantage of the opportunity the DIEF offers to present successes and challenges in addressing cases of diversion, the outcomes of which can serve to inform and strengthen cross-border diversion prevention efforts.

INDUSTRY ACTORS ARE IMPORTANT STAKEHOLDERS IN THE ATT. THEY ARE ALSO OFTEN DRIVERS OF TECHNICAL INNOVATION, WHICH MAY BE HARNESSED IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES WITH SECURING CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION.

ENGAGEMENT WITH INDUSTRY

Industry actors are important stakeholders in the ATT. They are also often drivers of technical innovation, which may be harnessed in support of efforts to address challenges with securing conventional ammunition. One example of relevant private-sector-led innovation is the embedding of radio frequency identification devices into ammunition packaging or into sensitive ammunition types like anti-tank missiles. Another example concerns a commercial solution to apply chemical identification taggants to loose ammunition to enhance its traceability. To date, industry representatives have not made significant contributions to the deliberations of the ATT sub-working group on Article 11 or other ATT fora. However, with the thematic focus of CSP9 being the role of industry in the ATT framework, future working group meetings may look to explore how the private sector can contribute to enhancing controls on conventional ammunition. In April 2023, the President of CSP9 shared a draft working paper for consideration that encourages industry and private-sector entities to engage in the ATT process to contribute to guidance and information that can support efforts to ensure that transfers do not contravene Treaty provisions outlined in Articles 6, 7, 9 and 11 and to share information on developments that may support effective Treaty implementation.
CONCLUSION
The ATT provides a critical platform to consider measures through which transfers of conventional ammunition can be secured and safeguarded. While conventional ammunition is imperfectly addressed within the Treaty and is not included in the scope of several of its key articles relating to import, transit or trans-shipment, brokering and diversion controls, among others, the evidence from working group discussions, initial reporting and plenary interventions is that States Parties are working to apply the Treaty’s core provisions to ammunition as well as arms within their national control systems.

While the Treaty does not integrate references to Article 3 across all its operative articles, it focuses its ammunition-specific obligations on export controls and establishes explicit links to the articles relating to prohibitions (Article 6) and export assessment (Article 7). This in effect enshrines within the Treaty the recognition of the need to ensure that ammunition of all types and calibres is not transferred to actors that could use them to conduct human rights violations, acts of terrorism or war crimes. Given the distinct safety and security issues posed by the diversion of conventional ammunition, and the evidence that recently produced ammunition is often recovered from illicit non-state actors, it is important that States Parties focus particular attention within the Treaty framework on how to secure and safeguard ammunition before, during, and after transfer; that is, promote effective management of conventional ammunition to reduce diversion. This could include exploration of post-shipment cooperation measures and pre-export controls that could reduce the risk of ammunition diversion, the sharing of information relating to ammunition diversion cases and the engagement of specialist expertise to explore creative solutions to protect conventional ammunition from falling into the hands of illicit armed actors.
AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY CH-47 CHINOOK FROM THE 5TH AVIATION REGIMENT FLIES OVERHEAD DURING EXERCISE CHAU PHA IN TOWNSVILLE FIELD TRAINING AREA, QUEENSLAND.

CREDIT: © COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE / LCPL RILEY BLENNERHASSETT
CHAPTER 2: ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS – ASSESSING 2021 ANNUAL REPORTS

2.1 – ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS

Transparency in arms transfers is a central component of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and fundamental to achieving its aims and objectives. The object and purpose of the Treaty cannot be fulfilled in the absence of transparency among states trading in arms, and transparency more broadly is central to the effective implementation of its operative articles. Transparency can also be seen as an indication of a government’s commitment to monitoring, oversight and accountability.

Article 13.3 of the ATT explicitly requires all States Parties to submit an annual report on their authorized or actual arms exports and imports by 31 May each year.1 The annual reports are crucial in enabling States Parties and other ATT stakeholders to examine whether Treaty commitments have been fulfilled. The analysis of 2021 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, reporting that contributes to the aims and objectives of the Treaty, and reporting that contributes to a higher standard of transparency.

Overall, the analysis of 2021 annual reports shows that progress towards accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting remains disappointing. While there have been some improvements in transparency and some States Parties have resumed reporting after the COVID-19 pandemic, States Parties fall short in other aspects of transparency. In particular, the proportion of annual reports that are meaningfully transparent has been decreasing each year and only a few States Parties provide information on arms transfers that support a higher standard of transparency.

KEY FINDINGS

- Only 68 States Parties (62 per cent) required to submit a 2021 annual report did so. This is the lowest proportion since reporting began in 2015. Of those, only 44 (65 per cent) submitted one that was on time, compared to 46 (70 per cent) who did so for 2020.

- Only 28 States Parties (25 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2021 submitted one that was meaningfully transparent. This proportion is lower than for the previous year when 31 (30 per cent) met these criteria.

- Twenty-one States Parties (31 per cent) submitted a confidential annual report for 2021. This is slightly lower than for 2020 when 23 States Parties (34 per cent) did so.

- Compared to the previous year, a slightly lower number of States Parties disaggregated data by weapon type. Thirty-eight States Parties (93 per cent) did so for 2020 compared to 36 (86 per cent) that provided such information for 2021.

- However, more States Parties are providing descriptions and comments of reported transfers, contributing to a higher standard of transparency. Thirty-four States Parties (50 per cent) submitted an annual report providing descriptions and 28 (41 per cent) provided comments, compared to 29 (44 per cent) and 25 (38 per cent) that did so in their 2020 annual report.

- Only 19 States Parties (17 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2021 complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.

---

METHODOLOGY
Annual reports were downloaded for analysis on 1 February 2023. Reports later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration.

This chapter examines ATT annual reporting on three levels to evaluate whether and to what degree, the reporting obligations and transparency objectives of the ATT have been fulfilled. ATT Monitor analysis considers whether annual reports:

1. Are compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations.
2. Are meaningfully transparent and contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty.
3. Contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

For each level, the ATT Monitor established specific criteria on which annual reports are evaluated. These criteria are listed below.

Distinct evaluation exercises were undertaken for each level of reporting to distinguish between (1) Treaty obligations (Article 13.3 reporting requirements), (2) the minimum amount of information the ATT Monitor has determined is needed for annual reports to be meaningfully transparent and to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty (for example, public reporting), and (3) additional information that, when provided, contributes to a higher standard of transparency (for example, comments on the nature of reported transfers). The analysis of each category separately allows to examine different levels of commitment to transparency. For instance, even though an annual report submitted after the reporting deadline does not meet Article 13.3 obligations, it may still contain information that is meaningfully transparent, thereby contributing to a higher standard of transparency.

The analysis takes into account annual reports for all years, including those submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, the numbers presented in this report concerning annual reports covering the years 2015 to 2020 differ slightly from those presented in previous ATT Monitor Reports.

The analysis evaluates only information provided by States Parties in annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat. It does not seek to determine whether or not all transfers are reported or to independently verify the accuracy of that information. As such this analysis is not a general measure of transparency for all arms transfers.

COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
Article 13.3 of the Treaty requires that States Parties submit by 31 May of each year an annual report on their arms exports and imports during the previous calendar year. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if it:

- Is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
- Is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).2
- Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or relevant ‘nil’ reports indicating that no arms were transferred.

In total, 110 States Parties were required to submit by 31 May 2022 an annual report on their imports and exports in 2021. Only 68 of them (62 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor’s 1 February 2023 cut-off date for analysis.3

SUBMITTING REPORTS TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT
The annual reports submitted for 2021 extended the long decline in transparency. When reports submitted late for previous years are taken into account, the number of annual reports submitted annually has ranged between 67 and 69 since 2018. However, as more States Parties have joined the ATT, the proportion of those submitting a report has decreased from 84 per cent for 2015 to 62 per cent for 2021 (see Figure 1).

---

2 Annual reports are due by 31 May each year, but States Parties are granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.
3 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Palau, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
A few States Parties were new reporters for 2021. The People’s Republic of China submitted an annual report in the first year that one was due. Four States Parties (Guatemala, Iceland, Niger and Seychelles) submitted one for the first time, several years after they were required to do so. They are part of a group of seven States Parties that submitted reports for 2021 after having not done so in at least some previous years. Sixty-one States Parties have submitted reports for every year that one was due.

States Parties that did not submit a 2021 annual report can be split into three groups.

- Four were required to submit an annual report for the first time but did not (Afghanistan, Namibia, Niue and Sao Tome and Principe).
- A further 15 did not submit an annual report even though they had submitted one in a previous year.
- Twenty-two – the group of most concern – have never submitted an annual report despite being required to do so for several years.

---

4 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Iceland, Malta, Niger and Seychelles.
5 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
6 Cameroon, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Uruguay.
7 Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Suriname and Togo.
Previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report have noted that States Parties that joined the Treaty more recently have been less likely to submit an annual report than those that ratified or acceded to the Treaty soon after it entered into force (as mentioned above only one State Party required to submit for the first time for 2021 actually did so). The lack of reporting may be explained by the more recent States Parties lacking the capacity to prepare reports or the political will to do so. As such, reporting should be a focus for capacity building and other outreach activities.

The regional distribution of annual reports for 2021 follows the trend identified in previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report. The highest rates of reporting are among States Parties from Asia and Europe, whereas a minority of States Parties from Africa or the Americas submitted reports, and Oceania has a mixed record. The latter three regions should be prioritized for capacity building with regard to reporting.

SUBMITTING ANNUAL REPORTS ON TIME

Forty-four of the 68 States Parties that submitted an annual report (65 per cent) complied with the Treaty obligation to do so by 31 May. The other 24 (35 per cent) submitted their report between the Treaty deadline and the ATT Monitor’s 1 February cut-off for analysis.

The ATT Monitor has previously examined the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the Treaty. Some States Parties that did not submit annual reports in years affected by the pandemic have since met their requirements. For example, Barbados, Côte d’Ivoire, Honduras, Madagascar, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia submitted late reports covering the years 2019 and 2020. In addition, Barbados, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Malta and Zambia submitted late reports for years prior to 2019. These States Parties should be commended for doing so.

REPORTING BOTH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS COVERED BY ARTICLE 2.1

Almost all States Parties that made their annual report public complied with the Article 13 obligation to report on exports and imports. Of those that did not, Austria and the United Kingdom provided no information on their imports while Burkina Faso did not include a table on exports. None of the three submitted a ‘nil’ report stating that no arms were imported or exported. Burkina Faso indicated that some commercially sensitive or national security information had been withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty, which may explain the absence of export data. Austria and the United Kingdom did not make such an indication.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Only 42 States Parties (38 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2021, compared to 46 (44 per cent) that did so for 2020. They submitted their annual report to the ATT Secretariat, they did it by the 31 May deadline, and they reported on arms imports and exports or submitted ‘nil’ reports.

FULFILLING THE TRANSPARENCY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY

The object and purpose of the ATT are established in Article 1 and include ‘Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties’. Reporting is a fundamental means by which States Parties can contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of Article 1. Without reporting, it is impossible for States Parties to have confidence that others are fulfilling their Treaty obligations. Transparency is thus an essential aspect of promoting international cooperation and responsible arms transfers.

---

10 Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
11 Albania, Argentina, Austria, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Iceland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Norway, Palau, Senegal and Seychelles.
13 Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden and Switzerland.
The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent and to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT, an annual report should at minimum:15

1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.

2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.

3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.

4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).16

5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

States Parties can submit ‘nil’ reports indicating that they did not import or export any arms, which also contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Therefore, the ATT Monitor also considers that an annual report can be meaningfully transparent if the State Party has clearly submitted a ‘nil’ report on exports or imports.

IDENTIFYING MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

Based on the ATT Monitor’s methodology, only 28 annual reports for 2021 (25 per cent of all reports due) met the above criteria and were thus meaningfully transparent.17 Figure 3 shows that the percentage of reports that were meaningfully transparent has declined from 46 per cent for 2015 to 25 per cent for 2021. The number of meaningfully transparent reports has also declined from 33 for 2017 to 28 for 2021.


16 An authorized export or import is one that has been approved by national authorities, while an actual export or import concerns the physical movement of weapons or a change in ownership. Authorizations are generally granted before the actual export takes place, sometimes years in advance. For more information, see Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). ‘Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers’. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k. pp. 11-12

17 Albania, Argentina, Benin, Canada, Chile, Estonia, France, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

While part of the explanation for the decline in meaningfully transparent reporting is the decline in the proportion of submitted due annual reports (as noted above), equally important is the increasing proportion of States Parties that do not make their reports public (these reports are only distributed among States Parties). Article 13 of the Treaty does not state that reports should be made public but that they ‘shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat’, without clarifying to whom they shall be made available.

- Twenty-one States Parties submitted a confidential annual report (31 percent of reports) for 2021. The number and proportion of confidential reports has steadily increased from only 2 (4 per cent) for 2015 to 23 (34 per cent) in 2020, before declining slightly to 21 (31 per cent) for 2021 (see Figure 2.3).
- Eighteen States Parties have never made their annual reports public (having either kept them confidential or not reported).

![Figure 2.3 - Number and Percentage of Confidential Reports (As of 1 February 2023)](image_url)

---


20 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Botswana, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, People’s Republic of China, Senegal, Seychelles and State of Palestine.

Five States Parties (Benin, Maldives, Monaco, Palau and Sierra Leone) submitted ‘nil’ annual reports to state that they had neither imported nor exported any arms during 2021. The remaining 42 reports, which contain data on arms transfers, are assessed in the remainder of this section, along with reports from previous years that were submitted by the 1 February deadline.22

To be meaningfully transparent, an annual report must indicate what type of weapon was imported from or exported to a particular state. Previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report have highlighted that excessive aggregation of imports and exports by source/destination or weapon type in annual reports can be an obstacle to determine what type of arms transfers have taken place.23 For 2021, thirty-six reports (86 per cent of public reports that contain import or export data) included disaggregated data on the importers or exporters of the arms transfers in question.24 Some reports did not meet this standard of meaningful transparency. One State Party (Malta) simply provided the total number of small arms that had been exported or imported and a list of all the states that they had been exported to or imported from, without indication of which countries provided or received which type of weapons. Without such indication, is not possible to discern how many weapons were transferred to or from each state. Five additional States Parties (Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Jamaica and Norway) aggregated importers or exporters only in some cases. For example, Denmark’s annual report indicated that some categories of small arms were exported to ‘multiple states’.

A similar form of excessive aggregation occurs when weapons types are combined. Thirty-six annual reports (86 per cent of public reports that contain import or export data) included sufficiently disaggregated information on weapon types.25 Of those that did not:

- Two States Parties (Austria and Malta) aggregated data for all weapon types. For example, Austria aggregated data for exports of all small arms, light weapons and their parts and components, obscuring what type of equipment was transferred.26

- Four States Parties (Australia, Belgium, Ireland and Norway) aggregated some weapon types. For example, among its imports Ireland made use of the ‘other’ category for small arms. Using this category is encouraged as a means to provide extra data, but Ireland’s report aggregated 4,844 items and included the following broad listing ‘Action only, Airguns, Barrel Only, Blank firing, Bolt Only, Deactivated, Eod (explosive ordnance disposal), Frame Only, Humane, Moderator, Receiver Only, Scope, Shotgun.’

Annual reports should also indicate whether transfers are actual or authorized. Not all authorized exports or imports ultimately take place as orders may be cancelled or reduced before transfer. If authorized weapons are actually transferred, these weapons may cross national borders during a different reporting period to that of the authorization, even perhaps several years later. Knowing whether authorized or actual transfers are reported is vital to understanding apparent discrepancies between reports produced by different States Parties.27

---

22 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.


24 Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

25 Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

26 Austria did not report any data on imports.

Three States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland and Portugal) did not specify whether any of the transfers listed in their 2021 annual report referred to authorized or actual transfers. Finland and Portugal had specified this in previous reports.

Eight States Parties specify some but not all of the transfers listed in their annual report. For example, the Czech Republic specified that the data for its exports of battle tanks concerned actual transfers, but it provided no information for its other exports and its imports listed in its report.

The ATT reporting template includes columns for States Parties to record the number of weapons imported or exported and their financial value. This information is valuable to understand the magnitude of an arms transfer. All 42 of the annual reports that contain data on transfers included some information on the number of items or their financial value. Two States Parties did not include numbers or value data for some transfers: Australia stated that the number of missiles it imported was ‘withheld’ and Sweden stated that the number of some light weapons exports was ‘classified’. This information conforms to Article 13.3 of the Treaty, which states that some ‘some commercially sensitive or national security information’ can be withheld, and both States Parties have acted responsibly in highlighting what data was withheld.

### CHANGES IN COMMITMENTS TO TRANSPARENCY

Table 2.1 shows the percentage of public annual reports since 2015 that meet the criteria for meaningful transparency. This reveals some diverging trends.

- The proportion of annual reports that provided sufficient disaggregation by importer and exporter increased from 66 per cent in 2015 to 88 per cent in 2020 but fell to 86 per cent in 2021.
- The proportion of annual reports that are adequately disaggregated by weapon type has fluctuated, reaching a peak of 93 per cent in 2020 before dropping to 86 per cent in 2021.
- There has been a consistent decrease in the number of annual reports that specify whether a transfer pertains to an actual export or only an authorization.
- The proportion of annual reports that include information on units or financial value has improved, rising from 96 per cent in 2015 to 100 per cent in 2021.

The diverging nature of these trends means that improvements in transparency in some areas have been counterbalanced by deterioration in others, leading to the overall decline in transparency described above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provided information disaggregated by importer/exporter</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided information disaggregated by weapon type</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicated whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Romania and Serbia.
29 The analysis does not consider ‘nil’ reports or annual reports that were submitted before they were due.
FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE TRANSPARENCY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY

Only 19 States Parties (17 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2021 submitted one that was on time, public and meaningfully transparent. This proportion is lower than in the previous year when 24 per cent met these criteria.

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

The previous sections described the minimum reporting standard for compliance with the Treaty under Article 13.3 and the threshold for meaningfully transparent annual reports that support and contribute to its aims and objectives. States Parties are also encouraged by the Treaty to provide more information, and thereby to contribute to an even higher standard of transparency.

