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A26 SUBMARINE OF THE SWEDISH NAVY SURFACING.

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## **ACRONYMS**

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty	PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management
ATT-BAP	Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment	REC	Regional Economic Communities
	Project	SADC	Southern African Development Community
AU	African Union	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research
CAVR	Centre for Armed Violence Reduction		Institute
CEPS	Ghana Immigration Service and Customs Excise and Preventive Service	SLANSA	Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations	UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament
CSP	Conference of States Parties to the ATT	UNLIREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin
DIEF	Diversion Information Exchange Forum		America and the Caribbean
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy	UNPoA	UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons
GEE	UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen	UNRCPD	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace
GNASCA	Ghana National Commission for Small Arms		and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific
	and Light Weapons	UNSCAR	United Nations Trust Facility Supporting
IHL	International Humanitarian Law		Cooperation on Arms Regulation
IHRL	International Human Rights Law	VTF	ATT Voluntary Trust Fund
ITI	International Tracing Instrument	WGETI	ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation
MOSAIC	Modular Small-Arms-Control Implementation Compendium	WGTR	ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	WGTU	ATT Working Group on Treaty Universalization
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee	WHO	World Health Organization

#### THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor is the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The project was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Austria, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society, and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

The ATT Monitor meets the research needs of ATT stakeholders by:

- Synthesizing information and analysing trends and developments on ATT compliance to advance the Treaty's universalization and implementation
- Assessing standards of national reporting (Article 13) and relevant transparency commitments
- Providing country-by-country analysis on reporting and transfer practices

- Identifying patterns and trends of exports/imports of conventional weapons and reporting them against ATT criteria
- Making research findings available in print and online, in user-friendly formats, and translating key publications into languages other than English
- Maintaining a global network of experts who contribute to ATT Monitor outputs through the International Reference Group (IRG), and contribute to development of ATT Monitor content through the Editorial Team

This information is used to:

- Advance the ATT's universalization and implementation
- Identify key challenges in advancing global acceptance of the ATT's norms and its full implementation, and propose steps to address these challenges
- Provide recommendations for government policy planning and decision-making
- Provide a research-based tool to civil society for use in developing advocacy campaigns and capacity-building and training programs





# STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW (JUNE 2020 – MAY 2021)

This review covers the period between 1 June 2020 and 31 May 2021, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some of the key events and milestones during the past year, and it assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties to the Treaty regarding universalization and compliance.

This review takes stock of what has been another unusual year for all multilateral diplomacy processes, including the ATT, which have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering these impacts, this section first takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the abovementioned period. It then considers the decisions and outputs of the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), which includes three sub-working groups on risk assessment (Articles 6 and 7), diversion (Article 11) and transit and transshipment (Article 9). Finally, the review looks at compliance with the ATT's core provisions and assesses whether the cumulative actions of ATT stakeholders have contributed to the Treaty's objective of reducing human suffering.

#### ATT COMPLIANCE AND COVID-19

Preliminary analysis of ATT initial and annual reports submitted between 1 June 2020 and 31 May 2021 shows that ATT reporting this year was likely impacted again by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has disrupted work dynamics, delayed scheduling and hampered the reporting capacities of many States Parties, particularly those that had no standard or systematic process for reporting to the ATT already in place. Though the on-time reporting rate for 2020 annual reports submitted this year marked a notable increase in compliance from the previous year, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely one of several factors contributing to low and uneven compliance rates in ATT reporting overall.

Similarly, the work cycle of the Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7) has proceeded differently than in previous years. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ATT stakeholders were required to adjust to a written procedure for CSP6 and then a virtual meeting format, both of which invited limited engagement from ATT States Parties. Following an intersessional silence procedure in early 2021, States Parties took the decision to hold a single virtual session

of the ATT Working Groups meetings and of the CSP7 Informal Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in April 2021, followed by virtual intersessional consultations in June to finalize documentation for submission to CSP7 for consideration and possible adoption.¹ The analysis and summaries presented below take into account the extraordinary changes in this year's cycle due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, which will also require consideration when conducting analysis over time.

#### UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2021, the ATT Secretariat listed 110 countries as States Parties, accounting for 57 per cent of all United Nations (UN) member states. It listed a further 31 countries as Signatories.

Four countries became States Parties to the ATT between 1 June 2020 and 31 May 2021. Afghanistan, China and Niue acceded, and São Tomé and Príncipe ratified the Treaty. This nearly matches the universalization rate of the previous year, which also saw the addition of four new States Parties.


Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties between 2015 and 2021. With the exception of 2018–2019, when seven countries ratified the Treaty, universalization progress has remained relatively consistent. While the pace of new membership to any treaty generally slows over time, a pattern is emerging in which progress in ATT universalization remains slow.

Table 1: New membership to the ATT by 31 May of each year

Year	Accessions	Ratifications	Total Number of States Parties
2020-2021	3	1	110
2019-2020	3	1	106
2018-2019	0	7	102
2017-2018	2	1	95
2016-2017	1	6	92
2015-2016	2	14	82

<sup>1</sup> CSP7 President (2021). 'Announcement: Confirmation of the Format of the Preparatory Meeting for the Seventh Conference of States Parties'. www.bit.ly/3zMonr7.

# MAP OF STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS AND STATES PARTIES (AS OF 31 MAY 2021)



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RATIFIED/ACCEDED: Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, State of Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia.

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SIGNED: Andorra, Angola, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti,
Gabon, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United States of America,
Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.



NOT YET JOINED: Algeria, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei
Darussalam, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco,
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen.

The geographic spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2021, the regions with the lowest proportion of ATT States Parties were Oceania at 43 per cent (six of 14 countries) and Africa at 52 per cent (28 of 54 countries).

Europe at 91 per cent (39 of 43 countries), the Americas at 74 per cent (26 of 35 countries) and, for the first time this year, Asia at 71 per cent (10 of 14 countries) have higher regional proportionality of States Parties.

Positively, all four new States Parties are from regions with the lowest ATT participation.

The ATT continues to enjoy particularly strong support among certain sub-regional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with 14 of its 15 members (93 per cent) being States Parties
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 12 of 15 members (80 per cent) being States Parties<sup>3</sup>

# UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

This year saw the fourth funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the date of the virtual PrepCom meeting of CSP7 in April 2021, 28 States Parties<sup>4</sup> had made voluntary contributions totalling US\$9.9 million over the course of the fund's lifespan. Three States Parties (Canada,

Costa Rica and Montenegro) made voluntary contributions for the first time this year, increasing the total VTF budget by approximately US\$1 million compared to the previous year. An additional US\$70,231.51 has been contributed to the VTF Outreach Programme.<sup>5</sup>

The ATT Secretariat received 26 applications from 20 States Parties for 2020 VTF-funded projects.<sup>6</sup> The VTF Selection Committee approved funding for 12 projects to be implemented in 12 countries in 2020,<sup>7</sup> with a total budget of US\$1.2 million.<sup>8</sup> This marks a decrease from the 20 projects approved with a total budget of US\$2 million for 2019 VTF funding, despite the increase in the VTF's disbursement budget.<sup>9</sup> Many of these projects were organized with civil society organizations (CSOs) as implementing partners, reinforcing the vital role partnerships play in meaningfully advancing universalization and implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the VTF Selection Committee since its first year of operation.

Table 2: Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year<sup>10</sup>

Year	Number of Applications	Number of Projects Approved	Total Budget for Approved Projects
2020	26	12	US\$1.2 million
2019	39	20	US\$2 million
2018	23	10	US\$834,803
2017	21	17	US\$1.3 million

- 2 Analysis based on UN Statistics Division regional groupings. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/. For more information on Treaty membership, see the ATT Secretariat website:https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html?templateId=209883#.
- 3 CARICOM (N.D.). 'Membership'. http://caricom.org/membership. One CARICOM member, Montserrat, is not a UN member state and so is not a State Party to the ATT.
- 4 The States Parties that made voluntary contributions to the VTF are: Argentina, Australia, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Government of Flanders Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Germany and New Zealand also contributed to the VTF outreach programme.
- 5 ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2019 to August 2020'. 17 July 2020. ATT/VTF/2020/CHAIR/614/Conf.Rep. https://bit.ly/3779ceU, p. 3.
- 6 Ibic
- 7 Projects were approved for: Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Togo and Zambia.
- 8 For a complete list of projects, see ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2019 to August 2020'. 17 July 2020. ATT/VTF/2020/CHAIR/614/Conf.Rep. https://bit.ly/3779ceU, p. 24.
- 9 For more information, see Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'ATT Monitor Annual Report 2020'. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/EN\_ATT\_Monitor-Report-2020\_Online.pdf, p. 11.
- 10 This table shows projects and funding that were approved by the VTF Selection Committee and does not take into consideration cases where a project was withdrawn or otherwise not completed.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the implementation and completion of 2020 VTF-funded projects as well as on the number of projects approved in 2020 that decreased from the previous year. As the deadline to apply for VTF funding was in January 2020, the applications for 2020 projects could not account for the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The VTF Selection Committee thus requested all applicants submit a COVID-19 risk-mitigation strategy outlining measures to be taken in order to ensure that projects meet government and/or the World Health Organization (WHO) health and safety guidelines associated with the pandemic. Given the various national lockdowns, the disbursement for all 2020 VTF-funded projects was delayed to January 2021, with exceptions for cases where grantees demonstrated the ability to move ahead in 2020 with funded projects in accordance with pandemic restrictions.

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation efforts have also continued this year. Mechanisms like the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), the EU ATT Outreach Project and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

UNSCAR grants were approved for the eighth year to a range of UN agencies, international and regional organizations, CSOs and research institutes. These include the Centre for Armed Violence Reduction (CAVR), the Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA) and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD).<sup>11</sup>

National and regional training workshops around the world again brought together CSOs and government representatives to support universalization and implementation of the ATT by exploring technical challenges, legal requirements of membership to the ATT and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts to implement ATT provisions. However, these workshops and trainings were held less frequently and in a virtual format this year as a result of ongoing challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### Examples include:

- On 28–29 November 2020, participants attended a
  workshop in Costa Rica on 'Reducing illicit arms and
  ammunition trafficking: moving towards a safer Latin
  America without fear of armed violence'. Participants from
  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
  Panama and Peru shared information on national
  experiences with armed violence, arms and ammunition
  controls, and illicit arms trafficking. The workshop was
  implemented by the Arias Foundation and the United
  Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
  Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
  (UNLIREC) with support from Germany.<sup>12</sup>
- On 3–15 December 2020, the EU ATT Outreach Project organized a virtual activity for Chile that focused on instruments, including the ATT, to prevent, detect and address diversion and the illicit trafficking of conventional weapons. A total of 243 Chilean government officials participated in discussions and presentations on issues such as operational interagency exchange and regional and international platforms.<sup>13</sup>
- On 14–16 April 2021, the Geneva Centre for Security
  Policy (GCSP) organized a virtual ATT course titled 'Virtual
  Learning Journey: Building Capacities for Effective
  Implementation of the ATT'. A total of 80 participants from
  45 countries attended, including government officials, civil
  society members and representatives from international
  organizations. The course was made available with
  support from Australia and Canada.
- On 11–14 May 2021, the GCSP organized a virtual Spanishlanguage ATT course titled 'Curso virtual: Creación de capacidades para una implementación eficaz del Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas'. A total of 50 participants from 12 Latin American countries attended, including government officials, civil society members and industry representatives. The course was made available with support from UNLIREC and Spain.

<sup>11</sup> United National Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (2021). 'UNSCAR 2020 Call for Proposals – selected applications'. 14 January 2021. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/UNSCAR-2021-Call-for-Proposal-Selected-Applications-Indicative.pdf.

<sup>12</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2021). 'Reducing Illicit Arms and Ammunition Trafficking: Moving Towards a Safer Latin America Without the Fear of Armed Violence'. ATT Assistance Database. https://att-assistance.org/index.php/activity/reducing-illicit-arms-and-ammunition-trafficking-moving-towards-safer-latin-america.

<sup>13</sup> SIPRI (2021). 'EU ATT Outreach Project II – Online Activity for Chile'. ATT Assistance Database. https://att-assistance.org/index.php/activity/eu-att-outreach-project-ii-online-activity-chile.

#### REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

#### ANNUAL REPORTS

ATT annual reports are due by 31 May each year, detailing arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year. However, States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a defacto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of the 7 June 2021 deadline, 105 States Parties were required by Article 13.3 of the ATT to submit their 2020 annual reports. Of these, 46 submitted their annual reports on time, representing a compliance rate of 44 per cent. This reflects a notable increase in on-time reporting compared to that for 2019 reports (37 per cent) when States Parties submitted reports in the early waves of the COVID-19 pandemic, but it is below the compliance rate for 2018 reports (49 per cent). This year's on-time reporting nevertheless underscores the persistent challenge with low compliance rates in ATT reporting overall.

Thirteen States Parties (Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Benin, El Salvador, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Maldives, Mauritius, the Republic of North Macedonia and the State of Palestine) elected to make their 2020 reports private, representing approximately 28 per cent of on-time submissions. By comparison, 17 per cent of reports submitted on time last year were private, continuing the concerning trend towards increased private reporting.

A preliminary analysis of the contents of the 2020 annual reports can be found in Chapter 4.1.

The submission of 2019 annual reports – the focus of the analysis in Chapter 3.1 – marked five years of ATT annual reporting. The ATT Monitor finds that progress by States Parties in implementing reporting obligations and transparency commitments has been slow, and there is much work to be done to support full compliance with these Treaty provisions.

A full analysis of the first five years of ATT annual reporting can be found in Chapter 2.1.





#### **INITIAL REPORTS**

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires that each State Party submit an initial report on implementation within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty for that State Party. As of 7 June 2021, 105 of 110 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 81 had done so, representing a compliance rate of 77 per cent.

This year, five States Parties (Cameroon, Canada, the Maldives, Palau and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat. Three States Parties (Cameroon, the Maldives and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) elected to keep their initial reports private, continuing the concerning trend towards increased private reporting.

In addition to submitting initial reports, States Parties are required under Article 13.1 to provide the ATT Secretariat with relevant updates or changes to their national arms-transfer control systems. One State Party (Hungary) submitted an updated report this year, joining Japan, New Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden as the only States Parties to have provided these updates to the Secretariat.

An in-depth analysis of the contents of newly submitted initial reports and updates can be found in Chapter 4.2.

The ATT Monitor also evaluated the first five years of ATT initial reporting. This analysis shows that States Parties' reporting compliance is not living up to the promise or requirements of the ATT, as many States Parties remain non-compliant, and the number of confidential reports is increasing.

A full analysis of the first five years of ATT initial reporting can be found in Chapter 2.2.

#### **SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES**

#### SIXTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Sixth Conference of States Parties (CSP6) was conducted through a written procedure on 17–21 August 2020. Representatives from 102 countries, including 89 States Parties, one state that acceded to the Treaty but for which it had not yet entered into force, and 12 Signatories registered to attend the conference. Other stakeholders also registered to attend, including representatives of nine international and regional organizations, including UN agencies, and 28 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing industry.

<sup>15</sup> Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). UNTS\_(ATT) Art 13.1. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

<sup>16</sup> The ATT Monitor captures attendance at CSPs as indicated by the CSP Final Report each year. This year, attendance refers to States Parties that registered to attend CSP6 but may or may not have participated by written procedure.

<sup>17</sup> ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Final Report'. ATT/CSP6/2020/SEC/635/Conf.FinRep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/2EkDHTJ, p. 3.

Ambassador Federico Villegas of Argentina was elected President of the conference during CSP6, succeeding Ambassador Carlos Foradori following his departure from Geneva. Decisions adopted via silence procedure included the following:

- Establishment of the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF), mandating the CSP7 President to organize the first meeting of the DIEF within the timeframe of ATT meetings in 2021, and deciding to review the usefulness of the DIEF at CSP8
- Endorsement of the standing agenda items and the recurring and specific tasks for the WGTR in the period between CSP6 and CSP7
- Election of Ambassador Lansana Gberie of Sierra Leone as President of CSP7
- Election of Cyprus, Germany, Latvia and Peru as Vice Presidents of CSP7
- Scheduling of CSP7 for 30 August-3 September 2021<sup>18</sup>

Several draft decisions were not adopted via silence procedure. Some of these were taken forward intersessionally during the CSP7 cycle while others await final endorsement during the CSP7 annual meeting. These decisions included the multi-year work plans for all three sub-working groups of the WGETI, as well as the CSP6 President's working paper on enhancing transparency and information sharing to address diversion.<sup>19</sup>

Overall, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the CSP6 process. Active engagement by ATT stakeholders, which was permitted only in written form, was down from previous CSPs. In order to safeguard the continuity of the ATT process and the work of the ATT Secretariat during COVID-19, the agenda and a majority of the proposed decisions remained procedural in nature, resulting in limited progress towards the universalization and effective implementation of the Treaty. Two decisions containing substantive elements were adopted by silence procedure without open discussion: one on the mandate and priority areas of work of the WGTR and the other establishing the DIEF.

Transparency – one of the Treaty's key purposes alongside reducing human suffering and contributing to peace, security and stability – was at the centre of many of the discussions at CSP6. While extraordinary working methods were adopted as a way to ensure continuity in the ATT process during the COVID-19 pandemic, these did not allow for significant progress towards the Treaty's effective implementation.

# SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP7 included meetings of the ATT Working Groups and the PrepCom on 26–30 April 2021, followed by virtual informal consultations on 28–30 June 2021. This format was adopted in place of the two in-person sets of meeting that traditionally move forward intersessional work due to challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The remote consultations were scheduled to prepare and finalize the documentation from the April meetings to be submitted to CSP7. At the time of writing, the consultations had yet to take place and its outcomes had yet to be shared with ATT stakeholders. The summaries that follow cover work completed up to this consultation period.

The multi-year work plans of the WGETI sub-working groups were adopted by States Parties in March 2021, prior to the Working Group meetings. During these meetings, the WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Sang Beom Lim of the Republic of Korea, continued to address the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on Articles 6 and 7 (prohibitions and export assessment), Article 11 (diversion) and Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment). Three appointed facilitators led the discussions.

The WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7, facilitated by Ambassador Ignacio Sánchez de Lerín of Spain, discussed the outcome of States Parties' responses to the sub-working group's methodology template to help facilitate the unpacking of key concepts in Articles 6 and 7. After CSP6, the facilitator collated and reviewed the small number of inputs received on the methodology template and prepared a summary report of the responses. ATT stakeholders discussed this report as well as general feedback on the methodology for this exercise during the meeting of the sub-working group.<sup>20</sup>

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 11, facilitated by Ms. Stela Petrović of Serbia, discussed two topics: a discussion paper outlining elements of a process for assessing the risk of diversion, which may be put forward for possible adoption at CSP7, and the practicalities associated with assessing the risk of diversion of an export and the possible establishment of mitigation measures. The sub-working group also further examined the role of information exchange in conducting risk assessment and sought to identify the types of information that are relevant and necessary in exchanges on diversion.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>20</sup> ATT WGETI (2021). 'Chair Letter and Sub-Workgroups Documents for 26–28 April 2021'. 31 March 2021. ATT/CSP7.WGETI/2021/CHAIR/655/M. LetterWorkPlans. https://bit.ly/3BJ5hD8, p. 8.

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 9, facilitated by Mr. Rob Wensley of South Africa, also discussed two topics: exploring national approaches to the terms 'transit' and 'trans-shipment', including how States Parties distinguish between the two and what this means in practice, and a discussion on the phrases 'under its jurisdiction' and 'through its territory in accordance with international law'. States Parties were encouraged to share information on national practices in these areas.<sup>22</sup>

The WGTR, co-chaired by Mr. Alejandro Alba Fernández of Mexico and Ms. Iulia Vlădescu of Romania, continued to pursue an agenda including substantive work to support reporting by States Parties in the CSP7 preparatory meetings. Along with an update on the state of play of compliance with reporting obligations and a discussion of challenges concerning reporting and related substantive reporting and transparency issues, the WGTR continued its discussion on amending the annual and initial reporting templates. The WGTR co-chairs prepared explanatory documents for each reporting template. These changes will be discussed in virtual consultations in June 2021 and will be put forward for adoption by CSP7.<sup>23</sup>

The WGTU, co-facilitated by Ambassadors Federico Villegas of Argentina and Lansana Gberie of Sierra Leone, discussed the activities of Sierra Leone's CSP Presidency to promote universalization of the ATT, updates on efforts by the WGTU co-chairs and States Parties to promote universalization, the status of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty, and efforts of civil society and industry to promote universalization.<sup>24</sup>

The PrepCom meeting for CSP7 was held on 30 April 2021. Ambassador Gberie introduced the priority theme for Sierra Leone's CSP Presidency earlier in the week and discussed the draft working paper on 'Strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and ensure efficient stockpile management.'25 During the PrepCom meeting, the ATT Secretariat provided an overview of the status of implementation of the decisions taken at CSP6, reported on the status of operation of the VTF and financial contributions. The Management Committee presented proposed draft guidelines regarding financial arrangements between States Parties and the ATT Secretariat.<sup>26</sup>

Overall, the Working Groups and PrepCom meetings of CSP7 did not pursue ambitious agendas for continuing work on effective ATT implementation and saw limited participation by ATT stakeholders. The WGTR maintained the most ambitious agenda, which included concrete efforts to continue reviewing the effectiveness of ATT reporting templates to increase transparency in the arms trade. The other Working Groups, however, set expectations low in their agendas for intersessional work.

There is still progress to be made in working towards effective implementation of all Treaty provisions. Nearly seven years after the Treaty entered into force, States Parties remain reluctant to discuss compliance with, and possible violations of, the ATT in terms of transfer decisions. Notably, there are still no mechanisms for such discussion in place, and ATT stakeholders appear unlikely to provide space to address these matters in general exchanges.

# TAKING STOCK - ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

In joining the ATT, States Parties committed to its object and purpose of reducing human suffering while promoting a responsible trade in conventional arms. Robust application of specific provisions in Article 6 (prohibitions) and Article 7 (export and export assessment) is at the heart of ensuring this humanitarian imperative is honoured. Article 6.3, for example, explicitly prohibits arms transfers that could be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity or certain war crimes. Article 7 states the criteria under which States Parties must conduct a risk assessment prior to authorizing a licence to assess the potential that transferred items could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).

