STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW JUNE 2022-MAY 2023

This review covers the period between 1 June 2022 and 31 May 2023, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some of the key events and milestones during the past year, and it assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first looks at compliance with the ATT’s core provisions and assesses whether States Parties are complying with their obligations under the Treaty in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. Second, it takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the above-mentioned period. It then considers the decisions and outputs of the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGUTU), the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), which includes three sub-working groups on risk assessment (Articles 6 and 7), diversion (Article 11) and transit and transshipment (Article 9).

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Ten years after the Arms Trade Treaty was adopted, its main aims and objectives of reducing human suffering continued to be tested. More than a year since the Russian Federation unlawfully invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the humanitarian crisis caused by the war has resulted in severe consequences for civilians, with widespread displacement, food and medical shortages, and a devastating impact on the overall well-being and safety of the affected populations.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine created in March 2022 has collected evidence that Russian authorities have engaged in numerous violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law across various regions of Ukraine as well as within the Russian Federation. Many of these violations amount to war crimes, encompassing deliberate killings, attacks on civilians, unlawful detentions, torture, rape and forced displacements, particularly affecting children. The commission also determined that Russian armed forces conducted indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks using explosive weapons in populated areas, which violate international humanitarian law. Furthermore, the commission has found that the series of attacks by Russian armed forces on Ukraine’s energy-related infrastructure since 10 October 2022, along with the use of torture by Russian authorities, may constitute crimes against humanity, warranting further investigations.1

Since February 2022, the war has inflicted immense devastation upon the civilian population of Ukraine. As of early May 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights had documented the deaths of 8,792 civilians and the injuries of another 14,815 in the country since 24 February 2022.2 Furthermore, the war has triggered a scale of population displacement unparalleled in Europe since the Second World War. As of 21 February 2023, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had reported approximately eight million Ukrainian refugees scattered across Europe, around 90 per cent of them women and children. Approximately 5.4 million people are currently displaced from their homes because of the war.3

Following the start of the war, Western countries and their allies imposed several sets of sanctions on the Russian Federation. The European Union also closed a legal loophole that allowed the transfer of weapons to the Russian Federation despite the arms embargo in place since 2014. Based on the information provided in 2022 ATT annual reports, there was a deep decline in the number of States Parties reporting authorized or actual arms exports to the Russian Federation compared to previous years. This observation presents an optimistic indication that certain States Parties are taking steps to enforce and modify their national policies, aligning them with the obligations outlined in the ATT. Additionally, it suggests that some States Parties may have reinforced their dedication to upholding the principles and objectives of the ATT.

Only one State Party (Serbia) reported transfers of SALW to the Russian Federation for 2022 in their ATT annual report. While media reports indicate that the People’s Republic of China has provided equipment and materials critical for military uses, such as transport vehicles and semiconductors, that enable the Russian military forces to sustain their offensive, there is no clear evidence that it has transferred conventional weapons to the Russian Federation, which would constitute a violation of the ATT. Countries like Iran, which are not members of the ATT, transferred armed drones to the Russian Federation during 2022. It appears that Iran and North Korea have also provided ammunition to the Russian Federation.

Over the past year, Ukraine has been the recipient of weapons and military assistance from at least 29 States Parties. This has included aircraft, helicopters, tanks and armoured vehicles, missile and rocket systems, air defence systems, artillery, ammunition and munitions, and a wide range of SALW. Based on available information from open sources, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the States Parties that provided the largest amount of military aid to Ukraine, amounting to an estimated €20.8 billion. A preliminary analysis of ATT 2022 annual reports shows some interesting trends that could be related to the war in Ukraine and the challenges that States Parties could be facing in implementing their obligations under the Treaty. Of note, the on-time reporting rate for 2022 was the lowest since 2015 (see Chapter 3.1) and a group of States Parties that have regularly submitted their annual reports on time or a few weeks late, did not do so this year. On the positive side, other States Parties have shown their commitment to reporting and used a variety of mechanisms to submit information on their arms transfers to Ukraine – from reporting publicly the types of weapons transferred to indicating whether they were donations or aid or disclosing that the number of weapons in specific categories transferred were withheld due to national security reasons. These are all practices that promote the transparency aims and objectives of the ATT.
UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2023, the ATT Secretariat listed 113 countries as States Parties, accounting for 58 per cent of all United Nations (UN) member states. It listed a further 28 countries as Signatories. Gabon and Andorra, which ratified the Treaty on 21 September 2022 and 2 December 2022 respectively, were the only countries to become a State Party to the ATT between 1 June 2022 and 31 May 2023. This represents a continuation of the trend of a low annual rate of ATT accessions and ratifications. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties per year between 2015 and 2023.