For example, Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms. States Parties could include in their annual reports information on a wider range of items than those set out in the eight weapons categories defined in Article 2. Reports could include information on, for example, ammunition, munitions and parts (including exports or imports of complete weapons that have been disassembled and are transferred as parts). The ‘FAQ-type guidance document on annual reporting obligations’ endorsed by the ATT Conference of States Parties encourages States Parties to provide as much additional information as possible, even in the absence of a requirement to do so.

Though Article 5.3 states that ‘Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms’, the ATT reporting template does not outline all weapons that are covered by the Treaty. For example, shotguns are not mentioned explicitly. Instead, to allow a State Party to report a wider range of arms exports or imports, the template has sub-categories for ‘other’ small arms and/or light weapons, and a section for voluntary national categories of weapons. States Parties can also use their own national reporting format.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if States Parties do at least one of the following:

1. Include descriptions of reported transfers that provide details on the make, model and/or calibre of transferred conventional arms.
2. Include comments on reported transfers that provide details on the nature of the transfer, including end-use/end-user information.
3. Include ‘0’, ‘nil’, ‘/’ or any other indication that no transfers were made in relevant weapons categories and sub-categories.
4. Clearly indicate whether commercially sensitive or national security information was withheld or not, and, if it was, what information was withheld.
5. Include information reported in voluntary national categories that includes arms categories covered by Article 2.1 but not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (shotguns, etc.).
6. Include information reported in voluntary national categories that includes arms categories not covered by Article 2.1 (ammunition, parts and components, gas-powered firearms, etc.).
7. Include any other kind of additional information, including national reports, detailed tables or annexes with information of arms categories not covered by Article 2.1 (other type of aircraft, vessels and vehicles that fall outside the categories of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or imaging, communications and radar items).
8. Include national definitions of reported categories of conventional arms.

---

30 Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTS

The ATT reporting template provides for reporting of broad categories of weapons (for example ‘Armoured combat vehicles’ or ‘Warships’). It also includes a column in which States Parties can give a more detailed description of what was supplied. Twelve States Parties included descriptions for all the transfers they reported and 22 included descriptions for some of the transfers they reported. This was an improvement on the previous year when 29 annual reports contained at least some descriptions. Descriptions provide important contextual information that can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, in its 2021 report Belgium included the export of six aircraft to the United States with the description that they were ‘C-130’, which are usually used for transport and that they were ‘ex Belgian Defense’. These aircraft are not covered within the scope of Article 2.1.

The ATT reporting template also includes a column for States Parties to provide comments on the context of a transfer. Four annual reports (Albania, Liechtenstein, Mexico and Peru) contained such comments on every transfer while 25 included such comments on some transfers. This was an improvement on the previous year when 25 reports contained such comments. Comments can also provide important information that can help to explain a transfer. For example, Mexico clarified in its 2021 report that 1,500 ‘rifles or carbines’ exported to Paraguay were for sporting use. Similarly, in its 2021 report Burkina Faso commented that 1,316 ‘rifles or carbines’ imported from Turkey were ‘armes civiles’ or ‘civilian weapons’.

FILLING IN BLANK SPACES

Definitively stating that there were no transfers of a particular type of weapon provides much more information than leaving blank spaces in sections of an annual report. Article 13.3 of the Treaty allows a State Party to ‘exclude commercially sensitive or national security information’. If a State Party leaves parts of its report blank, it is not possible to know whether there were no transfers of a particular weapon, or whether information has been withheld. Seventeen States Parties used symbols like ‘0’, ‘/’ or ‘-’ to indicate that no transfers of specific weapon types had taken place in their 2021 report. This was an improvement on the previous year when 15 States Parties included such indications.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

The ATT reporting template includes an option to tick a box to indicate whether or not information has been withheld for commercial sensitivity or national security reasons in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty. Thirty-nine States Parties ticked ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to indicate whether or not information was withheld in their 2021 annual report. Eight States Parties provided no such indication in their 2021 report, leaving readers without clarity on how much or where information had been withheld.

36 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa and Spain.
37 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
38 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
40 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Maldives, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.
41 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland.
42 Albania, Austria, Chile, France, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and United Kingdom.
VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Some annual reports contain information on a wider range of conventional arms than specified in the ATT reporting template. This information is provided under the ‘other’ subcategories for small arms and light weapons, in a section for voluntary national categories of weapons, or in additional supplementary tables of data.

- Nineteen States Parties included in their 2021 annual report data on arms that are covered within the scope of Article 2 of the Treaty but are not explicitly specified in the reporting template.43 For example, Argentina, Mexico and Peru reported transfers of shotguns and Romania reported a transfer of 20 mm cannon.

- Eleven States Parties reported on a wider range of military equipment in their annual report.44 Belgium, as noted, reported the transfer of six C-130 transport planes. Other examples include Liechtenstein reporting the transfer of a ‘silencer’, New Zealand reporting imports of stun guns and South Africa providing information on exports of remote-controlled weapon systems.

- Six States Parties (Australia, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) provided in their annual report supplementary tables containing additional data that go beyond the scope of Article 2.1. For example, Norway attached a copy of a government white paper on all its 2021 defence-related exports.

- Seven States Parties (Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Sweden) included in their annual report additional information on their definitions of arms or of exports and imports. For example, Albania clarified that its definitions were from the EU Common Military List whereas the Republic of Korea noted that its definition of arms exports and imports was based on licenses granted and not actual transfers.

Table 2.2 shows the number of annual reports that supported a higher standard of transparency in 2021.

Table 2.2 – Annual Reports that support a higher standard of transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Included in the annual report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions of arms transferred (for some or all transfers)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments on the nature of a transfer (for some or all transfers)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information that there was no transfer of a particular type of weapon</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indication of whether commercially sensitive or national security information was withheld</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data on arms covered within the scope of Article 3 but not explicitly specified in the reporting template</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data on a wider range of arms not covered within the scope of Article 3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary tables containing additional data</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on the national definitions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden and United Kingdom.

44 Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and Sweden.
TEXTBOX 2.1 - GOING BEYOND ARTICLE 13: REPORTING ON AMMUNITION

The status of ammunition within the scope of the ATT was one of the most contentious issues during Treaty negotiations (see Chapter 1). A compromise was reached to include ammunition in some but not all aspects of the ATT. Instead of including it among the list of the equipment covered in Article 2 of the Treaty, it is referenced separately in Article 3. This reference states:

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.45

One critical effect of this formulation is to exclude ammunition from the annual reporting requirements in Article 13 (which refers only to the equipment listed in Article 2). Nevertheless, Article 5 on general implementation provides additional guidance when it states: "Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms."46 Reporting on imports and exports of ammunition would be consistent with this guidance and with the overall aim of the Treaty to promote transparency as expressed in Article 1.47

The ATT reporting template offers an opportunity to States Parties to report on a broader range of arms by including a section on voluntary national categories and categories for ‘other’ small arms or light weapons, to be defined by the State Party. In practice, States Parties can also report using national templates or attach separate documents to their annual report containing any information they deem appropriate.

In 2021, four States Parties (Estonia, Finland, Norway and Sweden) submitted reports on ammunition imports or exports. Estonia utilized the ‘other’ section of the reporting template to disclose the export of 130 items of ‘120 mm mortars test ammunition’ to Israel. The remaining three used other methods to report on ammunition, providing additional data in the voluntary national categories section (Sweden and Finland) or in a separate document (Norway). The data provided by each country are based upon equipment categories in the EU Common Military List.48 The list is used by EU member states to ensure that policies are applied to a uniform set of equipment (Norway is not a member state but voluntarily aligns itself with EU arms export policies). It is based upon the control lists developed by the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is used by many countries around the world.49

These three States Parties reported transfers of ammunition covered by two categories of the EU Common Military List:

- ‘ML3’ covers ammunition for small arms, larger artillery guns and high-velocity kinetic energy weapon systems. It also covers associated fuse-setting components for ammunition.
- ‘ML4’ covers a much wider range of equipment specially designed for military use: ‘bombs, torpedoes, grenades, smoke canisters, rockets, mines, missiles, depth charges, demolition-charges, demolition-devices, demolition-kits, “pyrotechnic” devices, cartridges and simulators’.50 Some of these items are generally understood to be munitions/ammunition but others are stand-alone weapons.

49 For more information on Wassenaar Arrangement control lists, see the Wassenaar Arrangement website: https://www.wassenaar.org/control-lists/
The EU Common Military List also contains items that may be used in the production of ammunition:

- ‘ML 7’ covers chemical agents that may be used in some types of ammunition (for example, riot-control agents).
- ‘ML8’ covers explosives and propellants, some of which can be used in the production of ammunition.
- ‘ML18’ covers production equipment.
- ML22 covers technology for other categories (including for ML3 and ML4).

However, as these items can be used for other purposes, one cannot be certain that a specific transfer was related to ammunition.

The above illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of using EU Common Military List categories. As the list is already used in export and import licensing, a State Party should have the information at hand, which can be included in reporting with little expenditure of resources. Using them leads to a rich data source that can provide important supplementary information on transfers of ammunition and many other items comprising the broadest range of conventional arms. Nevertheless, some of the list’s categories are highly aggregated and it is not possible to know exactly what type of ammunition or associated product was exported. A State Party should therefore not solely rely on the list’s categories for reporting.

In its 2021 report, Sweden indicated that it had exported ML3 goods to 39 states for a total value of SEK 2.7 billion (US$314 million)\(^\text{51}\) and ML4 items to 22 states for a total value of SEK 904 million (US$106 million).\(^\text{52}\) Finland reported exports of ML3 items to 16 states for a total value of EUR 10 million (US$12 million)\(^\text{53}\) and ML4 items to 13 states for a total value of EUR 5 million (US$6 million).\(^\text{54}\) The government white paper submitted by Norway indicates that it exported ML3 goods worth NOK 623 million (US$73 million) to 21 states\(^\text{55}\) and ML4 goods worth NOK 1.6 billion (US$189 million) to 12 states.\(^\text{56}\)

For Norway, this was a change from its previous method of ATT reporting. In its annual reports for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2020 it provided the total financial value of all its ammunition exports, which was included in the voluntary national categories section of the reporting template. Norway has therefore provided more information on ammunition in its report for 2021.

---

51 Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Zambia.
52 Australia, Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
53 Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and United States.
54 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
55 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States.
56 Australia, France, Germany, Lithuania, Malaysia, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States.
A member of HMCS Halifax’s Air Department guides the hoist cable of a CH-148 Cyclone down to the flight deck as part of deck evolutions during Operation Reassurance on 7 July 2022.

Credit: © NATO
MOST TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

No State Party submitting a 2021 annual report used all the transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Nineteen States Parties (accounting for 17 per cent of reports due) complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency. Of these, three States Parties (Peru, South Africa and Sweden) provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency. Peru provided descriptions and comments for all transfers, indicated whether it had withheld data and provided additional information on types of arms not covered by the template. South Africa provided some comments and descriptions for all transfers, indicated those categories of arms for which it had no exports or imports, indicated whether information had been withheld and provided data on types of arms not covered by the ATT reporting template. Sweden provided some comments and descriptions, indicated what kind of information had been withheld, indicated those categories of arms for which it had no exports or imports, provided information on national definitions and included additional data on a wide range of munitions not included in the reporting template.

CONCLUSION

Transparency in reporting is critical to achieving the ATT’s aim of promoting a responsible arms trade. States Parties, civil society organizations and citizens around the world need to have confidence that States Parties are implementing the Treaty consistently with its obligations. Without comprehensive, on-time and public reporting, confidence in the Treaty will diminish.

This chapter has highlighted some positive aspects of reporting in 2021. Sixty-one States Parties have consistently submitted reports for every year that one was due. Slightly more reports contained additional detail in the form of comments about specific transfers or descriptions of weapons transferred. The previously identified trend of more and more States Parties submitting confidential reports has slightly reversed for 2021, though the number remains high.

There is much work still to be done. Two concerning trends identified in previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report continued in the latest year of reporting. First, the proportion of States Parties that submitted an annual report has continued to decline. For 2021, only 62 per cent of States Parties fulfilled the Treaty obligations to submit a report on their arms imports and exports over the previous year. Far fewer States Parties submitted reports that were meaningfully transparent. This sustained a long-term decline with only 25 per cent of submitted public reports that allowed a reader to understand what was exported to whom. Ten years after the Treaty was adopted, the majority of the trade in weapons remains in the shadows.

The ATT Monitor has previously identified three factors explaining why some States Parties have not submitted public reports that advance the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty: capacity, national systems and political will. All parties involved in providing international cooperation and assistance in relation to the arms trade could encourage transparency by addressing these three factors. Attention can be paid to building more national capacity to collect and compile data, and national transfer-control and licensing systems can be adapted so they can more easily produce data useful for reporting. During the 1st Working Groups and Preparatory Meeting for the Ninth Conference of States Parties to the ATT, held in February 2023, the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting proposed that the ATT Secretariat identify regional reporting champions that could engage with States Parties in their region that struggle with their reporting duties. This, along with more focus on building capacity in reporting, would be a positive step towards increasing reporting rates and improving the quality of information submitted in annual reports.

57 Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
A MH-60 SEAHAWK HELICOPTER PARKS ON THE FLIGHT DECK OF USS MOUNT WHITNEY.

CREDIT: © NATO
2.2 – COUNTRY PROFILES

This section examines the annual reports submitted by States Parties to the ATT Secretariat covering their exports and imports of conventional arms in 2021. It presents an analysis of the reporting and transfer practices of each reporting State Party in the form of country profiles. By disaggregating its analysis by country, the ATT Monitor intends to provide easily comparable and nationally relevant findings to help inform future practice.

One hundred and ten States Parties were required to submit an annual report for 2021 to the ATT Secretariat within one week of 31 May 2022. As of 1 February 2023, 68 had done so, of which 47 made theirs public. These reports form the basis of the analysis presented here.

Annual reports are one of the key tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. They help to build confidence between countries and enable States Parties to demonstrate that their arms trade policies are consistent with their obligations in the ATT. For annual reports to fulfil this pivotal role, it is necessary that States Parties complete them in a comprehensive, accurate and public manner.

The ATT Monitor continuously builds on the findings of assessments of each round of annual reporting. The analysis here seeks to supplement and build on the baseline analysis completed by the ATT Monitor in previous reports, which includes an assessment of reporting, examples of good national practices, and interpretive and practical challenges that are common among States Parties.

METHODOLOGY

All annual reports were downloaded for analysis by 1 February 2023. Reports received by the ATT Secretariat after this date or later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in its report each year to ensure adequate time for in-depth analysis.

Each profile takes stock of States Parties’ compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations for each year a report was due and indicates whether reports were made public.

Where applicable, States Parties’ reports for 2021 were compared to those for 2020 to consider the extent to which national reporting changed between annual reporting periods under the ATT and to assess whether the common challenges identified had changed. Reporting practices were assessed for each State Party according to key criteria identified in previous ATT Monitor reports. These criteria are:

- Submitting a report as per each State Party’s legal obligation under Article 13.3
- Compliance with Article 13.3’s on-time reporting obligation (within one week of the 31 May 2022 reporting deadline)
- Making a report public (including withholding data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security and indicating where or what information was withheld)
- Providing data on both imports and exports, or submitting ‘nil’ reports
- Providing data that is clearly disaggregated by weapon type, importer and/or exporter, and number of items and/or financial value, and that specifies whether transfers are actual or authorized
- Providing information that goes beyond the minimum requirements specified in Article 13.3 (for example, reporting on exports/imports of ammunition, national categories, etc.)

Overall, each State Party is considered based on the extent to which its annual report contributes to or undermines the objective of increased transparency in the global arms trade. The analysis is not intended to highlight technical errors or as a ‘name and shame’ exercise, but to present comparable information that is country-specific to inform policymakers and civil society in each State Party, and to help support and build knowledge and capacity among officials responsible for completing ATT annual reports.

The ATT Monitor considers reports to be on time if they are received by the ATT Secretariat within one week of the 31 May reporting deadline. Dates of submission provided by States Parties in their annual reports and the dates on which they were received by the ATT Secretariat were sometimes different. The reason for the gaps between the stated and actual dates of submission is unclear. In such instances, the ATT Monitor uses the ATT Secretariat’s date of receipt of annual reports as its basis for making determinations concerning on-time reporting.

---

1 States Parties are granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period beyond the deadline set out in Article 13 to submit their annual reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.
2 To be classified here as having provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import, a State Party must clarify if it was reporting an authorized or actual import or export (or both), provide a number or value for each item and clearly name the final exporting/importing country.
The ATT Secretariat and the ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting work diligently each year to make improvements to the ways in which States Parties submit annual reports, including through the introduction of the online reporting tool in 2018 and other recent amendments to reporting templates. The analysis notes how States Parties chose to submit their reports as well as any discrepancies between the information provided using the ATT online tool and the ATT reporting template (where States Parties submitted using both methods). Under the ATT, States Parties can submit the same report they provide to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) as their ATT annual report; however, there are key differences between these reports. For example, the UNROCA template does not allow countries to specify whether they are withholding data for commercial or national security-related reasons, whereas the ATT online tool and reporting template do. Therefore, the ATT Monitor considers this confidentiality criterion as ‘Unspecified’ for countries that submitted UNROCA reports to the ATT.

Where States Parties included values of transfers in their reports, transfer summaries include the monetary value of their imports or exports. All values have been converted to US dollars using the OECD data annual conversion rate for each currency for the 2021 calendar year unless otherwise indicated. In some cases, the currency used by States Parties to report values was not specified. Each of these cases is noted in relevant profiles.

In some instances, States Parties used country codes to indicate the final exporting and importing countries. The ATT Monitor determined which countries such codes referenced using online sources, such as the United Nations country code list, but it did not verify with each State Party whether such determinations are accurate.

In addition to assessing reporting practices, each country profile includes key data relating to the exports and imports described by States Parties in their annual reports. This data includes:

- Total number of export/import partners and their Treaty status (as of 1 February 2023)
- The number and categories of major conventional weapon items reported, if available
- The number and sub-categories of small arms and light weapons (SALW) reported
- The principal trade relationships reported by the State Party

Each profile also takes stock of States Parties’ reporting practice over the last five years by indicating whether an ATT annual report was submitted (✓) or not submitted (✗) for reporting years in which reports were due (only years in which reports were due to be submitted are listed in each profile). Annual reports submitted before a State Party’s first report was due are noted as well (*). Each profile also indicates whether reports were made public (✓) or kept confidential (✗) for each year a report was submitted.

