This review covers the period between 1 June 2021 and 31 May 2022, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some of the key events and milestones during the past year, and it assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the abovementioned period. It then considers the decisions and outputs of the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), which includes three sub-working groups on risk assessment (Articles 6 and 7), diversion (Article 11) and transit and trans-shipment (Article 9). The review also looks at compliance with the ATT’s core provisions and assesses whether States Parties are complying with their obligations under the Treaty in the context of the conflict in Ukraine.

### Universalization

As of 31 May 2022, the ATT Secretariat listed 111 countries as States Parties, accounting for 56 per cent of all United Nations (UN) member states. It listed a further 30 countries as Signatories. The Philippines, which ratified the Treaty on 24 March 2022, was the only country to become a State Party to the ATT between 1 June 2021 and 31 May 2022. This represents a drop in the universalization rate of the previous two years, both of which saw the addition of four new States Parties. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties between 2015 and 2022.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
<th>Ratifications</th>
<th>Total Number of States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021-2022</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020–2021</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019–2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018–2019</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017–2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016–2017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015–2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The geographic spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2022, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 43 per cent (six of 14 countries) and Africa at 52 per cent (28 of 54 countries). Europe at 91 per cent (39 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 77 per cent (27 of 35 countries) have the highest proportions of States Parties.

The accession of the Philippines is a positive development for ATT universalization in Asia and could help to further drive universalization efforts in the region, particularly given the accession of the People’s Republic of China two years earlier.

The ATT continues to enjoy particularly strong support in certain sub-regional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with 14 of its 15 members (93 per cent) being States Parties
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 13 of 15 members (86.7 per cent) being States Parties.

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1 Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN members, they are not counted in this share.
RATIFIED/ACCEDED: Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Republic of North Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, State of Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia.

SIGNED: Andorra, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Gabon, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

NOT YET JOINED: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen.
UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

This year saw the fifth funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the first Working Group and Informal Preparatory meetings for the Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP8) in February 2022, 28 States Parties had made voluntary contributions totalling US$10.8 million over the course of the fund’s lifespan, increasing the VTF budget by US$0.9 million compared to the previous year. Germany and New Zealand contributed an additional US$70,231.51 to the VTF Outreach Programme.

The ATT Secretariat received 21 applications from 20 States Parties for 2021 VTF-funded projects and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for 13 projects with a total budget of US$1.3 million. This marks a decrease from the 26 project applications received for the 2020 VTF funding, despite the slight increase in the VTF’s disbursement budget. Many of these projects were organized with civil society organizations (CSOs) as implementing partners, reinforcing the vital role partnerships play in meaningfully advancing universalization and implementation efforts. Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the number of applications received for VTF projects, which have yet to return to pre-pandemic levels. A majority of VTF applications are for regional or national training programmes and workshops, which have been disproportionately affected by restrictions on travel and in-person meetings.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF’s first year of operation.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also had a significant impact on the implementation and completion of 2021 VTF-funded projects. While in previous funding cycles, a majority of VTF projects were completed within a 12-month period, only 11 of 20 projects funded in the 2019 cycle had been successfully completed by February 2022. Similarly, for the 2020 funding cycle, three of the ten funded projects had been successfully completed by February 2022.

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation have also continued this year. Mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), the EU ATT Outreach Project and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

UNSCAR grants were approved for the ninth year to a range of international and regional organizations, CSOs and research institutes. These include Conflict Armament Research, Non-Violence International Southeast Asia, and the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

National and regional training workshops around the world again brought together CSOs and government representatives to support universalization and implementation of the ATT.

Table 2 – Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Applications</th>
<th>Number of Projects Approved</th>
<th>Total Budget for Approved Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>US$1.26 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>US$963,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>US$2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>US$834,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>US$1.3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Ibid., p. 6.
7 This table shows projects and funding that were approved by the VTF Selection Committee and does not take into consideration cases where a project was withdrawn or not completed.
8 One application (from Tuvalu) was withdrawn and one project (from Lebanon) was discontinued, leaving 18 projects in the 2019 cycle. Dlala, D. (2022). Ibid., p. 12.
9 One application (from Botswana) was withdrawn and one project (from Madagascar) was discontinued, leaving eight projects in the 2020 cycle. Dlala, D. (2022). Ibid., p. 13.
by exploring the technical challenges, legal requirements of membership to the ATT and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts to implement ATT provisions.