Table 1: New membership to the ATT by 31 May of each year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
<th>Ratifications</th>
<th>Total Number of States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022–2023</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021–2022</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019–2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019–2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018–2019</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017–2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016–2017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015–2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A consequence of this slow rate of universalization is that the geographic spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2023, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 43 per cent (six of 14 countries) and Africa at 54 per cent (29 of 54 countries). Europe at 93 per cent (40 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 77 per cent (27 of 35 countries) have the highest proportion of States Parties.

The ATT continues to enjoy particularly strong support in certain sub-regional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with 14 of its 15 members (93 per cent) being States Parties
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 13 of its 15 members (86.7 per cent) being States Parties.

10 Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN members, they are not counted in this share.

RATIFIED/ACCEDED: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, State of Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia.

SIGNED: Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe

NOT YET JOINED: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen.
UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

This year saw the sixth funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions for its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the first Working Group and Informal Preparatory meetings for the Ninth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP9) in February 2023, 28 States Parties had made voluntary contributions totalling US$11.5 million over the course of the fund’s lifespan, increasing the VTF budget by US$0.7 million compared to the previous year. An additional US$70,231.51 was allocated to the VTF Outreach Programme.

The ATT Secretariat received 15 applications from 13 States Parties for 2022 VTF-funded projects and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for six projects with a total budget of US$612,184. This marks a notable decrease from the 21 project applications received for the 2021 VTF funding, despite the slight increase in the VTF’s disbursement budget.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, which demonstrates the importance of partnerships in achieving universalization and implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF’s first year of operation.

Table 2: Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Projects Approved</th>
<th>Total Budget for Approved Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>US$ 612,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>US$ 1.26 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>US$ 963,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>US$ 2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>US$ 834,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>US$ 1.3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Ibid., p. 5.
16 Table 2 shows projects and funding that were approved by the VTF Selection Committee.
The COVID-19 pandemic continued to have an impact on the implementation and completion of VTF-funded projects in 2022. While a majority of projects in the 2019 and 2020 funding cycles were completed within a 12-month period, only one was completed in the 2022 cycle.\(^{17}\) Similarly for the 2021 funding cycle, only three of the 13 funded projects had been successfully completed by February 2023.\(^{18}\)

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation also continued this year. Mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, the EU ATT Outreach Project and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

Government representatives and CSOs from around the world met at national and regional training workshops to learn more about the ATT and how to implement it in their countries. They discussed the technical challenges, legal requirements and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts to implement ATT provisions.

Examples include:

- From 7 to 9 June 2022, the Subregional Small Arms and Ammunition Field Identification and Tracing (SAAFIT) Dialogue and Training took place in Nairobi, Kenya. It was jointly conducted by the African Union Commission, the Regional Centre on Small Arms, the Kenyan National Focal Point on Small Arms, the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies and the Bundeswehr Verification Centre. Delegations from six East African countries, along with experts from Interpol, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, Conflict Armament Research, and the Sub-Regional Arms Control Mechanism, participated in the training, whose objective was to equip the delegations with technical and policy knowledge related to the identification, marking, record-keeping and destruction of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. The training was part of the project ‘Supporting small arms and light weapons (SALW) control in Africa’ that seeks to support the implementation of international and regional small arms control instruments, including the ATT, and is funded by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany.\(^{19}\)
• From 25 to 26 October 2022, Rwanda’s Ministry of Interior, the ATT Secretariat and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) held a two-day sensitization workshop for the country’s CSOs on its ATT accession. The permanent secretary in the Ministry of Interior, Mr Sesonga Benjamin, highlighted that the illicit trafficking in SALW is a major cause of insecurity in the RECSA region and recalled that full implementation of the ATT would reduce this problem in the region.20

• On 1 June 2023, Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the EU, through France’s cooperation agency Expertise France and Germany’s Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), held the third phase of the EU Partner to Partner ATT program. During the regional conference, titled ‘The importance and usefulness of the ATT’, authorities from more than 20 countries shared cases and key aspects of how they have prevented the diversion of conventional weapons. The EU-Mexico program, which began in 2020, seeks to promote international cooperation, legal assistance, and shared responsibility to address gun violence in Mexico and the region.21


REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

ANNUAL REPORTS

States Parties are required to submit by 31 May each year annual reports detailing their arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year. However, they are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2023, 110 of the 113 States Parties were required to submit their 2022 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 35 submitted an annual report by the deadline – a compliance rate of 32 per cent. This was the lowest on-time annual reporting compliance rate in the ATT’s history – the previous record low being when the initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a rate of 38 per cent for the 2019 annual reports. It is likely, however, that more than these 35 States Parties submitted their 2022 annual reports on time. In past years, all reports submitted on time were uploaded on the ATT Secretariat’s website and made available by the 7 June deadline. This year, as of 20 June 2023, an additional ten reports had been published after the deadline, increasing to 45 the number of reports available.