States Parties' commitments to the humanitarian objectives of the ATT have been tested in the conflict in Yemen as problematic arms transfers to the Saudi-led coalition are ongoing.<sup>27</sup> Specifically, many States Parties and Signatories had been exporting weapons and ammunition to Saudi Arabia prior to 2014 when fighting in Yemen began.<sup>28</sup> In fact, Saudi Arabia has been the world's largest arms importer since 2014 and

<sup>22</sup> lbid., p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> ATT WGTR (2021). 'Co-Chairs Report of 28–29 April 2021 Meeting'. 4 June 2021. ATT/CSP7:WGTR/2021/CHAIR/711/M.Rep. https://bit.ly/3xdURb8.

<sup>24</sup> ATT WGTU (2021). 'Draft Agenda for CSP7 Preparatory Meeting: 27 April 2021'. 31 March 2021. ATT/CSP7.WGTU/2021/CHAIR/658/M.Agenda. https://bit.ly/3zltjMQ.

<sup>25</sup> For more information, see CSP7 President (2021). 'Draft Working Paper Presented by the President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the ATT'. 9 April 2021. ATT/CSP7/2021/PRES/659/Conf.SALWPSSM. https://bit.ly/3j20Lax.

<sup>26</sup> ATT Secretariat (2021). 'Draft Annotated Agenda CSP7 Information Preparatory Meeting'. 16 March 2021. https://bit.ly/3rDeUyw.

<sup>27</sup> The Saudi-led coalition consisted originally of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. Other countries also provided support. See United Nations Human Rights Council (2015). 'Situation of human rights in Yemen'. 7 September 2015. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/A\_HRC\_30\_31\_AEV.pdf.

<sup>28</sup> For previous analysis of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, see Control Arms Secretariat (2016). 'Dealing in Double Standards. How Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia are Causing Human Suffering in Yemen'. Case Study 2. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ATT-Monitor-Case-Study-2-Saudi-Arabia-.pdf.

was among the top five in previous years.<sup>29</sup> However, its arms procurement was placed into the spotlight of the international community when it launched its military campaign to support the Yemeni government against Houthi rebels in March 2015. The humanitarian crisis that subsequently unfolded has caused an international outcry, especially as the Saudi-led coalition carried out an aerial campaign that resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians over several years.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has estimated that 233,000 people have died since the war began, over half of them from indirect causes such as lack of food, health services and infrastructure.<sup>30</sup> More than 20 million Yemenis (80 per cent of the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance, and the war has already displaced four million people.<sup>31</sup>

Since the launch of the Saudi-led coalition's military campaign in 2015, 23,093 air raids and more than 60,000 individual strikes have been documented. Of the air raids, 7,502 (32 per cent) have hit military targets, 6,683 (29 per cent) non-military sites and 8,908 (39 per cent) unknown sites.<sup>32</sup> Air raids on non-military targets have hit residential areas, transport, farms, markets, government compounds and schools, among others. Attacks by all the warring parties have caused more than 100,000 casualties, including between 12,000 and 18,000 civilians, according to the most recent report from

the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (GEE).<sup>33</sup> It is also estimated that between 2018 and 2020 more than a quarter of civilian casualties were children, yet the numbers could be higher.<sup>34</sup>

Gender-based violence (GBV) continues to be prevalent in Yemen and the GEE has made clear that all parties to the conflict continue to commit acts of GBV, including sexual violence, in contravention of IHL and IHRL.<sup>35</sup> Article 7.4 of the ATT requires an exporting State Party to take into account the risk of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of GBV or serious acts of violence against women and children. The conflict in Yemen shows how States Parties that continue to export weapons to members of the Saudi-led coalition are not fulfilling their obligations in this regard.

Various efforts to encourage States Parties to implement provisions of the ATT in accordance with its object and purpose of reducing human suffering and to stop problematic arms transfers that fuel the Yemen conflict have had mixed results.<sup>36</sup> Analysis of ATT annual reports submitted by States Parties detailing exports and imports between 2015 and 2019 reveals a positive development in that the number of States Parties that exported weapons to Saudi Arabia fell in recent years from 13 to 7.



VARIOUS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE STATES PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE ATT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF REDUCING HUMAN SUFFERING AND TO STOP PROBLEMATIC ARMS TRANSFERS THAT FUEL THE YEMEN CONFLICT HAVE HAD MIXED RESULTS.

- 29 SIPRI (2019). 'Global arms trade: USA increases dominance; arms flows to the Middle East surge, says SIPRI'. 11 March 2019. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/global-arms-trade-usa-increases-dominance-arms-flows-middle-east-surge-says-sipri.
- 30 UN News (2020). 'UN humanitarian office puts Yemen war dead at 233,000, mostly from 'indirect causes''. 1 December 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1078972.
- 31 Relief Web (2021). WFP Yemen Situation Report #5,' May 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-situation-report-5-may-2021
- 32 See Yemen Data Project. https://www.yemendataproject.org/.
- 33 UN Human Rights Council (2020). 'Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014. Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen'. 28 September 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf.
- 34 Save the Children (2021). 'Yemen: A quarter of all civilian casualties are children'. 23 March 2021. https://www.savethechildren.net/news/yemen-quarter-all-civilian-casualties-are-children. Previous reports estimate that more than 7,500 children had been killed or wounded since the conflict began. See Lederer, E. (2019). 'UN report: 7,500 kids killed or wounded in Yemen since 2013'. The Associated Press, 29 June 2019. https://apnews.com/article/25365d9670d0422d90ecce66c451fa0f.
- 35 UN Human Rights Council (2020). 'Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014. Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen'. 28 September 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf.
- 36 The European Parliament, for example, adopted two resolutions (in 2016 and 2017) calling for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia and it again urged member states to impose an arms embargo in 2020. See Abramson, J. (2018). 'Europeans Cut Saudi Arms Sales'. Arms Control Association, March. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-03/news/europeans-cut-saudi-arms-sales; Al Jazeera (2020). 'EU Parliament urges arms embargo on Saudi Arabia'. 17 September 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/g/17/eu-parliament-urges-arms-embargo-on-saudi-arabia.

Other positive developments include the implementation of bans on exporting arms to Saudi Arabia and other types of restrictive policies by some ATT States Parties, including Belgium,<sup>37</sup> Germany,<sup>38</sup> the Netherlands,<sup>39</sup> Norway,<sup>40</sup> Switzerland<sup>41</sup> and Italy.<sup>42</sup> In contrast, some States Parties that are large exporters of conventional weapons, such as France and the United Kingdom, have continued to supply weapons to Saudi Arabia throughout the war despite evidence that all parties have committed serious violations of IHL and IHRL.<sup>43</sup>

As the conflict in Yemen continues, States Parties and Signatories to the ATT that continue selling weapons to the Saudi-led coalition have yet to live up to the object and purpose of the Treaty to reduce human suffering.



AS THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN CONTINUES, STATES PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES TO THE ATT THAT CONTINUE SELLING WEAPONS TO THE SAUDI-LED COALITION HAVE YET TO LIVE UP TO THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE TREATY TO REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING.

#### THE 2021 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 takes an in-depth look at stockpile management as a key mechanism for addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and highlights synergies between ATT provisions and other global arms control frameworks. It then explores the nature and dynamics of stockpile management practices in Sub-Saharan Africa as the region engages with past and present arms control norms. The chapter seeks to promote a nuanced understanding of gaps in stockpile management practices and policies that are illustrated in a case study that highlights challenges faced by Ghana in establishing and implementing these systems.

Chapter 2.1 evaluates five years of ATT annual reporting data, looking at the degree to which annual reporting by States Parties is meaningfully transparent and whether it has contributed to transparency in line with the Treaty's object and purpose. This chapter examines two different aspects of reporting. First, it assesses whether States Parties have met the requirement set out in Article 13.3 to submit timely ATT annual reports. Second, it assesses the degree to which the information provided in those reports contributes positively to meaningful transparency in the global arms trade.

- 37 European Studies Unit (2021). 'Belgian Council of State suspends export licences for arms to Saudi Arabia'. 9 March 2021. https://www.esu.ulg.ac.be/belgian-council-of-state-suspends-export-licences-for-arms-to-saudi-arabia/; Arabian Business (2020). 'Belgian region halts arms sales to Saudi Arabia'. 6 February 2020. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/politics-economics/439541-belgian-region-halts-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia; RTBF (2018). 'Borsus: "Les armes wallonnes pour l'Arabie saoudite ne sont plus destinées à des opérations militaires hors du pays": 19 January 2018. https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail\_borsus-les-armes-wallonnes-pour-l-arabie-saoudite-ne-sont-plus-destinees-a-des-operations-militaires-hors-du-pays?id-9815845.
- 38 Stone, J. (2018). 'Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and Finland stop weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in response to Yemen famine'. Independent. 23 November 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/saudi-arabia-arms-embargo-weapons-europe-germany-denmark-uk-yemen-war-famine-a8648611.html. See also, Bisaccio, D. (2020). 'Germany extends arms embargo on Saudi Arabia'. Defense and Security Monitor. 24 March 2020. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2020/03/24/germany-extends-arms-embargo-on-saudi-arabia/. However, some reports also noted that during 2019 Germany sold over €1 billion worth of weapons to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. See Deutsche Welle (2020). 'German arms sale approvals jump slightly in first quarter of 2020'. 9 April 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/german-arms-sale-approvals-jump-slightly-in-first-quarter-of-2020/a-53080988.
- 39 The Netherlands, in particular, applies a denial policy on arms exports by which export licenses for military goods are not granted unless 'it can be incontrovertibly demonstrated that these goods will not be used in the conflict in Yemen'. See Maletta, G. (2019). 'Legal challenges to EU member states' arms exports to Saudi Arabia: Current status and potential implications'. SIPRI Topical Backgrounder. 28 June 2019. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/legal-challenges-eu-member-states-arms-exports-saudi-arabia-current-status-and-potential.
- 40 Reuters (2018). 'Norway suspends arms exports licenses to Saudi Arabia'. 9 November 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-saudi-idUSKCN1NE22E. Earlier in 2018, Norway had also decided to suspend arms exports to the United Arab Emirates. See Al Jazeera (2018), 'Norway suspends arms exports to UAE over war in Yemen'. 3 January 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/3/norway-suspends-arms-exports-to-uae-over-war-in-yemen
- 41 The New Arab (2018). 'Switzerland halts Saudi arms parts trade over Khashoggi murder scandal'. 31 October 2018. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/switzerland-halts-saudi-arms-parts-trade-over-khashoggi-scandal
- 42 Al Jazeera (2021). 'Italy permanently halts arms sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE'. 29 January 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/29/italy-makes-permanent-arms-sale-freeze-to-saudi-arabia.
- 43 UN Human Rights Council (2020). 'Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014. Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen'. 28 September 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf.

Chapter 2.2 offers reflections on five years of ATT initial reporting. It examines trends in reporting compliance and provides a snapshot of progress made towards Treaty implementation based on publicly available information as provided by States Parties in their initial report. The chapter concludes by looking at enduring challenges to ATT reporting and considerations of how such challenges impact treaty implementation.

Chapter 3.1 takes an in-depth look at 2019 ATT annual reports. It includes an overall analysis of reporting practices, comparing 2018 and 2019 ATT annual reports. This identifies changes in reporting practices and assesses whether inconsistencies and gaps identified in the ATT Monitor analysis of 2018 annual reports were resolved in 2019 reports.

Chapter 3.2 includes country profiles for each State Party obliged to submit a 2019 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, timely reporting, withholding security information),

as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners.

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Chapter 4.1 includes a summary assessment of 2020 annual reports submitted within one week of the 2021. It is anticipated that more States Parties will submit their report in the window between the legal deadline of 31 May and the beginning of CSP7. As such, this analysis will be expanded in next year's ATT Monitor report.

Chapter 4.2 includes a summary assessment of initial reports and updates to them submitted by States Parties as of 7 June 2021. From this assessment comes an analysis of reporting non-compliance, highlighting challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations and the efforts of the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to address them.





# CHAPTER 1: STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO ERADICATE THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND ENSURE EFFICIENT STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

#### INTRODUCTION

Sierra Leone, as President of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7), chose as its priority theme strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ensuring efficient stockpile management. This choice reflects Sierra Leone's own post-conflict experiences and resonates with those of many other countries in Africa.¹ Sierra Leone's choice is important because conflict and armed violence in Africa are often exacerbated by leakages from official arms stocks. Effective arms stockpile management can, therefore, help mitigate the destructive effects of violent conflicts, in line with the object and purpose of the ATT – to promote regional and international peace and security and to reduce human suffering.

Many areas in Sub-Saharan Africa² experience high levels of armed conflict and violence fuelled by the illicit circulation of SALW, further complicating the challenges to maintaining peace and security in the region. Even with opportunities to mitigate the risks posed by these weapons, there are gaps in implementation of international and regional arms control instruments and in national legal frameworks for stockpile management. Identifying where these gaps lie can inform and focus efforts to strengthen national stockpile management systems and procedures and contribute to the detection and prevention of the diversion of SALW to the illicit market.

This chapter looks at stockpile management as a key mechanism for addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the context of ATT provisions and other global and regional arms control frameworks. It then explores the nature and dynamics of stockpile management practices in Sub-Saharan Africa as the region attempts to harmonize its past and present arms control standards. The chapter seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the gaps in stockpile management practices and policies by focusing on the specific challenges faced by Ghana in establishing and implementing these systems.

#### **DEFINING STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT**

Stockpile management includes a wide range of systems and procedures, including storage and warehouse management, physical security of arms in storage, control of internal transfers between warehouses and depots, staff training, documentation and record-keeping.<sup>3</sup>

The modular small-arms-control implementation compendium (MOSAIC) defines stockpile management as the "procedures and activities that are necessary for the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation and handling of small arms and light weapons."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties (2021). 'Draft working paper presented by the President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – Strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and ensure efficient stockpile management'. ATT/CSP7/2021/PRES/659/Conf.SALWPSSM, 09 April 2021. https://bit.ly/3j20Lax.

<sup>2</sup> Sub-Saharan Africa includes the sub-regions of Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa, based on UN Statistics Division regional groupings. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/.

<sup>3</sup> President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties (2021). 'Draft working paper presented by the President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – Strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and ensure efficient stockpile management'. ATT/CSP7/2021/PRES/659/Conf.SALWPSSM.Rev2, 15 June 2021. https://bit.ly/3j20Lax, pp. 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations (2012). 'Modular small-arms-control implementation compendium (MOSAIC), Stockpile management: Weapons.' MOSAIC 05.20:2012(E) V1.0, 27 August, 2012. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.20-2012EV1.0.pdf, p. v.



The result of measures taken to ensure minimal risk of accidents and hazards deriving from weapons and explosive ordnance to personnel working with arms and ammunition, as well as to adjacent populations.<sup>5</sup>

The MOSAIC framework recognizes two categories of arms that are subject to stockpile management practices:

- 1. Arms of national security and parastatal agencies
- 2. Arms produced and stored by commercial concerns and regulated by national civilian authority<sup>7</sup>

Although evolving and specific to SALW, MOSAIC provides clear guidelines for national and international arms control stakeholders to implement the body of norms provided for in specific international, regional and national instruments which, in part, seek to reduce the risk of loss and theft of weapons and ammunition.

National stockpiles of weapons and ammunition include the full range of weapons and ammunition stock in a country. It encompass all weapons and ammunition maintained by multiple state agencies including the police, military (active and reserve), border guards and private commercial enterprises.<sup>8</sup>

A country's arms stockpile management system encompasses all the legal, policy and technical arrangements that facilitate proper accounting, security and safety of all arms and ammunition within it. These include processes for arms usage and maintenance by security agencies and the enforcement of regulations of civilian-ownership of firearms.



#### STOCKPILE SECURITY

The result of measures taken to prevent the theft of weapons and explosive ordnance; entry by unauthorized persons into munitions storage areas; and acts of malfeasance, such as sabotage.<sup>6</sup>

# STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND ADDRESSING THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) THROUGH THE ATT

With its thematic focus, Sierra Leone's CSP7 Presidency seeks to engage ATT stakeholders on issues at the core of peace and security challenges in Africa. In doing so, the CSP7 President's Paper encourages ATT States Parties to identify links, increase collaboration and strengthen the implementation of ATT provisions alongside other global and regional arms control frameworks in order to enhance safe and secure accounting, storage and disposal of weapons as a means of addressing the illicit trade in conventional weapons – particularly SALW.9

#### **DIVERSION**

Stockpile management is a crucial tool in limiting the potential for diversion at all stages of the arms transfer chain. To address these risks and tackle diversion, the ATT sets out provisions that require States Parties to address diversion on the national level and also focuses on international cooperation and assistance measures to strengthen international efforts to combat diversion.

Article 11 addresses the responsibilities of States Parties in taking steps and implementing measures to prevent and address diversion. All parties concerned in an arms transfer, including importing and trans-shipment states, should ensure that diversion-prevention measures are routinely implemented at each stage in the transfer chain – including stockpile management practices and measures to be taken by importing/transit/trans-shipment states.

- 5 Bevan, J. (Ed.). (2008). 'Conventional ammunition in surplus: A reference guide.' Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-05-Conventional-Ammo/SAS-Conventional-Ammunition-in-Surplus-Book-07-Chapter-5.pdf.
- 6 Ibid
- 7 United Nations (2012). 'Modular small-arms-control implementation compendium (MOSAIC), Stockpile management: Weapons'. MOSAIC 05.20:2012(E) V1.0, 27 August, 2012. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.20-2012EV1.0.pdf, p. 3.
- 8 Bevan, J. (Ed.). (2008). 'Conventional ammunition in surplus: A reference guide'. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-05-Conventional-Ammo/SAS-Conventional-Ammunition-in-Surplus-Book-07-Chapter-5.pdf.
- 9 President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties (2021). 'Draft working paper presented by the President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and ensure efficient stockpile management'. ATT/CSP7/2021/PRES/659/Conf.SALWPSSM.Rev2, 15 June 2021. https://bit.ly/3j20Lax, p. 1.
- 10 Relevant stakeholders have an opportunity to address diversion at all stages in the transfer chain. For more information on these states, see Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'Chapter 1: Enhancing Transparency and Information Sharing to Prevent and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Weapons to the Illicit Market'. 2020 ATT Monitor. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/EN\_ATT\_2020\_Chapter-1.pdf, p. 21.

#### TEXTBOX 1.1 - DIVERSION-PREVENTION MEASURES<sup>11</sup>

Measures to be taken by importing/transit/trans-shipment states in implementing Article 11 obligations and efforts to prevent and address diversion include:

#### 1. Before the Transfer

- Systematized import/transit/trans-shipment/ brokering authorization processes, including a licence application process and requiring the provision of documentation such as contract, end-use certificate, information concerning shipping arrangements and route, and obligation to provide delivery verification certificate post-export.
- Appropriate conditions attached to the transfer, including specifying end-use restrictions (for example, no reexport or re-assignment without prior written consent), requiring proof of secure storage on arrival in the importing state and/or secure passage to the end-user, and clear consequences should arms be diverted, reexported or misused (for example, withholding spare parts or ammunition, suspension of exports, no further exports authorized).
- Effective enforcement by customs, border-security and law-enforcement agencies including clear channels of communication between licensing and enforcement checks to ensure that shipments are bona fide and that authorization/documentation is correct and in order.

#### 2. During the Transfer

- Transit/trans-shipment authorizations obtained in advance of any transfer/trans-shipment taking place and adequate security for shipments at transit/transshipment hubs.
- Steps taken by transit/trans-shipment hubs to check the registration of all shipping entering and leaving port.
- Tracking of cargo and ensuring that no unscheduled stops are made by the conveyance.
- Effective enforcement by customs and law enforcement including clear channels of communication between licensing and enforcement agencies, checking that shipments are bona fide and authorization/documentation is correct and in order.
- Authority for enforcement agencies in transit/transshipment states to interdict and/or impound suspect shipments.

# 3. Post-Delivery – at or after importation and from postdelivery storage

- Delivery verification provided to the exporting State Party in a timely manner.
- Physical checks on correct delivery and assignment and to verify that stockpile security provisions are adequate as per any conditions stipulated by the exporting State Party.
- A combination of random and targeted follow-up checks to ensure that weapons remain with the authorized end-user for the declared end-use.



STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT IS A CRUCIAL TOOL IN LIMITING THE POTENTIAL FOR DIVERSION AT ALL STAGES OF THE ARMS TRANSFER CHAIN. TO ADDRESS THESE RISKS AND TACKLE DIVERSION, THE ATT SETS OUT PROVISIONS THAT REQUIRE STATES PARTIES TO ADDRESS DIVERSION ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND ALSO FOCUSES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT DIVERSION.

#### INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION

Article 16 makes clear that states may seek assistance and support in implementing measures that help decrease the risks of diversion, including stockpile management and other post-delivery security measures. Recognising that arms control is best achieved as a multinational endeavour, the ATT also includes many international cooperation provisions that support accountable and transparent arms export controls, when implemented effectively, and contribute to the responsible regulation of conventional arms, including SALW. Article 15 similarly encourages information sharing among ATT States Parties 'regarding illicit activities and actors in order to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional arms.'

#### REPORTING

The ATT's requirements with regard to recordkeeping and reporting serve to enhance efforts to detect and prevent diversion in the context of stockpile management and beyond. Article 12 calls on States Parties to maintain national records on exports and imports licenses issued. In the context of stockpile management, the importance of storing records of national licensing procedures cannot be underestimated. Similar to the ATT, in the ECOWAS Convention on small arms, applications for such licenses include the provision of relevant information from the manufacturer to the end-user, including the means of transport of the weapons and ammunition intended to be transferred. By reinforcing the obligation of States Parties to maintain such records, the ATT supports interstate capability to detect diversion and enhances states' ability to respond to international tracing requests within the global regulatory framework for international conventional arms transfers.



SPECIFIC ATT PROVISIONS THAT SEEK TO STRENGTHEN STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO ADDRESS DIVERSION CAN BE BOLSTERED WHEN IMPLEMENTED ALONG WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS, AS WELL AS PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES SEEKING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SAME GOALS.

#### GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR SALW CONTROL

Specific ATT provisions that seek to strengthen stockpile management practices to address diversion can be bolstered when implemented along with other international and regional arms control instruments, as well as programs and initiatives seeking to contribute to the same goals. Table 1.1 highlights examples of these instruments and initiatives.

The priority theme is also linked to general frameworks of conflict prevention and management, peace-building and development, humanitarian assistance and the prevention of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) more broadly.