Examples include:

- On 1–2 June 2021, the EU ATT Outreach Project organized a virtual activity for Malaysia, which was the fourth and final activity of the part of the Roadmap Project for Malaysia. The workshop ‘dealt with enforcement training, best practice examples for the establishment of a national export control system and an interactive case study’.11 A total of 59 participants from 13 different Malaysian ministries and agencies (including the Attorney General’s Chambers, the Joint Force Headquarters, the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence) participated in discussions and presentations that identified key challenges in Malaysia’s accession process and explored the possibilities of follow-up activities.12

- On 6–9 September 2021, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa carried out two workshops in collaboration with the National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Mali. These were ‘a three-day training on gender mainstreaming small arms control and a one-day workshop on gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation of SALW control National Action Plan’.13 Thirty participants took part in the three-day training and 18 attended the one-day workshop, including the CNLPAL regional heads, government officials and civil society members. The trainings aimed at enhancing participants’ understanding of strategic and technical approaches that could further advance the country’s efforts in these areas.13 The workshops were made available with support from the EU.

- From 28 March to 11 April 2022, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy organized a two-week virtual executive course with three days of live sessions covering all aspects of the ATT and related instruments.15 The course involved participants from at least 31 countries and aimed to clarify the obligations and implications of ATT membership, while also improving capacities to implement it with the aim of promoting a responsible global arms trade. The course was made available with support from UNSCAR.16


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.
**REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

**ANNUAL REPORTS**

States Parties are required to submit by 31 May each year annual reports detailing their arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year.\(^{17}\) However, they are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2022, 110 of the 111 States Parties\(^{18}\) were required to submit their 2021 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 44 submitted an annual report by the deadline – a compliance rate of 40 per cent. This is one of the lowest ever compliance rates for on-time reporting, second only to that for the 2019 annual reports (37 per cent), which was heavily impacted by the early waves of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Fourteen States Parties made their 2021 reports confidential, representing nearly 32 per cent of on-time submissions.\(^{20}\) By comparison, 28 per cent of reports submitted on time last year and 17 per cent in 2019 were confidential, continuing the concerning trend toward increased confidential reporting. This year, the trend has been driven not only by first-time reporters electing to report confidentially, but also by States parties shifting from public to confidential reporting. Of the 14 States Parties that submitted confidential reports in 2021, three had never submitted an annual report before (Guatemala, Niger and People’s Republic of China) and four had submitted public annual reports for six years before reporting confidentially for the first time this year (Croatia, Latvia, Portugal and Spain).

A preliminary analysis of the contents of the 2021 annual reports can be found in Chapter 3.1.

**INITIAL REPORTS**

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each States Party, within the first year after the Treaty’s entry into force for that State Party, to submit an initial report to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement it.\(^{20}\) As of 7 June 2022, 110 of 111 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 86 (78 per cent) had done so.\(^{21}\)

This year, five States Parties (Afghanistan, Namibia, Niue, People’s Republic of China and São Tomé and Príncipe) were required to submit their initial reports. As of 7 June 2022, only the People’s Republic of China had done so. In addition, four States Parties (Botswana, Grenada, Guatemala and Niger) belatedly submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat over the past year. Of these, only Niger elected to make its report public, continuing the concerning trend toward increased confidential reporting.

Article 13.1 requires States Parties to provide the ATT Secretariat, in addition to initial reports, with relevant updates or changes to their national arms-transfer control systems. One State Party (Romania) submitted an updated initial report this year, joining Japan, Hungary, New Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden as the only States Parties to have provided updates to the Secretariat.

An in-depth analysis of the contents of newly submitted initial reports and Romania’s update can be found in Chapter 3.2.