This section looks solely at transfer data as reported by each State Party in its ATT annual report. It does not compare the data with other relevant reporting mechanisms or findings by independent experts, media sources, national reports to parliamentary authorities or think tanks such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Integrating information from such external sources would likely paint a different picture of the global arms trade, particularly with respect to the volume of transfers between countries. For the analysis conducted by the ATT Monitor and others to be as accurate as possible, it is critical that States Parties submit clear and comprehensive annual reports and that they consider the fulfillment of their reporting obligations as an opportunity to support the ATT’s goal of greater transparency in the global arms trade. States Parties or other ATT stakeholders are encouraged to reach out to the ATT Monitor to help clarify any information presented in the profiles below.

---

5 Where applicable, analysis includes the names of non-ATT members and non-UN members to make clear trade relationships that extend beyond the ATT.
6 Categories of major conventional weapons include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.
7 Sub-categories of small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns and others. Sub-categories of light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, mortars of calibres less than 76mm and others.
8 Principal trade relationships are determined by totaling the number or value of transferred items reported by each State Party, depending on which is used in each report. Where States Parties provided both a number and value for transferred items, the ATT Monitor makes clear which was used in determining principal trade relationships.
US TROOPS CONDUCT LIVE-FIRE TRAINING DURING READINESS EXERCISE ROCK DAWN, LATVIA.

CREDIT: © US ARMY / SGT. LUKE MICHALSKI
AFGHANISTAN

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?  2021 ✗

Were submitted reports made public?  

ALBANIA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public?  Yes

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons?  Unspecified – Not indicated

What reporting template was used?  ATT reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?  2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✗ 2021 ✓


REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021


Albania did not report any exports of any major conventional weapons or SALW exports.

Albania reported Actual Numbers of small arms imports, as opposed to 2020 when its report was kept confidential.
Albania reported imports from three countries. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

Albania did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Albania reported the import of 926 small arms, all revolvers and self-loading pistols. The main exporters were Austria (77.2 per cent), the United States (18.5 per cent) and Italy (4.3 per cent).

Albania did not specify whether any information was withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons.

Albania could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Albania did not report exports in its 2021 annual report.

Albania provided clear, disaggregated numbers for all its reported small arms imports, both by weapon sub-category and by exporting state.

Albania provided descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported imports.

Albania did not report exports in its 2021 annual report.

Albania provided clear, disaggregated numbers for all its reported small arms imports, both by weapon sub-category and by exporting state.

Albania provided descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported imports.

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public? No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✓ 2021 ✓

ARGENTINA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? No

What reporting template was used? ATT online reporting tool

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? Yes

Were submitted reports made public?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Argentina continued to report actual numbers of small arms exports. It did not report major conventional weapons or light weapons exports.

Argentina continued to report actual numbers of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It did not report light weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did.
GOOD PRACTICES

Argentina indicated that it did not exclude data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons, after indicating in its 2020 report that some information had been withheld for such reasons.

Argentina continued to provide disaggregated numbers for its small arms exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and exporting state.

Argentina indicated that imports reported in the small arms ‘others’ sub-categories were shotguns.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Argentina could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of some of its small arms imports.

Argentina could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

• Argentina reported exports to six countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
• Argentina did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
• Argentina reported the export of 59,686 small arms covering one category: revolvers and self-loading pistols.
• The main importers of small arms from Argentina were the United States (87.1 per cent), Paraguay (8.4 per cent) and Guatemala (2 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

• Argentina reported imports from 12 countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
• Argentina reported the import of two major conventional weapons items: two warships from France.
• Argentina reported the import of 20,726 small arms. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (67.2 per cent), rifles and carbines (20.7 per cent) and ‘others’ (small arms) (11.8 per cent).
• The main exporters of small arms to Argentina were Brazil (29.8 per cent), Austria (27 per cent) and the United States (17.5 per cent).
AUSTRALIA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
Yes – On Time

Was the 2021 annual report made public?  
Yes

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?  
Yes

What reporting template was used?  
ATT online reporting tool

 Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?  
2017 ✓  
2018 ✓  
2019 ✓  
2020 ✓  
2021 ✓

 Were submitted reports made public?  
2017 ✓  
2018 ✓  
2019 ✓  
2020 ✓  
2021 ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2021

Australia’s reporting changed in its 2021 annual report.

Australia continued to report Authorized Numbers and Values of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Australia reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not specify whether such numbers were Actual or Authorized.

Australia continued to report aggregated numbers of SALW exports. It provided aggregated information on SALW imports, as opposed to 2020 when it provided disaggregated information by exporting state and number of items.
GOOD PRACTICES

Australia provided the number of authorizations and the number of items included in its exports of SALW. It supplied this in a table added to the reporting template.

Australia specified in some places where information was withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security related’ reasons.

Australia provided descriptions for all its major conventional exports and imports. It also provided comments for all its major conventional imports.

Australia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports of major conventional weapons instead of leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Australia continued to provide aggregated information regarding SALW importers and exporters, along with the numbers and values of SALW exports and imports, making it impossible to determine weapons sub-categories.

Australia could provide comments describing the nature of its reported major conventional weapons exports as it did on the aggregated table of SALW.

Australia could provide more descriptions and comments on the nature of exports and imports of SALW.

Australia could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports of SALW weapons instead of leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

• Australia reported exports to 18 countries and territories. Of these, 10 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and five were non-members (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands).

• Australia reported the export of 249 major conventional weapons with a total value of AUD404.6m (US$304m), covering two categories. In terms of value, these were armoured combat vehicles (99.6 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (0.4 per cent).

• In terms of value, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Australia were New Zealand (49.4 per cent), the United States (49.3 per cent) and Jamaica (1 per cent).

• Australia reported the export of 832 small arms from 106 permits granted with a total value of AUD1.6m (US$1.2m).

• In terms of value, the main importers of small arms from Australia were the Solomon Islands (46.2 per cent), the United States (39.5 per cent) and the United Kingdom (7.7 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

• Australia reported imports from three countries. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

• Australia reported the import of 113 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, these were battle tanks (66.4 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (22.1 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (11.5 per cent).

• In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons to Australia were the United States (77.9 per cent) and Germany (22.1 per cent).

• Australia reported the import of 306 SALW items. These were portable anti-tank guns (85.3 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (14.7 per cent).

• The main importers of SALW to Australia were Sweden (85.3 per cent) and Germany (14.7 per cent).

10 Australia is also included as an end destination for temporary exports for demonstration purposes.
11 Australia also reported exports to one non-UN member (New Caledonia).
13 Ibid.
14 Australia also reported imports of missiles, etc., from the United States but withheld the number of items; therefore, the actual number here is likely higher.
AUSTRIA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? Unspecified – Not indicated

What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✓ 2021 ✓


REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Austria’s reporting changed in its 2021 annual report.

Austria reported Authorized and Actual Values of SALW exports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Actual Numbers of SALW exports. It did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.

Austria did not report imports in its 2021 report.
Austria did not report imports in its 2021 annual report. Austria reported exports to 88 countries and territories. Of these, 57 were ATT States Parties, ten were Signatories and 15 were non-members (Bolivia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Tunisia and Uganda). Austria reported exports to six non-UN members (Aruba, Greenland, Kosovo, Macao, New Caledonia and Taiwan).

Austria reported the export of SALW items with a total value of €1.3m (US$15m). In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Austria were the United States (76.4 per cent), Slovakia (14.7 per cent) and Australia (2.5 per cent). Austria aggregated data such that it is impossible to determine the relevant sub-categories of SALW exports.

Austria did not provide numbers of items for any of its exports in its 2021 report as it did in its 2020 report.

Austria did not include the front page of the ATT reporting template with its 2021 report. It is therefore unclear why it has not reported on imports or if any information has been withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security related’ reasons. Austria aggregated all transfers by importing state in its 2021 report, making it impossible to determine weapon sub-categories.

Austria did not report exports of major conventional weapons. Austria reported the export of SALW items with a total value of €1.3m (US$15m). In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Austria were the United States (76.4 per cent), Slovakia (14.7 per cent) and Australia (2.5 per cent).

Austria aggregated data such that it is impossible to determine the relevant sub-categories of SALW exports.

15 Austria also reported exports to six non-UN members (Aruba, Greenland, Kosovo, Macao, New Caledonia and Taiwan).
### BAHAMAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Report Submitted</th>
<th>Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Previous Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports Due</th>
<th>Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BARBADOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Report Submitted</th>
<th>Annual Report Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes – On Time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Previous Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports Due</th>
<th>Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
669 SQUADRON OF THE UK ARMY AIR CORPS TAKE PART IN A PATROL DURING EXERCISE IRON WOLF, LITHUANIA.

CREDIT: © MOD CROWN / LCOH STEPHEN MCRITCHIE
BELGIUM

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Belgium’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report. Belgium used the online reporting template, as opposed to using the standard reporting template as it did for its 2020 report.

Belgium reported Authorized Numbers and Values of major conventional weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Authorized Numbers of major conventional exports. It did not report SALW exports after reporting Authorized Values of small arms exports in 2020.

In 2021, Belgium reported Authorized Numbers of major conventional weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any imports of major conventional weapons. It reported numbers of SALW imports, but it did not specify whether transfers were Authorized or Actual, as opposed to 2020 when it reported mostly Authorized Values of small arms imports aggregated by the exporting state and Actual Numbers of light weapons imports.
Belgium reported imports from 30 countries. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and two were non-members (Belarus and India).

Belgium reported the import of one manned combat aircraft from the Netherlands.

Belgium reported the import of 1,850 SALW items, of which 1,800 were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems from Norway (97.3 per cent) and 50 were rifles and carbines from Italy (2.7 per cent).

Under voluntary national categories, Belgium also provided data on ML1 imports, worth €57.1m (US$67.6m). The main exporters to Belgium were the United States (20.9 per cent), Germany (18.5 per cent) and Japan (14.1 per cent).

Belgium could provide comments describing the nature of its reported exports.

Belgium could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Belgium did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual SALW imports.

Belgium reported exports to 55 countries. Of these, 41 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and seven were non-members (India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar and Tunisia).

Belgium reported the export of 13 major conventional weapons with a total value of €19.3m (US$22.8m), covering three categories. In terms of value, the majority of these were manned combat aircraft (67.6 per cent), combat aircraft (unmanned) (29.7 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (2.6 per cent).

In terms of value, the importers of major conventional weapons from Belgium were the United States (97.3 per cent), Poland (2.6 per cent) and Spain (0.1 per cent).

Belgium reported the export of small arms under national voluntary categories with a total value of €157.4m (US$186.3m) under national categories.

In terms of value, the main importers of small arms under voluntary national categories from Belgium were the United States (36.1 per cent), the United Kingdom (14.3 per cent) and Germany (7 per cent).

Belgium also reported exports to one non-UN member (Taiwan).


Belgium also reported imports from one non-UN member (Taiwan).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submission Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BELIZE**

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? **No**

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Were submitted reports made public?
C8 CARBINE LIVE FIRE RANGE AT THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY CENTRE (IPSC), IN STARYCHI, UKRAINE.

CREDIT: © DND CANADA / AVIATOR MELISSA GLOUDE

Benin submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**


Benin submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.
Benin submitted ‘nil’ reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2021 report.

**GOOD PRACTICES**

- Benin submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports.

**ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

- Benin submitted a ‘nil’ report for imports.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reporting changed in its 2021 annual report.

Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to provide Numbers and Values for exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW items, but it did not specify whether transfers were Authorized or Actual.

Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that it excluded data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons, after indicating that it did not withhold information in its 2020 report.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided its own definitions of the term ‘export’, indicating this covers ‘goods, technologies and services of strategic importance are permanently or temporarily getting out of the customs territory of BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], and transfer of software or technology, using electronic media, fax or telephone to destinations outside of the territory of BiH, including verbal transfer of technology, using telephone, only when the technology in question is contained in a document whose relevant part is read or described over the telephone in such a way as to achieve an entirely identical result.’

| Was the 2021 annual report submitted? | Yes – On time |
| Was the 2021 annual report made public? | Yes |
| Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? | Yes |
| What reporting template was used? | ATT reporting template |
| Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? | 2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✓ 2021 ✓ |
Bosnia and Herzegovina reported imports from 13 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Eritrea).

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of 6,395 SALW items with a total value of €1.8m (US$2.1m), covering four sub-categories. In terms of value, the imports included revolvers and self-loading pistols (69.4 per cent), rifles and carbines (15.5 per cent) and assault rifles (11.7 per cent).

In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Bosnia and Herzegovina were Slovakia (32.5 per cent), Serbia (19.5 per cent) and the Czech Republic (17.3 per cent).

Bosnia and Herzegovina reported exports to eight countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-members (Kenya and Uganda).

Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 19 major conventional weapons21 with a total value of €254,205 (US$289,198).22 All were large-calibre artillery systems.

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Bosnia and Herzegovina were the United States (78.9 per cent), Kenya (15.8 per cent) and Bangladesh (5.3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of SALW from Bosnia and Herzegovina were Uganda (46.7 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (34.1 per cent) and rifles and carbines (19.2 per cent).

In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Bosnia and Herzegovina were Uganda (46.7 per cent), Serbia (29.6 per cent) and Switzerland (19.7 per cent).

**GOOD PRACTICES**

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided both numbers and values of all reported exports and imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided disaggregated information on SALW imports and exports, both in terms of numbers and values of items.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided descriptions of all items exported and imported.

Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

**ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Bosnia and Herzegovina excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual exports or imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina could have indicated clearly that there were no exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

---

21 The total value of exports might be larger as it is unclear whether Bosnia and Herzegovina disclosed the value of the exports of major conventional weapons to Bangladesh and Kenya.

22 Currency conversion via XE Data, reflecting conversion rate on 31 December 2021 (0.879) https://www.xe.com/es/currencytables/?from=USD&date=2021-12-31#table-section.

23 Ibid.
### BOTSWANA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes – Missed Deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BRAZIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BULGARIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes – Missed Deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NATO SHARPSHOOTER RIFLES IN ESTONIA.
CREDIT: © MOD CROWN
BURKINA FASO

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time
Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons? Yes
What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 ✓ 2018 ✗ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✗ 2021 ✓
Were submitted reports made public? 2017 ✓ 2019 ✗ 2021 ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021


Burkina Faso did not report any exports and it did not submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Burkina Faso specified where information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Burkina Faso reported Authorized and Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.

Burkina Faso supplied its own definition of the word 'import', indicating it covers 'Physical transfer of items across a national border' and 'transfer of titles.'
Burkina Faso reported imports from five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

Burkina Faso reported the import of 28 major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (85.7 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (14.3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional weapons to Burkina Faso were Türkiye (71.4 per cent), Germany (14.3 per cent) and Bulgaria (14.3 per cent).

Burkina Faso reported the import of 8,307 SALW items covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (81.7 per cent), rifles and carbines (15.8 per cent) and light machine guns (1.2 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Burkina Faso were Brazil (81.7 per cent), Türkiye (15.8 per cent) and Bulgaria (2 per cent).


Burkina Faso provided disaggregated numbers for its SALW and major conventional weapons imports, both by weapon type and by importing and/or exporting state.

Burkina Faso could provide descriptions and more comments describing the nature of its reported imports.

Burkina Faso aggregated states from which it imported revolvers and self-loading pistols, making it impossible to determine the origin of the small arms imports.

Burkina Faso could have indicated clearly whether it submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports by ticking the relevant box on the front page of its report.

Burkina Faso did not include a report of exports.

Burkina Faso reported imports from five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

Burkina Faso reported the import of 28 major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (85.7 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (14.3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional weapons to Burkina Faso were Türkiye (71.4 per cent), Germany (14.3 per cent) and Bulgaria (14.3 per cent).

Burkina Faso reported the import of 8,307 SALW items covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (81.7 per cent), rifles and carbines (15.8 per cent) and light machine guns (1.2 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Burkina Faso were Brazil (81.7 per cent), Türkiye (15.8 per cent) and Bulgaria (2 per cent).
### CABO VERDE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submission</th>
<th>Public Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CAMEROON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submission</th>
<th>Public Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A SOLDIER PREPARES A CARL GUSTAF RECOILLESS RIFLE DURING A MULTINATIONAL TRAINING EVENT IN POLAND.

CREDIT: © U.S. ARMY / SPC. HUBERT D. DELANY III
REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Canada’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. Canada continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports. Canada continued to report Actual Numbers of SALW imports.
Canada reported clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export.

Canada provided descriptions on the nature of some of its SALW exports and imports.

Canada provided descriptions and comments on some of its major conventional weapons exports.

Canada reported clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export.

Canada provided descriptions on the nature of some of its SALW exports and imports.

Canada provided descriptions and comments on some of its major conventional weapons exports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Canada could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of all reported exports and imports.

Canada could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Canada did not specify whether reported exports of combat aircraft were manned or unmanned, per UN Registry Definitions of Categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT.24

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

- Canada reported exports to nine countries. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Saudi Arabia).

- Canada reported the export of 160 major conventional weapons, covering two sub-categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (73.8 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (26.2 per cent).

- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Canada were Saudi Arabia (72.5 per cent) and the United States (26.2 per cent).

- Canada reported the export of 1,064 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (96.3 per cent) and light machine guns (3.2 per cent).

- The main importers of SALW from Canada were the United Kingdom (78.2 per cent), Denmark (8.9 per cent) and the Netherlands (8.6 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

- Canada reported imports from nine countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

- Canada did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

- Canada reported the import of 15,388 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (96.6 per cent).

- The main importers of SALW to Canada were the United States (85.8 per cent) and Austria (11.7 per cent).

24 For example, the UN Registry definitions of weapons categories include combat aircraft that are: (a) manned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defence or reconnaissance missions; or (b) unmanned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction. For more information, see ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). ‘Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT’. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf. Rep.Rev. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 25.
### CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Status</th>
<th>Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Status</th>
<th>Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A US AIR FORCE F-16 FIGHTING FALCON AT GRAF IGNATIEVO AIR BASE IN BULGARIA.

CREDIT: © NATO
CHILE

CHILE's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Chile did not report any exports and it did not submit a 'nil' report for exports. In 2020 it submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports.

Chile reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons. It did not report imports of any SALW items as it did in its 2020 report.

---

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>Yes – On time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons?</td>
<td>Unspecified – Not indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>ATT online reporting tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</th>
<th>2018 ✓</th>
<th>2019 ✓</th>
<th>2020 ✓</th>
<th>2021 ✓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

* Report submitted before it was due.
Chile reported imports from one ATT State Party.