#### TEXTBOX 1.2 - STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT REFERENCES IN ATT INITIAL REPORTS

Although physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) generally pertains to the control of weapons within a country's borders and therefore is not explicitly referenced in the ATT text, the Treaty implicitly references its provisions. Information captured in some initial reports can represent good practice when it comes to improving arms controls in-country and supporting Treaty implementation.

Six States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Monaco, Norway, Samoa and Sierra Leone) have referenced PSSM in their initial reports.

These references differ in terms of level of detail and type of national measures. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that it has a certificate for security measures, while Liberia mentioned safe storage capacity and Monaco provided specific descriptions of its safe storage. Additionally, Norway mentioned its ability to provide assistance to other countries for PSSM and Sierra Leone noted its practice of maintaining records of weapons stockpiles.

Table 1.1 - International SALW control instruments and other initiatives

International Instruments			
Instrument	Description	Stockpile Management Provisions	
2001 UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts, and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) <sup>22</sup>	Provides a framework for states to control and regulate licit flows of SALW, prevent their diversion, promote and strengthen international cooperation and develop mechanisms to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. <sup>13</sup>	The Protocol calls States to take appropriate measures to secure 'firearms, their parts and components and ammunition at the time of manufacture, import, export and transit' in order to 'prevent loss or diversion' (Art. 11a).	
2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) <sup>14</sup>	Politically binding framework for states to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. In particular, it encourages states to strengthen or develop norms at the national, regional and global level to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects as well as the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of SALW.	UNPoA makes several references to stockpile management procedures, including appropriate locations for stockpiles, physical security measures, control of access to stocks, inventory management and accounting control, staff training, security, accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held.	
		It also refers to measures taken to identify, secure, and dispose of surplus stocks (para. II.18).	
2005 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI) <sup>15</sup>	Politically binding instrument that encourages states to develop and implement a set of national measures on marking and record-keeping of SALW. It also promotes international cooperation and assistance to enable tracing of illicit SALW.	The ITI makes no explicit reference to stockpile management measures, but it establishes the need to ensure, 'at the time of transfer from government stocks to permanent civilian use of a small arm or light weapon that is not marked in a manner that allows tracing, the appropriate marking permitting identification of the country from whose stocks the transfer of the small arm or light weapon is made:16	
	Other Initiatives		
Modular small-arms-control implementation compendium (MOSAIC)	Voluntary, practical guidance notes that translate into practice the objectives of key global agreements aiming to prevent the illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including the Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the International Tracing Instrument, the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty. <sup>17</sup>	This document provides guidance on the safe, secur effective and efficient management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons, in support of an overarching small arms and light weapons control programme. It is intended to assist in preventing the loss and theft of small arms and light weapons from government and other (e.g. manufacturer's) stockpile	
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (and sustainable goals) <sup>18</sup>	A plan of action born from the 2015 Millennium Development Goals, set an ambitious series of 17 goals and 169 targets for 2030 focused on people, prosperity, the planet, peace and partnership.	There is no direct reference to stockpile manageme or security in the SDGs. However, target 16.4 of Goal 16 aims at significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows, strengthening the recovery and return of stolen assets and combating all forms of organized crime by 2030. Leakages from unsecured stockpiles contribute to the illicit trafficking in arms.	

<sup>12</sup> United Nations (2001). 'United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Adopted by resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001 at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, entered into force on 3 July 2005. https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/recenttexts/18-12\_c\_e.pdf.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2021). 'The Firearms Protocol.' https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/the-firearms-protocol.html.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations. (2001). 'Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects'. In 'Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (9-20 July 2001)'. A/CONF.192/15. https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.192/15(Supp), pp. 7-22.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations. (2005). 'International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons'. Adopted in 2005. https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Firearms/ITI.pdf.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations (2018). 'Modular small-arms-control implementation compendium (MOSAIC): Stockpile management. Weapons.' https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.20-2012EV1.0.pdf.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). 'Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. A/Res.70/1 https://www.un.org/ga/search/view\_doc.asp?symbol-A/RES/70/1&Lang-E.

The CSP7 President's Paper makes clear the usefulness of these instruments and initiatives in collectively addressing in illicit trade in SALW and enhancing efficient stockpile management practices. In working towards coherent implementation of these initiatives, states may identify gaps under other international instruments that may be addressed by the ATT and commonalities between relevant assistance programs specific to stockpile management.<sup>19</sup>

#### STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa experiences high levels of armed conflict and violence that are exacerbated by the uncontrolled circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). More than fifteen countries had active armed conflicts in this region in 2019.<sup>20</sup> SALW have been the weapons of choice in past and current conflicts, underscoring the need to strengthen efforts to eradicate their illicit trade and ensure efficient stockpile management.

In the context of the global trade of conventional arms, Sub-Saharan Africa is a consumer and importer region with relatively few facilities for the manufacturing of conventional weapons. SALW are manufactured in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan, while artisanal small arms are manufactured in Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. South Africa and Sudan are the only two countries with major manufacturing and exporting capabilities.<sup>21</sup>

Because most states in Sub-Saharan Africa do not manufacture arms, they lack the experience of generating arms records directly from the manufacturing stage as many exporters do. They tend to import SALW from multiple global sources for use by multiple domestic government actors with limited, if any, coordination at the regional and national levels.

As an importer region, Sub-Saharan countries experience the global arms trade at the second stage (during the transfer/en route to the intended end-user/in transit), third stage (at or after importation post-delivery) and fourth stage (from post-delivery storage/from national stockpiles) of the arms transfer chain.<sup>22</sup> Sea ports are centralized hubs, official points of entry of arms into most countries in the region and platforms for trans-shipment of arms to land-locked countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Zimbabwe, South Sudan and Niger.

Illicit arms in the region move by air and sea, but mainly across land borders in vehicles managed by a variety of state and non-state actors, including armed groups, criminal gangs, local arms manufacturers, returning peacekeepers and corrupt security officials.<sup>23</sup> Porous borders facilitate black market sales of SALW and allow arms to circulate across national borders to non-state warring factions.<sup>24</sup> Across the continent, the diversion of national stockpiles 'through corruption, theft or battlefield capture'<sup>25</sup> and supplies from other states, including other African states, are also sources of illicit arms supplies to non-state armed groups.<sup>26</sup> As such, poorly managed stockpiles pose a challenge to addressing illicit trafficking in SALW in the region.

#### HISTORY OF STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Arms control efforts have a long history in Africa, dating back as early as the slave trade era.<sup>27</sup> With the partition of Africa after the 1884 Berlin Conference and new, more lethal, developments in firearms technology brought by the Industrial Revolution, surplus weapons from Europe soon found their way to Africa, increasing the availability of weapons and stoking fears of a blow-back effect against the occupying powers.<sup>28</sup> The 1890 Brussels Conference Act, which primarily sought to eradicate the slave trade, also sought to minimize the consequences of an influx of firearms in the region by prohibiting the export of modern weapons to what is now Sub-Saharan Africa, except for

- 19 President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties (2021). 'Draft working paper presented by the President of the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and ensure efficient stockpile management'. ATT/CSP7/2021/PRES/65g/Conf.SALWPSSM, 0g April 2021. https://bit.ly/3j20Lax.
- 20 Davis, I. (2020). 'Armed conflict and peace processes in sub-Saharan Africa'. In SIPRI Yearbook 2020. Oxford University Press. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/07; and Adeniyi, A. (2017). 'The Human Costs of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa'. Oxfam. https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file\_attachments/rr-human-cost-uncontrolled-arms-africa-080317-en.pdf.
- 21 Danssaert, P. (2020). 'Defence-related companies in Africa.' 1 January 2020. https://ipisresearch.be/publication/arms-and-ammunitions-factories-in-africa/.
- 22 Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'ATT Monitor 2020'. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/EN\_ATT\_Monitor-Report-2020\_Online.pdf, p. 21.
- 23 Florquin, N., Lipott S. and Wairagu F. (2019). 'Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa'. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, p. 38.
- 24 Mangan, F. and Nowak, M. (2019). 'The West Africa-Sahel Connection'. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. See also, Florquin, N., Lipott, S., & Wairagu, F. (2019), 'Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa'. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- 25 Mangan, F. and Nowak, M. (2019), 'The West Africa-Sahel Connection'. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, p. 5.
- 26 Zohar, E. (2015). 'How rebellious non-state-actors acquire weapons'. Doctoral dissertation, University of Otago.
- 27 For an in-depth analysis of the history of small arms controls in Africa, see Grip, L. (2017). 'Small Arms Controls in Africa'. Chapter 3. Dissertation Thesis. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/84363842.pdf.
- 28 For a detail account of that era, see Ibid, pp. 72-78.

those used by colonial law enforcement authorities. Article I (7) of the 1890 Brussels Conference Act, for example, introduced restrictions on the import of firearms and ammunition throughout the entire slave-trade territory.<sup>29</sup>

In the aftermath of World War I (WWI), the accumulation of arms and ammunitions and the destabilizing effects they posed to peace and security led to the establishment of the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and its Protocol, agreed in 1919 (1919 Convention). The 1919 Convention prohibited the importation of arms and ammunition to nearly the whole continent of Africa,30 but established that arms and ammunition imported under special licenses into the continent would be admitted at ports by the colonial ruling authority of that territory, and that those arms and ammunition would be stored in a warehouse managed by the same authorities. Stockpile management was also placed under the responsibility of the colonial ruling authorities. Even though the 1919 Convention was eventually abandoned,31 in 1922, Britain introduced an Arms and Ammunition Ordinance in the territories under its control in Africa that replicated the 1919 Convention provisions.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, France passed the Decree-Law of 18 April 1939 on war materials, arms and ammunitions, applicable to its territories in Africa that also contained provisions similar to those in the 1919 Convention.33

These arms control policies were inherited by newly independent African states beginning in the 1950s. Post-colonial African states did not fundamentally change colonial-era legislations<sup>34</sup> or challenge their underlying conceptual framework. As the Cold War unfolded, millions of small arms and light weapons entered Sub-Saharan Africa and equipped 'anti-colonial fighters, newly independent states and super proxy forces alike.'35 For example, in West Africa, as military coups became a common feature of post-colonialism, so did a higher demand for weapons to equip

national security forces.<sup>36</sup> Likewise, national weapons stockpiles increased as inter-state and civil wars broke out in Sudan (1955), Mozambique (1964), Uganda and Tanzania (1971), and Angola (1975), among others.

The growing increase of SALW in national stockpiles was not matched with effective stockpile management policies or reforms to colonial-era SALW legislation. For example, until 2012, Sierra Leone, had an arms and ammunition act that dated back to 1955.<sup>37</sup> Poor or non-existent controls of military and police stockpiles meant that many government weapons were diverted to the illegal market and actors during this time period.

# STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TODAY: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES

Inspired by the need for conflict prevention and conflict management, international arms control efforts came into focus at the start of the 21st century with the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. With colonial-era national legislation still in place in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, efforts by the regional economic communities (RECs) of the African Union (AU) to embrace the international movement to curb the illicit arms trade grew. With this regional momentum, national governments, with or without the support of domestic legislative reform, were able to leverage newly-developed regional frameworks to implement the provisions of relevant and recent international arms control instruments.<sup>38</sup> RECs continue to play a critical role in strengthening arms control policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The most relevant regional instruments on SALW that set specific provisions on stockpile management and security in Sub-Saharan Africa are described below in Table 1.2.

- 29 Warren, A., and Grenfell, D. (Eds.). (2017). 'Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century'. Edinburgh University Press, p. 79.
- 30 Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol. The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 15, No. 4. www.jstor.org/stable/2213279, p. 302. Other territories were also included in the convention.
- 31 Parker, S. (2008). 'Implications of States' Views on an Arms Trade Treaty,' January 2020, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/implications-of-states-views-on-an-arms-trade-treaty-en-240.pdf, p. 3. Another attempt to control the arms trade was made in 1925 when the League of Nations negotiated the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and Implements of War (the 1925 Geneva Convention). The convention prohibited the export of all weapons to Sub-Saharan Africa. As with the 1919 Convention, this agreement was never ratified. Overall, these conventions were characterized by the idea that stricter arms control should be imposed in order to limit the availability of weapons to the African people to the benefit of colonial powers.
- 32 See 'The Laws of the Gold Coast (including Togoland under British Mandate', pp. 1696-1725.
- 33 Legifrance. 'Décret du 18 avril 1939 fixant le régime des matériels de guerre, armes et munitions'. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/LEGITEXT000006071834/1958-10-08.
- 34 As Lina Grip notes, African states inherited arms-control institutions from the colonial rulers, including national weapons registries, licensing systems and legislation. See Grip, L. (2017), Grip, L. (2017). 'Small Arms Controls in Africa'. Chapter 3. Dissertation Thesis. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/84363842.pdf, p. 87.
- 35 Fleshman, M. (2011). 'Small Arms in Africa. Counting the Cost of Gun Violence'. Africa Renewal, December 2011. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2011/small-arms-africa.
- 36 Keili, F. L. (2008). 'Small arms and light weapons transfer in West Africa: a stock-taking'. Disarmament Forum 4. UNIDIR, p. 1.
- 37 Ibid, p. 8
- 38 Oppong, R. F. (2009). 'Redefining the relations between the African Union and regional economic communities in Africa'. In 'Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook, 2009.' Trade Law Centre and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. See also, African Union, Protocol on relations between the African economic community and regional economic communities. https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/annexes/AEC\_protocols.pdf.

Table 1.2 – Legally binding regional instruments that set specific provisions on stockpile management and security in Sub-Saharan Africa

Instrument	Description	Stockpile Management Provisions	
2001 Southern African Development Community Firearms Protocol <sup>39</sup>	Seeks to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials and their excessive and destabilizing accumulation, trafficking, possession and use in the region.	Requires member states to 'enhance their capacity to manage and maintain secure storage of state-owned firearms' (Article 8.b); to implement programmes for the collection, storage, and destruction of surplus, redundant and obsolete firearms to prevent them from entering the illicit market or being diverted (Article 10).	
2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa <sup>40</sup>	Seeks to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of SALW in the region as well as preventing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of SALW there.	Encourages states to incorporate in their national legislation, provisions for effective control of SALW, including their storage and usage (Article 3.c.vii); to 'establish and maintain complete national inventories of small arms and light weapons held by security forces and other state bodies' and maintain them securely stored (Article 6.a); to secure, destroy and dispose SALW rendered surplus, redundant or obsolete for 'the implementation of a peace process, the re-equipment or reorganisation of armed forces and/ or other state bodies' to avoid their diversion into the illicit market (Article 8); and to 'establish an effective mechanism for storing impounded, recovered or unlicensed illicit small arms and light weapons pending the investigations that will release them for destruction' (Article 9.d).	
2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and Other Related Material (ECOWAS Convention) <sup>41</sup>	Regulates the manufacture, trade, possession, and disposal of SALW, firearms, and ammunition.	Provides practical measures member states shall take 'to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their national stocks' of SALW, including effective standards and procedures for stockpile management, storage and security (Article 16).  Refers to the need to securely store all weapons collected for destruction.	
2010 Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components (Kinshasa Convention) <sup>42</sup>	Seeks to prevent, combat and eradicate in Central Africa the illicit trade and trafficking in SALW, their ammunition and all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly, to strengthen control of the manufacture, trade, movement, transfer, possession and use of SALW.	Explicitly defines national stockpile (Article 2.u) and national stockpile management (Article 2.v). Encourages states to take measures to ensure the safety and security of the stocks of weapons and ammunition manufactured or distributed (Article 12.3). Sets specific provisions for stockpile management, including physical security of depots, inventory management and record keeping, staff training and security during manufacture and transport of SALW belonging to the armed and security forces as well as other competent state bodies (Article 16).	

<sup>39</sup> Southern Africa Development Community (2001). 'Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Region'. https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8361/Protocol\_on\_the\_Control\_of\_Firearms\_Ammunition2001.pdf.

<sup>40</sup> United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) (2004). 'The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa'. https://unrec.org/ged/download.php?itemId=4&language=fr\_FR.

<sup>41</sup> Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (2006). ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, their ammunition and other associated material. Adopted on 14 June 2006, entered into force on 29 September 2009. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/research/disarmament/dualuse/pdf-archive-att/pdfs/ecowas-convention-on-small-arms-and-light-weapons-their-ammunition-and-other-related-materials.pdf.

<sup>42</sup> United Nations (2010). Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2010/04/20100430%2001-12%20PM/Ch\_xxvi-7.pdf.

In addition to these agreements, the 2013 African Union Silencing the Guns initiative<sup>43</sup> and the 2016 Master Roadmap of practical steps to silence the guns by 2020 (Lusaka Master Roadmap)<sup>44</sup> set ambitious goals to achieve 'a conflict-free Africa, prevent genocide, make peace a reality for all and rid the continent of wars, violent conflicts, human rights violations, and humanitarian disasters. The initiative encourages states to 'take measures to secure stockpiles in emergency and conflict situations' in order to reduce the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALW in Africa. These initiatives have already made progress in supporting states in enhancing stockpile management practices and can both inform and support the implementation of diversion-prevention measures under the ATT.<sup>46</sup>

Despite numerous normative frameworks for conflict management and prevention, challenges persist in Sub-Saharan Africa to implement them, including provisions related to stockpile management. The case study below illustrates some of these challenges as faced by Ghana in implementing efficient arms control legislation and effective stockpile management systems.

# CASE STUDY: GHANA'S STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

Despite Ghana's reputation as a historically peaceful and stable country relative to others in West Africa, its stockpile management systems remain underdeveloped and its arms control regulations more broadly remain disjointed and incomplete. Arms control legislation in Ghana does not

establish standards for maintaining safe and secure national stockpiles in state-owned armouries, though a number of state agencies are authorized end-users of firearms. As such, Ghana's legislative framework for arms control establishes multiple arms management authorities responsible for implementing different elements of this regulatory framework. Along with the colonial history of arms control in the region and the proliferation of illicitly-manufactured firearms in-country, this complex arrangement presents a number of challenges for Ghana in establishing and implementing efficient stockpile management systems.

#### PROBLEMATIC HISTORICAL LEGACIES

Ghana's legal and regulatory framework for the import, export, and trans-shipment of firearms and ammunition, including explosives, is still shaped by the historical arms and ammunition enforcement put in place by colonial powers in the region. The 1922 British Arms and Ammunition Ordinance is particularly influential. By prohibiting 'the manufacture and the assembling of firearms, arms of war, or of ammunition [...] except at arsenals established by the Imperial or Gold Coast Government,' the country was not able to develop national arms and ammunition management strategies that would carry over post-independence. As a result, this had implications for the development of licensing and record-keeping systems, as well as the development of arms and ammunition-related legislation that would reflect modern standards for effective stockpile management.



DESPITE NUMEROUS NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION, CHALLENGES PERSIST IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TO IMPLEMENT THEM, INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATED TO STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT.

<sup>43</sup> African Union (2013). 'African Union 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration'. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36205-doc-50th\_anniversary\_solemn\_declaration\_en.pdf, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> African Union (2016). 'African Union master roadmap of practical steps to silence the guns by 2020'. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37996-doc-au\_roadmap\_silencing\_guns\_2020.pdf.en\_.pdf.

<sup>45</sup> United Nations (2019). "Silencing the Guns' campaign kicks off in 2020.' 23 December 2019. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/silencing-guns-campaign-kicks-2020.

#### CHALLENGES WITH INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

Ghana has six main arms and ammunition-related laws that intersect with different social and economic sectors in the country, rather than collectively combine and contribute to focused and centralized arms control goals:

- The State Secrets Act, 1962 (Act 101)
- The Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962 (L.I. 200)
- The Arms and Ammunition Act, 1972 (N.R.C.D.9)
- The Arms and Ammunition Act, 1996 (Act 519)
- The Customs Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993
- The Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act. 703) and the Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2012 (L.I. 2177)

These laws establish multiple arms management authorities (Minister of Interior, Minister of Finance and Minister of Lands and Natural Resources) and do not promote inter-agency collaboration in firearms management at a national level. In the context of international cooperation, the State Secret Act of 1962 prohibits the sharing of information on arms and ammunition with other foreign entities (for example, the sharing of official information on SALW with neighboring states is an offense under this law).<sup>47</sup> Despite the cooperative provisions of recent international and regional arms control instruments, these national laws are the references that government officials in Ghana use on a daily basis, making it difficult to implement cohesive arms control strategies.

For example, Ghana's armed forces and police have their own sets of stockpile management procedures and systems. The armed forces are required to 'keep records of all imported weapons imported for them.' Service Instruction Number 96 within the Ghana Police Service<sup>47</sup> establishes a mandatory requirement that all police armouries keep dedicated books for recording bulk receipt of weapons and ammunition from national, regional, divisional and district headquarters. Stocks are periodically reviewed but these records 'are considered as national secret and are not reviewed by other bodies.'<sup>48</sup>

# OUTDATED STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Police armouries generally retain colonial era structures and are mostly constructed of stone, heavy concrete and heavy metal/iron gates that maintain security but do not adequately vent air, producing excessive heat inside. Baseline assessments conducted by the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms, UNDP and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in 2015 and by UNIDIR in 2019 showed that security agencies in Ghana have significant needs in relation to storage facilities as they mostly lack space and do not comply with international technical guidelines. 49 For example, the locations of some of Ghana's arms and ammunition depots are increasingly coming under pressure from urbanization and without appropriate safety and security measures, there are risks not only associated with theft of stockpiles but also explosions, like the one that took place in Michel Camp military base in 2019.50

#### ILLICIT LOCALLY MANUFACTURED FIREARMS

An additional and fundamental problem for stockpile management in Ghana comes from the fact that few or no regulations exist as it relates to artisan locally produced weapons. The colonial laws criminalized local arms manufacturing as a means of maintaining power and control through restricting access to weapons. As a result, locally produced weapons cannot be registered into the arms database managed by the police. The State has no record of them and it is 'virtually impossible to quantify the actual extent of craft gun production in Ghana, as gunsmiths have no incentive to keep records.'51 It has been estimated that Ghana has the capability to produce 200,000 illegal weapons annually,52 weapons that fall under no regulation whatsoever. For the purposes of improving stockpile security to avoid SALW diversion into the illegal market, the lack of recordkeeping for locally produced weapons deepens this challenge.

<sup>47</sup> Parliament of the Republic of Ghana (1962). 'State Secrets Act, 1962 (ACT 101). Section 3 (2). http://elibrary.jsg.gov.gh/fg/laws%20of%20ghana/2%20REP/STATE%20SECRETS%20ACT,%201962%20ACT%20101.htm.

<sup>48</sup> Ghana Inspector-General of Police. 'Ghana Police Service Instructions'. https://ghfinder.com/ghana-police-service-instructions-pdf/.