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18 Having ratified the Treaty in March 2022, the Philippines’ first annual report will not be due until 2023.
19 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Croatia, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Latvia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Spain and State of Palestine.
SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7) was conducted in a hybrid format between 30 August and 3 September 2021. Representatives from 103 countries, including 86 States Parties, 15 Signatories and two Observer States attended.22 Other stakeholders also attended, including representatives of seven international and regional organizations, including the EU and UN agencies, and 33 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing industry.23 The thematic focus of CSP7 was strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and to ensure efficient stockpile management, with a particular emphasis on anchoring ATT implementation efforts firmly within the global framework for arms control and better linking the ATT to international and regional efforts to prevent the illicit trade in and diversion of SALW.24

Ambassador Lansana Gberie of Sierra Leone served as the President of the Conference. Procedural decisions adopted included the following:

- Endorsement of the revised annual reporting template
- Endorsement of the standing agenda items and the recurring and specific tasks for the WGTR in the period between CSP7 and CSP8
- Adoption of the new annual and initial reporting templates, as proposed by the WGTR
- Endorsement of the Draft Paper Outlining Elements of a Process for Assessing the Risk of Diversion as a living document to be reviewed and updated by the WGETI
- Appointment of Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and the United Kingdom as members of the Management Committee for two years, from CSP8 to CSP9
- Election of Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany as President of CSP8
- Election of Japan, Latvia, Mexico and South Africa as Vice-Presidents of CSP8
- Scheduling of CSP8 for 22–26 August 2022.25

EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES – INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP8 included the First Working Group and Informal Preparatory meetings on 15–18 February 2022 and the Second Working Group and Informal Preparatory meetings on 26–29 April 2022. The meetings were held in a hybrid format, owing to the protracted COVID-19 crisis and ongoing travel restrictions in some countries.

The WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Sang-beom Lim, deputy permanent representative of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea, continued to address the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on Articles 6 and 7 (prohibitions and export assessment), Article 11 (diversion) and Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment). The three appointed facilitators led the discussions on these items.

The WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7, facilitated by Ambassador Ignacio Sánchez de Lerín of Spain, reviewed possible draft elements for Chapter 1 (Key concepts) of the proposed Voluntary Guide to assist States Parties in implementing Articles 6 and 7. During the first meeting of the sub-working group, inputs were collected from delegations to help improve the draft text. The second meeting continued these discussions and also saw a focus on Topic 6 and 7 of the work plan, which addressed the scope of Article 6 and encouraged participants to exchange views on how to interpret the terms of the article.26

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 11, facilitated by Ms Stela Petrović of Serbia, considered in its February meeting the role of transit and trans-shipment states in diversion. States Parties discussed their different national control systems, with a particular emphasis on transit via air and land, and stressed the importance of inter-agency collaboration. In line with the WGETI’s multi-year plan, in April the sub-working group covered three areas: the role of importing states in preventing diversion, post-delivery cooperation and the role of the private sector and civil society in mitigating diversion risk. Discussions focused on the importance of importing and exporting states sharing the burden of diversion-mitigation measures with a strong emphasis on cooperation, both between states and between governments and industry.27

23 Ibid.
27 Ibid., pp. 27–28.
The WGETI sub-working group on Article 9, facilitated by Mr Rob Wensley of South Africa, focused on measures to regulate transit and trans-shipment of arms by land and air in its February meeting, with the objective of exploring options and common practice for strengthening national regulatory processes. The second meeting of the sub-working group, in April, addressed transit and trans-shipment of arms by sea and looked at the role of the private sector in arms transit and trans-shipment. Discussions emphasized the importance of including sub-contractors in arms control efforts and stressed that only a holistic approach that fosters cooperation between maritime and land operators can be effective in mitigating illicit transfers during transit and trans-shipment.28