Chile reported the import of two major conventional weapons items, both warships from Australia.

Chile did not report any exports in its 2021 annual report.

Chile provided descriptions for all its reported imports.

Chile could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Chile did not indicate, by ticking the relevant box on the front page of its report, whether it had excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons.

Chile could have indicated clearly that it did not report any exports by ticking the relevant ‘nil’ report box on the front page of its report.

Chile did not report any exports in its 2021 annual report.

Chile reported imports from one ATT State Party.

Chile reported the import of two major conventional weapons items, both warships from Australia.

COSTA RICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2017 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td>2017 ✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


GOOD PRACTICES

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA
# CÔTE D’IVOIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Yes – Missed deadline**

# CROATIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Yes – On Time**

# CYPRUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Yes – Missed deadline**
SOLDIERS USE A 120 MM MORTAR SYSTEM ON AN M1129 MORTAR CARRIER DURING A LIVE-FIRE EVENT AT CAMP FUJI, JAPAN.

CREDIT: © U.S. NAVY / PETTY OFFICER 2ND CLASS CHRISTOPHER LANGE
CZECH REPUBLIC

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? No

What reporting template was used? ATT online reporting tool

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✓ 2021 ✓


REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Czech Republic’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Czech Republic reported Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Czech Republic reported Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.

25 Czech Republic reported Actual Numbers of exports of battle tanks.
Czech Republic reported imports from 13 countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and two were non-members (Ethiopia and Pakistan).

Czech Republic reported the import of 71 major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (98.6 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (1.4 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional weapons to the Czech Republic were the United Arab Emirates (98.6 per cent) and Ukraine (1.4 per cent).

Czech Republic reported the import of 24,658 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (83.8 per cent), sub-machine guns (5.5 per cent) and light machine guns (5.1 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to the Czech Republic were Ethiopia (82.9 per cent), Serbia (7.2 per cent) and Türkiye (4.9 per cent).

Czech Republic also reported exports to one non-UN member (Taiwan).

Czech Republic provided comments for some of its major conventional weapons exports.

Czech Republic provided disaggregated numbers for all its exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and exporting state.

Czech Republic could provide more comments and descriptions on the nature of all its exports and imports of SALW and major conventional weapons.

Czech Republic did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual exports or imports, though this may be inferred to some degree by the definitions of the terms ‘exports’ and ‘imports’ it provided.

Czech Republic could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
DENMARK

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Denmark’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Denmark continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. It continued not to report exports of major conventional weapons.

Denmark continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports.

Denmark continued to report **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports. It reported a mix of **Authorized** and **Actual numbers** of light weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported **Authorized Numbers**.
Denmark reported imports from three countries, all ATT States Parties.

Denmark did not provide information on exporting states for its small arms imports.

Denmark reported the import of 54 armoured combat vehicles from Switzerland.

Denmark reported the import of 16,881 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (51.5 per cent), ‘others’ (small arms) (32.8 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (10.5 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the majority of SALW imports were from ‘Multiple exporting states’ (95.4 per cent) and Norway (4.5 per cent).

Denmark did not provide information on importing states for its exports.

Denmark did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Denmark reported the export of 2,578 SALW items covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (65.3 per cent) and ‘others’ (small arms) (28.3 per cent).

Denmark could provide more comments describing the nature of its reported imports and exports.

Denmark did not provide descriptions of the reported imports/exports under the small arms ‘others’ category.

Denmark continued to aggregate exporting and importing countries as ‘Multiple States’, making it impossible to determine from or to where small arms items were imported or exported.

Denmark could provide more comments describing the nature of its reported imports and exports.

Denmark did not provide descriptions of the reported imports/exports under the small arms ‘others’ category.

Denmark did not provide information on importing states for its exports.

Denmark did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Denmark reported the export of 2,578 SALW items covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (65.3 per cent) and ‘others’ (small arms) (28.3 per cent).

Denmark indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
### DOMINICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Reports Due</th>
<th>Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Reports Due</th>
<th>Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EL SALVADOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Report Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AN ASSORTMENT OF 5250 ILLICIT FIREARMS AND SMALL WEAPONS DURING ITS DESTRUCTION IN NGONG HILLS NEAR KENYA’S CAPITAL NAIROBI.

CREDIT: © THOMAS MUKOYA
Estonia’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Estonia reported Authorized Numbers of major conventional weapons exports and Authorized and Actual Numbers of SALW exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report exports of major conventional weapons and reported mainly Authorized Numbers of SALW exports.

Estonia continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons imports. It reported Actual Numbers of SALW imports. This differed from its 2020 report where it reported mainly Authorized numbers of SALW imports.
Estonia reported imports from 22 countries. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Estonia reported the import of six large-calibre artillery systems from the Republic of Korea.

Estonia reported the import of 8,216 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (78.3 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (11.7 per cent) and ‘others’ (light weapons) (3.9 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Estonia were the United States (84.3 per cent), Germany (4.5 per cent) and Austria (4.2 per cent).

Estonia provided disaggregated numbers for its major conventional weapons and SALW exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and/or exporting state.

Estonia provided descriptions of exports reported under armoured combat vehicles, recoilless rifles and SALW ‘others’ sub-categories.

Estonia provided descriptions and comments for some of its imports.

Estonia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in some specific weapons categories and sub-categories.

Estonia reported exports to 17 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-member (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).27

Estonia reported the export of three armoured combat vehicles to Norway.

Estonia reported the export of 8,883 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were recoilless rifles (90.1 per cent), rifles and carbines (3.9 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (2.5 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Estonia were Sweden (90.1 per cent), Finland (2 per cent) and Latvia (1.6 per cent).

Estonia could provide descriptions and comments on the nature of all its reported exports and imports.

Estonia could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

---

27 Estonia also reported exports to one non-UN member (Taiwan).
FINLAND

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

Finland’s reporting changed in its 2021 report.

Finland reported **Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports but did not specify whether transfers were **Actual** or **Authorized**, as opposed to 2020 when it reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports.

Finland reported **Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons imports after not doing so in its 2020 report. It did not report any SALW imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported **Actual Numbers** of all small arms imports, except for one that was not specified.

Finland continued to report **Actual Values** of additional exports under voluntary national categories.
Finland reported imports from one ATT State Party.

Finland reported the import of six large-calibre artillery systems from the Republic of Korea.

Finland did not report imports of SALW.

Finland reported exports to 52 countries. Of these, 39 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and five were non-members (India, Indonesia, Qatar, South Sudan and Uzbekistan). 28

Finland reported the export of three armoured combat vehicles to Latvia.

Finland reported the export of 988 rifles and carbines.

The main importers of small arms from Finland were India (37.7 per cent), the Czech Republic (8 per cent) and the United States (7.7 per cent).

Finland also reported the exports of small arms (EU Common Military List ML1) with a total value of €6.1m (US$7.3m) 29 under national categories. The main exporters of these were India (33 per cent), Uzbekistan (13.7 per cent) and Singapore (11.3 per cent).

Finland provided descriptions for all its exports and imports.

Finland reported additional information on exports under voluntary national categories while also providing values for these transfers.

Finland excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Finland could provide comments describing the nature of its reported exports and imports.

Finland did not specify whether it reported actual or authorized exports or imports.

---

28 Finland also reported exports to a non-UN member (Kosovo).

FRANCE

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public?  Yes

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons?  Unspecified – Not indicated

What reporting template was used?  National reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were submitted reports made public?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

France’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. France reported Actual Numbers of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW. France reported Actual Numbers of imports of SALW. As in its 2020 report, it did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
France reported imports from seven countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

France did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

France reported the import of 51,857 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68.8 per cent), assault rifles (25 per cent) and rifles and carbines (3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main exporters of SALW to France were Austria (68.8 per cent), Germany (25.7 per cent) and Belgium (3.2 per cent).

France reported exports to 40 countries. Of these, 26 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and seven were non-members (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan).

France reported the export of 657 major conventional weapons, covering seven categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (69.9 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (8.8 per cent) and combat aircraft (8.5 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from France were India (33.5 per cent), Qatar (24.4 per cent) and Egypt (10.2 per cent).

France reported the export of 3,552 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (46.5 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (41.4 per cent) and rifles and carbines (6.3 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from France were the United States (57.6 per cent), Switzerland (16.7 per cent) and Chad (6 per cent).

GOOD PRACTICES
France provided clear, disaggregated data for every reported export and import.

France provided descriptions of items for all reported exports and imports. These descriptions named the sub-category of weapons and in some cases provided additional details such as calibres. It also provided some comments describing the nature of its transfers.

France indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
France did not specify whether reported exports of combat aircraft and attack helicopters were manned or unmanned, per UN Registry Definitions of Categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT.

France did not specify whether any information was withheld for “commercial sensitivity/national security-related” reasons.

France could provide comments describing the nature of more of its reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA
- France reported exports to 40 countries. Of these, 26 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and seven were non-members (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan).
- France reported the export of 657 major conventional weapons, covering seven categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (69.9 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (8.8 per cent) and combat aircraft (8.5 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from France were India (33.5 per cent), Qatar (24.4 per cent) and Egypt (10.2 per cent).
- France reported the export of 3,552 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (46.5 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (41.4 per cent) and rifles and carbines (6.3 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from France were the United States (57.6 per cent), Switzerland (16.7 per cent) and Chad (6 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA
- France reported imports from seven countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- France did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- France reported the import of 51,857 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68.8 per cent), assault rifles (25 per cent) and rifles and carbines (3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of SALW to France were Austria (68.8 per cent), Germany (25.7 per cent) and Belgium (3.2 per cent).

30 For example, the UN Registry definitions of weapons categories include combat aircraft that are: (a) manned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defence or reconnaissance missions; or (b) unmanned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction. For more information, see ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: ATT/CSP5/WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf. Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 25.
31 France also reported exports to one non-UN member (Kosovo).
## GEORGIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td>Yes – Missed Deadline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AN UH-60 BLACK HAWK IN KOSOVO.

CREDIT: © US ARMY / STAFF SGT. TAWNY SCHMIT
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
FIRE THE 84MM CARL-GUSTAF
RECOILLESS RIFLE AT CFB
VALCARTIER, CANADA.

CREDIT: © DND CANADA / CPL HUGO MONTPETIT
Germany included a note in its 2021 report providing more information about its reported exports and imports.

Germany continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports and **Authorized Numbers** of **SALW exports**. Germany reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any import of major conventional weapons. It continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of **SALW imports**.
Germany reported imports from 11 countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Germany reported the import of 16 major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were missile and missile launchers (missile, etc.) (93.8 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (6.2 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional weapons to Germany were Israel (75 per cent), the United States (18.8 per cent) and Italy (6.2 per cent).

Germany reported the import of 4,260 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (59.6 per cent), light machine guns (34.2 per cent) and rifles and carbines (3.8 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Germany were France (59.6 per cent), Latvia (25.9 per cent) and Romania (4.6 per cent).

Germany reported exports to 34 countries. Of these, 28 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-members (Egypt, Jordan and Qatar).

Germany reported the export of 64 major conventional weapons, covering six categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (62.5 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (21.9 per cent) and warships (6.3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Germany were Spain (60.9 per cent), Qatar (10.9 per cent) and Australia (6.3 per cent).

Germany reported the export of 22,787 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (81.8 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (12.3 per cent) and sub-machine guns (4.4 per cent).

The main importers of SALW to Germany were the United Kingdom (58.7 per cent), Estonia (23.5 per cent) and Belgium (13.5 per cent).
## GHANA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## GREECE

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public?  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## GRENADA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GUATEMALA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Report Submitted</th>
<th>Publicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes – On time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### GUINEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Report Submitted</th>
<th>Publicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### GUINEA BISSAU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Report Submitted</th>
<th>Publicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GUYANA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports Submitted</th>
<th>Were Submitted Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? No

Was the 2021 annual report made public? No

### HONDURAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports Submitted</th>
<th>Were Submitted Reports Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public? No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Were submitted reports made public?
A .50 CALIBRE MACHINE GUN AT THE UK COMMANDO TRAINING CENTRE ROYAL MARINES (CTCRM) LULWORTH CAMP.

CREDIT: © MOD CROWN / ANDY HIBBERD
REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Hungary’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report. Hungary reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any major conventional exports. It continued to report Actual Numbers of exports of SALW.

Hungary did not report any major conventional weapon imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons imports. It continued to report Actual Numbers of imports of small arms. It did not specify whether its light weapons imports were Actual or Authorized.

Hungary continued to specify that it does not define the terms ‘exports’ and ‘imports’ as physical transfers of items across the border, transfers of control or transfers of title, noting instead that it ‘doesn’t have a single criterion for this, it depends on the transfer and the destination (transfer of control, delivery verification date, leaving Hungary’s territory, etc.).’
Hungary reported imports from 22 countries. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.

Hungary did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Hungary reported the import of 4,770 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (79.1 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (20.1 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Hungary were Germany (20.4 per cent), Austria (18 per cent) and the Czech Republic (14.6 per cent).

Hungary reported exports to 14 countries. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Uzbekistan).

Hungary reported the export of two armoured combat vehicles: one to Lithuania and one to Slovakia.

Hungary reported the export of 605 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (89.9 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (6.3 per cent) and heavy machine guns (3.5 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Hungary were Romania (28.3 per cent), the United States (18.4 per cent) and Germany (13.9 per cent).

GOOD PRACTICES

Hungary provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported imports and exports.

Hungary provided descriptions and comments describing the nature of nearly all reported exports and imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Hungary could provide more comments describing the nature of all reported exports and imports.

Hungary could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Hungary excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

- Hungary reported exports to 14 countries. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Uzbekistan).
- Hungary reported the export of two armoured combat vehicles: one to Lithuania and one to Slovakia.
- Hungary reported the export of 605 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (89.9 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (6.3 per cent) and heavy machine guns (3.5 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Hungary were Romania (28.3 per cent), the United States (18.4 per cent) and Germany (13.9 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

- Hungary reported imports from 22 countries. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.
- Hungary did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Hungary reported the import of 4,770 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (79.1 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (20.1 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Hungary were Germany (20.4 per cent), Austria (18 per cent) and the Czech Republic (14.6 per cent).
ICELAND

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons? No

What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 ✗ 2018 ✗ 2019 ✗ 2020 ✗ 2021 ✓

Were submitted reports made public? 2021 ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Iceland submitted an annual report for the first time.

Iceland submitted ‘nil’ reports for exports.

Iceland reported Authorized Numbers of small arms imports.
Iceland did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Iceland reported the import of 1,028 small arms, covering two sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (82.6 per cent).

Iceland submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports.

Iceland indicated clearly that there were no reported imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Iceland submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2021.

Iceland could provide descriptions and comments on imports of small arms.

Iceland could provide information on exporting states for its reported imports of small arms.

Iceland could provide descriptions and comments on imports of small arms.

Iceland did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Iceland reported the import of 1,028 small arms, covering two sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (82.6 per cent).
IRELAND

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Ireland’s reporting changed in its 2021 annual report.

Ireland reported Numbers and Values of major conventional weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any such exports. In 2021, it reported Authorized Numbers and some Values of small arms exports, unlike in 2020 when Authorized Numbers, Actual Numbers and some Values of small arms exports were reported. Ireland continued not to report exports of light weapons.

Ireland did not report major conventional weapons imports, unlike in 2020 when it submitted a ‘nil’ report for major conventional weapons imports.

Ireland reported Numbers of small arms imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Actual Numbers of small arms imports. Ireland continued not to report imports of light weapons.
Ireland reported imports from 13 ATT States Parties.  
Ireland did not report imports of major conventional weapons.  
Ireland reported the import of 6,491 small arms, covering three sub-categories. These were ‘others’ (small arms) (74.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (21.6 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (3.8 per cent).  
In some cases, Ireland aggregated information for importing countries for these sub-categories, making it impossible to determine where these items were exported.

Ireland reported exports to nine countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.  
Ireland reported the export of two manned combat aircraft, with a total value of €35,000 (US$41,420). The importer was left blank. However, the comments of the transfer indicate that it corresponds to a ‘Donation of non-serviceable aircrafts to UK Museum’.  
Ireland reported the export of 197 small arms, with a total value of €50,948 (US$60,293).  
In terms of numbers, these were ‘others’ (small arms) (76.1 per cent), rifles and carbines (19.8 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.1 per cent).  
In some cases, Ireland aggregated information for importing countries for these sub-categories, making it impossible to determine where these items were exported.

Ireland provided comments and/or descriptions for most of its reported transfers.  
Ireland reported some values of small arms exports in addition to the number of items transferred.  
Ireland indicated clearly that there were no reported exports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Ireland continued to aggregate the final importing/exporting countries in some of its small arms exports and imports sub-categories, making it impossible to determine how many items were exported to or imported from specific countries.  
Ireland did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual major conventional weapons exports and small arms imports.  
Ireland could provide more comments and descriptions on the nature of all its reported transfers.  
Ireland could have indicated clearly that there were no reported imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Transfer Summary - 2021: Export Data

- Ireland reported exports to nine countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Ireland reported the export of two manned combat aircraft, with a total value of €35,000 (US$41,420). The importer was left blank. However, the comments of the transfer indicate that it corresponds to a ‘Donation of non-serviceable aircrafts to UK Museum’.
- Ireland reported the export of 197 small arms, with a total value of €50,948 (US$60,293).
- In terms of numbers, these were ‘others’ (small arms) (76.1 per cent), rifles and carbines (19.8 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.1 per cent).
- In some cases, Ireland aggregated information for importing countries for these sub-categories, making it impossible to determine where these items were exported.

Transfer Summary - 2021: Import Data

- Ireland reported imports from 13 ATT States Parties.
- Ireland did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Ireland reported the import of 6,491 small arms, covering three sub-categories. These were ‘others’ (small arms) (74.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (21.6 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (3.8 per cent).
- In some cases, Ireland aggregated information for importing countries for these sub-categories, making it impossible to determine where these items were exported.