<sup>49</sup> Republic of Ghana (2010) 'Stockpile Management and Security'. National Report of Ghana on its Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA); Section A.5, p. 5. New York, NY: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Ghana to the United Nations. 18 June 2010.

<sup>50</sup> See Pokoo, J. M., Aning, K. and Jaye, T.(2016). 'Addressing the challenges of small arms and light weapons availability in Ghana.' Accra: Adwinsah; UNIDIR (2020). 'Weapons and Ammunition Management Country Insight: Ghana.'

<sup>51</sup> Ghanaweb (2019). 'Michel Camp: Bombs explode at ammunition depot,' 16 January 2019. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Michel-Camp-Bombs-explode-at-ammunition-depot-715551.

<sup>52</sup> Aning, E. (2005). 'The Anatomy of Ghana's Secret Arms Industry'. Small arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-1-Full-manuscript.pdf, p. 83.

#### REGIONAL VS. NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

A final point relates to how these different regulations intersect with Ghana's commitments to the provisions of the different regional and international arms-control instruments it has ratified or signed. In the 2006 ECOWAS Convention, states are encouraged to establish National Commissions to implement the provisions of the Convention. Ghana established its own National Commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons (GNACSA) in 2007 by Act 736, as an advisory body to the Minister of Interior. It was tasked with setting up programs to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade in SALW, ensuring that Ghana commits to its responsibilities in the ECOWAS Convention while educating the general public about the dangers of SALW in order to discourage their illicit production.53 Since its establishment, it developed a National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management (NAP) that provides the framework for a comprehensive set of activities to ensure the effective and efficient control and management (including stockpile) of arms in the country.

However, current laws in Ghana have been in place for more than four decades, making it difficult to use them to address current SALW issues. In some cases, legal interpretation of these laws is ambiguous, and in others they are incompatible with the ECOWAS Convention.<sup>54</sup> In Ghana, for example, some sections of the Arms and Ammunition Decree of 1972 indicate an outright ban arms manufacturing, while it is permissible with official permission in other sections. The ECOWAS Convention 'encourages dialogue with local manufacturers of small arms', though this is prohibited by the Ammunition Decree of 1972.<sup>55</sup>

#### IMPROVING STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

While Sub-Saharan Africa increasingly faces the problem posed by the illicit circulation of SALW, there are opportunities to mitigate the risks posed by these weapons to peace and security in the region. Strong national stockpile management systems and procedures could help detect and prevent the diversion of SALW to the illicit market and actors.

Sub-Saharan states have identified the need for international assistance to improve stockpile security and destroy weapons.<sup>56</sup> Ghana's case shows that updates in infrastructure,

for example, would allow the country to comply with international technical guidelines. It also shows that more needs to be done to amend and improve outdated arms control legislation that remains an obstacle to advancing the goals set forth in the regional conventions and the AU Silencing the Guns Initiative.

#### CONCLUSION

With the ATT and other international and regional arms control instruments, there exists a robust legal and normative framework for strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW and improve stockpile management practices. However, there is still work to be done to support its effective implementation, as seen in the case study of Ghana in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Colonial-era legislation, complexities in policy implementation and oversight, poor infrastructure and technology gaps all contribute to the challenges endemic to Sub-Saharan Africa to curbing the illicit trade in SALW. Nevertheless, collective efforts on the regional level continue to support national legislative reform and shift momentum toward more effective arms control. Internationally, states in Sub-Saharan Africa have the opportunity to strengthen these efforts by seeking both international assistance and cooperation in the context of the ATT and other instruments. African states reporting to the UN PoA on stockpile management provisions, for example, have already identified the need for international assistance to improve stockpile security and destroy weapons.<sup>57</sup> The ATT, through the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) provides an additional assistance platform for States Parties in Sub-Saharan Africa that need to update their national control systems, including stockpile management systems and procedures.<sup>58</sup>

By prioritizing the universalization and implementation of the ATT and the focused coordination of the broader normative and legal arms control framework within national governments, among regional partners, and on the international level, progress can be made to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, increase transparency in the arms trade and reduce human suffering.

<sup>54</sup> Parliament of the Republic of Ghana (2007). 'National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons Act, 2007 (Act 736)'. https://www.unrec.org/docs/harm/Ghana/ACTS/National%20commission%20on%20SALW%20act%202007.pdf.

<sup>55</sup> Soshu, M. (2013). 'Managing National Commissions for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in West Africa'. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Managing-National-Commissions-for-Small-Arms-and-Light-Weapons-Control.pdf.

<sup>57</sup> See United Nations Programme of Action. 'International Assistance'. https://smallarms.un-arm.org/international-assistance.

<sup>58</sup> For example, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. See United Nations Programme of Action. 'International Assistance'. https://smallarms.un-arm.org/international-assistance.

<sup>59</sup> Many Sub-Saharan States Parties to the ATT have been beneficiaries of the VTF since 2017. See Arms Trade Treaty. 'Voluntary Trust Fund.' https://thearmstradetreaty.org/voluntary.html.



# CHAPTER 2: LOOKING BACK TO MOVE FORWARD: EVALUATING FIVE YEARS OF ATT REPORTING

#### 2.1 - ANNUAL REPORTS

#### INTRODUCTION

Transparency in arms transfers is a central component of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and fundamental to achieving its goals and objectives. The object and purpose of the ATT itself cannot be fulfilled in the absence of transparency among states trading in arms, and transparency more broadly is central to the effective implementation of the ATT's operative articles. Transparency can also be seen as directly linked to a government's willingness to commit to monitoring, oversight and accountability.¹

The ATT's requirements for reporting on arms transfers are the primary tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. Timely, comprehensive and meaningfully transparent reporting facilitates confidence building, responsibility and cooperation by allowing States Parties and civil society to be certain that Treaty commitments have been respected.

During the negotiations to develop the ATT, many governments and civil society organizations expressed a desire that the Treaty foster improvements in the transparency of the global arms trade. As such, transparency in the form of public reporting was a key priority from the onset of negotiations<sup>2</sup> that saw widespread support from 81 per cent of States Parties and Signatories to the ATT when it entered into force in 2014.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter evaluates the first five years of ATT annual reporting – which includes 2015–2019 annual reports – to determine whether such reporting has lived up to the promise and requirements of the ATT. Building on previous ATT Monitor analysis of annual reports each year, this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty, and reporting that contributes to a higher standard of transparency. This chapter finds that a number of reporting trends threaten to undermine both transparency in the global arms trade and States Parties' commitments to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- Declining rates of compliance with ATT reporting obligations are undermining transparency in the global arms trade. Less than half of States Parties have fulfilled all of their ATT annual reporting requirements in any given year.
- Declining rates of compliance with ATT reporting obligations and increasing rates of confidential reporting are reducing the percentage of reports submitted each year that contribute positively to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. The percentage of reports due that are meaningfully transparent fell from 46 per cent to 30 per cent over the 2015–2019 period.
- The decline in reporting has not been offset by any significant improvement in the transparency in information provided in publicly available reports. The percentage of publicly available reports that are meaningfully transparent have remained relatively consistent at 58 per cent for 2015 and 59 per cent for 2019, indicating that capacity among States Parties may also have remained static.
- A group of States Parties that consistently submit publicly available reports each year has increased the occurrence of comments and descriptions of reported transfers, contributing to a higher standard of transparency in their reports.
- Only 12 States Parties have been fully compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and have submitted reports that contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty for every year a report was due.
- Only eight States Parties have been fully compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, submit reports that contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty for every year a report was due and include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency.

<sup>1</sup> Holtom, P. (2008). 'Transparency in Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 22 July 2008. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP22.pdf, p. 3. See also Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'ATT Monitor 2020'. 19 August 2020. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/EN\_ATT\_Monitor-Report-2020\_Online.pdf, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> See Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2017-report/, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Of the 130 ATT States Parties or Signatories at this time, 105 had explicitly called for public reporting. See Karim, A. and Marsh, N. (2015). 'State positions and practices concerning reporting and the Arms Trade Treaty'. Control Arms. https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/States-Practices-PT1.pdf, p. 1.

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#### **METHODOLOGY**

Annual reports for all years were downloaded for analysis on 7 June 2021. Reports subsequently or later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. In many reporting years, one or more States Parties submitted reports before they were required to do so. While this is a commendable practice, this review does not take stock of those reports in order to reflect accurately on compliance with reporting obligations.

This chapter examines three different categories of ATT annual reporting to evaluate whether and to what degree, after five years, the reporting obligations and transparency objectives of the ATT have been fulfilled. ATT Monitor analysis considers whether 2015–2019 annual reports:

- 1. Are compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations
- 2. Are meaningfully transparent and contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty
- 3. Contribute to a higher standard of transparency

For each reporting category, the ATT Monitor established specific criteria upon which annual reports are evaluated in each reporting category. These criteria are provided below.

Distinct evaluation exercises were undertaken for each reporting category to distinguish between Treaty obligations (Article 13.3 reporting requirements), the minimum amount of information the ATT Monitor has determined is needed for reports to be meaningfully transparent and to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty (for example, public reporting), and additional information that, when provided, contributes to a higher standard of transparency (for example, comments on the nature of reported transfers). Using all of these criteria in one exercise to evaluate annual reports would not have produced accurate analysis regarding transparency. For example, an annual report submitted after the reporting deadline is not compliant with Article 13.3 obligations, but may otherwise include information that is meaningfully transparent and contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

The submission of 'nil' reports for exports and/or imports may fulfil both Article 13.3 reporting obligations and the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. However, 'nil' reports do not provide the same opportunity for States Parties to provide additional information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency as reports that contain transfer information. Nonetheless, those that submit 'nil' reports may still have an equivalent commitment to transparency.

The submission of 2019 annual reports was likely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The unprecedented effects of the pandemic should be taken into account when considering 2019 reporting data to assess overall trends. On-time reporting, in particular, may have been lower for 2019 reports as a result of challenges due to the pandemic.

The ATT Monitor has reviewed only annual reports that have been made publicly available on the ATT Secretariat website. It is important to note that full compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations (for example, providing information on both exports and imports) may actually be different when accounting for transfer information provided in confidential reports.<sup>4</sup>

This analysis evaluates only information provided by States Parties in annual reports. It does not seek to determine whether or not all transfers are reported or to independently verify the accuracy of that information. As such this analysis it not a general measure of transparency for all arms transfers.

# OVERVIEW OF ATT ANNUAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS AND TRANSPARENCY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

#### ARTICLE 13.3 ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Article 13.3 of the ATT establishes requirements for the submission of annual reports each year.



Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1.5 Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

<sup>4</sup> Previous ATT Monitor analysis has shown that data accuracy is an important issue, and the ATT Monitor has made recommendations for improvements in this regard. For an analysis of the many discrepancies between reports see ATT Monitor Report 2017, pp. 45–50; ATT Monitor Report 2018, pp. 85–91; and ATT Monitor Report 2019, pp. 100–109.

<sup>5</sup> The arms covered by Article 2.1 are: (a) Battle tanks; (b) Armoured combat vehicles; (c) Large-calibre artillery systems; (d) Combat aircraft; (e) Attack helicopters; (f) Warships; (g) Missiles and missile launchers; and (h) Small arms and light weapons.

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The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be fully compliant with the requirements laid out in Article 13.3 if a report:

- 1. Is submitted to the ATT Secretariat
- Is submitted on time within one week of the 31 May deadline<sup>6</sup>
- 3. Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 and/or relevant 'nil' reports

While the Treaty requires States Parties to report on authorized or actual exports and imports, it does not explicitly define the types of information States Parties need to include in their annual reports. It instead uses the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) as a reference.<sup>7</sup>

#### TRANSPARENCY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Article 1 of the ATT establishes the object and purpose of the Treaty, including 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms.' Reporting is the primary tool at the disposal of States Parties for contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of Article 1.



#### **ARTICLE 1: OBJECT AND PURPOSE**

The object of this Treaty is to:

- Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;
- Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion;

for the purpose of:

- Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
- · Reducing human suffering;
- Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.



<sup>6</sup> States Parties are granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period beyond the deadline set out in Article 13 to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

<sup>7</sup> The ATT reporting template uses information contained in the UNROCA standardized reporting forms as a starting point and includes: the number of items or the financial value of reported conventional arms, and the final importing or exporting States Parties of reported conventional arms. For more information, see WGTR (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP5,WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 16.

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The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include the minimum information needed in order to be meaningfully transparent and contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1 if a report:

- Is submitted and made publicly available on the ATT Secretariat website
- 2. Provides information that is disaggregated by weapon type
- Provides information that is disaggregated by importer/ exporter
- Indicates whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both)<sup>8</sup>
- 5. Provides the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type

States Parties that submit 'nil' reports can also contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. As such, the ATT Monitor also considers an annual report to include the minimum information needed in order to be meaningfully transparent if a report clearly submits 'nil' reports on exports and/or imports.

These criteria established by the ATT Monitor go beyond the minimum information provided by the reporting templates. Notably, these criteria also include provisions for the disaggregation of information by weapon type. Annual reports can meet these criteria only when information provided in them is adequately disaggregated in respective reporting templates. Disaggregated information is crucial to supporting transparency as it provides the basic information necessary to determine what was transferred to whom.<sup>9</sup>

#### A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

States Parties may provide information in ATT annual reports that goes beyond the minimum information needed in order to contribute to the aims and objectives of the Treaty in Article 1, as well information required by Article 13.3. This information contributes to a higher standard of transparency and is in some cases encouraged (though not required) by other ATT provisions.

Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the provisions of the Treaty, including annual reporting obligations, to the broadest range of conventional arms. States Parties, then, could consider including information on all conventional arms in their national control list. <sup>10</sup> Similarly, States Parties could also consider including information on ammunition/munitions and parts and components. The 'FAQ-type guidance document on annual reporting obligations' endorsed by the ATT Conference of States Parties (CSP), makes clear that the Treaty provides no obligation to include such information but does include an encouragement to do so. <sup>11</sup>



#### **ARTICLE 5.3: GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION**

Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered under Article 2 (1) (a)-(g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered under Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than the descriptions used in relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

<sup>8</sup> An authorized export or import is one that has been approved by national authorities, while an actual export or import concerns the physical movement of weapons or a change in ownership. Authorizations are generally granted before the actual export takes place, sometimes years in advance. For more information, see WGTR (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, pp. 11-12.

g These criteria also build on criteria used in previous analysis conducted by the ATT Monitor. For more information, see Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'ATT Monitor 2020'. 19 August 2020. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/EN\_ATT\_Monitor-Report-2020\_Online.pdf, p. 40.

<sup>10</sup> Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers': ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 13.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if, in their annual reports, States Parties do at least one of the following:

- Include descriptions of reported transfers that provide details on the make, model and/or calibre of transferred conventional arms
- Include comments on reported transfers that provide details on the nature of the transfer, including end-use/ end-user information
- Include 'o', 'nil', '/' or any indication that no transfers were made in relevant weapons categories and subcategories
- 4. Clearly indicates that commercially sensitive or national security information was or was not withheld, and, if it was, the report indicates what information was withheld
- Include information reported in voluntary national categories that include arms categories covered by Article 2.1 but are not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (shotguns, etc.)<sup>12</sup>
- Include information reported in voluntary national categories that include arms categories not covered by Article 2.1 (ammunition, parts and components, gaspowered firearms, etc.)
- 7. Include any other kind of additional information, including national reports and detailed tables
- 8. Clearly indicates when it includes national definitions of categories of conventional arms reported and, if so, provides relevant definitions

The 'FAQ-type document' endorsed by the CSP also draws on the object and purpose of the Treaty in suggesting that States Parties consider reporting as much information as possible, including 'complete conventional weapons covered under Article 2.1 that are exported/imported in disassembled parts and components' as well as ammunition.<sup>13</sup>



<sup>12</sup> Though Article 5.3 states that 'Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms,' the widely used reporting templates do not include some weapons that are covered by the Treaty (for example, shotguns are not mentioned explicitly). The templates have subcategories for 'other' small arms and/or light weapons and also a section for 'Voluntary National Categories' of weapons, both of which allow a State Party to report on a wider range of arms exports or imports. States Parties can also use their own national reporting format.

<sup>13</sup> WGTR (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 14.

### ARTICLE 13.3 ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The number of States Parties required to submit an annual report has increased each year since the ATT came into force as new States Parties have ratified and acceded to the Treaty.

The first round of ATT annual reports, detailing exports and imports in the 2015 calendar year, were required to be submitted by 61 States Parties by 31 May 2016. Five years later, 97 States Parties were required to submit annual reports detailing exports and imports in the 2019 calendar year by 31 May 2020.


Figure 2.1 shows the increasing number of States Parties required to submit an annual report each year.



THE NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT HAS INCREASED EACH YEAR SINCE THE ATT CAME INTO FORCE AS NEW STATES PARTIES HAVE RATIFIED AND ACCEDED TO THE TREATY.

# FIGURE 2.1 - NUMBER OF ANNUAL REPORTS DUE PER REPORTING YEAR Number of reports due to be submitted 61 75 89 92 97 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Report on transfers during calendar year





Above, the ATT Monitor examines the extent to which States Parties due to submit reports each year have fulfilled Article 13.3 annual reporting requirements.

### SUBMITTING REPORTS TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT

In five years, the percentage of States Parties submitting annual reports has declined from 82 per cent of 2015 reports to 64 per cent of 2019 reports.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

- Fifty-eight States Parties have submitted a report every year they were required to do so<sup>15</sup>
- Twelve States Parties have a mixed record, having submitted reports in some years and not in others<sup>16</sup>
- Twenty-eight States Parties required to submit reports have not done so in any year<sup>17</sup>

There are likely two reasons for the decline in the percentage of States Parties submitting annual reports. First, States Parties that were due to submit their first report after the first round of ATT annual reporting in 2015 have generally been less likely to submit any reports. It may be the case that this group of States Parties has decreased willingness and/or capacity to submit reports. Second, some States Parties stopped submitting reports after initially doing so.

It is particularly concerning that a group of 28 States Parties that were required to submit reports have not done so in any year, as this represents a sizable percentage of reports due each year. As such, it presents a significant barrier to transparency in reporting and to wider implementation of other Treaty obligations.

14 Some States Parties have submitted a report even though they were not required to do so. These reports are not included in the analysis in this chapter.

16 Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Nigeria, Paraguay, Samoa, South Africa and Tuvalu.

17 Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte D'Ivoire, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia.

<sup>15</sup> Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

# REPORTING BOTH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS COVERED UNDER ARTICLE 2.1

Article 13.3 requires States Parties to report on both exports and imports of conventional arms.

Most publicly available annual reports contained transfer information on both imports and exports. However, in some cases, States Parties submitted reports that provided no transfer information for either exports or imports, omitted sections of the reporting template or did not submit relevant 'nil' reports.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:


- Austria and the United Kingdom submitted publicly available reports every year they were required to do so and did not submit any import data in any year
- Mali provided no export data for 2015

- Burkina Faso provided no export or import data for 2015, and no import data for 2016
- Paraguay provided no import data for 2016 and 2018
- Though these five States Parties submitted publicly available reports in these years, such reports were not in compliance with the requirements set out in Article 13.3.
   To be compliant, these States would need to include import or export data, or submit relevant 'nil' reports.

### SUBMITTING REPORTS ON TIME

Article 13 of the Treaty establishes 31 May as the deadline for submitting annual reports each year. States Parties are also granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period.<sup>18</sup>

Figure 2.3 shows that the on-time reporting rate has varied each year, with the lowest rate of on-time reporting occurring in 2019.



<sup>18</sup> Some States Parties have indicated that the date of submission for their annual reports was before the reporting deadline, although the reports were made available after the reported date of submission. The reasons for the gaps between the stated and actual dates of submission have not been verified with States Parties.

It was expected that States Parties' first annual reports might be submitted late as states adjusted to the new reporting system. However, the lowest rate of late reports was seen in the submission of 2018 annual reports, which was followed by the highest rate of late reports in the submission of 2019 annual reports. Though the 2019 late reporting rate was similar to that of 2016, it may be assumed that challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic likely affected States Parties' ability to submit reports on time for that year.


ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015–2019 period:

- Twenty States Parties submitted every due report on time<sup>19</sup>
- Fourteen States Parties did not submit on time every year, but their timeliness had improved<sup>20</sup>
- Nineteen States Parties submitted a late report for 2019 after previously reporting on time<sup>21</sup>
- Twelve States Parties were late with every report they submitted<sup>22</sup>

# FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Figure 2.4 shows that less than half of States Parties have fulfilled all Article 13.3 reporting requirements in any given year.

Low percentages of full compliance with Article 13.3 obligations among States Parties are mainly due to low ontime reporting rates. Only a minority of States Parties have submitted at least one on-time report in each year a report was due, with the submission of 2019 annual reports marking the lowest percentage of on-time reporting. As a result, almost two-thirds of States Parties failed to fulfil their reporting obligations for transfers that took place in that year.



<sup>19</sup> Albania, Argentina, Benin, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden and Switzerland.

<sup>20</sup> Belgium, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Jamaica, Japan, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Sierra Leone and Uruguay.

<sup>21</sup> Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Republic of North Macedonia, Senegal, Serbia, United Kingdom.

<sup>22</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Mali, Nigeria, Paraguay and Tuvalu.

# FULFILLING THE TRANSPARENCY AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY


The ATT provides little guidance as to what information should be included in annual reports to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. As such, a State Party could fulfil Article 13.3 reporting obligations yet submit a report that contains little or no meaningfully transparent information on its arms exports and imports. Such a report would comply with the basic requirements set out in Article 13.3 but would not contribute to fulfilling the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Using the criteria established by the ATT Monitor, this section evaluates whether publicly available annual reports submitted by States Parties include the minimum information needed in order to be meaningfully transparent and achieve the aims and objectives of the ATT.

# IDENTIFYING MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

There has been a consistent decline in the percentage of reports that provide the minimum information needed in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the ATT. Figure 2.5 shows that over the 2015–2019 period, the percentage of States Parties that submitted meaningfully transparent reports fell from 46 per cent to 30 per cent.


Figure 2.6 shows that over the 2015–2019 period there has been a relatively static percentage of publicly available reports that are meaningfully transparent, beginning with 58 per cent for 2015 reports and changing only slightly to 59 per cent for 2019 reports.



The number of publicly available reports that are meaningfully transparent has remained relatively static. However, the percentage of reports due that are meaningfully transparent has decreased.