The WGTR, co-chaired by Ms Sabine Visser of the Netherlands and Ms Griselle del Carmen Rodríguez Ramírez of Panama, continued to pursue an agenda including substantive work to support reporting by States Parties in the CSP8 preparatory meetings. Along with an update on the state of play in compliance with reporting obligations, discussions focused on challenges concerning reporting and related substantive reporting and transparency issues, including in relation to data aggregation in annual reports and the rise in confidential reporting. The co-chairs also reiterated their appeals for States Parties to make use of the information-sharing tools at their disposal.29

The WGTU, co-chaired by Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany and Ambassador Lansana Gberie of Sierra Leone, discussed the activities of Germany’s Presidency to promote universalization of the ATT, the efforts by the WGTU co-chairs and States Parties to promote universalization, the status of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty, and efforts by civil society and industry to promote universalization.30

The first Informal Preparatory meeting for CSP8 was held on 18 February 2022 and the second on 29 April 2022. Ambassador Thomas Göbel of Germany, President of CSP8, opened the first Informal Preparatory meeting by introducing the priority theme for the German Presidency – post-shipment controls and on-site verifications – and outlined how this would be taken forward during the CSP8 cycle. There was also an update on the status of gender participation in ATT meetings, pursuant to CSP5 commitments. The second Informal Preparatory meeting saw an update on the informal consultations conducted regarding this priority theme, along with progress reports from all ATT subsidiary bodies, while the ATT Secretariat provided updates on financial contributions, the status of operation of the VTF and the status of the EU-funded project to support ATT implementation.31

Overall, the Working Groups and Preparatory meetings of CSP8 did not pursue ambitious agendas. However, the meetings in February and April had diverse in-person attendance, in part due to the presence of numerous sponsored delegates, and were enriched by the high number of statements from representatives of states in the Global South.32 The WGTR had the most ambitious agenda, which included efforts to continue reviewing the effectiveness of the ATT reporting templates to increase transparency in the arms trade. The other Working Groups set expectations low in their agendas for intersessional work.

There is still progress to be made in working toward effective implementation of all Treaty provisions. Nearly eight years after the Treaty entered into force, States Parties remain reluctant to discuss compliance with, and possible violations of, the ATT in terms of transfer decisions. Notably, there are still no agreed mechanisms for such discussions, and States Parties appear unlikely to provide space to address these matters in general exchanges.

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

More than seven years after the Arms Trade Treaty’s entry into force, States Parties continue to grapple with its full and meaningful implementation. Nowhere has this been truer than in the current war in Ukraine, which was sparked by Russia’s unlawful invasion on 24 February 2022 and was met with widespread condemnation, as seen both at the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.33

Between 2015 and 2020, at least 10 States Parties reported the transfer of weapons to Ukraine. Since October 2021, when Russia started massing troops at its border with the country, at least eight States Parties have delivered weapons
and military aid to Ukraine. Days after the invasion, the EU Council decided to supply €450 millions of lethal military assistance to Ukraine and more than 20 States Parties have delivered defensive and offensive weaponry. By June 2022 the EU’s financial support to Ukraine's military had reached €2 billion. Notably, countries like Germany or Sweden that have traditionally pursued a more cautious policy with regard to arms export to conflict areas have delivered military equipment to Ukraine. As of 18 May 2022, more than US$68 billion had been pledged or authorized for the delivery of weapons and military assistance to Ukraine.

The Ukraine conflict poses significant challenges for ATT States Parties. While the country has the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and there is no evidence that the weapons being supplied to it are being used to commit serious violations of international law, most of these weapons flows have been the subject of little oversight. Indeed, the desire to urgently send arms as a matter of practical and symbolic support for Ukraine has obscured some of the well-known risks associated with funneling arms to conflict zones. This significantly increases the risk of weapons, including sophisticated technologies, being diverted into the hands of Russian soldiers, organized criminal groups or extremist organizations. The 2021 Global Organized Crime index described Ukraine as one of the largest illegally trafficked arms markets in Europe, especially when it comes to small arms and ammunition. Interpol has warned that weapons risk falling into the hands of criminal groups. In 2010, researchers evaluated the number of SALW in circulation in Ukraine at 6.2 million, the third-highest number in the world after the People’s Republic of China and Russia. Furthermore, the Ukrainian authorities recorded the disappearance of 300,000 SALW from military stocks in eastern Ukraine between 2013 and 2015.