34 The total value of exports might be larger as it is unclear whether Ireland disclosed the value of the exports of rifles and carbines and other small arms to multiple countries.
ITALY

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time
Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes
Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? No
What reporting template was used? ATT online reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 - ✓ 2018 - ✓ 2019 - ✓ 2020 - ✓ 2021 - ✓
Were submitted reports made public? 2017 - ✓ 2018 - ✓ 2019 - ✓ 2020 - ✓ 2021 - ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Italy’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Italy continued to report Authorized Numbers of small arms and major conventional exports, except for small arms ‘light machine guns’ sub-category that was not specified. It did not report exports of light weapons, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Authorized Numbers of light weapons exports.

Italy continued to report Authorized Numbers of SALW imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Authorized Numbers of major conventional weapons imports.

Italy specified that its definitions of the terms ‘exports’ and ‘imports’ cover export and import licenses Authorized in 2021.36

36 For import licenses. Italy specifies that intra-EU transfers do not require import licenses and therefore they are not reflected in its annual report.
Italy reported imports from six countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Italy did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Italy reported the import of 3,250 SALW, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (80 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (15.2 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (3.2 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Italy were Switzerland (78.2 per cent), the United States (18.5 per cent) and the United Kingdom (3.1 per cent).

Italy reported exports to 42 countries. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and 12 were non-members (Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan).

Italy reported the export of 13,885 major conventional weapons, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were armoured combat vehicles (91 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (8.1 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Italy were the United States (82.5 per cent), Spain (7.6 per cent) and the Netherlands (6.6 per cent).

Italy reported the export of 116,281 small arms, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (88.2 per cent), rifles and carbines (6.6 per cent) and assault rifles (4.6 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from Italy were Brazil (69.5 per cent), Qatar (21.7 per cent) and Morocco (5.6 per cent).

GOOD PRACTICES

Italy continued to provide clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported imports and exports, including export destination and import source countries.

Italy indicated clearly that there were no reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank, except for the exports of the small arms ‘others’ sub-category that was not specified.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Italy could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all reported exports and imports.
JAMAICA

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Jamaica’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. Jamaica reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and imports. It continued not to report exports or imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.
Jamaica reported imports from eight countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.

Jamaica did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Jamaica reported the import of 2,792 SALW, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (78.2 per cent), ‘others’ (small arms) (19.8 per cent) and rifles and carbines (1.7 per cent).

Jamaica aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple importing states in most cases.

Jamaica indicated that exports and imports reported in the small arms ‘others’ sub-category were shotguns.

Jamaica reported exports to six countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Jamaica did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Jamaica reported the export of 130 small arms, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (50.8 per cent), rifles and carbines (36.2 per cent) and ‘others’ (small arms) (5.4 per cent).

Jamaica aggregated the number of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple importing states in most cases.

Jamaica aggregated numbers of exports and imports of small arms items by weapons sub-categories, making it impossible to determine how many items of each weapon were exported or imported by each reported state.

Jamaica could provide comments and descriptions on the nature of all its reported transfers.

Jamaica provided no information on imports or exports of major conventional weapons.

Jamaica reported imports from eight countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.

Jamaica did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Jamaica reported the import of 2,792 SALW, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (78.2 per cent), ‘others’ (small arms) (19.8 per cent) and rifles and carbines (1.7 per cent).

Jamaica aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple importing states in most cases.
## JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td>Yes – On time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>ATT reporting template³⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✓ 2021 ✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Japan's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report. Japan used the standard reporting template as opposed to using the online reporting template as it did for its 2020 report.

Japan continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports, and it did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons as in its 2020 report.

Japan continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and light weapons imports, and **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms imports.

Japan continued to provide information on SALW exports and imports organized according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Code) of the World Customs Organization. It did not provide any comments or descriptions in the additional data.

---

³⁷ Japan also submitted separate annex tables detailing SALW imports and exports.
Japan reported imports from 13 countries. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Japan reported the import of six manned combat aircraft from the United States.

Japan reported the import of 4,490 small arms with the total value of ¥2,142m (US$19.5m). These were SALW (aggregated) (99.9 per cent) and mortars of calibres less than 75mm (0.1 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Japan were Germany (41.1 per cent), the United States (23 per cent) and Italy (21.2 per cent).

Japan reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

Japan did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Japan reported the export of 108,264 small arms with a total value of ¥5,034m (US$45.9m).

In terms of value, the main importers of small arms from Japan were the United States (62.6 per cent), Belgium (28.7 per cent) and Australia (4.1 per cent).

Japan provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported exports and imports.

Japan provided descriptions for all its reported exports and imports, except for the imports of the light weapons ‘Mortars of calibres less than 75 mm’ sub-category.

Japan included both numbers and values of its small arms exports and imports.

Japan indicated clearly that there were no reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Japan’s use of the HS Code for reporting its small arms exports and imports meant that the data provided did not correspond directly to the categorization within the ATT reporting template, making it impossible to comparatively analyse its transfer data.

Japan could provide comments describing the nature of its reported transfers.

Good Practices

Japan provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported exports and imports.

Japan provided descriptions for all its reported exports and imports, except for the imports of the light weapons ‘Mortars of calibres less than 75 mm’ sub-category.

Japan included both numbers and values of its small arms exports and imports.

Japan indicated clearly that there were no reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Room for Improvement

Japan’s use of the HS Code for reporting its small arms exports and imports meant that the data provided did not correspond directly to the categorization within the ATT reporting template, making it impossible to comparatively analyse its transfer data.

Japan could provide comments describing the nature of its reported transfers.

Transfer Summary - 2021: Export Data

- Japan reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Japan did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Japan reported the export of 108,264 small arms with a total value of ¥5,034m (US$45.9m).
- In terms of value, the main importers of small arms from Japan were the United States (62.6 per cent), Belgium (28.7 per cent) and Australia (4.1 per cent).

Transfer Summary - 2021: Import Data

- Japan reported imports from 13 countries. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Japan reported the import of six manned combat aircraft from the United States.
- Japan reported the import of 4,490 small arms with the total value of ¥2,142m (US$19.5m). These were SALW (aggregated) (99.9 per cent) and mortars of calibres less than 75mm (0.1 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Japan were Germany (41.1 per cent), the United States (23 per cent) and Italy (21.2 per cent).

---

39 Ibid.
## KAZAKHSTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Yes – Missed Deadline</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Yes – On Time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes – On Time</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## LATVIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Yes – On Time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Yes – On Time</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes – On Time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## LEBANON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Lesotho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submission Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Was the 2021 annual report submitted?** No

**Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?**

**Were submitted reports made public?**

### Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submission Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Was the 2021 annual report submitted?** No

**Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?**

** Were submitted reports made public?**

2018 ✗
Liechtenstein’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Liechtenstein continued to report *Actual Numbers* of small arms exports. It continued not to report exports of major conventional weapons. It reported *Aggregated Numbers* of light weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any light weapons exports.

Liechtenstein reported mainly *Authorized Numbers* of small arms imports as it did in its 2020 report. In 2020, it reported *Actual Numbers* in the sub-category ‘others’, as opposed to its 2021 report where this is not specified.

Liechtenstein continued not to report imports of major conventional weapons. It reported *Aggregated Numbers* of light weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any light weapons imports.
Liechtenstein reported imports from two ATT States Parties.

Liechtenstein did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Liechtenstein reported the import of 12 small arms, covering three sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (66.7 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (25 per cent) and ‘others’ (small arms) (8.3 per cent).

The exporters of small arms to Liechtenstein were Austria (66.7 per cent) and Germany (33.3 per cent).

Liechtenstein exported small arms to two ATT States Parties.

Liechtenstein did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Liechtenstein reported the export of four small arms: one rifle and carbine to Austria and three rifles and carbines to Slovenia.

Liechtenstein provided clear, disaggregated data for all its small arms imports and exports.

Liechtenstein provided comments describing the nature of its transfers. It also noted that small arms exports and imports were non-commercial as it did in its 2020 report.

Liechtenstein indicated that the import reported in the small arms ‘others’ sub-category was a silencer.

Liechtenstein provided clear, disaggregated data for all its small arms imports and exports.

Liechtenstein could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Liechtenstein provided comments describing the nature of its transfers. It also noted that small arms exports and imports were non-commercial as it did in its 2020 report.

Lithuania

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public? No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were submitted reports made public?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LUXEMBOURG

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Luxembourg’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report.

Luxembourg continued to report Actual Numbers of small arms exports and did not report any exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Luxembourg continued to report Actual Numbers of SALW imports and did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
Luxembourg reported imports from six countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Russian Federation).

Luxembourg did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Luxembourg reported the import of 640 SALW, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (43 per cent), sub-machine guns (32.2 per cent) and assault rifles (22.7 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Luxembourg were Germany (63.8 per cent), the Russian Federation (16.7 per cent) and Austria (11.7 per cent).

Luxembourg reported exports to two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and one was a Signatory.

Luxembourg did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Luxembourg reported the export of 11 small arms and light weapons: ten revolvers and self-loading pistols exported to Türkiye and one rifle and carbine exported to the United Kingdom.

Luxembourg provided clear, disaggregated data for all its small arms imports and exports.

Luxembourg provided descriptions describing the nature of each reported export and import.

Luxembourg could provide comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.

Luxembourg could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

**GOOD PRACTICES**

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA**

- Luxembourg reported exports to two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and one was a Signatory.
- Luxembourg did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Luxembourg reported the export of 11 small arms and light weapons: ten revolvers and self-loading pistols exported to Türkiye and one rifle and carbine exported to the United Kingdom.

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA**

- Luxembourg reported imports from six countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Russian Federation).
- Luxembourg did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Luxembourg reported the import of 640 SALW, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (43 per cent), sub-machine guns (32.2 per cent) and assault rifles (22.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Luxembourg were Germany (63.8 per cent), the Russian Federation (16.7 per cent) and Austria (11.7 per cent).

**MADAGASCAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>Yes – On time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2017 ✔ 2018 ✔ 2019 ✔ 2020 ✔ 2021 ✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Maldives

- **Was the 2021 annual report submitted?** Yes – On time
- **Was the 2021 annual report made public?** Yes
- **Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?** Yes
- **What reporting template was used?** ATT reporting template
- **Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?**
  - 2017 ✓
  - 2018 ✓
  - 2019 ✓
- **Were submitted reports made public?**
  - 2017 ✗
  - 2018 ✓
  - 2019 ✓

## Reporting Practice Summary - 2021

Maldives’ reporting changed in 2021.

Maldives submitted a public 2021 report after keeping its 2020 and 2019 reports confidential.

Maldives submitted ‘nil’ reports for both exports and imports.

* Report submitted before it was due.
Maldives submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2021 report.

**GOOD PRACTICES**

- Maldives submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA**

- Maldives submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA**

**MALI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2017 ✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MALTA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? No

What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were submitted reports made public?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Malta submitted a public 2021 report after keeping its 2020 and 2019 reports confidential.

Malta reported Authorized Numbers and Values of small arms exports. It did not report any major conventional weapons and light weapons exports.

Malta reported Authorized Numbers of small arms imports. It did not report any major conventional weapons and light weapons imports.
Malta reported imports from ten countries. Of these, five were ATT State Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-members (Oman and Tunisia).

Malta did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Malta reported the import of 14,561 aggregated small arms.

Malta aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple importing states in most cases.

Malta made its report public after not doing so in 2020 and 2019.

Malta indicated clearly that there were no reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Malta reported exports to four countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (India).

Malta did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Malta reported the export of 77 aggregated small arms.

Malta aggregated the number of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple exporting states in most cases.

Malta could provide more descriptions and include comments on exports and imports of small arms.

Malta could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports of SALW in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
### Mauritania

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? **No**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mauritius

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? **Yes – On time**

Was the 2021 annual report made public? **No**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CREDIT: © UN PHOTO / RENATA RUIZ
Mexico

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public?

Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? Yes

What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2017 ✓ 2018 ✓ 2019 ✓ 2020 ✓ 2021 ✓


Reporting Practice Summary - 2021

Mexico’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. Mexico continued to report Actual Numbers of small arms exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Mexico continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.
Mexico reported imports from nine countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.

Mexico reported the import of 1,980 major conventional weapons items, all missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) from the United States.

Mexico reported the import of 17,131 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (48.1 per cent), ‘others’ (rifles) (12.4 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (11.6 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Mexico were the United States (45.6 per cent), Israel (16.6 per cent) and Italy (13.5 per cent).

Mexico provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports. Mexico provided descriptions and comments describing the nature of each reported export and import.

Mexico excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Mexico could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Mexico reported exports to five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a non-member (Bolivia).

Mexico did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Mexico reported the export of 4,720 small arms, covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (98.9 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (1.1 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from Mexico were Guatemala (43.4 per cent), Paraguay (31.8 per cent) and El Salvador (17 per cent).
Monaco's reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report.

Monaco submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.
GOOD PRACTICES

Monaco submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2021 report.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

- Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

- Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY LIVE FIRE TRAINING OF MK2 REMOTE WEAPON SYSTEM.

CREDIT: © COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE / JONATHAN GOEDHART
Montenegro's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Montenegro continued to report both Actual and Authorized Numbers of small arms exports, but it did not report exports of light weapons, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Actual and Authorized Numbers of light weapons exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Montenegro continued to report Actual and Authorized Numbers of SALW imports. As opposed to 2020, it did not report the imports of any major conventional weapons.

Montenegro continued to indicate that it excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.
Montenegro reported imports from ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Montenegro did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Montenegro reported the import of 4,965 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (60.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (34.6 per cent) and assault rifles (4.6 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Montenegro were Italy (27.9 per cent), the Czech Republic (25.5 per cent) and Slovakia (17.5 per cent).

Montenegro reported exports to eight countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Montenegro did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Montenegro reported the export of 49,411 small arms covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (83.8 per cent) and assault rifles (16.1 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from Montenegro were the United States (81 per cent), Ghana (8.1 per cent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.6 per cent).

GOOD PRACTICES

Montenegro provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Montenegro provided detailed descriptions of most of its reported exports and imports as well as some comments describing the nature of its imports of small arms.

Montenegro could provide comments describing the nature of more of its reported imports and exports.

Montenegro could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

ATT MONITOR 2023

2.2 – COUNTRY PROFILES

GOOD PRACTICES

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

- Montenegro reported exports to eight countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
- Montenegro did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Montenegro reported the export of 49,411 small arms covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (83.8 per cent) and assault rifles (16.1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Montenegro were the United States (81 per cent), Ghana (8.1 per cent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.6 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

- Montenegro reported imports from ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Montenegro did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Montenegro reported the import of 4,965 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (60.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (34.6 per cent) and assault rifles (4.6 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Montenegro were Italy (27.9 per cent), the Czech Republic (25.5 per cent) and Slovakia (17.5 per cent).

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Montenegro excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Montenegro could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
### MOZAMBIQUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2020 ✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NAMIBIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2021 ✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AUSTRALIAN ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOLDIERS ROPE OUT OF A US MV-22 OSPREY DURING EXERCISE DIAMOND STORM IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES.

CREDIT: © COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE / CPL. RODRIGO VILLABLANCA
### NETHERLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td>Yes – On time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?</td>
<td>Unspecified – Not indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>UNROCA Template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

Netherlands’ reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report. Netherlands continued to submit its UNROCA report.

Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports. It reported **Actual Numbers** of light weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report light weapons exports.

Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.
Netherlands reported imports from 24 countries. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.

Netherlands reported the import of eight manned combat aircraft from Italy.

Netherlands reported the import of 17,890 SALW, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were sub-machine guns (65.2 per cent), rifles and carbines (26.5 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (6.6 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to the Netherlands were Poland (49.5 per cent), the Czech Republic (16.9 per cent) and Canada (11.7 per cent).

Netherlands reported exports to 26 countries. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.

Netherlands reported the export of 40 major conventional weapons, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missile and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (47.5 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (37.5 per cent) and battle tanks (10 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from the Netherlands were Malaysia (47.5 per cent), Germany (47.5 per cent) and the United States (2.5 per cent).

Netherlands reported the export of 24,408 small arms, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were light machine guns (51.4 per cent), ‘others’ (small arms) (20.5 per cent) and assault rifles (18.2 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from the Netherlands were the United States (82.7 per cent), the United Kingdom (8.5 per cent) and Austria (3.2 per cent).

Netherlands provided clear, disaggregated information for each reported export and import.

Netherlands provided descriptions for all exports and imports of major conventional weapons as well as for some SALW imports and exports.

Netherlands could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of more of its reported small arms exports.
NEW ZEALAND

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time
Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes
Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons? No
What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

New Zealand’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 report.

New Zealand continued to report Authorized Numbers of small arms exports and exports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

New Zealand continued to report Authorized Numbers of SALW imports and imports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
New Zealand reported imports from 26 countries and territories. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.\footnote{New Zealand also reported imports from three non-UN members (French Polynesia, Hong Kong and Taiwan).}

New Zealand did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

New Zealand reported the import of 31,867 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (75.4 per cent), ‘others’ (small arms) (19.5 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (3.5 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to New Zealand were Brazil (17.8 per cent), Finland (17 per cent) and the United States (14.8 per cent).

New Zealand reported the export of 8,399 shotguns under National Voluntary Categories. The main exporters of shotguns under voluntary national categories were Türkiye (62.2 per cent), Italy (22.7 per cent) and the United States (6.8 per cent).

New Zealand reported exports to 21 countries and territories. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and five were non-members (Fiji, Indonesia, Oman, Papua New Guinea and Tonga).\footnote{New Zealand also reported exports to two non-UN members (French Polynesia and New Caledonia).}

New Zealand did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

New Zealand reported the export of 859 small arms, covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (69.4 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (30.6 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from New Zealand were China (29.6 per cent), New Caledonia (26 per cent) and Australia (14.2 per cent).

New Zealand reported the export of 630 shotguns under voluntary national categories. The main importers of shotguns under national voluntary categories were Australia (54.3 per cent), New Caledonia (17.8 per cent) and Papua New Guinea (14.6 per cent).

New Zealand could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its exports and imports.

New Zealand could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports of major conventional weapons and light weapons as it did in 2020, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
### NIGER

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  **Yes – On time**

Was the 2021 annual report made public?  **No**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2021 ✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NIGERIA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  **No**

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NIUE

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  **No**

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN (UNMISS) DESTROYING WEAPONS IN 2014.
CREDIT: © UN PHOTO / ISAAC BILLY
REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Norway’s reporting changed in its 2021 annual report. Norway used the ATT standard reporting template, as opposed to 2020 when it used the online template.

Norway continued to not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It continued to report Actual Numbers of small arms exports.