Decreasing reporting rates, as more States Parties are due to submit reports each year, as well as the increasing rate of confidential reporting, have the most significant impact on transparent reporting. As described in the above section, States Parties that acceded to the Treaty after 2016 have been less likely to submit a report.<sup>23</sup> As fewer States Parties submitted reports, the percentage of reports due that were meaningfully transparent fell.

Notably, the decline in reporting has not been offset by any significant improvement in the quality of reports that are publicly available as defined by the above criteria. When the Treaty was negotiated it was understood that some States Parties might need time to develop the capacity to produce more detailed reports. However, the numbers of meaningfully transparent reports above indicate that capacity among States Parties may also have remained static.




ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

- Twenty-five States Parties have submitted a meaningfully transparent report every year one was due<sup>24</sup> and have consistently demonstrated commitments to transparency
- Twenty-seven States Parties did not submit meaningfully transparent reports in any of the five years.<sup>25</sup> Of these:
  - Twelve States Parties did not make their reports public<sup>26</sup>
  - Nine States Parties did not provide enough disaggregated information on importers and/or exporters<sup>27</sup>
  - Five States Parties did not provide enough disaggregated information on the types of arms exported<sup>28</sup>
  - Four States Parties did not state whether data concerns authorizations or actual transfers<sup>29</sup>
  - Four States Parties provided no export or import data and no corresponding 'nil' report<sup>30</sup>

Notably, some reports were not meaningfully transparent as they did not meet multiple criteria.

Examples of reports that did not meet the above criteria include:

- Norway's 2019 annual report, which states that it had imported an aggregated total of 250 assault rifles and 54 machine guns but provided no information on exporting countries.
- Australia's 2018 annual report, which provided data on importing and exporting countries but aggregated all types of small arms and light weapons, making it impossible to tell whether an export was, for example, of assault rifles or light machine guns (see example below).
- Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2017 annual report, which included the export of 65 mortars of calibres less than 75mm to the United States and Côte d'Ivoire, making it impossible to determine how many went to each importing country. It also did not state whether this concerned authorizations or actual exports.



- 24 Benin, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Uruguay.
- 25 Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Greece, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Nigeria, Republic of North Macedonia, State of Palestine, Sweden and United Kingdom.
- 26 Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, Greece, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria and State of Palestine.
- 27 Australia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius and Monaco.
- 28 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Monaco and Sweden.
- 29 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Ireland and Malta.
- 30 Austria, Burkina Faso, Mali and United Kingdom.

### CHANGES IN COMMITMENTS TO TRANSPARENCY

In the 2015–2019 period, more States Parties submitted reports that became less transparent than States Parties that submitted reports that improved transparency.

Four States Parties (Croatia, Panama, Paraguay and Slovakia) improved the transparency of their reporting and produced meaningfully transparent reports for 2019 after having previously produced a report that was not.<sup>31</sup>

The transparency of reporting worsened for reports submitted by 15 States Parties.<sup>32</sup>After having previously submitted one report or more that was meaningfully transparent from 2015 onwards, by 2019 the following States Parties had stopped doing so:<sup>33</sup>

- Samoa, South Africa and Tuvalu did not submit a report for 2019 even though they had submitted meaningfully transparent reports in one or more previous years.
- Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, the Republic of North Macedonia<sup>34</sup> and Senegal stopped making their reports publicly available.
- El Salvador, Italy,<sup>35</sup> Luxembourg, Norway<sup>36</sup> and the Republic of Moldova stopped showing which country had received how many of the arms reported.
- Argentina and Finland did not properly indicate whether reported transfers were authorized or actually occurred.



- 31 A reporting record is considered to have improved if a State Party produced a 2019 report that was meaningfully transparent after a previous report was not.
- 32 A reporting record is considered to have worsened if a State Party did not report in 2019 or its report was not meaningfully transparent, after submitting one or more reports that were in a previous year.
- 33 Albania, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa and Tuvalu.
- 34 The Republic of North Macedonia also did not disaggregate importers and exporters.
- 35 Italy also did not disaggregate by weapon type.
- 36 Norway also did not indicate whether transfers were authorized or actual transfers in all cases.

# FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE TRANSPARENCY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY

This section looks at States Parties that are in full compliance with Article 13.3 reporting requirements and also submit reports that fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty.


Figure 2.7 shows that the percentage of reports due each year that comply with Article 13.3 reporting requirements and also provide the minimum information needed in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the ATT fell from 34 per cent for 2015 to 21 per cent for 2019.

Figure 2.8 shows that the percentage of publicly available reports that that comply with Article 13.3 reporting requirements and also provide the minimum information needed in order to achieve the aims and objectives has fluctuated but has remained between 40 and 50 per cent in all years.


Only one-fifth of States Parties due to submit a report produced one for 2019 that was on time, was publicly available and contained meaningfully transparent information. In addition to declining reporting rates and increasing confidential reporting, challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic likely affected States Parties' ability to submit reports on time for that year.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:


 Only 12 States Parties submitted a report that fulfilled their legal reporting requirements and commitments to transparency for every year that they were due to report (the Czech Republic, Benin, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland).











# REPORTS WITH A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY


This section evaluates the degree to which States Parties provided information in annual reports that goes beyond the minimum information needed in order to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1.

### **DESCRIPTIONS OF ARMS TRANSFERRED**

Descriptions of the types of arms exports and imports can provide important information on what is being transferred. For example, instead of using only the basic template small arms subcategory of 'Assault Rifles', States Parties can provide additional descriptions of the make/model of these items. In its 2018 annual report, Benin notes that the assault rifles it imported from China were 'AK de 7,62mm modèle 81-1'.

Figure 2.9 shows that the number of reports that include descriptions for one or more transfers rose between 2015 and 2018, and then fell in 2019. However, the percentage of reports due that included descriptions fell consistently, from 52 per cent for 2015 to 35 per cent for 2019. This is mainly due to the overall decline in reporting.

Figure 2.10 shows that there has been a high and rising percentage of publicly available reports that included transfer data (excluding 'nil' reports) and also included descriptions. The percentage rose from 70 per cent for 2015 to 76 per cent for 2019, with a high point of 80 per cent for 2018.



ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

- Fifty-one States Parties included descriptions on some or all transfers in one or more report that they were due to submit.<sup>37</sup>
- Twenty-three States Parties included descriptions for some or all of the transfers in every report that they were due to submit.<sup>38</sup>
- Five especially transparent States Parties (Benin, Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Slovenia) have included descriptions for every transfer in every report that they were due to submit.

### COMMENTS ON THE NATURE OF A TRANSFER


States Parties can also provide comments that describe the nature of and/or the context in which a transfer took place. For example, Jamaica reported an export of assault rifles to Panama in 2018, and in a comment, it described the transfer as being for 'Law Enforcement Exercises'. Such comments can help allay possible concerns about the impact of an arms transfer.

Figure 2.11 shows that the percentage of reports due that included comments has declined. However, as with descriptions, the number of reports has increased slightly, indicating that the decline in percentages is likely due to the increasing number of States Parties that do not make their reports publicly available.

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					⊠	1,515 PIEZAS		ITALIA	ITALIA	PISTOLA SEMIAUTOMÁTICA MARCA BERETTA, CAL. 9 MM	USO MILITAR Y SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA.
evólveres y pistola	as automáticas			35 PIEZAS		ITALIA	ITALIA	PISTOLA SEMIAUTOMÁTICA MARCA CHIAPPA FIREARMS CAL. 0.22"	USO DEPORTIVO Y PROTECCIÓN DE DOMICILIO.		
				1,645 PIEZAS		ITALIA	ITALIA	PISTOLA SEMIAUTOMÁTICA MARCA BERETTA, CAL. 0.380	USO DEPORTIVO Y PROTECCIÓN DE DOMICILIO.		
						AL. 0.22"	ICILIO.				
	49 PIEZAS		E.U.A.	E.U.A.	SEMIAUTOMÁTICA USO DEPORTI Y PROTECCIO		ECCIÓN				
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<sup>37</sup> Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

<sup>38</sup> Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.




An increasing proportion of publicly available reports that contain transfer data (excluding 'nil' reports) also include comments. As shown in Figure 2.12, 46 per cent of these reports included comments on some or all transfers for 2015, and that proportion increased to 58 per cent for 2019.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

- Nine States Parties (Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) have included some comments in every report they were due to submit.
- Two States Parties (Jamaica and Liechtenstein) included comments on every transfer in every report.



NINE STATES PARTIES (GERMANY, HUNGARY, IRELAND, JAMAICA, LIECHTENSTEIN, ROMANIA, SLOVENIA, SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM) HAVE INCLUDED SOME COMMENTS IN EVERY REPORT THEY WERE DUE TO SUBMIT.



# INDICATIONS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO TRANSFERS OF A PARTICULAR ARMS CATEGORY OR SUBCATEGORY

Many States Parties submit reports with blank spaces in the template. This is likely because the State Party did not export or import a specific category or subcategory of arms. However, a blank space is ambiguous, and it is often unclear as to whether no transfers were made, or data has been withheld. To be clearer, some States Parties stated definitively in their report that no transfers were made in each category and/or subcategory of weapon type, often with a 'o', 'nil', '/' or other indication.

Figure 2.13 shows that the percentage of reports due and submitted that state that no transfers of a particular arms category and/or subcategory were made has declined since 2016.



[A] BLANK SPACE IS AMBIGUOUS, AND IT IS OFTEN UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER NO TRANSFERS WERE MADE, OR DATA HAS BEEN WITHHELD.







Figure 2.14 shows that the percentage of publicly available reports containing transfer data that state that there were no transfers of a particular arms category and/or subcategory has also declined since 2016.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

 Twenty-eight States Parties indicated definitively, in at least one report, that there were no transfers of a particular arms category and/or subcategory.<sup>39</sup>  Ten did so in every year they were due to submit a report (Costa Rica, Estonia, France, Ireland, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia and Sweden).

Amendments to the reporting template may encourage more States Parties to definitively report that no transfers of a particular arms category and/or subcategory had occurred.



<sup>39</sup> Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

# WITHHELD COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE OR NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Article 13.3 of the Treaty states that 'Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.' The reporting templates, therefore, provide an opportunity to indicate whether information has been withheld on such grounds. Some States Parties, demonstrating a higher commitment to transparency, indicated where and/or what information had been withheld.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

- Twenty-eight States Parties stated in every report due whether or not information was withheld.<sup>40</sup>
- Twenty-seven States Parties did so unevenly (mainly due to lack of reporting in some years).<sup>41</sup>
- Five States Parties have never indicated in their publicly available reports whether confidential information has been withheld, making it impossible to fully assess the scope of their reports.<sup>42</sup>


Examples of the few States Parties that indicated they had withheld information and specified what information had been withheld, include:

- Australia provided an indication in every report it submitted. In addition, it specified that it did not include the number of missiles and other weapons imported for the Australian defence forces.
- Sweden provided an indication in every report it submitted. In addition, it reported as 'classified' the number of missile, rocket or recoilless gun systems it exported and imported.
- Finland provided an indication in its 2016 annual report and specified that it had not stated the number of antitank missiles it imported.<sup>43</sup>

These States Parties have reduced the uncertainty about what information they withheld, which improved the ability to assess their compliance with the Treaty.



- 40 Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.
- 41 Argentina, Australia, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tuvalu and United Kingdom.
- 42 Austria, Estonia, France, Georgia and Poland.
- 43 In addition, Monaco in its reports for 2017 and 2018 stated that data was not available for its imports of pistols and revolvers or of rifles and carbines.



### ADDITIONAL ARMS CATEGORIES

Some States Parties include in their annual reports information on all conventional arms in their national control list, not just those that appear in ATT reporting templates. This information is often provided under the 'other' subcategories for both small arms and light weapons, a section for 'Voluntary National Categories' of weapons, or in additional national definitions of weapons categories that are used in annual reports.

ATT Monitor analysis shows that over the 2015-2019 period:

- Twenty-four States Parties have used one of these opportunities to report on arms categories covered by Article 2 of the Treaty that are not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (the most common type described is shotguns).<sup>44</sup>
- Fourteen States Parties have used the opportunity to report on arms not covered by Article 2 or 3 (including electro-shock weapons, ammunition, air- or gas-powered guns, and antique firearms).<sup>45</sup> Such arms include electroshock weapons, ammunition, air- or gas-powered guns, and antique firearms.
- Eight States Parties have provided data in additional tables.<sup>46</sup>
- Thirteen States Parties have provided national definitions of categories and/or subcategories of weapons in one or more reports.<sup>47</sup>

### **EXCEPTIONALLY TRANSPARENT STATES PARTIES**

No State Party has consistently used all of the transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. However, eight States Parties (Benin, Germany, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland) have consistently complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information in annual reports that goes beyond the *minimum* information needed in order to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.

'Nil' reports do not provide the same opportunity for States Parties to provide additional information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency as reports that contain transfer information. Nonetheless, States Parties that submit 'nil' reports may still have an equivalent commitment to transparency.

<sup>44</sup> Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden and United Kingdom.

<sup>45</sup> Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Sweden and Switzerland.

<sup>46</sup> Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Senegal and Sweden.

<sup>47</sup> Albania, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

### CONCLUSION

This chapter finds that a number of reporting trends threaten to undermine both transparency in the global arms trade and States Parties' commitments to the object and purpose of the Treaty. Despite a group of States Parties that consistently fulfil Article 13.3 reporting obligations in full, submit reports that contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty, and include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency, this number remains relatively small.

Less than half of States Parties have fulfilled all Article 13.3 reporting requirements in any given year and 28 have not submitted reports in any year they were required to do so. Twenty-seven States Parties did not submit meaningfully transparent reports in any of the five years, and the proportion of meaningfully transparent reports to all reports due fell from 46 per cent to 30 per cent over the 2015–2019 period – due largely to the declining reporting rate and the concerning increase in confidential reporting.



WITHOUT IMPROVED COMPLIANCE
WITH REPORTING OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS TO MEANINGFULLY
TRANSPARENT REPORTING, THE ATT
CANNOT LIVE UP TO ITS ORIGINAL INTENT.

Transparency and reporting are essential to fulfilling the object and purpose of the Treaty. Without improved compliance with reporting obligations and commitments to meaningfully transparent reporting, the ATT cannot live up to its original intent. Identifying challenges to reporting – including the reporting templates themselves, an absence of political will and capacity and a lack of awareness of Treaty obligations and commitments – is a first step to encourage all ATT stakeholders to take action to support States Parties in fully implementing these provisions. Without this assistance, these problematic reporting trends threaten to undermine transparency in the global arms trade.





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### 2.2 - INITIAL REPORTS

### INTRODUCTION

Article 13.1 of the Arms Trade Treaty requires States Parties to 'provide an initial report to the Secretariat of measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures.' Furthermore, the Treaty requires States Parties to report 'on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate.' ATT initial reports should therefore serve as an important component of Treaty implementation and tool to measure and assess how States Parties understand and incorporate the Treaty's provisions into their national control systems.


This chapter offers reflections on five years of ATT initial reporting. It examines trends in reporting compliance and provides a snapshot of progress made towards Treaty implementation based on publicly available information as provided by States Parties in their initial reports. The chapter concludes with enduring challenges to ATT reporting and considerations of how these impact Treaty implementation.

### ATT INITIAL REPORTING AT A GLANCE

As of 7 June 2021, 105 States Parties were required to have submitted an initial report on their efforts to implement the Treaty to the ATT Secretariat. Of these, 81 have submitted their initial reports, reflecting a compliance rate of approximately 77 per cent. While the number of submitted reports has increased each year since 2016, the overall compliance rate for ATT initial reporting has remained relatively constant, as demonstrated in Figure 2.1, which provides a snapshot of initial reporting compliance by year, with the annual timeframes determined by the publication schedules of ATT Monitor Annual Reports.

The steady compliance rate raises several concerns about reporting and transparency norms, as well as about the ability to conduct objective assessments of Treaty implementation.

Although States Parties are obligated to submit an initial report on their efforts to implement the ATT, many continue to experience difficulties in meeting this requirement. As of 7 June 2021, 24 States Parties had not submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat – approximately 23 per cent of States Parties required to report.



There are regional trends in these missing reports. Of the 24 States Parties that have yet to submit their initial reports, 13 are from Africa, nine are from the Americas, one is from Asia and one is from Europe. Furthermore, nine of these are among the least developed countries, according to UN figures, and nine are small island developing states.



[I]T REMAINS IMPORTANT FOR ATT STAKEHOLDERS TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE WITH AND INVESTIGATE OBSTACLES TO ATT REPORTING IN ORDER TO SUPPORT STATES PARTIES IN MEETING THEIR TREATY REQUIREMENTS...

Table 2.1: Initial report submissions by region (as of 7 June 2021)

Region	Number of States Parties Due to Report	Number of States Parties that Have Reported	Regional Reporting Rates
Africa	26	13	50%
Americas	27	18	67%
Asia	8	7	88%
Europe	39	38	97%
Oceania	5	5	100%

Many of these 24 States Parties have been delinquent in completing their initial reports for several years, with the majority of these having missed the due date by more than three years. This record of non-reporting may indicate larger challenges concerning available resources and/or capacity constraints that may limit States Parties' ability to complete their initial reports, as well as potential uncertainties regarding Treaty reporting requirements and deadlines. It also likely reflects a lack of political will for and prioritization of meeting Treaty obligations.

Some regional trends may also reflect where additional outreach on reporting, such as workshops or individual country trainings, has been done or is absent. Therefore, it remains important for ATT stakeholders to continue to engage with and investigate obstacles to ATT reporting in order to support States Parties in meeting their Treaty requirements, as well as to better understand implementation and non-compliance.

Table 2.2: Reporting delinquency timelines


	6 months–1 year late	1–2 years late	3+ years late
Number of States Parties	26	13	50%

While the Treaty requires States Parties to report on updates made to their national transfer control systems, there is still no formal or standardized way for them to update their initial reports to reflect changes to their national implementation measures.

Only five States Parties have provided information on 'any new measures undertaken in order to implement' the ATT, as required under Article 13.1 of the Treaty (Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden). They each provided updates in different ways, underscoring the lack of standardization and challenges with identifying new elements in updated reports.


One of the most concerning trends in reporting over the first five years is the increasing rate of private reporting. Private reports, which can only be viewed by other States Parties, limits public understanding, analysis, insights and identification of trends regarding States Parties' interpretation and implementation of the Treaty's provisions. Private reporting also impedes the ability to identify implementation gaps, needs and potential assistance.

Of the 81 submitted initial reports to date, 17 are private, representing approximately 21 per cent of all submitted ATT initial reports. Private reports continue to represent an increasing share of overall initial reports, as shown in Figure 2.3. As noted in last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report, two of the 47 initial reports submitted by May 2016 were private, representing 4 per cent of all submitted reports. The percentage of private reports has increased every year since.



Of the 17 States Parties that elected to make their initial reports private, seven are in Africa, three are in the Americas, four are in Asia, two are in Europe and one is in Oceania. Of these:

- Seven of the 13 States Parties in Africa that submitted initial reports did so privately, representing nearly 54 per cent of the regional total of submitted reports.
- Three of 18 States Parties in the Americas that submitted initial reports did so privately, representing approximately 17 per cent of the regional total of submitted reports.
- Four of seven States Parties in Asia that submitted initial reports did so privately, representing 57 per cent of the regional total of submitted reports.
- Two of 28 States Parties in Europe that submitted initial reports did so privately, representing five per cent of the regional total of submitted reports.
- One of five States Parties in Oceania that submitted initial reports did so privately, representing 20 per cent of the regional total of submitted reports.



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### INSIGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION

Sixty-four States Parties have provided publicly available initial reports to the ATT Secretariat. Initial reports offer an overview of key elements of States Parties' national transfer control systems and provide important insights into national interpretations of Treaty provisions. However, because the reporting templates give States Parties the option of simply responding yes or no to questions regarding several aspects of Treaty implementation, it is often difficult to get a complete picture of what Treaty implementation looks like...

### NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM

Article 5.2 of the ATT obligates States Parties to 'establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list.' Of the 64 States Parties that have submitted public initial reports, 52 indicated that their national control system includes a national control list. The Treaty also obliges States Parties to have national systems to control exports of conventional arms, ammunition, and parts and components, as well as to regulate the import, transit and brokering of conventional arms.

According to publicly available reports, 54 States Parties indicated that their national system maintains controls for exports, 60 indicated their system contains import controls,

58 indicated their national control system covers transit/transshipment, and at least 49 States Parties indicated that their national system regulates brokering. Five States Parties (the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova and Zambia) noted that they were drafting, reviewing and/or updating their national systems/legislation to include controls for brokering, though the status of those efforts is unclear based on available reporting.

### **PROHIBITIONS**

Article 6 of the ATT prohibits arms transfers in three specific circumstances. Of the 64 States Parties that submitted publicly available initial reports, 56 – or approximately 88 per cent – indicated that they prohibit arms transfers in all circumstances detailed in Article 6.1

For example, Bulgaria noted that its national control system prohibits arms transfers in all circumstances detailed in the Treaty text. It elaborated further by stating: 'The Council of Ministers adopts Decree about the List of States and Organizations against which the Republic of Bulgaria Imposes a Prohibition or Restrictions on the Sale and Deliveries of Arms and their Related Equipment, in Compliance with Resolution of UNSC and Decisions of EU and the OSCE (regularly updated).'



The Treaty prohibits arms transfers if they (1) would violate a State Party's obligations under measures adopted by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in particular arms embargoes; (2) would violate a State Party's relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a party, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms; and (3) if the State Party has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks against civilian objects or civilians protected as such or other war crimes.

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### **EXPORTS**

The ATT initial reporting template features several questions related to arms exports. Information provided in initial reports can help improve the understanding of how national export-control systems work in practice. For example, 53 out of 64 publicly reporting States Parties revealed in their initial reports that they have measures in place to ensure authorizations are detailed and issued prior to exports. Forty-nine States Parties reported they have systems in place through which they can reassess export authorizations if they become aware of new and relevant information.

For example, Zambia reported that its national authorities can reassess export permit applications for firearms but also that this procedure is not codified in its relevant legislation. Therefore, Zambia indicated that its 'new legislation to implement the ATT will explicitly include provisions that permit reassessment of export permit applications.' Sweden, by comparison, indicated that it maintains the authority to revoke an export license permanently or for a specific period of time.

### **DIVERSION**

Several articles within the ATT underscore the importance of preventing and mitigating the risk of diversion. The ATT initial report template offers States Parties an opportunity to report on their counter-diversion efforts. Sixty – or approximately 94 per cent – of States Parties that reported publicly indicated they have measures in place to prevent diversion, while 51 indicated that their national control systems include measures to be taken when diversion is detected.