Of the 35 annual reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat website by the 7 June deadline, nine were kept confidential, nearly 26 per cent of on-time submissions. This represents a positive development: a decrease in confidential on-time reporting compared to 32 per cent of the 2021 annual reports submitted by 7 June 2022 being kept confidential last year.

A preliminary analysis of the contents of the 2022 annual reports can be found in Chapter 3.1.

INITIAL REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each State Party, within the first year after its entry into force for that State Party, to submit to the ATT Secretariat an initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty. As of 7 June 2023, 110 of 113 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 87 (79 per cent) had done so.

Two States Parties submitted overdue initial reports since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Report: Brazil, which was due to report in 2019 and Lesotho in 2017. Based on dates of Treaty accession, no new States Parties were required to submit a report by 7 June 2023.

Article 13.1 requires States Parties to provide the ATT Secretariat, in addition to initial reports, with relevant updates or changes to their national arms-transfer control systems. As of 7 June 2023, none of the initial reports that are public appear to have been updated since the publication of last year’s ATT Monitor Annual Report.

An in-depth analysis of the contents of newly submitted initial reports is provided in Chapter 3.2.

23 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Croatia, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Latvia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Spain and State of Palestine.
**SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES**

**EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES**

The Eighth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP8) was conducted in person between 22 and 26 August 2022. Representatives from 108 countries, comprising 87 States Parties, 20 Signatories and one Observer State attended.26 Other stakeholders also attended, including representatives of ten international and regional organizations, including the EU and UN agencies, and 40 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing industry.27 The thematic focus of CSP8 was post-shipment controls and coordination, effective export verification and good-faith cooperation between exporters and importers.28

Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany served as the President of CSP8. Procedural decisions adopted included the following:

- Endorsement of the extension by one additional year of the work of the sub-working group on Article 11 to enable focus on post-shipment delivery cooperation
- Endorsement of the revised ‘FAQ’-type guidance document on the annual reporting obligation
- Endorsement of the mandate for the WGTR in the period between CSP8 and CSP9
- Appointment of Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as members of the VTF Selection Committee from CSP9 to CSP10
- Election of the permanent representative of the Republic of Korea to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Yoon Seong-mee, as the President of CSP9
- Election of Australia, Latvia, Uruguay and South Africa as Vice-Presidents of CSP9
- Scheduling of CSP9 for 21–25 August 2023 in Geneva, Switzerland29

27 Ibid.
THE NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69), RIGHT, REPLENISHES FROM THE FAST COMBAT SUPPORT SHIP USNS SUPPLY (T-AOE 6) IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

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The WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Ignacio Sánchez de Lerín, permanent representative of Spain to the Conference on Disarmament, addressed the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on Articles 6 and 7 (prohibitions and export assessment), Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment) and Article 11 (diversion).

The WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7, facilitated by Ambassador Sánchez de Lerín, reviewed the list of possible draft elements (developed from discussions held in the CSP8 cycle) for Chapter 2 (Article 6 – prohibitions) of the proposed Voluntary Guide to assist States Parties in implementing Articles 6 and 7. The sub-working group further highlighted the need to complement the Voluntary Guide with an exchange of concrete practical experiences of States Parties, and it discussed arms transfer mitigation measures regarding the implementation of Article 7.4 on gender-based violence.30

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 11 (diversion), facilitated by Mr Rob Wensley of South Africa, focused on the Draft Voluntary Guide on the Implementation of Article 9,32 a resource for States Parties seeking to strengthen their transit and trans-shipment controls, in its February meeting. The draft received positive feedback without objections, and there were discussions on the importance of regional cooperation and the need for further exploration of implications for free trade areas, competing jurisdictions and industry stakeholders. States Parties further explored state practice regarding the implementation and relationships among Articles 6, 7 and 9. During the second meeting of the sub-working group in May, inputs were collected from delegations to continue improvements to the Draft Voluntary Guide, which concluded the final work of this sub-working group.33

The WGTU, co-chaired by President of CSP9 Ambassador Yoon Seong-mee of the Republic of Korea and by Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany, discussed the activities of the Republic of Korea to promote universalization of the ATT, efforts to promote universalization by the WGTU co-chairs and States Parties (particularly stressing the utility of a regional approach) and by civil society, and the status of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty.35