Norway reported Actual Numbers of imports of major conventional weapons after not doing so in its 2020 report. It reported Actual Numbers of small arms imports as opposed to 2020 when it did not specify whether small arms imports were Actual or Authorized. It also did not report light weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did report Actual Numbers of light weapons.
Norway reported imports from two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and one was a Signatory.

Norway reported the import of seven major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. It reported the import of one armoured combat vehicle and six manned combat aircraft.

Norway reported the import of 3,300 assault rifles.

Norway reported exports to 45 countries. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and three were non-members (Indonesia, Oman and Qatar). 42

Norway did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Norway reported the export of 240 small arms covering two sub-categories. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (52.9 per cent) and rifles and carbines (47.1 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from Norway were Germany (36.3 per cent), the United States (21.3 per cent) and Denmark (16.3 per cent).

Under voluntary national categories, Norway also provided data covering 15 categories of the EU Common Military List. Under ML1 items in category A, which includes small arms, it reported exports worth NOK157,416 (US$18,325). 43

Norway excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Norway could provide descriptions and comments on its reported exports and imports.

Norway could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Norway left blank the exporting states, making it impossible to determine from where small arms items were imported.

Norway provided disaggregated numbers for its small arms exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and/or exporting state.

Norway made extensive use of ‘Section C: Voluntary National Categories’ to report data under 15 out of 22 EU Common Military List categories. It reported aggregate values of items exported to individual destinations under each category. It included this in a separate annex.

Norway could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Norway left blank the exporting states, making it impossible to determine from where small arms items were imported.

**Transfer Summary - 2021: Export Data**

- Norway reported exports to 45 countries. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and three were non-members (Indonesia, Oman and Qatar). 42
- Norway did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Norway reported the export of 240 small arms covering two sub-categories. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (52.9 per cent) and rifles and carbines (47.1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Norway were Germany (36.3 per cent), the United States (21.3 per cent) and Denmark (16.3 per cent).
- Under voluntary national categories, Norway also provided data covering 15 categories of the EU Common Military List. Under ML1 items in category A, which includes small arms, it reported exports worth NOK157,416 (US$18,325). 43

**Transfer Summary - 2021: Import Data**

- Norway reported imports from two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and one was a Signatory.
- Norway reported the import of seven major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. It reported the import of one armoured combat vehicle and six manned combat aircraft.
- Norway reported the import of 3,300 assault rifles.

---

42 Norway also reported exports to one non-UN member (New Caledonia).
Palau’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. Palau submitted ‘nil’ reports for both exports and imports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>Yes – Missed deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>2020 ✓ 2021 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td>2020 ✓ 2021 ✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Palau submitted ‘nil’ reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2021 report.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA
- Palau submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA
- Palau submitted a ‘nil’ report for imports.
### Panama

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Paraguay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### People’s Republic of China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Yes - On time</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AT4 RECOILLESS ANTI-TANK WEAPON.

CREDIT: © SAAB AB / CHRISTOPHER LOMFORDS
Peru's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report. Peru continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports. Peru reported Authorized and Actual Numbers and Values of major conventional weapons imports. It reported Actual Numbers and Values of small arms imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Authorized and Actual Numbers of small arms imports. It reported Authorized and Actual imports of light weapons, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any light weapons imports.
Peru reported imports from 16 countries. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Peru reported the import of 2,517 major conventional weapons items, covering three sub-categories, with a total value of US$758,360. In terms of value, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (83.6 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) (10.6 per cent).

In terms of value, the main exporters of major conventional weapons to Peru were Bulgaria (65.7 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (13.5 per cent) and Sweden (10.6 per cent).

Peru reported the import of 10,236 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were ‘others’ (semi-automatic pistols) (66.1 per cent), ‘others’ (semi-automatic shotguns) (16.6 per cent) and ‘others’ (semi-automatic carbines) (9.3 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Peru were Brazil (27.2 per cent), Türkiye (18.5 per cent) and the United States (16.2 per cent).

**GOOD PRACTICES**

Peru provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported imports.

Peru provided numbers and values for most SALW and major conventional weapons imports.

Peru provided descriptions and comments describing the nature and end-use of all reported imports, which are consistent and detailed.

**ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Peru could have indicated clearly that there were no reported imports in specific major conventional weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Poland’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report. Poland used the online reporting template as opposed to using the standard reporting template as it did for its 2020 report. Poland continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Poland continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It reported Actual Numbers of light weapons, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any light weapons imports.
Poland reported imports from six countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Poland reported the import of 40 missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United States.

Poland reported the import of 1,381 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were ‘others’ (small arms) (61.3 per cent), assault rifles (20.1 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (14.8 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Poland were Türkiye (36.2 per cent), Germany (25.1 per cent) and Italy (16.1 per cent).

Poland provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Poland provided descriptions of items for some exports of major conventional weapons and all light weapons imports.

Poland reported exports to 16 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-member (Jordan).

Poland reported the export of 117 major conventional weapons, covering five sub-categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (68.4 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (12 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (11.1 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Poland were Lithuania (68.4 per cent), the Philippines (8.6 per cent) and Ukraine (7.7 per cent).

Poland reported the export of 61,397 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (38.9 per cent), sub-machine guns (32.7 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (21.1 per cent).

The main importers SALW from Poland were the United States (55 per cent), the Netherlands (26.8 per cent) and the Czech Republic (17.1 per cent).

Poland did not specify if any ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ data had been withheld from the report.

Poland could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of its SALW exports and imports of major conventional weapons and small arms.

Poland could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Poland provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Poland provided descriptions of items for some exports of major conventional weapons and all light weapons imports.

Poland reported exports to 16 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-member (Jordan).

Poland reported the export of 117 major conventional weapons, covering five sub-categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (68.4 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (12 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (11.1 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Poland were Lithuania (68.4 per cent), the Philippines (8.6 per cent) and Ukraine (7.7 per cent).

Poland reported the export of 61,397 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (38.9 per cent), sub-machine guns (32.7 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (21.1 per cent).

The main importers SALW from Poland were the United States (55 per cent), the Netherlands (26.8 per cent) and the Czech Republic (17.1 per cent).
PORTUGAL

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public? Yes

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons? Yes

What reporting template was used? ATT online reporting tool

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? Yes

Were submitted reports made public? Yes

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Portugal’s reporting changed in its 2021 annual report.

Portugal reported Numbers and Values of major conventional weapons exports, as opposed to its 2020 report when it did not report exports of major conventional weapons. It reported Numbers of small arms exports. It did not specify whether small arms exports were Authorized or Actual, as opposed to its 2020 report when it reported Authorized Numbers. As in its 2020 report, it did not report exports of light weapons.

Portugal did not specify whether SALW imports were Authorized or Actual in a similar way to its 2020 report. It reported Numbers of SALW imports and in some cases Values too.

Portugal did not report imports of major conventional weapons, as opposed to its 2020 report.
Portugal reported imports from 22 countries. Of these, 19 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.

Portugal did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Portugal reported the import of 8,821 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (43.4 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (29.1 per cent) and assault rifles (24.4 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Portugal were Belgium (41.7 per cent), Austria (17 per cent) and Italy (15.5 per cent).

Portugal reported exports to 36 countries. Of these, 30 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-members (Kuwait, Pakistan and Tajikistan).

Portugal reported the export of 14 armoured combat vehicles to Tajikistan.

Portugal reported the export of 86,571 small arms covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (99.9 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (0.1 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from Portugal were the United States (49.1 per cent), Belgium (41.2 per cent) and Spain (2.9 per cent).

Portugal reported values of major conventional weapons exports and some imports of small arms.

Portugal did not specify whether it was reporting authorized or actual imports or exports.

Portugal could provide more descriptions and include comments describing the nature of its reported transfers.

**GOOD PRACTICES**

Portugal provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported exports and imports.

Portugal provided descriptions of its major conventional weapons exports.

Portugal reported values of major conventional weapons exports and some imports of small arms.

**ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Portugal did not specify whether it was reporting authorized or actual imports or exports.

Portugal could provide more descriptions and include comments describing the nature of its reported transfers.

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA**

- Portugal reported exports to 36 countries. Of these, 30 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-members (Kuwait, Pakistan and Tajikistan).
- Portugal reported the export of 14 armoured combat vehicles to Tajikistan.
- Portugal reported the export of 86,571 small arms covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (99.9 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (0.1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Portugal were the United States (49.1 per cent), Belgium (41.2 per cent) and Spain (2.9 per cent).

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA**

- Portugal reported imports from 22 countries. Of these, 19 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Portugal did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Portugal reported the import of 8,821 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (43.4 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (29.1 per cent) and assault rifles (24.4 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Portugal were Belgium (41.7 per cent), Austria (17 per cent) and Italy (15.5 per cent).
REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Republic of Korea's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Republic of Korea reported Authorized Numbers of major conventional weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any. It continued to report Authorized Numbers of small arms exports. It did not report light weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported Authorized Numbers of light weapons exports.

Republic of Korea continued to report Authorized Numbers of small arms imports. It continued not to report any imports of major conventional weapons and light weapons as it did in its 2020 report.

Republic of Korea provided its own definitions of the terms ‘exports’ and ‘imports’, indicating in both instances that its data is based on licenses granted (Authorized) and not on Actual transfers.
Republic of Korea reported imports from five countries, all ATT State Parties.

Republic of Korea did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Republic of Korea reported the import of 169 small arms. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (34.3 per cent), assault rifles (34.3 per cent) and sub-machine guns (29.6 per cent).

The main exporters of small arms to the Republic of Korea were Bulgaria (34.3 per cent), Germany (33.7 per cent) and Switzerland (29.6 per cent).

Republic of Korea reported exports to two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and one was a non-member (Nepal).

Republic of Korea reported the export of one warship to Peru.

Republic of Korea reported the export of 8,853 small arms, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (93.1 per cent) and light machine guns (4.6 per cent).

All small arms exports were to Nepal.

Republic of Korea excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons, but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Republic of Korea could provide comments on the nature of all its reported transfers.
### Republic of Moldova

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? No

### Republic of North Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? No
UN INTERIM SECURITY FORCE FOR ABYEI (UNISFA) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN ABYEI.

CREDIT: © UNMAS / UNISFA
REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Romania’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report.

Romania continued to report Actual Numbers of SALW exports. As in its 2020 report, it did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Romania continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports, except for small arms ‘others’ sub-category that was not specified whether they were Actual or Authorized.
Romania reported imports from 14 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Romania reported the import of 34 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were large-calibre artillery systems (52.9 per cent), missile and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (44.1 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (2.9 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional weapons to Romania were the United States (97.1 per cent) and Portugal (2.9 per cent).

Romania reported the import of 14,546 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (58.4 per cent), rifles and carbines (33.9 per cent) and assault rifles (6.9 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Romania were the United States (71 per cent), Bulgaria (18.7 per cent) and Iraq (5.7 per cent).

Romania provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported exports and imports.

Romania provided descriptions of most of its transfers and, in many cases, comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.

Romania indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Romania reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Iraq).

Romania did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Romania reported the export of 64,694 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (40.5 per cent), rifles and carbines (34.4 per cent) and assault rifles (22.9 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Romania were the United States (71 per cent), Bulgaria (18.7 per cent) and Iraq (5.7 per cent).

Romania provided descriptions of most of its transfers and, in many cases, comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.

Romania indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Romania could provide comments and descriptions on the nature of all its reported transfers.

### GOOD PRACTICES

- Romania reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Iraq).
- Romania did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Romania reported the export of 64,694 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (40.5 per cent), rifles and carbines (34.4 per cent) and assault rifles (22.9 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Romania were the United States (71 per cent), Bulgaria (18.7 per cent) and Iraq (5.7 per cent).

### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Romania reported imports from 14 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Romania reported the import of 34 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were large-calibre artillery systems (52.9 per cent), missile and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (44.1 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (2.9 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional weapons to Romania were the United States (97.1 per cent) and Portugal (2.9 per cent).
- Romania reported the import of 14,546 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (58.4 per cent), rifles and carbines (33.9 per cent) and assault rifles (6.9 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Romania were the Czech Republic (42.5 per cent), Germany (20.7 per cent) and Austria (17.4 per cent).
### SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Were Submitted Reports Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SAINT LUCIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Were Submitted Reports Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Were Submitted Reports Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SAMOA

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports were due?</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2017 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2018 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SAN MARINO

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports were due?</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports were due?</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SENEGAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</strong></td>
<td>Yes – Missed Deadline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Were submitted reports made public?</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AN EC135 HELICOPTER AT HMAS ALBATROSS IN NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA.

CREDIT: © COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE / CPOIS CAMERON MARTIN
**SERBIA**

Was the 2021 annual report submitted?  Yes – On time

Was the 2021 annual report made public?  Yes

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?  No

What reporting template was used?  ATT reporting template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reports Submitted</th>
<th>Public Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

Serbia’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report.

Serbia continued to report mainly Actual Numbers of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Serbia continued to report Actual Numbers of imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.
Serbia reported imports from 23 countries. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and two were non-members (Belarus and Russian Federation).

Serbia reported the import of 111 major conventional weapons items, covering five sub-categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missile and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (75.7 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (21.6 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional weapons to Serbia were Cyprus (75.7 per cent) and Belarus (20.7 per cent).

Serbia reported the export of 97,022 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (45.4 per cent), assault rifles (26.3 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (20.4 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Serbia were Croatia (38.9 per cent), Montenegro (24.9 per cent) and the Czech Republic (10 per cent).

Serbia provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported exports and imports.

Serbia provided descriptions and comments for some of its exports and imports.

Serbia could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported transfers.

Serbia could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Serbia did not clarify with descriptions the reported imports/exports under the small arms ‘others’ category.

Serbia reported exports to 34 countries. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and eight were non-members (Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Myanmar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and Uganda).

Serbia reported the export of 8,579 major conventional weapons, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were large-calibre artillery systems (61.2 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (38.4 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (0.3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Serbia were the United Arab Emirates (45.9 per cent), Burkina Faso (20.2 per cent) and the United States (15.2 per cent).

Serbia did not clarify with descriptions the reported imports/exports under the small arms ‘others’ category.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SEYCHELLES**

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed Deadline

Was the 2021 annual report made public? No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were submitted reports made public? 2021 ✗
A CHINOOK HELICOPTER LIFTING AN M-777 HOWITZER DURING AN EXERCISE IN ESTONIA.
CREDIT: © NATO
Sierra Leone's reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. Sierra Leone submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.
Sierra Leone submitted ‘nil’ reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2021 report.

GOOD PRACTICES

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA

- Sierra Leone submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA

- Sierra Leone submitted a ‘nil’ report for imports.

HMS SÖDERMANLAND
SUBMARINE AT SHIPLIFT.

CREDIT: © SAAB AB / GLENN PETTERSON
**SLOVAKIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

Slovakia’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report. Slovakia reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports. Slovakia reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.
Slovakia reported imports from 24 countries. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-member (Russian Federation).

Slovakia reported the import of 401 major conventional weapons items, covering five categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were armoured combat vehicles (94.5 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (4 per cent) and battle tanks (0.8 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional weapons to Slovakia were Kazakhstan (89.3 per cent), Croatia (3.5 per cent) and the Czech Republic (2 per cent).

Slovakia reported the import of 99,146 SALW items, covering ten sub-categories. Of these, the majority were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (92.8 per cent), rifles and carbines (4.1 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (2.9 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Slovakia were Brazil (29 per cent), the United States (18.8 per cent) and Israel (10 per cent).

Slovakia reported exports to 47 countries. Of these, 33 were ATT States Parties, ten were Signatories and four were non-members (India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan and Oman).

Slovakia reported the export of 6,173 major conventional weapons, covering five categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (98.1 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (1.5 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (0.2 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Slovakia were Poland (48.9 per cent), Serbia (40.5 per cent) and the Czech Republic (10 per cent).

Slovakia reported the export of 68,262 SALW items. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (91.6 per cent), sub-machine guns (5.9 per cent) and rifles and carbines (1.7 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Slovakia were Brazil (29 per cent), the United States (18.8 per cent) and Israel (10 per cent).

Slovakia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Slovakia provided descriptions and some comments describing the nature of most of its major conventional weapons exports and imports as well as for some SALW exports and imports.

Slovakia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Slovakia could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of some of its small arms exports and imports.
**SLOVENIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
<td>ATT reporting template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were submitted reports made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

Slovenia’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons exports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any major conventional weapons exports. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports. It did not report exports of light weapons as it did in its 2020 report.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it did not report any major conventional weapons imports. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports.
Slovenia reported imports from six countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.

Slovenia reported the import of 38 armoured combat vehicles, indicating the United States as the state of origin.

Slovenia reported the import of 125 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (56 per cent), heavy machine guns (24.8 per cent) and sub-machine guns (8 per cent).

The main exporters of SALW to Slovenia were Germany (36 per cent), the United States (30.4 per cent) and Austria (21.6 per cent).

Slovenia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export as well as both numbers and values of each reported transfer.

Slovenia provided descriptions of all reported exports and imports as well as comments on some transfers.

Slovenia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific major conventional weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Slovenia could provide more comments describing the nature of its small arms exports and SALW imports.

Slovenia could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in some small arms categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Slovenia reported exports to 29 countries. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and four were non-members (Indonesia, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan and Russian Federation).

Slovenia reported the export of eight major conventional weapons, all missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) to the Russian Federation.

Slovenia reported the export of 29,684 small arms with a total value of €6.7m (US$8m). In terms of value, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (99.7 per cent) and sub-machine guns (0.2 per cent).

The main importers of small arms from Slovenia were the United States (83.5 per cent), Brazil (5.4 per cent) and Israel (1.5 per cent).

Slovenia also reported exports to one non-UN member (Kosovo).

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa’s reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

South Africa reported mainly Authorized Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports, as opposed to 2020, when it reported a mix of Actual and Authorized Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

South Africa continued to report Authorized Numbers of small arms weapons imports. It continued not to report any major conventional weapons and light weapons imports.
South Africa reported imports from 13 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Russian Federation).

South Africa did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

South Africa reported the import of 7,961 small arms, covering three sub-categories. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (65.8 per cent), rifles and carbines (22.5 per cent) and ‘others’ (small arms) (11.7 per cent).

The main exporters of small arms to South Africa were Türkiye (34.4 per cent), Brazil (18.8 per cent) and Slovakia (18.5 per cent).