Examples of measures that States Parties indicated they have in place to prevent diversion include examining parties involved in a transfer, requiring end-use and/or end-user documentation, and checking destinations against watch and/or entity of concern lists. And examples of measures that States Parties indicated they have in place to be taken when a diversion is detected include alerting other potentially affected States Parties, using international tracing mechanisms to identify points of diversion – such as the International Tracing Instrument.



WHILE THE MAJORITY OF REPORTING STATES PARTIES DO NOT ELABORATE IN THEIR INITIAL REPORTS ON SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT MEASURES, SOME (FOR EXAMPLE, CANADA, ESTONIA AND THE NETHERLANDS) PROVIDED LINKS TO THEIR RELEVANT LAWS THAT SUPPORT NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE ATT. OTHER STATES PARTIES (FOR EXAMPLE, GERMANY, ICELAND, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND SWITZERLAND) OFFERED INSIGHTS ON THE TYPES OF PUNISHMENTS THAT CAN BE INCURRED (FOR EXAMPLE, FINES, IMPRISONMENT) FOR VIOLATIONS OF THEIR NATIONAL ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS.

### **ENFORCEMENT**

Of the 64 States Parties that made their initial reports publicly available, 56 – or approximately 88 per cent – indicated that they have measures in place to enforce national laws and regulations as they pertain to ATT implementation.

While the majority of reporting States Parties do not elaborate in their initial reports on specific enforcement measures, some (for example, Canada, Estonia and the Netherlands) provided links to their relevant laws that support national enforcement of the ATT. Other States Parties (for example, Germany, Iceland, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland) offered insights on the types of punishments that can be incurred (for example, fines, imprisonment) for violations of their national arms transfer controls.

Fifty-three publicly reporting States Parties – or approximately 83 per cent – indicated that their national legislation allows for the provision of joint assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in the event that relevant laws and regulations are violated.

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# THE CHALLENGES OF THE INITIAL REPORT TEMPLATES

With initial reporting compliance relatively stable at 77 per cent, nearly a quarter of States Parties continue to experience difficulties meeting their ATT reporting requirements. The ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) retains as one of its priority issues the need to improve reporting compliance. In 2015, the WGTR developed provisional initial and annual reporting templates to encourage consistent reporting and support assessments of Treaty implementation through standardized information collection. However, both reporting templates have presented challenges to clear and comprehensive reporting. As detailed in the Stimson Center's report, 'The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations', the reporting templates present challenges across three broad categories: the language and statements used, the format of certain questions and omitted content.<sup>2</sup>

Specifically, the initial reporting template has a complicated structure and contains several questions that lack specificity or depth to allow States Parties to elaborate on specific measures and practices they have in place to implement the ATT.

In some cases, a tick box in the initial report template is the only means through which States Parties can indicate whether their national control system includes implementation measures, with no way to describe the ways in which that system works. Moreover, the template confusingly separates voluntary and mandatory Treaty obligations (listed as 'binding' and 'non-binding' obligations) in two separate sections of the reporting template. Although the Treaty itself does not include different statuses for measures to implement the Treaty, the distinction in the reporting template has confused States Parties as to what information they must and should provide in their initial reports.³ Furthermore, and as noted elsewhere, the template does not yet offer an easy and intuitive way for States Parties to update (or indicate updates to) their initial reports when their national measures change.

These challenges can compound other complications that States Parties experience in meeting their ATT initial reporting requirements. Therefore, it will remain important to monitor progress towards revising the reporting templates and to continue engaging States Parties on good reporting practices for informative understandings of Treaty implementation.

<sup>2</sup> Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) (2020). 'The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations'. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Reporting-Templates-Challenges-and-Recommendations\_Web-Version.pdf.

<sup>3</sup> For more information, see Ibid.

### CONCLUSION

Initial reports are a required and necessary element of the ATT. However, over the first five years of the Treaty, States Parties' reporting compliance is not living up to the promise or requirements of the ATT.

Twenty-four States Parties remain non-compliant with their initial reporting obligation and an increasing share of States Parties have elected to make their initial reports private. Numerous challenges in ATT initial reporting prevent gaining a complete picture of ATT implementation. These challenges are due in part to the reporting templates – how questions are phrased and organized – as well as to the absence of political will and capacity in completing initial reports, a lack of urgency for States Parties to complete their initial reports on time and an increasing number of private reports.

As a result, initial reports are not providing the insights required to effectively monitor ATT implementation. The ability to identify global progress and good practice is therefore limited. In many cases, it is not possible to discern whether the Treaty is being effectively implemented or to match gaps and needs with assistance and resources.

Transparency is a central part of the ATT's object and purpose. If States Parties do not comply with their Treaty obligations, it is impossible to identify good practice, lessons learned and improved national practice to ensure that arms transfers do not contribute to human suffering. It is also not possible to measure whether the ATT is having the desired effect in more effectively regulating global arms transfers to prevent human suffering. ATT initial reports are not simply an afterthought of the Treaty – they are a key metric in identifying its effectiveness. Without universal compliance with the reporting requirements and increased public reporting, the ATT cannot live up to its original intent.





# CHAPTER 3: ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS – ASSESSING 2019 ANNUAL REPORTS

### 3.1 - ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS

### INTRODUCTION

Transparency is a vital component of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and fundamental to achieving its goals and objectives. ATT annual reports facilitate confidence building, responsibility and cooperation by allowing States Parties and other stakeholders to be certain that Treaty commitments have been fulfilled. Information contained in annual reports can also help to inform licensing decisions and may be used to identify diversion. Accurate, comprehensive and timely reporting is a prerequisite for transparency, and Article 13 includes the obligation for all States Parties to submit an annual report on their authorized or actual arms exports and imports by 31 May each year.<sup>1</sup>

An analysis of 2019 ATT annual reports shows a downward trend in compliance with Article 13 reporting obligations, as well as an increase in the rate at which reports are kept private. This trend in private reporting is concerning as private reports create a challenge for identifying global arms exports and imports, prevent a public accounting of arm sales and impede the identification of particularly troubling transfers or potentially dangerous arms accumulations.

The on-time completion rate for 2019 ATT annual reports was the lowest of any year and challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic may have affected some States Parties' ability to submit reports. The public-health crisis forced many governments to change their work patterns to focus on more immediate priorities and to accommodate a virtual environment. Government officials may have had limited capacities or limited access to the information necessary to complete the reports.

The ATT Monitor downloaded all ATT annual reports for analysis by 1 February.² Many States Parties have submitted 2019 reports after this date, and in some cases reports from previous years, likely as states continued to address COVID-19 challenges.³ While these late reports are not part of the analysis below, the ATT Monitor takes stock of these late submissions in its review of five years of ATT annual reporting data in Chapter 2.1. Because annual reporting is an obligation in Article 13.3, there is still work to be done to support full compliance of these obligations by all States Parties now and in the future.

### **QUANTITY OF REPORTS**

### REPORTING COMPLIANCE

Ninety-seven States Parties were required to submit their 2019 annual report on arms exports and imports within one week of 31 May 2020.4 Fifty-six States Parties submitted reports detailing arms transfers made in 2019 by 1 February 2021.<sup>5</sup> Of these, one State Party (the Maldives) submitted a 2019 annual report even though its first report was not due until 31 May 2021. In the analysis below, States Parties that submitted reports but were not yet obliged to do so were not included in the determination of compliance rates in order to reflect accurately on compliance with reporting obligations.

Of the 97 States Parties due to submit 2019 annual reports, 55 (57 per cent) did so, and 42 (43 per cent) did not. The total number of reports due and submitted, as well as the overall reporting compliance rate, was lower for 2019 reports than for the previous year. Ninety-two States Parties were required to submit 2018 annual reports, and of these, only 61 States Parties (66 per cent) submitted a report by 1 February 2020.

- 1 See Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). UNTS\_(ATT) Art 13(3).
- 2 The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February each year as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in this report to ensure adequate time for in-depth analysis.
- 3 The States Parties that submitted a report for 2019 after 1 February 2021 are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia and the Republic of North Macedonia. These reports are not considered in the remainder of this section.
- 4 ATT annual reports are due by 31 May each year, reflecting arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year. However, States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.
- Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

The reporting rates over time, including rates of public reporting, are summarized in Table 3.1.

Notably, five States Parties that had submitted a report every year from 2015-2018 did not submit a 2019 report by the ATT Monitor cut-off date for analysis. As noted above, the decline in reporting for 2019 annual reports is likely due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Compliance rates, as well as private reporting rates, will be different if accounting for reports submitted after the ATT Monitor cut-off date for analysis.



Table 3.1 - Annual Reports submitted by 1 February each year by number and percentage of reports due

	20	19	2018		2017		2016		2015		
Number of reports due	9	7	g	92		89		75		61	
Reports due and submitted <sup>7</sup>	55	57%	61	66%	58	65%	53	71%	49	80%	
Reports not submitted	42	43%	31	34%	31	35%	22	29%	12	20%	
Reports made public	45	46%	51	55%	54	61%	50	67%	48	79%	
Reports kept private	10	10%	10	11%	4	4%	3	4%	1	2%	



<sup>6</sup> Bulgaria, Costa Rica and the Republic of North Macedonia submitted reports after 1 February 2021. These reports are not considered in the remainder of this section

<sup>7</sup> Numbers of reports submitted do not include reports for any year that were submitted after 1 February 2021.

### LATE REPORTS

Only 34 States Parties (62 per cent) submitted 2019 annual reports within one week of the 31 May deadline.8 Twentyone States Parties, or 38 per cent of all reports submitted, reported late.9

The rate of late reporting was higher for 2019 annual reports than for the previous reporting year, likely as a result of challenges presented by COVID-19. For 2018 annual reports, 44 States Parties (72 per cent) submitted reports within one week of the reporting deadline, and 17 (28 per cent) submitted late reports. There were four more late reports than in the previous year, and 11 States Parties submitted late reports for 2019 despite having submitted on-time reports for the previous year.<sup>10</sup>


### PUBLIC OR PRIVATE REPORTING


An increased percentage of States Parties each year are keeping their annual reports private, continuing a worrying trend towards private reporting.

Only 45 of reports due were submitted by the ATT Monitor cut-off date for analysis and made publicly available. Ten States Parties kept their reports private. Though the number of reports kept private remained the same for 2019 and 2018 reports, the rate of private reporting among submitted reports increased to 18 per cent in 2019 from 16 per cent in 2018.



THOUGH THE NUMBER OF REPORTS KEPT PRIVATE REMAINED THE SAME FOR 2019 AND 2018 REPORTS, THE RATE OF PRIVATE REPORTING AMONG SUBMITTED REPORTS INCREASED TO 18 PER CENT IN 2019 FROM 16 PER CENT IN 2018.





<sup>8</sup> Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

<sup>9</sup> This number may actually be greater, as States Parties submitted reports after 1 February ATT Monitor cut-off date for analysis. The late reporters prior to this date are: Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, El Salvador, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Cyprus, Greece, Kazakhstan, Malta, Senegal, Serbia and United Kingdom.

<sup>10</sup> Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Serbia and United Kingdom.

<sup>11</sup> Albania, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Senegal and State of Palestine.

Article 13.3 of the Treaty obliges States Parties to report each year on imports and exports from the preceding calendar year. <sup>12</sup> Including information in their annual reports on both imports and exports is necessary for States Parties to fulfil their ATT annual reporting obligations.

As highlighted in previous editions of the ATT Monitor Annual Report, 3 some States Parties have included little or no information on their imports when completing ATT annual reports, nor have they submitted 'nil' reports that indicate no transfers were made in the previous year. However, analysis of exports reported by other States Parties suggests that some states did import arms but, for one reason or another, did not submit import data in their reports.

In 2019 annual reports, two States Parties (Austria and the United Kingdom) again did not provide information on imports, nor did they submit a 'nil' report. However, other States Parties reported exports to the United Kingdom.

Providing information on imports, as well as exports, is crucial for States Parties to demonstrate consistency between arms-trade policies and ATT obligations. For example, control and monitoring of imports is a key part of a State Party's arms-transfer control system, and reporting on imports can be a vital component of efforts to identify diversion and other weaknesses in national control systems.

### **DIVING DEEPER INTO REPORTING RATES**

Other reporting trends may help determine why States Parties do or do not submit reports and may also help ATT stakeholders identify States' needs for assistance in fulfilling reporting obligations. A number of trends – including regional reporting rates, history of ATT participation and status as large exporters/importers – are explored below.

It is likely that a number of States Parties are not fulfilling their reporting obligations because they lack the capacity to do so. The factors described in the remainder of this section can be used to inform decisions and identify possible recipients of international assistance to be provided under Article 16, or to tailor assistance to the needs of different kinds of States Parties. For example, States Parties that import or export small quantities of conventional arms each year may well have different bureaucratic requirements for reporting than those with large industries that produce arms for export.

While insufficient resources and/or capacity constraints may contribute to low reporting rates, it is also likely that lack of political will and prioritization of reporting obligations are also the cause of decreasing commitments to transparency among States Parties.

### REGIONAL REPORTING DISPARITIES

Table 3.2 shows differences in regional compliance with ATT reporting obligations for 2019 annual reports.

All States Parties in Asia submitted 2019 annual reports, as did the great majority of States Parties in Europe and half of those in Oceania. Only a minority of States Parties from Africa or Latin America and the Caribbean did so.

Table 3.2 – 2019 Annual reporting numbers and percentages by region

	Africa		Asia		Europe		Americas		Oceania		
Number of States Parties due to report	23		(	6		39		25		4	
Reporting States Parties	4	17%	6	100%	34	87%	10	40%	2	50%	
Non-reporting States Parties	19	83%	0	0%	5	13%	15	60%	2	50%	

<sup>12</sup> See Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). UNTS\_(ATT) Art 13(3).

<sup>13</sup> For an in-depth look at the importance of reporting imports and challenges associated with missing import data, see Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'ATT Monitor 2020', 26 August 2020, https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/EN\_ATT\_2020\_Chapter\_2-1.pdf, pp. 40–45.

### ATT PARTICIPATION

Ongoing analysis of ATT annual reports shows States Parties that acceded to the Treaty after it came into force are less likely to be compliant with reporting obligations and to submit ATT annual reports. This trend continued with 2019 reports.

Of the 55 reports due and submitted, 42 (75 per cent) were submitted by States Parties who were among the first to ratify the Treaty, 14 most of which had the capacity and systems in place to complete and submit reports prior to the Treaty's entry into force. 15

Of the 42 States Parties that did not submit a 2019 annual report, only 19 (41 per cent) were among the group of states to first ratify the Treaty.

### LARGE EXPORTERS/IMPORTERS

A State Party's status as a large exporter/importer may also correlate with its ability to complete and submit ATT annual reports. Among the States Parties that submitted 2019 reports, 24 were among the top 50 arms exporters, 16 as designated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 17 Among the States Parties that did not submit a 2019 report, only three were among the top 50 arms exporters (Brazil, Bulgaria and South Africa).

Similar reporting rates can be found among States Parties that are large arms importers. Among States Parties that submitted 2019 reports, 13 were among the top 50 arms importers, 18 while only one State Party that did not submit a 2019 report was among the top 50 arms importers. 19

The higher occurrence of large arms exporters/importers among reporting States Parties may have two explanations. First, such States Parties are likely to need sophisticated systems to monitor arms transfers and so they may already possess the required capacity. Second, arms-trade issues may have a much higher domestic political profile for these States Parties, so they may experience more domestic calls for transparency from parliamentarians, civil society and other constituencies.

It is also notable that 20 of the top 24 arms exporters and eight of the top arms importers that submitted 2019 reports are States Parties in Europe. The salience of arms exports as a political and economic issue in Europe has led to EU coordination, including on reporting. As such, EU member states already had a long history of reporting before joining the ATT.



ONGOING ANALYSIS OF ATT ANNUAL REPORTS SHOWS STATES PARTIES THAT ACCEDED TO THE TREATY AFTER IT CAME INTO FORCE ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE COMPLIANT WITH REPORTING OBLIGATIONS AND TO SUBMIT ATT ANNUAL REPORTS. THIS TREND CONTINUED WITH 2019 REPORTS.

<sup>14</sup> Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

<sup>15</sup> States Parties could also report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, via regional reporting mechanisms or produce national reports. See Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/EN\_ATT\_Monitor-Report-2019\_Online.pdf, p. 38.

<sup>16</sup> Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

<sup>17</sup> SIPRI estimates the value of a state's arms exports and imports, and ranks countries based on these. Data was downloaded from https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

<sup>18</sup> Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain and United Kingdom.

<sup>19</sup> The one State Party in this example is South Africa, which submitted a report in previous years.

### QUALITY OF REPORTING

The quality of information in ATT annual reports can either contribute to or undermine States Parties' efforts to fulfil transparency and confidence-building objectives as described in the Treaty's object and purpose.

To demonstrate commitments to transparency, and to provide the minimum necessary information needed in order to meaningfully assess a State Party's arms transfers, a publicly available report must, for each transfer:

- Specify weapon type
- Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type
- Clearly name the final exporting/importing country
- Identify whether the data concerns an authorized or an actual transfer

Of the 97 States Parties that had an obligation to submit a 2019 annual report, 28 (29 per cent) submitted one that met these four criteria. This represents only 51 per cent of all reports submitted. Despite the increase in the number of States Parties, six fewer reports in 2019 met all four criteria compared to the previous year.



AGGREGATION OF DATA PROVIDED IN ATT ANNUAL REPORTS REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT WAYS IN WHICH PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS DO NOT MEET THE MINIMUM STANDARD FOR INFORMATION THAT CONTRIBUTES POSITIVELY TO ATT OBJECTIVES CONCERNING TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

### AGGREGATION OF DATA

Aggregation of data provided in ATT annual reports remains one of the most significant ways in which publicly available reports do not meet the minimum standard for information that contributes positively to ATT objectives concerning transparency and confidence building.

Information aggregated by weapon type and/or exporting/importing countries makes it difficult or impossible to discern the quantity or type of weapons that were transferred to or from a particular state. Therefore, excessively aggregated data makes it difficult or impossible to determine if a State Party is abiding by its Treaty obligations.

Excessive aggregation was used in 14 of the 45 reports (31 per cent) that were submitted and made publicly available and contained transfer data ('nil' reports were excluded from this analysis), which means nearly one-third of submitted reports contain aggregation that hinders assessment of what transfers actually occurred.

For example, in their 2019 ATT annual reports:

- Ireland reported exports of 217 'Shotguns' and 'Airguns' to a total of nine countries, making it impossible to know the quantities and weapon types that were transferred to each destination country.
- Australia provided the total number of small arms exported to each destination country, but it provided aggregated information on weapon type, making it impossible to know whether it exported pistols or machine guns.

Ten States Parties aggregated importer/exporter information, making it unclear which country sent or received the transferred weapons.<sup>21</sup> A further six aggregated weapon types.<sup>22</sup> Two States Parties (Italy and Monaco) used both forms of aggregation.

### **GOOD PRACTICE**

ATT annual reports may include information that goes beyond the minimum criteria outlined above. The ATT annual reporting template, the online reporting tool and other formats provide space for descriptions of items exported and imported (for example, make and/or model of conventional arms) that have been, as well as additional comments on the context of the transfer (for example, end-use and/or end-user information).

<sup>20</sup> Argentina, Benin, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Uruguay.

<sup>21</sup> Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway and Republic of Moldova.

<sup>22</sup> Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Monaco and Sweden.

#### TEXT BOX - AGGREGATION OF DATA AND NATIONAL PRACTICE

In a presentation during the intersessional meetings of the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) in April 2021, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) provided a cursory look at national-level challenges that may be contributing to increased aggregation of information in ATT annual reports.<sup>23</sup>

Specifically, officials tasked with preparing reports may lack access to comprehensive data on the type, volume or importer/exporter for each reported transfer. They may also not have the means to verify and validate information internally. Lack of capacity in this regard may be a symptom

of inadequate record-keeping procedures and of difficulties in coordinating separate branches of government that may be involved in authorizing arms exports and imports (such as ministries of foreign affairs or defence, police services and customs services).<sup>24</sup>

State Parties wishing to provide international assistance to improve reporting could focus upon improving capacity in these areas. For example, States Parties could share national practices on desensitizing and declassifying disaggregated information, as well as useful national procedures, databases and tools for data disaggregation.<sup>25</sup>

Of the 55 annual reports that were due and submitted, 33 (60 per cent) provided descriptions of items exported and/or imported. Sixteen included descriptions of items in every reported transfer<sup>26</sup> and 17 included descriptions of items in some transfers.<sup>27</sup> This total represents five fewer reports that contained descriptions than in the previous year.

Twenty-five (45 per cent) due and submitted reports included comments on the context of reported exports and/or imports. Of these, four States Parties included comments on all reported transfers<sup>28</sup> and 21 included comments on some reported transfers.<sup>29</sup> This total represents one fewer report that contains comments than in the previous year.

# MOVING FORWARD AND ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO REPORTING

Analysis of 2019 ATT annual reports shows a downward trend in compliance with Article 13 reporting obligations, as well as an increase in the rate at which reports are made private. The ontime completion rate for 2019 ATT annual reports was the lowest of any year and challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic have likely affected some States Parties' ability to submit reports.

Nonetheless, commitments to transparency as demonstrated by timely, comprehensive and publicly available reporting appear to have decreased with this round of reporting. In particular, the trend in private reporting is concerning as private reports create a challenge for identifying global arms exports and imports.

This chapter identifies a number of possible barriers for States Parties in submitting comprehensive and publicly available annual reports, including those concerning capacity, national systems and political will. The annual reporting template itself also remains a barrier to transparency in reporting. Amendments to address some of these challenges and clarify information to better support reporting efforts have been the primary focus of the WGTR in its work during the CSP6 and CSP7 cycles. The WGTR continues its work towards improving reporting efforts and increasing the quantity and quality of ATT annual reports submitted by States Parties, including amendments to the reporting template and numerous initiatives to encourage the sharing of good practice and potential solutions to identified reporting challenges.

24 Ibid

25 Ibid

<sup>23</sup> See UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (2021). 'Setting the Scene: Aggregation of Data in Annual Reports'. April 2021. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/UNIDIR\_WGTR\_Reporting\_v290421%20(final)/UNIDIR\_WGTR\_Reporting\_v290421%20(final).pdf.

<sup>26</sup> Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia and Uruguay.

<sup>27</sup> Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

<sup>28</sup> Argentina, Jamaica, Liechtenstein and Mexico.