In this context, it is important to recall that one of the ATT objectives is to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion. Since diversion can take place at any stage of the transfer chain, in the case of Ukraine it is crucial for exporting States Parties to conduct substantial due diligence in the application of Article 11.2, which obliges them to assess the risk of diversion, and to encourage them, together with importing States Parties, to consider the establishment of diversion risk-mitigation measures, including confidence-building measures and joint programmes.

A second angle in the analysis of the war in Ukraine concerns arms transfers to Russia. After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the EU imposed an arms embargo that prohibited any involvement in the supply of arms and services related to military to Russia or dual use items for military use or military end-users in Russia by nationals of EU states or from the territories of EU states, unless contracts or agreements for


such supplies had been concluded before 1 August 2014. A recent report, based on information provided by EU members to the EU Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports, found that between 2015 and 2020, at least 10 EU member states [and ATT States Parties] have exported a total of €346 million worth of arms to Russia, possibly by using loopholes in the wording of the arms embargo. Article 7.7 encourages States Parties to reassess authorizations already granted if they become aware of new relevant information that could indicate there are risks associated to a given export. The ongoing war in Ukraine therefore could provide the space to renew States Parties’ commitments in relation to the existing EU arms embargo on Russia.

As the war in Ukraine continues, it should not distract global attention from the ongoing humanitarian and human rights crises in Yemen or Myanmar, among many others, where thousands of civilians have been killed and millions of others have been forced to flee. Arms continue to flow to these regions from States Parties, although in smaller quantities than in the case of Ukraine. In February 2022, the UN special rapporteur on Myanmar highlighted how the People’s Republic of China and Serbia continued to supply weapons to Myanmar after the coup that returned a military government to the country. Similarly, weapons deliveries to Saudi Arabia have continued apace. As States Parties progress in their efforts to implement the ATT in accordance with its object and purpose of reducing human suffering, the spread of conflicts around the world creates an urgent need for States Parties to begin to openly discuss – and better comply with – their obligations in relation to Articles 6 and 7.

**THE 2022 ATT MONITOR REPORT**

Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive picture of the challenges and opportunities that countries face as they look to align their national systems and become States Parties to the ATT. It lays out the political, strategic, systemic and institutional challenges that have complicated pathways to Treaty membership in different regions. The chapter includes case studies of the experiences from Colombia, Kenya and Malaysia, and it also considers the experience of the Philippines, which ratified the ATT in March 2022. It concludes with recommendations to continue promoting universalization and effective implementation of the ATT.

Chapter 2.1 provides an in-depth look at 2020 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties’ compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as to a higher standard of transparency. It shows that, while a group of States Parties have shown themselves to be committed to public reporting, the lack of meaningfully transparent reporting by many others is a matter of concern as reporting is vital to the implementation of the Treaty.

Chapter 2.2 includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2020 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting-practice metrics (public reporting, timely reporting, withholding security information) as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners.

Chapter 3.1 includes a summary assessment of 2021 annual reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline. It is anticipated that more States Parties will submit their report between the legal deadline of 31 May and the beginning of CSP8. Therefore, this analysis will be expanded in next year’s ATT Monitor report. The chapter shows that the seventh year of ATT annual reporting has seen a continuation of the trends that characterized the previous six years, including widespread non-reporting and increasing rates of confidential reporting.

Chapter 3.2 includes a summary assessment of initial reports and updates to them submitted by States Parties as of 7 June 2022. From this assessment comes an analysis of reporting non-compliance, highlighting challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations and the efforts of the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to address them. The chapter also presents some examples of how States Parties, in their initial reports, have described the implementation of post-shipment controls and on-site verifications, the theme of the CSP8 Presidency.


THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN (UNMISS) DESTROYING WEAPONS IN 2014.

CREDIT: © UN PHOTO / ISAAC BILLY