South Africa reported exports to 25 countries. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, eight were Signatories and one was a non-member (Indonesia).

South Africa reported the export of 71 major conventional weapons, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (97.2 per cent) and warships (2.8 per cent).

The main importers of major conventional weapons from South Africa were Mali (28.2 per cent), Cote d’Ivoire (26.8 per cent) and Senegal (22.5 per cent).

In terms of numbers, South Africa reported the export of 2,268 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (47.8 per cent), ‘others’ (small arms) (32.1 per cent) and rifles and carbines (19.4 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from South Africa were Zimbabwe (34.8 per cent), the United Kingdom (14 per cent) and Lesotho (11 per cent).

South Africa could provide more comments describing the nature of its reported imports and exports.

South Africa excluded some data for ‘commercial sensitivity/national security-related’ reasons, but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

South Africa could have indicated clearly that there were no reported exports in some of SALW imports and exports sub-categories instead of leaving the reported template blank.
Spain's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Spain continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports. It reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms, as opposed to 2020 when it reported a mix of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports. It did not report light weapons exports in its 2021 report, as opposed to 2020 when it reported a mix of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers**.

Spain continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports. It also reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports in two instances and **Authorized Numbers** for other SALW imports. It did not report light weapons imports, as opposed to 2020 when it reported **Authorized Numbers** of light weapons imports.
Spain reported imports from two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and the other was a Signatory.

Spain reported the import of two manned attack helicopters from the United States.

Spain reported the import of 46 small arms, all rifles and carbines.

The exporters of small arms to Spain were the United Kingdom (73.9 per cent) and the United States (26.1 per cent).

Spain reported exports to ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.

Spain reported the export of 97 major conventional weapons, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were large-calibre artillery systems (55.7 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (44.3 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Spain were Switzerland (51.6 per cent), the United Kingdom (20.6 per cent) and Portugal (13.4 per cent).

Spain reported the export of one fusil to Austria, clarifying that it was a return to origin.

Spain did not indicate by ticking the relevant box whether it had excluded some data for “commercial sensitivity/national security-related” reasons.

Spain could provide more comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.

Spain could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

**GOOD PRACTICES**

Spain provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported exports and imports.

Spain provided descriptions for all its exports and imports and comments for small arms exports.

**ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Spain provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported exports and imports.

Spain provided descriptions for all its exports and imports and comments for small arms exports.

Spain provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported exports and imports.

Spain provided descriptions for all its exports and imports and comments for small arms exports.

Spain did not indicate by ticking the relevant box whether it had excluded some data for “commercial sensitivity/national security-related” reasons.

Spain could provide more comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.

Spain could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA**

- Spain reported exports to ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Spain reported the export of 97 major conventional weapons, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were large-calibre artillery systems (55.7 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (44.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Spain were Switzerland (51.6 per cent), the United Kingdom (20.6 per cent) and Portugal (13.4 per cent).
- Spain reported the export of one fusil to Austria, clarifying that it was a return to origin.

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA**

- Spain reported imports from two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and the other was a Signatory.
- Spain reported the import of two manned attack helicopters from the United States.
- Spain reported the import of 46 small arms, all rifles and carbines.
- The exporters of small arms to Spain were the United Kingdom (73.9 per cent) and the United States (26.1 per cent).
### STATE OF PALESTINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes – On time</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
<td>Yes – On time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>●</td>
<td>2019 ❏</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SURINAME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>❏</td>
<td>❏</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</th>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020 ❏</td>
<td>2021 ❏</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DIRECT FIRE TRAINING WITH THE 2S3 ARTILLERY ARMOURED VEHICLE AT THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY CENTRE NEAR YAVORIV, UKRAINE.

CREDIT: © DND CANADA / AVIATOR STEPHANIE LABOSSIERE
**SWEDEN**

Was the 2021 annual report submitted? | Yes – On time
---|---
Was the 2021 annual report made public? | Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons? | Yes
What reporting template was used? | ATT online reporting tool

| Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? | 2017 ✓ | 2018 ✓ | 2019 ✓ | 2020 ✓ | 2021 ✓ |

**REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021**

Sweden's reporting changed slightly in its 2021 annual report.

Sweden continued to report mostly **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and light weapons exports as 'classified', in both cases leaving the values blank. It continued to report **Actual Values** of export of small arms under national categories as EU Common Military List ML1 items instead of reporting them in the relevant sections of the online reporting tool.

Sweden reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of small arms, as opposed to 2020 when it submitted a 'nil' report on imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons and light weapons as in its 2020 annual report.
Sweden made extensive use of 'Section C: Voluntary National Categories' to report data under 16 out of 22 EU Common Military List categories. It reported aggregate values of items exported to individual destinations under each category. It included this Annex 2 in the same document, as opposed from 2020 report where it included that list as a separate word document.

Sweden provided clear, disaggregated data on each reported export and import.

Sweden provided descriptions for all exports of major conventional weapons and light weapons and imports of small arms. It provided comments for small arms imports.

Sweden specified where information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and for which weapon sub-category: missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) and recoilless rifles.

Sweden indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Sweden could provide comments describing the nature of its exports.

Sweden reported exports to 59 countries. Of these, 43 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and ten were non-members (Algeria, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia).

Sweden reported the export of major conventional weapons, covering one category, missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS), to Brazil and the Czech Republic. It withheld the number of items involved in each transfer.

Sweden reported exports of light weapons, covering two sub-categories. These were recoilless rifles and portable antitank missile launchers and rocket systems to Australia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, South Africa and the United States. It withheld the number of items involved in each transfer.

Sweden indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Sweden reported imports from one ATT State Party.

Sweden did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

Sweden reported the import of 1,530 revolvers and self-loading pistols, all Glock pistols, from Austria.

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

Switzerland's reporting remained the same in its 2021 annual report.

Switzerland continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons exports and Authorized Numbers of SALW exports.

Switzerland continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons imports and Authorized Numbers of SALW imports.
Switzerland reported imports from 28 countries. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-members (India and Qatar).

Switzerland reported the import of 51 major conventional weapons items. It imported one missile and missile launcher (MANPADS) from Germany and 50 large-calibre artillery systems from Spain.

Switzerland reported the import of 9,941 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (60.2 per cent), assault rifles (25.2 per cent) and rifles and carbines (5.1 per cent).

Switzerland reported exports to 46 countries. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and four were non-members (Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia).

Switzerland reported the export of 166 major conventional weapons, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (99.4 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (0.6 per cent).

In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Switzerland were Denmark (33.7 per cent), Romania (30.1 per cent) and Ireland (15.1 per cent).

Switzerland reported the export of 47,378 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were sub-machine guns (44.2 per cent), assault rifles (20.8 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (19.2 per cent).

The main importers of SALW from Switzerland were the United States (62.6 per cent), Canada (4.5 per cent) and France (2.4 per cent).
### Togo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reported</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Trinidad and Tobago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reported</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Tuvalu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reported</th>
<th>Made Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A CF-188 HORNET AT MIHAIL KOGŁNICEANU AIR BASE, ROMANIA.

CREDIT: © DND CANADA / S1 ZACH BARR
# UNITED KINGDOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the 2021 annual report submitted?</th>
<th>Yes – On time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the 2021 annual report made public?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?</td>
<td>Unspecified – Not indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What reporting template was used?</td>
<td>UNROCA Template</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?</th>
<th>2017 ✓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2020 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2021 ✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were submitted reports made public?</th>
<th>2017 ✓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2020 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2021 ✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2021

United Kingdom’s reporting remained the same in its 2021 report.

United Kingdom continued to report Authorized Numbers of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

United Kingdom did not report imports in its 2021 report.
United Kingdom provided clear, disaggregated data for major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

United Kingdom provided descriptions of items and comments on the nature of most of its exports.

**GOOD PRACTICES**

United Kingdom provided no information on imports for major conventional weapons or SALW, and it did not indicate if it submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

United Kingdom did not specify whether the reported exports of attack helicopters were manned or unmanned, per UN Registry Definitions of Categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT.\[^{48}\]

United Kingdom did not specify whether any information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

United Kingdom could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of all reported exports.

**ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

- United Kingdom reported exports to 68 countries. Of these, 45 were ATT States Parties, 12 were Signatories and 11 were non-members (Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia).

- United Kingdom reported the export of 1,286 major conventional weapons, covering seven categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were armoured combat vehicles (48.3 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (36.3 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) (14 per cent).

- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from the United Kingdom were Belgium (28.8 per cent), Saudi Arabia (26.9 per cent) and Latvia (9.6 per cent).

- United Kingdom reported the export of 21,672 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (78.6 per cent), assault rifles (11.4 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (7 per cent).

- The main importers of SALW from the United Kingdom were Germany (25.4 per cent), Ireland (20.3 per cent) and the United States (18.4 per cent).

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: EXPORT DATA**

**TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2021: IMPORT DATA**

---

\[^{48}\] The UN Registry definitions of weapons categories include attack helicopters that are: (a) manned rotary-wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions; and (b) unmanned rotary-wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons. For more information, see ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). ‘Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT.’ ATT/CSP5:WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiEzk, p. 26.
### URUGUAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Were Reports Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ZAMBIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report Submitted</th>
<th>Were Reports Made Public?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BRITISH ROYAL MARINES HELOCasting INTO SEA IN NORTH DEVON, UK.

CREDIT: © MOD CROWN / LAC PALMER
3.1 PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2022 ANNUAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty requires States Parties to submit annual reports to the ATT Secretariat on their authorized or actual arms exports and imports that occurred during the previous calendar year. Each State Party is required to begin reporting following the first full calendar year after which the Treaty enters into force for it and to continue reporting every year thereafter. The Treaty requires that annual reports be submitted by 31 May each year – though the ATT Secretariat grants a seven-day grace period, creating a de facto annual reporting deadline of 7 June.

Annual reports can provide valuable insights into global arms trade dynamics. In particular, they can enhance awareness of global and regional weapons flows, assist in identifying potentially destabilizing weapons accumulations, facilitate assessments of Treaty compliance, and promote transparency and build confidence among states involved in the global arms trade. However, their potential is undercut by steadily declining compliance rates and persistent transparency challenges.

This chapter offers a preliminary analysis of annual reports submitted for the 2022 calendar year, as well as an update on the overdue annual reports that were submitted since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Annual Report, as of the de facto annual reporting deadline of 7 June 2023.

PREVIEW OF 2022 ANNUAL REPORTS

One hundred and ten of the 113 States Parties to the Treaty were required to report to the ATT Secretariat on their authorized or actual arms exports and imports in 2022. (The newest States Parties – Andorra, Gabon and the Philippines – were not required to submit a 2022 annual report.) As of 7 June 2023, the Secretariat’s website showed that 35 States Parties had submitted annual reports for 2022:

- Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Montenegro, New Zealand, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, State of Palestine, Switzerland and Uruguay
It is likely, however, that more than these 35 States Parties submitted their 2022 annual reports on time. In past years, all reports submitted on time were uploaded and made available by the 7 June deadline. This year, as of 20 June 2023, an additional ten reports appeared on the website, increasing to 45 the number of reports available on the ATT Secretariat’s website.² At the time of writing, the Secretariat had not responded to requests for clarification about how many of the reports posted after the 7 June deadline were actually submitted on time. With this apparent delay in posting, to ensure consistency with previous ATT Monitor analyses, which have used 7 June as the cut-off date for examining newly submitted annual reports, this chapter limits its analysis to the annual reports of the 35 States Parties listed above.³

If the figure of 35 States Parties is accurate, this would mean that only 32 per cent of the 110 due to submit a 2022 report did so on time. This would be the lowest on-time annual reporting compliance in the ATT’s history – the previous one being in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a compliance rate of 38 per cent for 2019 reports. The ATT Monitor looks forward to the ATT Secretariat’s clarification of the number of 2022 reports that were submitted on time.

### Table 3 - ATT Annual Reports on-time reporting rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Year</th>
<th>Number of On-Time Reports (using de facto 7 June deadline)</th>
<th>On-Time Compliance Rate (as percentage of reports due)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Between 7 and 20 June 2023, the ATT Secretariat’s website was updated to indicate that an additional ten States Parties had submitted 2022 annual reports (Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands and Portugal).
³ These additional reports will instead be included in the analysis in next year’s ATT Monitor Annual Report.
Among the 35 States Parties, developing and least developed countries led the way in early annual reporting this year. Of the first four 2022 annual reports submitted, two came from least developed countries (Madagascar and Sierra Leone) and one came from a small island developing country (Mauritius). With many States Parties having described the significant capacity and resource constraints on their reporting efforts, Madagascar, Mauritius and Sierra Leone should be commended for being among the first annual reporters for 2022. It would be useful to engage with these States Parties to better understand their reporting experiences and to consider whether there are lessons that other similar States Parties could learn from to enhance their own reporting practices.

Nine of the 35 States Parties (26 per cent) kept their 2022 annual reports confidential; that is, available only to the ATT Secretariat and other States Parties. Encouragingly, this represents a decrease in confidential on-time reporting compared to a rate of 32 per cent at the same point last year. It is also encouraging that several States Parties with a history of confidential reporting made their 2022 reports public. Most notably, Cyprus made its report public for the first time after five consecutive years of confidential reporting. Bulgaria and El Salvador, which had made their reports public for years but then kept their 2020 and 2021 reports confidential, made a welcome return to public reporting.

It is not yet clear what factors contributed to the decrease in confidential reporting but, as discussed more fully in the initial assessment below, this shift coincides with an increase in States Parties indicating that they withheld commercially sensitive and/or national security-related information from their reports. States Parties with these concerns may be becoming more willing to make their reports public while withholding such information as an alternative to making them confidential in full.

All but one of the nine States Parties that kept their 2022 reports confidential have a history of doing so. Two (Albania and Maldives) have oscillated between public and confidential reporting over the years, three (Georgia, Latvia and Mauritius) shifted to confidential reporting after making their first annual reports public and another three (Madagascar, People’s Republic of China and State of Palestine) have only submitted confidential reports. The exception is Finland, which made its 2022 report confidential after making its reports public for seven years. Some of these States Parties, including Finland and the People’s Republic of China, have emphasized the importance of transparency and reporting in recent interventions at ATT meetings. Their decision to keep their 2022 reports confidential is at odds with these statements and severely limits the practical utility of these documents while undermining the ATT’s broader transparency aims.

---

4 These characterizations are based on United Nations classifications. For more information, see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. ‘Methodology.’ https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/.
REPORTING UPDATES

The number of States Parties that have consistently fulfilled their ATT annual reporting obligations appears to have continued to decline this year – it is too soon to say so with certainty due to potential delays in posting annual reports on the ATT Secretariat’s website. The number of States Parties that had submitted all of their required annual reports by this year’s de facto reporting deadline of 7 June was 34 out of the 110 (31 per cent) that were required to submit at least one annual report. This would represent a continued decline, with the equivalent number in 2022 being 39 States Parties and that in 2021 being 41 States Parties. This decline is particularly significant given that the number of States Parties required to submit an annual report increased from 105 in 2021 to 110 this year as ATT membership has grown.

On the other hand, it is encouraging that several States Parties submitted overdue annual reports this year, which means that the number of those yet to submit any of their reports has decreased. As of 7 June 2023, according to the ATT Secretariat’s website, 26 States Parties (24 per cent of those due to report) had yet to submit any of their required reports. This is a decrease from 32 States Parties at the same point last year. Twenty-eight States Parties submitted 42 overdue annual reports over the past year: 26 reports were for 2021 and 16 were for previous years. They include six first-time reporters that submitted overdue reports: Côte d’Ivoire (which submitted its 2016–2021 reports), Trinidad and Tobago (which submitted its 2015–2019 reports), Zambia (which submitted its 2018–2021 reports) and Botswana, Iceland, and the Seychelles (which submitted their 2021 reports). This welcome development will hopefully encourage non-reporters to follow suit and submit their required reports in the months ahead.

While States Parties should strive to submit their reports on time – so as to not only to fulfil their Treaty obligations but also to facilitate timely assessments of arms trade dynamics – the submission of overdue reports can still yield valuable insights while reinforcing the obligatory nature of ATT reporting. States Parties should therefore be encouraged to submit overdue reports.

Another encouraging development over the past year was the decision by two States Parties (Portugal and Spain) to change their 2021 annual reports from confidential to public. They should be commended for taking this step to promote arms trade transparency. Other States Parties should periodically review the status of their earlier reports. If a report was kept confidential by mistake or if the conditions that initially warranted a report being confidential no longer apply, for example, the State Party should request the ATT Secretariat to make it public.

7 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Montenegro, New Zealand, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, State of Palestine, Switzerland and Uruguay.

8 Afghanistan, Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Suriname and Togo.

9 Albania, Argentina, Austria, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Norway, Palau, Senegal, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Zambia.
INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Several observations can be made based on an initial review of the contents of the 26 public 2022 annual reports posted on the ATT Secretariat’s website as of 7 June 2023.

Most publicly reporting States Parties continue to use a version of the recommended annual reporting template. Nineteen of the 26 analysed annual reports (73 per cent) used a version of the template.10 This was an increase from last year when the proportion was 63 per cent. In an example of good practice, 14 States Parties11 used the revised version of the template endorsed by the Seventh Conference of States Parties in 2021.

By contrast, use of the online reporting tool and other report formats remains modest. Six of the 26 States Parties (Argentina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Switzerland) used the online reporting tool, a slight decrease in the rate of usage to 23 per cent from 27 per cent last year. Other report formats, such as United Nations Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA) reports, are used even less. Of the 26 States Parties, only Canada submitted an UNROCA report as its 2022 ATT annual report.

Any confusion around ‘nil’ reporting may be dissipating. Four States Parties (Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay) submitted ‘nil’ annual reports for exports and one (Sierra Leone) submitted a ‘nil’ report for exports and imports. In previous years, some States Parties omitted any import and/ or export data from their reports without indicating that they were submitting ‘nil’ reports. The fact that none of the 26 States Parties did so could suggest that States Parties are developing a better understanding of ‘nil’ reporting in the ATT context.

Relatively few of the 26 States Parties provided information on national categories. Four (Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand, South Africa and Switzerland) indicated that their 2022 reports contained national definitions of categories of conventional arms reported, including one (New Zealand) that used Annex 2 of the reporting template to provide specific national definitions of these categories. An additional two States Parties (Australia and Japan) reported on arms transfers under national categories.