<sup>29</sup> Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and United Kingdom.



#### 3.2 - COUNTRY PROFILES

This section examines the annual reports submitted by States Parties to the ATT covering their exports and imports of conventional arms in 2019. It presents analysis of the reporting and transfer practices of each reporting State Party in the form of country profiles. By disaggregating its analysis by country, the ATT Monitor intends to provide easily comparable and nationally relevant findings to help inform future practice.

Ninety-seven States Parties were due to submit an annual report for 2019 to the ATT Secretariat by 31 May 2020. As of 1 February 2021, 56 had done so, for which 45 made theirs publicly available. These reports form the basis of the analysis presented here.

Annual reports are one of the key tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. They help to build confidence between countries and enable States Parties to demonstrate that their arms-trade policies are consistent with their obligations and commitments in the ATT. In order for annual reports to fulfil this pivotal role, it is necessary that States Parties complete them in a timely, comprehensive, accurate and public manner.

The ATT Monitor continuously builds on the findings of assessments of each round of annual reporting. The analysis here seeks to supplement and build on the baseline analysis completed by the ATT Monitor in previous reports, which included an assessment of reporting practices, identification of a baseline of trends, examples of good national practices, and interpretive and practical challenges that were common among States Parties.



IN ORDER FOR ANNUAL REPORTS TO FULFIL THIS PIVOTAL ROLE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT STATES PARTIES COMPLETE THEM IN A TIMELY, COMPREHENSIVE, ACCURATE AND PUBLIC MANNER.

#### **METHODOLOGY**

All annual reports were downloaded for analysis by 1 February 2021.<sup>3</sup> Any reports submitted subsequently or later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. Each profile takes stock of States Parties' compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations for each year a report was due and indicates whether reports were made publicly available.

Where applicable, State Parties' reports for 2019 were compared to those for 2018 so as to consider the extent to which national reporting practices changed following last year's round of annual reporting under the ATT. Reporting practices were assessed for each State Party according to key criteria identified in previous ATT Monitor reports. These criteria are:

- Submitting a report as per each State Party's legal obligation under Article 13.3
- Submitting a report on time (within one week of the 31 May 2020 reporting deadline)
- Making a report publicly available (including not withholding data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security)
- Completing accurate and non-contradictory information
- Providing data that is clearly disaggregated by weapon type and country<sup>4</sup>
- Providing information that goes beyond the minimum requirements specified in Article 13.3 (for example, reporting on exports/imports of ammunition, voluntary national categories, etc.)

Overall, each State Party is considered on the extent to which its annual report contributes to or undermines the objective of increased transparency in the global arms trade. The analysis is not intended to highlight technical errors or as a 'name and shame' exercise, but to present comparable information that is country-specific in order to inform policymakers and civil society in each State Party, and to help support and build knowledge and capacity among officials responsible for completing ATT annual reports.

- 1 States Parties are granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period beyond the 31 May deadline set out in Article 13 to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.
- 2 This number includes the annual report submitted by the Maldives, which was not yet due to submit.
- 3 The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February each year as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in this report to ensure adequate time for in-depth analysis.
- 4 In order to be classified here as having provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import, a State Party must clarify if it was reporting an authorized or actual import or export (or both), provide a number or value for each item and name clearly the final exporting/importing country.

The ATT Monitor considers reports to be on time if they are received by the ATT Secretariat within one week of the 31 May reporting deadline. Some States Parties have indicated that the date of submission for their 2019 annual reports was before the reporting deadline, although the reports were made available after the reported date of submission. The reasons for the gaps between the stated and actual dates of submission have not been verified with States Parties.

The submission of 2018 annual reports marked the first time States Parties had the option of doing so using the new online reporting tool on the ATT Secretariat website. The ATT Monitor has since noted in country profiles how States Parties choose to submit reports as well as any discrepancies between information provided using the online tool and the ATT reporting template (in the case that States Parties submitted using both methods).

When States Parties included values of transfers in their reports, transfer summaries include a monetary value of their imports or exports. All values have been converted to US dollars using the OECD data annual conversion rate for each currency for the 2019 calendar year, unless otherwise indicated. In some cases, the type of currency used by States Parties to report values was not specified. Each case is noted in relevant profiles.

In some instances, States Parties used country codes to indicate final exporting and importing countries. The ATT Monitor determined which countries such codes referenced using online sources, though it did not verify with each State Party whether or not such determinations are accurate.

In addition to assessing reporting practices, each country profile includes key baseline data relating to the exports and imports described by States Parties in their annual reports. This data includes:

- Total number of export/import partners and their Treaty status (as of 1 February 2021)<sup>5</sup>
- The number and categories of major conventional weapon items reported, if available<sup>6</sup>
- The number and sub-categories of small arms and light weapons (SALW) reported<sup>7</sup>
- The principal trade relationships reported by the State Party<sup>8</sup>

Each profile also takes stock of States Parties' reporting practice over the last five years by indicating whether an ATT annual report was submitted (\$\mathcal{X}\$) or not submitted (\$\mathcal{X}\$), for reporting years in which reports were due (only years in which reports were due to be submitted are listed in each profile). Annual reports submitted before a State Party's first report was due are noted as well (\*). Each profile also indicates whether reports were made publicly available (\$\mathcal{X}\$) or kept private (\$\mathcal{X}\$) for each year a report was submitted.

This section looks solely at transfer data as reported by each State Party in its ATT annual report. It does not compare the data with other relevant reporting mechanisms or findings by independent experts, media sources, national reports to parliamentary authorities, or think tanks such as the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).9 Integrating information from such external sources would likely paint a different picture of the global arms trade, particularly in respect of the percentage of trade between countries. In order for the analysis conducted by the ATT Monitor and others to be as accurate as possible, it is critical that States Parties submit clear and comprehensive annual reports and that they consider the fulfilment of their reporting obligations as an opportunity to support the ATT's goal of greater transparency in the global arms trade. States Parties or other ATT stakeholders may reach out to the ATT Monitor to help clarify any information presented in the profiles below.

<sup>5</sup> Where applicable, analysis includes the names of non-ATT members and non-UN members to make clear trade relationships that extend beyond the ATT.

<sup>6</sup> Categories of major conventional weapons include: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.


<sup>7</sup> Sub-categories of small arms include: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns and others. Sub-categories of light weapons include: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, mortars of calibres less than 75mm and others.

<sup>8</sup> Principal trade relationships are determined by totalling either the number or value of transferred items reported by each State Party, depending on which is used in each report. Where States Parties provided both a number and value for transferred items, the ATT Monitor makes clear which was used in determining principal trade relationships.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, SIPRI (2021). 'Arms Transfers Database'. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

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## **ALBANIA**



## **ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA**



## **ARGENTINA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Argentina's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Argentina continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports. It did not report major conventional weapons or light weapons exports.

Argentina continued to report **Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports but did not specify if they were authorized or actual transfers, as it did in its 2018 report. It reported **Actual Numbers** of most of its small arms imports but did not specify if the numbers represented authorized or actual transfers in a few instances. It did not report imports of light weapons.



Argentina provided descriptions of most exports and imports, as well as comments on some imports describing the nature of its transfers.

Argentina reported imports under the small arms 'others' subcategory and clarified in descriptions that it reported shotguns.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Argentina excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Argentina did not specify the exporting state in some of its reported imports.

Argentina could provide comments describing the nature of more of its reported exports and imports.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Argentina reported exports to ten countries in 2019. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Bolivia).
- Argentina did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Argentina reported the export of 29,645 small arms items, all of which were aggregated by importing country and described as semi-automatic pistols.
- The main importers of small arms from Argentina were the United States (86 per cent) and Paraguay (7 per cent).



- Argentina reported imports from ten countries in 2019.
   Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories. It did not specify the exporting state in some cases.
- Argentina reported the import of six major conventional weapons items: five manned combat aircraft from France and one manned attack helicopter from the United States.
- Argentina reported the import of 11,545 items of small arms, covering six sub-categories, including semiautomatic pistols reported as small arms (aggregated).
   Of these, the majority were semi-automatic pistols (45 per cent), rifles and carbines (30 per cent) and 'others' (small arms) (25 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Argentina were the United States (23 per cent), Turkey (19 per cent) and Brazil (15 per cent). Argentina reported different states of origin for one small arms import.

## **AUSTRALIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - M	1issed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified	- Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			UNI	ROCA template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publ	licly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Australia's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report. It submitted its UNROCA report in place of the ATT reporting template that it used in its 2018 report.

Australia continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports, though it did not report values of major conventional weapons exports as it did in its 2018 report. It did not report exports of light weapons.

Australia reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It did not report actual imports of major conventional weapons or specify whether its small arms imports were actual or authorized as it did in its 2018 report.

Australia continued to provide aggregated numbers of exports and imports of small arms, though its 2019 report aggregated small arms numbers by importing/exporting state, rather than by weapon sub-category as it did in its 2018 report.



Australia provided descriptions and comments for all reported imports of major conventional weapons and small arms.

Australia provided the number of authorizations (permits granted) along with the number of items in its exports of small arms.

Australia provided notes on overall volumes of reported sub-categories of small arms exports and imports, as well as comments that describe the types of firearms included in its report (for example, blank-firing firearms).



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Australia continued to provide aggregated numbers of exports and imports of small arms, making it impossible to determine either importing/exporting states or weapons sub-categories.

Australia did not specify whether reported imports of combat aircraft were manned or unmanned, per UN Register definitions of weapons categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT.<sup>10</sup>

Australia could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of more of its reported exports.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Australia reported exports to 28 countries in 2019. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and eight were non-members (Belarus, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands).
- Australia reported the export of 29 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. These were combat aircraft (86 per cent), warships (7 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (3 per cent) and battle tanks (3 per cent).
- The main importer of major conventional weapons from Australia was Canada (79 per cent).
- Australia reported the export of 7,486 items of small arms,<sup>11</sup> worth AU\$3.4m (US\$2.4m),<sup>12</sup> from 162 export permits granted.<sup>13</sup> Australia did not disaggregate data by weapons sub-category.
- In terms of numbers of items, the main importers of small arms from Australia were New Zealand (83 per cent),
   China (4 per cent) and the United States (4 per cent).



- Australia reported imports from three countries in 2019.
   Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory. It only provided information on exporting countries for transfers of major conventional weapons.
- Australia reported the import of 142 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (89 per cent) and combat aircraft (11 per cent).
- The main exporter of major conventional weapons to Australia was the United States (97 per cent). Australia withheld the number of missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) imported from the United States.
- Australia reported the import of 96,964 small arms items, all of which were aggregated according to firearm type.

- 10 For example, the UN Register definitions of weapons categories include combat aircraft that are: (a) manned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defense or reconnaissance missions; or (b) unmanned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction. For more information, see ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf. Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 25.
- 11 There is a slight discrepancy between the number for exports of small arms items by Australia totaled from its reported exports (7,486 items) and the total it provides at the end of the report (7,496). The reason for this discrepancy is unknown.
- 12 Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2019 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.
- 13 There is a discrepancy between the number provided by Australia for permits issued (164) and for the number of permits granted provided with its detailed reporting of small arms exports (162). The reason for the discrepancy is unknown.

# **AUSTRIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - Mis	ssed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified -	Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			ATT repor	ting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publ	icly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Austria's reporting practice remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Austria reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of exports of major conventional weapons. It reported in some cases **Authorized** and in other cases **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of exports of SALW.

Austria did not report imports in 2019.



Austria reported the number and value of its exports of major conventional weapons and SALW in its 2019 report.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Austria did not include the front page of the ATT reporting template with its 2019 report. It is therefore unclear why Austria has not reported on imports, or if any information has been withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Austria aggregated all SALW sub-categories in its 2019 report, in some cases aggregating SALW together and in some cases reporting on small arms and light weapons separately.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Austria reported exports to 88 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 56 were ATT States Parties, 11 were Signatories and 14 were non-members (Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Ecuador, India, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkmenistan).<sup>14</sup>
- Austria reported the export of five major conventional weapons items: two armoured combat vehicles to Germany, two to the United Kingdom, and one to the Czech Republic, with a total value of €119,000 (US\$133,259).<sup>15</sup>
- Austria reported the export of 2,707,631 SALW items, with a total value of €180.3m (US\$201.9m).<sup>16</sup> Austria aggregated data such that it is impossible to determine the relevant sub-categories of SALW exports.
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Austria were the United States (51 per cent), Switzerland (10 per cent) and Norway (6 per cent).



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

Austria did not report import data in 2019.

<sup>14</sup> Austria also reported arms exports to seven non-UN members (Aruba, Holy See, Hong Kong, Kosovo, Macau, New Caledonia and Taiwan).

<sup>15</sup> The total value of armoured combat vehicles reported by Austria may not reflect the actual value of these items. It is unclear why the total value reported is relatively low. Austria did not specify which currency is used for reported values of transfers. For this analysis, the ATT Monitor has assumed the currency to be euros. Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2019 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm

<sup>16</sup> Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2019 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

## **BAHAMAS**



# **BARBADOS**



A US AIR FORCE F-16 FIGHTING FALCON AT GRAF IGNATIEVO AIR BASE IN BULGARIA.

CREDIT: © NATO



#### **BELGIUM**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	ıl security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT onl	ine reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Belgium's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Belgium did not report exports of any major conventional weapons items, as it did in its 2018 report. It reported **Authorized Values** of small arms exports aggregated by importing country but did not include numbers as it did in its 2018 report. It did not report exports under voluntary national categories as it did in its 2018 report.

Belgium reported **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapon imports, after having provided **Actual Numbers** in its 2018 report. It reported mostly **Authorized Values** of small arms imports aggregated by exporting country, and in other cases **Actual Numbers** of imports of small arms items reported under relevant weapons subcategories. It had provided both actual numbers and values of small arms imports in its 2018 report.

Belgium reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of light weapons items, after not reporting any imports of light weapons in its 2018 report. It did not report imports under voluntary national categories as it did in its 2018 report.

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#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

Belgium reported more imports of SALW items disaggregated by weapon sub-category in its 2019 report than in 2018.



#### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Belgium reported aggregated values of small arms exports and imports, making it impossible to determine the relevant sub-categories of small arms reported.

Belgium did not report numbers of small arms exports and imports along with values, as it did in its 2018 report.

Belgium did not report additional SALW exports or imports under voluntary national categories, as it did in its 2018 report.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Belgium reported exports to 57 countries in 2019. Of these, 40 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and 11 were non-members (Algeria, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Russia and Tunisia).
- Belgium did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Belgium reported aggregated values of small arms in 2019 with a total value of €164.6m (US\$184.3m).<sup>17</sup>
- In terms of value, the main importers of small arms items from Belgium were the United States (32 per cent), France (15 per cent) and Portugal (7 per cent).



- Belgium reported imports from 27 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-member (India).<sup>18</sup>
- The only import of major conventional weapons reported by Belgium was of three large-calibre artillery systems from Germany, worth €32,000 (US\$35,834).<sup>19</sup>
- Belgium reported imports of small arms items aggregated by exporting state, with a total value of €41.5m (US\$46.5m).<sup>20</sup> It also reported imports of 11 small arms items of rifles and carbines from the United States.
- Belgium reported imports of 3,479 light weapons items from Germany and Norway.
- In terms of value, the main exporters of small arms to Belgium were Japan (40 per cent), the United States (20 per cent) and Germany (10 per cent).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Belgium also reported imports from one non-UN member in 2019 (Taiwan).

<sup>19</sup> Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2019 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm. 20 lbid.

#### **BELIZE**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2016 X

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X

#### BENIN





## **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Benin's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports. It reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports, after not reporting imports of any major conventional weapon items in its 2018 report.



Benin provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported imports.

Benin provided descriptions for each reported import.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Benin could provide comments on the nature of reported transfers.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2019.



- Benin reported imports from one ATT State Party in 2019.
- Benin reported the import of 30 major conventional weapons items: 30 armoured combat vehicles from China.
- Benin reported the import of 16,110 SALW items in six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (69 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (25 per cent), all of which were exported by China.

## **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly ava	2015 \rightarrow 2016 \rightarrow 2017 \rightarrow 2018 \rightarrow 2019 \rightarrow



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Bosnia and Herzegovina's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to provide **Numbers** and **Values** for exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW items. It continued not to specify whether exports were authorized or actual transfers.

Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that it excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, after indicating in its 2018 report that no information had been withheld.

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#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided both numbers and values of all reported exports and imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided descriptions of all items exported and imported, as well as some comments.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not specify whether it was reporting authorized or actual exports or imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported exports to eight countries in 2019. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 307 major conventional weapons items with a total value of €358.317 (US\$401,251),<sup>21</sup> the majority of which were large-calibre artillery systems (96 per cent).
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 13,550 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. These exports were worth €4.2m (US\$4.7m).<sup>22</sup> Some SALW were indicated to be 'non-perspective, outdated and surplus weapons'.
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Bosnia and Herzegovina were Austria (73 per cent) and Slovakia (16 per cent).



- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported imports from 15 countries in 2019. Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of 34 major conventional weapons items, all of which were armoured combat vehicles from the United States.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of 4,601 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. These reported imports were worth €2.1m (US\$2.4m).<sup>23</sup> In terms of value, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68 per cent), heavy machine guns (16 per cent) and rifles and carbines (11 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Bosnia and Herzegovina were the United States (22 per cent), Slovakia (17 per cent) and the Czech Republic (16 per cent).

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#### **BRAZIL**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

## **BULGARIA**

#### **BURKINA FASO**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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<sup>24</sup> Burkina Faso submitted its 2019 annual report to the ATT Secretariat ahead of the reporting deadline. However, the report was not posted to the ATT Secretariat website and made available before the 1 February cut-off date for ATT Monitor country profile analysis. The reasons for the delay are unknown.

#### **CABO VERDE**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2017 
Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2018 
2019 
X

#### **CAMEROON**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

## **CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X


#### **CHAD**

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

| Value of the previous years in which reports were due? | 2016 | X | 2017 | X | 2018 | X | 2019 | X | 2019

#### **CHILE**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?	Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national secu	rity-related reasons?
What reporting template was used?	ATT online reporting tool
reports were due?	Were submitted reports made publicly available?  2018  2019  2019



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Chile's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Chile reported **Actual Numbers** of exports of small arms items, after having submitted a 'nil' report for exports in its 2018 report. It did not report exports of any major conventional weapons items.

Chile reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of small arms items but did not specify whether one transfer was actual or authorized. It did not report imports of any major conventional weapons items as it did in its 2018 report.

<sup>\*</sup> Report submitted before it was due



Chile provided descriptions of all its reported exports and imports.

Chile provided a cut-off date for its report, as well as definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import', after not doing so in its 2018 report.



## **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Chile did not specify whether it was reporting authorized or actual imports for all of its reported transfers.

Chile excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Chile reported exports to one ATT State Party in 2019.
- Chile reported the export of 12 small arms items, all of which were assault rifles exported to Canada.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Chile reported imports from three countries in 2019.
   Of these, one was an ATT State Party and two were Signatories.
- Chile reported the import of 29 small arms items: 18 revolvers and self-loading pistols from Austria and Israel, and 11 sub-machine guns from the United States.

#### **COSTA RICA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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# **CÔTE D'IVOIRE**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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
## **CROATIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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
#### **CYPRUS**





# **CZECH REPUBLIC**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT o	nline reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available	2015 \( \sqrt{2016} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Czech Republic's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Czech Republic reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports and imports.



Czech Republic provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Czech Republic provided comments describing the nature of some major conventional weapons exports and SALW imports.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Czech Republic could provide more comments on exports and imports of SALW and on imports of major conventional weapons.

Czech Republic could provide descriptions of exports and imports.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Czech Republic reported exports to 57 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 35 were ATT States Parties, 11 were Signatories and 10 were non-members (Bolivia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda).<sup>25</sup>
- Czech Republic reported the export of 64 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories: large-calibre artillery systems (41 per cent), battle tanks (36 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (23 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons items from the Czech Republic were Uganda (34 per cent), Ukraine (25 per cent) and Slovakia (22 per cent).
- Czech Republic reported the export of 77,169 SALW items, covering 11 sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (33 per cent), assault rifles (28 per cent) and sub-machine guns (22 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW items from the Czech Republic were Hungary (34 per cent), Malaysia (13 per cent) and the United States (10 per cent).



- Czech Republic reported imports from 12 countries in 2019. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-members (Ethiopia, Jordan and Pakistan).
- Czech Republic reported the import of 65 major conventional weapons items: 25 battle tanks from Serbia and 40 armoured combat vehicles from Jordan.
- Czech Republic reported the import of 9,787 SALW items.
   Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (83 per cent), 'others' (light weapons) (10 per cent) and assault rifles (3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Czech Republic were Ethiopia (79 per cent), Bulgaria (10 per cent) and the United States (3 per cent).

## **DENMARK**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relate	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly a	2015 \( \sqrt{2016 \( \sqrt{1} \)} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017 \( \sqrt{1} \)} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019 \( \sqrt{1} \)} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Denmark's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Denmark continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons as it did in its 2018 report.

Denmark continued to report a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of light weapons imports after reporting actual numbers of items of light weapons imports in its 2018 report.



Denmark provided descriptions of some items, including all imports of major conventional weapons and some small arms imports.

Denmark reported exports of hand grenades and imports of mortar bombs under 'others' (light weapons) categories.

Denmark indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.



## ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Denmark continued not to provide information on final importing states in its reported exports of small arms.

Denmark continued to aggregate countries supplying its small arms imports, reporting the exporting states collectively as 'Multiple exporting states', making it impossible in some cases to determine the number of items from specific source countries.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Denmark did not provide information on importing countries in most cases.
- Denmark reported the export of 1,923 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (55 per cent) and 'others' (small arms) (33 per cent).
- Denmark named the final importing state of SALW only in the case of exports of 10 hand grenades to Germany, reported as 'others' (light weapons).



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Denmark did not provide information on exporting countries in many cases.
- Denmark reported the import of 130 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (56 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (28 per cent) and unmanned combat aircraft (15 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional weapons to Denmark were Switzerland (84 per cent) and France (15 per cent).
- Denmark reported the import of 18,071 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (49 per cent), 'others' (small arms) (39 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (11 per cent).
- Denmark reported the import of 380 mortar bombs from Spain, reported as 'others' (light weapons).

## **DOMINICA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2016 X

2017 X

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2019 **X** 

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

## **DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified - Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made public	2015 \( \sqrt{2016} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Dominican Republic's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Dominican Republic continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Dominican Republic reported both **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of imports of small arms, as well as additional imports under voluntary national categories, including ammunition. It did not report imports of small arms items in its 2018 report.