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31 Ibid., pp. 49–55.
32 Ibid., pp. 28–43.
33 Ibid., pp. 25–27.
The first Informal Preparatory meeting for CSP9 was held on 17 February 2023 and the second one on 12 May 2023. Ambassador Yoon Seong-mee of the Republic of Korea opened the first meeting by introducing the priority theme for the Korean Presidency – The Role of Industry in Responsible International Transfers of Conventional Arms36 – and outlined how this would be taken forward during the CSP9 cycle. Other updates provided overviews of the implementation of CSP8 decisions and progress reports of ATT subsidiary bodies. The second meeting saw an update on the informal consultations conducted regarding this priority theme, including the suggested utilization of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, along with progress reports from all ATT subsidiary bodies. The ATT Management Committee provided updates on the status of ATT finances and a proposal to review the ATT programme of work.37 The proposed review includes a reduction in the number of in-person meetings of the ATT Working Group from eight to five days, in an effort to optimize the support process and address the congested disarmament calendar and the limited capacity of delegations. It is also proposed that these streamlined meetings would be supported by informal consultations, either virtual or hybrid, to increase flexibility and inclusivity. The proposal aims to enhance practical implementation, avoid repetition and duplication, and adapt the process to the evolving needs of the Treaty.38

The WGETI had the most ambitious agenda of the CSP9 cycle, which included in May 2023 the presentation of a proposal to explore future options to configure its work.39 The draft paper seeks to address the need for improved communication and cooperation among States Parties. It proposes nine topics for the WGETI to examine, which would follow a sequential order from the ATT process, from ratification and accession through to post-delivery measures and international assistance. The WGETI will also seek to cooperate with other working groups, such as the WGTU, to develop implementation support for new States Parties. A new multi-year work plan will be elaborated over the course of 2024. The aim of these proposals is to boost the exchanges between States Parties and with other international instruments, such as the UN Programme of Action and the Human Rights Council. By approaching these subjects jointly and drawing from national experiences, the WGETI hopes to improve the implementation of the ATT and to make the Treaty more effective in preventing the illicit trade in arms.40

The other Working Groups set expectations low in their agendas for intersessional work, some perhaps due to the absence of a Chairperson and Facilitators. Almost nine years since the entry into force of the Treaty, the pressing urgency for concerted and unwavering efforts to enforce every provision has become even more evident. Regrettably, States Parties persist in unwarranted hesitancy when it comes to engaging in meaningful dialogues concerning compliance.

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ALMOST NINE YEARS SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, THE PRESSING URGENCY FOR CONCERTED AND UNWAVERING EFFORTS TO ENFORCE EVERY PROVISION HAS BECOME EVEN MORE EVIDENT. REGRETTABLY, STATES PARTIES PERSIST IN DISPLAYING UNWARRANTED HESITANCY WHEN IT COMES TO ENGAGING IN MEANINGFUL DIALOGUES CONCERNING COMPLIANCE.

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
THE 2023 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 summarizes how conventional ammunition is covered by the ATT and provides a brief analysis of the main gaps in how the Treaty addresses ammunition. It then focuses on one specific area of control – conventional ammunition diversion – by presenting several case studies that highlight some ways in which ammunition may be diverted. It also explores some of the measures that States Parties could take to attempt to prevent or mitigate such diversion. The chapter concludes with recommendations for how to address conventional ammunition within the current Treaty architecture, including the recently established Diversion Information Exchange Forum.

Chapter 2.1 provides an in-depth look at 2021 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties’ compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as to a higher standard of transparency. It shows that, while some States Parties have shown themselves to be committed to public reporting, the lack of meaningfully transparent reporting by many others is a matter of concern as reporting is vital to the implementation of the Treaty.

Chapter 2.2 includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2021 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting-practice metrics (public reporting, on-time reporting, withholding security information) as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners.

Chapter 3.1 includes a summary assessment of 2022 annual reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline. It is anticipated that more States Parties will submit their report between the legal deadline of 31 May and the beginning of CSP9. Therefore, this analysis will be expanded in next year’s ATT Monitor report.

Chapter 3.2 includes a summary assessment of initial reports and updates to them submitted by States Parties as of 7 June 2023. From this assessment comes an analysis of reporting non-compliance, highlighting challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations and the efforts of the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to address them. The chapter also presents some examples of how States Parties have described in their initial reports their relationship with arms industry, the theme of the CSP9 Presidency.
A UKRAINIAN SOLDIER AIMS A TRAINING VERSION OF THE NLAW (NEXT-GENERATION LIGHT ANTI-ARMOUR WEAPON) DURING TRAINING OVERSEEN BY NORWEGIAN INSTRUCTORS.

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