---

10 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Peru, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa and Uruguay.

11 Australia, Burkina Faso, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Peru, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovakia and Uruguay.

12 Argentina, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland.
A growing share of States Parties is withholding information from reports on grounds of commercial sensitivity or national security. Ten of the 26 States Parties (38 per cent) indicated doing so in their 2022 reports\(^\text{13}\) – an increase from previous years when the equivalent shares were 19 per cent for 2020 reports and 30 per cent for 2021 reports. One State Party (Australia) that withheld information this year provided a helpful indication of the type of information concerned, noting that the number of missiles and air to ground weapons it imported from the United States was ‘withheld’.

One possible reason for the increase this year in States Parties withholding information from their annual reports could be that some view arms transfers to Ukraine as more sensitive than those to other conflict areas. (The Netherlands, which is not included in the analysis in this chapter because its report was not posted on the ATT Secretariat website by the de facto deadline, stated at preparatory meetings for the Ninth Conference of States Parties that its ‘exports to Ukraine will not be included in its reports for national security reasons’, adding that this was an uncomfortable but necessary decision)\(^\text{14}\). Given that the increase in reports with information withheld has coincided with a decrease in confidential reporting, it may also be the case that States Parties concerned about commercially sensitive or national security-related information are becoming more comfortable with making their reports public with this information withheld as an alternative to confidential reporting.

**EXPORTS**

Twenty-one of the 26 States Parties that submitted public annual reports by this year’s de facto deadline, according to the ATT Secretariat’s website, reported exporting conventional arms during 2022\(^\text{15}\). Of them, 14 reported exporting major conventional arms\(^\text{16}\). This includes four that reported authorized exports (Australia, Montenegro, Republic of Korea and Switzerland), eight that reported actual exports (Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, New Zealand, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia) and one (South Africa) that did not always indicate whether it reported authorized or actual exports. One State Party (Bosnia and Herzegovina) did not indicate whether any of its reported major arms exports were authorized or actual exports. Such omissions are unfortunate, as they hinder accurate analyses of global weapons flows.

All of the 21 States Parties reported exporting small arms and/or light weapons (SALW)\(^\text{17}\). Nine reported authorized exports,\(^\text{18}\) nine reported actual exports,\(^\text{19}\) two (Argentina and Montenegro) reported authorized and actual SALW exports, and one (Bosnia and Herzegovina) did not indicate which it reported.

All of the 21 States Parties provided the number of items exported. Four (Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, and Japan) also provided the value for all items, and one (Ireland) did so for most items.

Three of the 21 States Parties reported differently on their major arms and SALW exports. Montenegro reported authorized major arms exports as well as authorized and actual SALW exports, while Germany and New Zealand reported actual major exports and authorized SALW exports.

---

13 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Montenegro, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia and South Africa.
15 Argentina, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa and Switzerland.
16 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa and Switzerland.
17 Argentina, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa and Switzerland.
18 Australia, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Switzerland.
19 Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Japan, Liechtenstein, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.
IMPORTS

Twenty-five of the 26 States Parties that submitted public reports by this year’s de facto deadline, according to the ATT Secretariat’s website, reported importing conventional arms during 2022.\(^{20}\) Sixteen\(^{21}\) of them reported importing major conventional arms, with all 16 reporting actual imports but three of them (Argentina, Montenegro and Peru) indicating that some transfers were authorized imports. Two of the 16 (Argentina and Czech Republic) did not always indicate whether particular transfers were authorized or actual imports.

All of the 25 States Parties reported importing SALW, with seven reporting authorized imports,\(^ {22} \) 13 reporting actual imports,\(^ {23} \) and three (Argentina, Montenegro and Peru) reporting actual and authorized imports. One (Argentina) did not always indicate whether its SALW imports were authorized or actual. Another one (Australia) reported most of its SALW imports in a separate table without indicating whether they were authorized or actual. Two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ireland) failed to indicate whether any of the SALW imports they reported were authorized or actual.

Nearly all of the 25 States Parties that reported conventional arms imports provided the number of items involved. The exceptions were Australia, which, as noted above, indicated that the number of some items was ‘withheld’, and the four States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Japan and Peru) that provided both the number and value for some of the items imported.

Three States Parties reported differently on their major arms and SALW imports. Germany, Jamaica and Switzerland indicated that data concerning their major arms imports represented actual imports and that their SALW import data corresponded to import authorizations.
CONCLUSION

In some key respects States Parties made progress towards realizing the Treaty’s transparency objectives in their 2022 annual reports. Six States Parties that had yet to report on their arms transfers to the ATT Secretariat submitted their first reports this year. Some developing and least developed States Parties alike set a laudable example by being among the first to submit 2022 reports. The trend of increased confidential reporting is showing signs of abating, with the proportion of confidential on-time reports having decreased this year and several States Parties with histories of confidential reporting making their 2022 reports public.

These gains were undermined, however, by enduring challenges and new ones. The available data analysed indicate that the rate of on-time annual reporting compliance continued to decline and may have hit a record-low this year. Despite positive developments regarding public reporting, it is troubling that a long-standing public-reporting State Party such as Finland made its 2022 report confidential. It will be worth looking into the apparent delays on the part of the ATT Secretariat in posting annual reports on its website, and perhaps into adding a column on the website related to the date of report submission (which is not available for confidential reports and not always provided by reporting States Parties) to support greater understanding and enhanced analysis of the state of reporting.

Looking ahead, the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) has an important role to play in addressing persistent issues around ATT annual reporting. This year, despite continued efforts made by the ATT Secretariat and office holders, no state agreed to chair the WGTR, leaving the office vacant and requiring the ATT Secretariat staff to take on the chair role. While the absence of a chair this year could be seen as having diminished the importance of reporting, the WGTR made some progress towards enhancing reporting at its February and May 2023 meetings, including with respect to the ATT Secretariat’s voluntary peer-to-peer reporting assistance project that aims to provide States Parties an opportunity to ask questions and share information and practical advice with one another around ATT reporting. The project, which began during the CSP6 cycle with a meet-and-greet event for States Parties interested in offering or receiving reporting assistance, stalled during the COVID-19 pandemic, and no meetings has been held since. This year, the WGTR sought to move the project forward by proposing that the ATT Secretariat identify States Parties that could serve as ‘regional champions’ on reporting and assist others in their region in overcoming reporting challenges.24 The proposal was generally well received at the CSP9 Working Group Meetings and, if well implemented, could play an important role in helping States Parties fulfil their reporting obligations.

Less progress was made on other aspects of the WGTR’s work. The development of an online searchable database of annual report data, a potentially valuable analytical tool, has been on its agenda since the CSP4 cycle. This year, WGTR participants were asked whether the ATT Secretariat should obtain cost estimates for building such a database. Relatively few States Parties responded, and – though several expressed their support – others expressed concerns about the database’s utility, feasibility and impact on State Parties’ reporting burdens, suggesting that the idea may still be far from becoming a reality. Work toward this goal continues to move forward through civil society and research organization programs, including Control Arms’ ATT Monitor Project and the Stimson Center’s ATT-Baseline Assessment Project, though collaboration between the WGTR and these projects in this regard has yet to take place.

Notable progress has been made in improving the state of annual reporting over the past year. However, concerted action from States Parties, the WGTR, the ATT Secretariat and other interested stakeholders is necessary to build on this momentum. Moreover, it is imperative that States Parties redouble their efforts to reverse the negative trends that continue to mar reporting – including non-compliance, confidential reporting and reporting irregularities that complicate efforts to understand and analyse the information provided – to ensure that annual reporting under the ATT lives up to its full potential.

U.S. Marines Fast Rope from a UH-1Y Venom Helicopter during Exercise Fuji Viper at Camp Fuji, Japan.

Credit: © U.S. Marine Corps / CPL. Kyle Chan
3.2 - UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS AND MONITORING TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

INTRODUCTION

States Parties are required under Article 13.1 of the ATT Treaty to submit, within one year of the Treaty’s entry into force for them, an initial report to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement it.1 States Parties are also required to report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken to implement the treaty, as appropriate.

Initial reports are important tools for monitoring and assessing Treaty implementation. They can provide valuable insights into how States Parties interpret and implement their ATT obligations; provide an opportunity for States Parties to assess the efficacy of their existing control measures; facilitate the identification of implementation gaps, assistance needs and good practice; help demonstrate Treaty compliance over time; and shed light on the ATT’s impact on strengthening national control systems. Despite this, a fifth of States Parties due to submit an initial report have yet to do so, with nearly two-thirds of these more than five years past their reporting deadline.

This chapter provides an update on the status of ATT initial reporting as of 21 June 2023.2 It discusses how initial reporting has stagnated over the past year, with only two new reports and no updated reports submitted, and it provides an overview of the overall state of compliance with the ATT’s initial reporting obligation. This chapter also considers how, despite their limitations, initial reports can shed light on issues of engagement between States Parties and industry, which is a thematic focus of the Ninth Conference of States Parties (CSP9).

RECENT REPORTS

Two States Parties have submitted overdue initial reports since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Annual Report: Brazil, which was due to report in 2019 and Lesotho in 2017. One State Party (Philippines) was required to submit its initial report by 21 June 2023, but had not yet done so according to the ATT Secretariat’s website on that date. The submission of overdue initial reports by Brazil and Lesotho is an example that other States Parties4 due to submit an initial report between June 2021 and June 2022 had not yet done so according to the ATT Secretariat’s website on 21 June 2023, which may not necessarily reflect all the initial reports submitted to the Secretariat by that date.

That only two initial reports were submitted over the past year, however, is worrying. It marks a decrease compared to each of the previous three years, during which five or more State Parties submitted initial reports. It also represents a continuation of the low rate of initial reporting compliance among the newest States Parties. The 2022 ATT Monitor Annual Report already highlighted the lack of compliance with initial reporting deadline requirements as only one (People’s Republic of China) of the five States Parties5 due to submit an initial report between June 2021 and June 2022 had done so. The 23 States Parties that have missed their initial reporting deadlines should be encouraged to follow the example of Brazil and Lesotho and submit their overdue reports as soon as possible. The ATT Secretariat should undertake individualized outreach to these States Parties and identify ways in which to support their compliance.

Both initial reports submitted over the past year illustrate the valuable insights these reports can provide, even when they are submitted late, and offer several examples of good reporting practice. Brazil and Lesotho made their reports public and used the revised initial reporting template that was endorsed by the Seventh Conference of States Parties in September 2021. The latter is helpful as the revised template includes new and more explicit questions that invite States Parties to provide more detailed information on their control systems as well as their assistance needs and capabilities. Brazil provided detailed responses to the questions in the template, often going beyond simply providing the information requested to also citing the relevant provision of its national legislation. For example, in response to question 6.E, which asks States Parties to identify ‘the competent national authority(-ies) for the regulation of brokering’, Brazil not only identified the Army Command but also cited and quoted the decree that sets out its responsibilities in that respect. This level of detail is extremely useful, as it enables more fine-tuned assessments of national control systems as well as more targeted follow-up on information provided.

---

2 This chapter’s analysis is based on the initial reporting data on the ATT Secretariat’s website as of 21 June 2023, which may not necessarily reflect all the initial reports submitted to the Secretariat by that date.
4 Afghanistan, Namibia, Niue, People’s Republic of China and São Tomé and Principe.
Lesotho used its initial report to highlight its implementation gaps and assistance needs. For example, it noted that its national control system does not include a national control list or definitions of import, transit and trans-shipment, and that its transit and trans-shipment control measures apply to general goods and not to the conventional arms and items covered by the ATT. Lesotho also took advantage of the expanded international assistance section in the revised reporting template to indicate and provide descriptions of the implementation assistance it would like to receive across a range of issue areas. States Parties should be encouraged to follow Lesotho’s example by calling attention to any implementation gaps or assistance needs they may have to ensure that the international community understands how best to assist them in effectively implementing the ATT as well as to facilitate assessments of global implementation trends and the Treaty’s overall impact.

NON-COMPLIANCE

All but two of the ATT’s 113 States Parties were required to have submitted an initial report as of 21 June 2023. (Only the two newest ones, Andorra and Gabon, were not yet required to have done so.) As of 21 June 2023, according to the ATT Secretariat’s website, 88 of the 111 States Parties concerned had done so – a compliance rate of 79 per cent. The rate has remained relatively steady over the years: for example, it was 78 per cent and 77 percent at this point in 2022 and in 2021 respectively.

Most of the 23 States Parties whose initial reports are overdue are several years past their deadline. Five of them (22 per cent) are less than two years late, three (13 per cent) are two-to-four-years late and 15 (65 per cent) are more than five years late.

Most of these States Parties report on aspects of their national transfer controls under other, voluntary transparency frameworks, including the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA). Seventeen (74 per cent) have submitted at least one PoA report. Twelve of them did so after 2015 – the first year of ATT reporting – and eight later in the years after their initial report was due.

It is not entirely clear why States Parties do not submit their initial reports despite reporting on their national control measures under other, voluntary frameworks. This may be due to a more established practice of reporting to the PoA, to the limited scope of the PoA or to the burdens that can arise when States Parties with limited capacity participate in multiple reporting frameworks. The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) could further explore the factors behind these disparate reporting practices and ways to close the gap between ATT initial reporting and PoA reporting among States Parties as well as support synergies in reporting. Just as efforts have been undertaken to leverage synergies between the ATT and UN Register of Conventional Arms to enhance reporting on arms exports and imports under both frameworks, there may be more that the ATT Secretariat and the WGTR could do to enhance reporting on national transfer controls by leveraging synergies between the ATT and the PoA.

JUST AS EFFORTS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO LEVERAGE SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ATT AND UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO ENHANCE REPORTING ON ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS UNDER BOTH FRAMEWORKS, THERE MAY BE MORE THAT THE ATT SECRETARIAT AND THE WGTR COULD DO TO ENHANCE REPORTING ON NATIONAL TRANSFER CONTROLS BY LEVERAGING SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ATT AND THE POA.

5 Gabon’s initial report is due by 19 December 2023 and Andorra’s by 1 March 2024.
6 Afghanistan, Namibia, Niue, Philippines and São Tomé and Príncipe.
7 Guinea Bissau, Lebanon and Mozambique.
8 Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Mali, Mauritania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino and Seychelles.
9 Afghanistan, Barbados, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, San Marino and São Tomé and Principe.
10 Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines and San Marino.
11 Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia and San Marino.
UPDATED REPORTS

States Parties are required under Article 13.1 of the Treaty to not only provide an initial report to the ATT Secretariat, but also to 'report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate'. The ATT does not specifically explain how this information is to be provided. However, States Parties can fulfill this obligation by submitting an updated version of their initial report.

None of the initial reports that were posted on the ATT Secretariat’s website as of 21 June 2023 appear to have been updated since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Annual Report. To date, only six States Parties (Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden) have submitted updated reports – despite several additional States Parties indicating in interventions at formal and informal ATT meetings that they have made changes to their national control systems since submitting their initial reports.14

The lack of updated initial reports raises several concerns. Updated initial reports are unambiguous indicators of compliance with States Parties’ international legal obligation to report to the ATT Secretariat new implementation measures undertaken. In that respect, the fact that only six States Parties have submitted updated reports calls into question how seriously States Parties take their Treaty obligations. Moreover, with most initial reports having been submitted over seven years ago, it is likely that many of them contain outdated information, which severely limits their utility. For instance, outdated reports cannot reliably be used to identify the implementation challenges States Parties are currently facing, to glean up-to-date insights on global good practice or – most fundamentally – to assess the ATT’s long-term impact on enhancing national control systems.

Relatedly, while not explicitly required by the ATT, States Parties have the option of changing their submitted initial reports from confidential to public. Two States Parties (Republic of Korea and Togo) did so in previous years but none did over the past year. To date, 21 States Parties (nearly a quarter of the 88 that have reported) keep their initial reports confidential. Making reports public and changing reports from confidential to public should be encouraged, as these practices advance the Treaty’s transparency aims and facilitate valuable analyses of implementation trends, gaps and good practices.

BOX: INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT

The Republic of Korea’s chose the role of industry in responsible international transfers of conventional arms as the thematic focus of its Presidency of the Ninth Conference of States Parties. In its April 2023 draft working paper on the topic, the Republic of Korea’s Presidency noted that ‘enhancing engagement between industry and private sector entities with other key ATT stakeholders can be mutually beneficial and support efforts to achieve the effective implementation of the ATT’.15

An analysis of the 67 public ATT initial reports submitted as of 20 June 2023 provides insights into whether and how States Parties have incorporated industry engagement into their national transfer control systems.

First, 14 of the States Parties included in the analysis (21 per cent) undertake some form of industry engagement.16 There are likely more who do so. But, with just 88 States Parties having submitted an initial report and 21 of them making their reports confidential, there cannot be yet a comprehensive picture of the policies and practices employed by all 113 States Parties. Furthermore, the initial reporting template does not place emphasis on industry engagement or provide clear instructions of where to list instances. Thus, such engagement may be more widespread than the reports might suggest.

Second, despite these limitations, an analysis of the public initial reports shows the range of measures by States Parties to engage with industry. In their initial reports, several described visiting, auditing or inspecting the facilities or operations of arms manufacturers or exporters to ensure compliance with national transfer controls. Some States Parties go further by requiring or encouraging industry actors to develop and implement internal compliance programs. States Parties also described organizing events – such as training sessions, seminars or speaking engagements – engaging in consultations, and developing guidance documents to raise awareness of relevant laws and policies among arms industry actors.
CONCLUSION

The submission of just two initial reports and the lack of any updated reports over the past year represent a major setback. With initial reporting having stagnated, we are left with only a partial – and in many cases outdated – understanding of measures States Parties have taken to implement the Treaty. This severely limits the ability of other States Parties, the ATT Secretariat and civil society actors to effectively assist State Parties in enhancing their national control systems and undermines efforts to take stock of the ATT’s impact. Additionally, the continued lack of progress on initial reporting in the tenth year of implementation is a worrying sign for the Treaty’s momentum. Although the absence of a chair of the WGTR this year might appear to have diminished the importance of reporting, compliance with the Treaty’s reporting provisions remains a legal requirement and a necessary component of its success.

“Although the absence of a chair of the WGTR this year might appear to have diminished the importance of reporting, compliance with the Treaty’s reporting provisions remains a legal requirement and a necessary component of its success.”