Dominican Republic reported imports under voluntary national categories, including ammunition, and provided more information on exporting countries than it did in its 2018 report.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Dominican Republic did not indicate, by ticking the relevant box on the front page of its report, whether it had excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national securityrelated' reasons, as it did in its 2018 report.

Dominican Republic aggregated the final exporting countries for reported imports in most small arms and voluntary national categories and sub-categories, so it is impossible to determine how many items were imported from which specific country.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

 Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2019.



- Dominican Republic reported imports from eight countries in 2019. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Dominican Republic reported imports of 1,153 small arms items covering two categories: 'Others (small arms) (60 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (40 per cent).
- Dominican Republic reported the import of 1,173,650 small arms items under voluntary national categories, including 1,155,000 pieces of ammunition from Italy, Spain and the United States.

# **EL SALVADOR**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly a	2015 🗸 2016 🗸 2017 🗸



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

El Salvador submitted a 2019 annual report after not submitting a 2018 report.

El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

El Salvador reported **Authorized Numbers** of imports of small arms items.



El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2019.



## **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

El Salvador aggregated the final exporting countries for its reported imports, so it is impossible to determine how many items within reported transfers were exported to which specific country.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2019.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- El Salvador reported imports from seven countries in 2019. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- El Salvador reported the import of 4,346 small arms items: 4,059 revolvers and self-loading pistols and 287 rifles and carbines.

#### **ESTONIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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#### **FINLAND**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	ıl security-relat	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		ATT onli	ne reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Finland's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Finland reported **Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons items but did not specify whether they were authorized or actual transfers as it did in its 2018 report. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports. It reported **Numbers** of light weapons exports but did not specify whether they were authorized or actual transfers, after having not reported light weapons in its 2018 report.

Finland continued to report **Numbers** of imports of small arms items and did not indicate whether they were authorized or actual transfers. It aggregated information according to item descriptions and did not identify exporting states as it did in its 2018 report.



Finland provided descriptions of all items of small arms imports and major conventional weapons exports, and provided descriptions and comments for all light weapons exports.



#### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Finland aggregated the information it provided for all of its small arms imports according to item descriptions while reporting the exporting states as 'All', so it is impossible to determine the exporting states.

Finland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Finland reported exports to 42 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 34 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and two were non-members (India and Uzbekistan).<sup>26</sup>
- Finland reported the export of two major conventional weapons items: two armoured combat vehicles to Sweden.
- Finland reported the export of 192,879 SALW items, the majority of which were 'others' (light weapons) (98 per cent), which were civilian firearms used for hunting and sporting purposes.
- The main importing states were the United States (83 per cent) and Australia (8 per cent).



- Finland did not specify exporting states in its reported imports in 2019.
- Finland did not report the import of any major conventional weapons.
- Finland reported the import of 114,840 small arms items, all of which were aggregated according to item descriptions, including rifles, shotguns, silencers and other accessories.

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# **FRANCE**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes	- On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified - Not	t indicated
What reporting template was used?			National reporting	j template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publi	cly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

France's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

France reported **Actual Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW. It reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of SALW, and did not report imports of major conventional weapons.



France provided clear, disaggregated data for every reported export and import in 2019.

France provided descriptions of items for all reported exports and imports. These descriptions named the sub-category of weapons and, in some cases, provided additional details such as calibre. France also provided some comments describing the nature of its transfers.



#### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

France did not specify whether reported exports of combat aircraft and attack helicopters were manned or unmanned, per UN Registry Definitions of Categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT<sup>27</sup>.

France could provide comments on more of its exports and imports describing the nature of its transfers.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- France reported exports to 27 countries in 2019. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories, and eight were non-members (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia).
- France reported the export of 1,542 major conventional weapons items, covering five categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (51 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (44 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from France were Saudi Arabia (37 per cent), Egypt (20 per cent) and Qatar (14 per cent).
- France reported the export of 321 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (87 per cent), heavy machine guns (5 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (4 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from France were Cameroon (31 per cent), the United States (29 per cent) and Canada (12 per cent).



- France reported imports from eight countries in 2019.
   Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- France did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- France reported the import of 16,589 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (73 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (16 per cent) and light machine guns (5 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to France were Germany (89 per cent of items) and Belgium (5 per cent).

<sup>27</sup> For example, the UN Register definitions of weapons categories include combat aircraft that are: (a) manned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defense or reconnaissance missions; or (b) unmanned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction. For more information, see ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT.' ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf. Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, p. 25.

# **GEORGIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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# **GERMANY**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relate	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		A	TT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly availa	2015 \rightarrow 2016 \rightarrow 2017 \rightarrow 2018 \rightarrow 2019 \rightarrow



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Germany's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Germany continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports and reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports.

Germany did not report imports of major conventional weapons, as it did in its 2018 report. It continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.



Germany provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Germany provided descriptions of reported major conventional weapons exports in addition to comments on some SALW imports.

Germany included a 'national disclaimer' on the front page of its report further clarifying what kinds of information may or may not be inferred through its reporting of authorized transfers.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Germany could provide descriptions and/or comments describing the nature of all reported exports and imports.

Germany could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.




#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Germany reported exports to 31 countries in 2019. Of these, 27 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-members (Jordan and Qatar).
- Germany reported the export of 38 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (45 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (26 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (18 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Germany were Lithuania (29 per cent), Republic of Korea (26 per cent) and Jordan (24 per cent).
- Germany reported the export of 48,848 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (82 per cent) and recoilless rifles (9 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Germany were France (29 per cent), Norway (23 per cent) and the United States (14 per cent).




- Germany reported imports from 16 countries in 2019. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Germany did not report the import of any major conventional weapons items in 2019.
- Germany reported the import of 101,693 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (99 per cent).
- The main exporter of SALW to Germany was the United Kingdom (98 per cent).

# **GHANA**



# **GREECE**



# **GRENADA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015 X 2016 X 2017 X 2018 X 2019 X	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	

<sup>\*</sup> Report submitted before it was due

# **GUATEMALA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2018 X

2019 X

#### **GUINEA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2015 X

2016 X


2017 X

2018 X

2019 X

# **GUYANA**

# **HONDURAS**



# **HUNGARY**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - Missed d	leadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	l security-relat	ed' reasons?		Yes
What reporting template was used?			ATT online report	ing tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly a		2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Hungary's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Hungary reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports, though it did not report exports of major conventional weapons in its 2018 report.

Hungary reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports. It reported light weapons imports, though it did not in its 2018 report.



Hungary provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export.

Hungary provided descriptions and/or comments describing the nature of nearly all reported exports and imports.

Hungary provided full names for the countries designated as exporting or importing states after providing undefined country codes in its first three years of reporting.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Hungary could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Hungary reported exports to 15 countries in 2019.
   Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Oman).
- Hungary reported the export of 15 major conventional weapons items: one armoured combat vehicle to Poland and 14 missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) to France
- Hungary reported the export of 3,221 small arms items, covering two sub-categories: revolvers and self-loading pistols (80 per cent) and rifles and carbines (20 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Hungary were the United States (78 per cent), Croatia (9 per cent) and Romania (6 per cent).
- Hungary was not the state of origin for many of its reported exports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Hungary reported imports from 20 countries in 2019.
   Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Hungary reported the import of 18 major conventional weapons items: four attack helicopters from Germany, 14 missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from Bulgaria (for re-export)<sup>28</sup> and a classified number of missiles and missile launchers (MANPADs) from France.
- Hungary reported the import of 4,749 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (59 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (35 per cent) and portable anti-tank quns (3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Hungary were Germany (25 per cent), Austria (23 per cent) and the United States (16 per cent).

### **ICELAND**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2015 🗶

2016 🗶

2017 **X** 

2018 **X** 

2019 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

# **IRELAND**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relate	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		[	ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly ava	2015 \(  \) 2016 \(  \) 2017 \(  \) 2018 \(  \) 2019 \(  \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Ireland's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Ireland continued not to report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It reported **Numbers** and some **Values** of exports of small arms items, though it did not specify if transfers were actual or authorized as it did in its 2018 report.

Ireland continued not to report imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It reported **Numbers** of imports of small arms items, though it did not specify if transfers were actual or authorized as it did in its 2018 report.



Ireland provided descriptions for most of its reported transfers.

Ireland reported some values of small arms exports in addition to the number of items transferred.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Ireland continued to exclude some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Ireland continued to aggregate the final importing countries under some small arms exports and imports sub-categories, so it is impossible to determine how many items within reported transfers were exported to which specific country.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Ireland reported exports to 15 countries in 2019. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Ireland did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Ireland reported the export of 1,369 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (80 per cent) and 'others' (small arms) (17 per cent), the latter of which were mostly sporting shotguns.
- In some cases, Ireland aggregated information for importing countries for these sub-categories so it is unclear to where these items were exported.



- Ireland reported imports from 21 countries in 2019. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Pakistan).
- Ireland reported the import of 3,970 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were 'others' (54 per cent), which were shotguns, airguns and combo guns, and rifles and carbines (42 per cent).
- Ireland aggregated information for exporting countries for these sub-categories so it is unclear from where these items were imported.

# **ITALY**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?				Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	ıl security-relat	ed' reasons?		Yes
What reporting template was used?			ATT online reporting tool a	and annex tables
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted repor	rts made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Italy's reporting practice changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Italy reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Italy reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports. It did not report light weapons imports in its 2018 report.



Italy made clear it reported authorized exports and imports, and it provided numbers of items transferred.



#### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Italy named all export destinations and import sources for SALW in a separate annex, making it difficult, in most cases, to determine which weapons were transferred to which country.

Italy excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Italy did not report the final importing states for its exports of major conventional weapons.
- Italy reported the export of 774 major conventional weapons items, covering seven categories. Of these, the majority were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (33 per cent), battle tanks (30 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (25 per cent).
- Italy reported the export of SALW to 42 countries. Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and 15 were non-members (Bolivia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkmenistan and Vietnam). It reported the destinations for its SALW exports in a separate annex so it is unclear which weapon types were transferred to which country.
- Italy reported the export of 48,353 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (44 per cent), assault rifles (26 per cent) and rifles and carbines (18 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW to Italy were Austria (17 per cent), Mexico (15 per cent) and Thailand (14 per cent).



- Italy did not report the import of any major conventional weapons items.
- Italy reported the import of small arms from two countries in 2019, one ATT State Party and one Signatory. It reported the exporting states for its SALW imports in a separate annex so it is unclear which types were transferred from which country.
- Italy reported the import of 7,664 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (39 per cent), light machine guns (39 per cent) and rifles and carbines (19 per cent).
- The two exporters of SALW to Italy were the United States (87 per cent) and Switzerland (13 per cent).

# **JAMAICA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Jamaica's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Jamaica reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and imports.



Jamaica provided comments describing the nature of most of its reported transfers.

Jamaica indicated that exports and imports reported in the small arms 'others' sub-categories were shotguns.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Jamaica aggregated numbers of exports and imports of small arms items by weapons sub-categories, making it impossible to determine how many of each weapon were transferred to each importing state or from each exporting state.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Jamaica reported exports to ten countries and territories in 2019. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.<sup>29</sup>
- Jamaica did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Jamaica reported the export of 192 small arms items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (44 per cent), assault rifles (23 per cent) and 'others' (small arms) (19 per cent), which were described as shotguns.
- Jamaica aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple importing states in most cases.



- Jamaica reported imports from 14 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.<sup>30</sup>
- Jamaica did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Jamaica reported the import of 6,475 small arms items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (55 per cent), rifles and carbines (32 per cent) and 'others' (small arms) (11 per cent), described as shotguns.
- Jamaica aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple exporting states in all cases.

#### **JAPAN**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?				Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relate	ed' reasons?		No
What reporting template was used?			ATT online reporting tool a	and annex tables
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted repor	ts made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Japan's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Japan again did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports.

Japan continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of its SALW imports.

Japan continued to provide information on SALW exports and imports organized according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Code) of the World Customs Organization.



Japan provided clear, disaggregated data for all of its reported exports and imports.

Japan provided descriptions for all of its reported exports and imports.

Japan included both numbers and values of its SALW exports and imports.



### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Japan's use of HS Codes for reporting its small arms exports and imports meant that the data provided did not correspond directly to the categorization within the ATT reporting template, making it difficult to comparatively analyse its transfer data.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Japan reported exports to 13 countries in 2019. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and two were non-members (Egypt and Kuwait).
- Japan reported the export of 106,233 small arms items with a total value of ¥5.1m (US\$46.5m).<sup>31</sup>
- In terms of value, the main importers of small arms from Japan were the United States (61 per cent) and Belgium (30 per cent).



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Japan reported imports from 15 countries in 2019. Of these,
   13 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Japan reported the import of 11 major conventional weapons items, all of which were armoured combat vehicles from the United States.
- Japan reported the import of 5,039 SALW items with a total value of ¥1.7m (US\$15.6m).<sup>32</sup>
- In terms of value, the main exporters of small arms to Japan were Sweden (36 per cent), the United States (36 per cent) and Italy (13 per cent).

#### **KAZAKHSTAN**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Was the 2020 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Yes - Missed deadline

No

# **LATVIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Latvia's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Latvia again did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports.

Latvia continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports and **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports.



#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

Latvia provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2019.

Latvia provided both the number and value of SALW exports and imports.



# **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Latvia could provide descriptions and/or comments describing the nature of more of its reported exports and imports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

 Latvia reported exports of 112 small arms items, all of which were rifles and carbines to Lithuania, with a total value of €226,321 (US\$253,439).<sup>33</sup>



- Latvia reported imports from ten countries in 2019. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Latvia reported the import of 18 major conventional weapons items, all of which were armoured combat vehicles from the United Kingdom.
- Latvia reported the import of 4,210 SALW items with a total value of €859,587 (US\$962,583),<sup>34</sup> covering nine subcategories. Values were not included for all reported SALW imports. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (49 per cent), rifles and carbines (20 per cent) and assault rifles (19 per cent).
- In terms of numbers of items, the main exporters of SALW to Latvia were Austria (49 per cent) and Germany (39 per cent).

# **LESOTHO**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

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Were submitted reports made publicly available?

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# **LIBERIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – On time
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015 <equation-block> 2016 🗸 2017 🗶 2018 🗸 2019 🗶</equation-block>	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015 🗸 2016 🔏 2018 🔏

<sup>\*</sup> Report submitted before it was due



# **LIECHTENSTEIN**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Liechtenstein's reporting practice remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Liechtenstein reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports. It did not report exports or imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.



Liechtenstein continued to provide descriptions of exports and imports and comments describing the nature of its transfers. It noted that all small arms exports and imports were non-commercial.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Liechtenstein could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Liechtenstein reported exports to two ATT States Parties in 2019.
- Liechtenstein reported exports of 17 small arms, covering two sub-categories: 14 rifles and carbines and three revolvers and self-loading pistols.
- The importers of small arms from Liechtenstein were Austria (94 per cent) and Germany (6 per cent).



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Liechtenstein reported imports from two ATT States Parties in 2019.
- Liechtenstein reported imports of 22 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (55 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (41 per cent).
- The exporters of small arms to Liechtenstein were Austria (73 per cent) and Germany (23 per cent).
   One import reported as 'others' (small arms) was from an unspecified exporting county.

#### **LITHUANIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted? Yes - On time Was the 2020 annual report submitted? No 2015 🗸 2015 🗸 Were reports submitted in previous years in which Were submitted reports made publicly available? reports were due? 2016 🗸 2016 🗸 2017 🗸 2017 🗸 2018 🗸 2018 X 2019 🗸 2019 X

# **LUXEMBOURG**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relate	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly a	2015 \( \sqrt{2016} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Luxembourg's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Luxembourg reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and imports, after it did not specify whether transfers were actual or authorized in its 2018 report.

Luxembourg did not report any major conventional weapons or light weapons exports or imports.



Luxembourg indicated clearly that its reported exports and imports were actual transfers, after not doing so in its 2018 report.

Luxembourg provided descriptions for all reported exports and imports, as well as some comments describing the nature of its transfers.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Luxembourg aggregated some of its information on reported exports and imports by small arms sub-category, making it impossible to determine how many weapons in each sub-category were transferred to the multiple importing states.




# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Luxembourg reported small arms exports to three countries in 2019. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory. Luxembourg was not the state of origin for any of its exports.
- Luxembourg reported the export of 41 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (85 per cent) and rifles and carbines (12 per cent).




- Luxembourg reported small arms imports from two ATT States Parties in 2019.
- Luxembourg reported the export of 736 small arms items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (35 per cent), assault rifles (34 per cent) and sub-machine guns (29 per cent).


# **MADAGASCAR**



# **MALDIVES**



# **MALI**



<sup>\*</sup> Report submitted before it was due

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#### **MALTA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015 X 2016 X 2017 V 2018 X 2019 V	Were submitted reports made publicly ava	2017 🗸

# **MAURITANIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?


2016 X

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
2018 X

2019 X

# **MAURITIUS**



# **MEXICO**





#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Mexico's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Mexico reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports, after it submitted a 'nil' report for exports in its 2018 report. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Mexico reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons in its 2018 report.



Mexico provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Mexico provided descriptions and comments describing the nature of each reported export and import, all of which are consistent and detailed.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Mexico excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Mexico reported exports to two ATT States Parties in 2019.
- Mexico did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Mexico reported the export of 1,250 small arms items, covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (96 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4 per cent).



- Mexico reported imports from 14 countries in 2019. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Mexico reported the import of 42 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United States.
- Mexico reported the import of 159,983 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were 'others' (light weapons) (65 per cent), described as mostly grenades and revolvers and self-loading pistols (27 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Mexico were the United States (81 per cent), Italy (6 per cent) and Austria (5 per cent).

# **MONACO**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Mis	ssed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified -	Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			ATT repor	ting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2017	Were submitted reports made public	ly available?	2017



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Monaco's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Monaco reported aggregated **Authorized Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons and small arms, after it withheld the number and/or value of the transfers in its 2018 report. It again did not report imports of light weapons.



Monaco reported numbers of imports of small arms items after it did not do so in its 2018 report.

Monaco indicated clearly in its report where it had zero exports and imports to report.



# **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Monaco indicated that information on exporting states was 'unknown' for all of its reported imports.

Monaco did not indicate, by ticking the relevant box on the front page of its report, whether it had excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2019.



- Monaco reported imports of eight major conventional weapons items, all of which were aggregated and from unknown exporting states.
- Monaco reported imports of five small arms items, all of which were aggregated and from unknown exporting states.

# **MONTENEGRO**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?			
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly a	2015 \( \sqrt{2016} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Montenegro's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Montenegro continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons.

Montenegro continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports. It did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.

Montenegro submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, though it provided information on both SALW exports and imports, after having not done so in its 2018 report.



#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

Montenegro provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Montenegro provided descriptions on all of its reported exports and imports, as well as comments describing the nature of its reported exports.

Montenegro provided both numbers and values for all reported exports and imports.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Montenegro did not provide and/or aggregated information on exporting states for some of its reported small arms imports.

Montenegro could indicate that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories, rather than submit 'nil' reports that cover the full scope of exports and imports.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019; EXPORT DATA

- Montenegro reported exports to seven countries in 2019. Of these, four were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Indonesia).
- Montenegro did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Montenegro reported the export of 9,588 items of SALW with a total value of €3.5m (US\$3.9m),<sup>35</sup> covering five sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority of these items were revolvers and self-loading pistols (48 per cent), assault rifles (24 per cent) and light machine guns (20 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Montenegro were Poland (57 per cent) and Malaysia (34 per cent).



- Montenegro reported imports from six ATT States Parties in 2019.
- Montenegro did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Montenegro reported the import of 6,232 SALW items with a total value of €4.4m (US\$4.9m),<sup>36</sup> covering three sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority of these items were rifles and carbines (44 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (33 per cent) and portable antitank missile launchers and rocket systems (23 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Montenegro were not specified (31 per cent), Serbia (27 per cent) and Slovenia (12 per cent). Montenegro reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

# **NETHERLANDS**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?			
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly a	2015 \( \sqrt{2016} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Netherland's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports. It did not report exports of light weapons.

Netherlands reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.



Netherlands provided clear, disaggregated information for each reported export and import.

Netherlands provided descriptions for all exports and imports of major conventional weapons, as well as for many SALW imports, and it likely grouped together some transfers according to end-use and/or end-user.

Netherlands indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.



### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Netherlands could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of more of its reported small arms exports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Netherlands reported exports to 28 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 25 were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Kuwait).<sup>37</sup>
- Netherlands reported the export of 39 major conventional weapons items. These were armoured combat vehicles (59 per cent) and battle tanks (41 per cent) to Estonia, Finland and Sweden. Netherlands was not the state or origin for all of these transfers.
- Netherlands reported the export of 3,269 small arms items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (32 per cent), light machine guns (28 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (24 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from the Netherlands were the United States (28 per cent), Belgium (28 per cent) and the United Kingdom (17 per cent).



- Netherlands reported imports from 23 countries in 2019. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Netherlands reported the import of two major conventional weapons items, both manned combat aircraft from Italy.
- Netherlands reported the import of 15,085 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (42 per cent), rifles and carbines (19 per cent) and assault rifles (18 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to the Netherlands were Austria (31 per cent), Germany (20 per cent) and Canada (9 per cent).

# **NEW ZEALAND**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

New Zealand's reporting remained the same in its 2019 report.

New Zealand continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and exports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

New Zealand continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports and imports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons.



New Zealand provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

New Zealand reported exports and imports under voluntary national categories, and provided extensive information in Annex 2 to clarify specific national definitions of Category VIII weapons (SALW) and of its voluntary national categories.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

New Zealand could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- New Zealand reported exports to 26 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and eight were non-members (Fiji, Indonesia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Tonga).<sup>38</sup>
- New Zealand did not report the export of any major conventional weapons.
- New Zealand reported the export of 1,750 small arms, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (50 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (30 per cent) and shotguns reported under voluntary national categories (19 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from New Zealand were China (45 per cent), New Caledonia (13 per cent) and Australia (9 per cent).



- New Zealand reported imports from 31 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and four were non-members (Fiji, India, Papua New Guinea and Tonga).<sup>39</sup>
- New Zealand did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- New Zealand reported the import of 17,222 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (73 per cent), shotguns reported under voluntary national categories (15 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (11 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to New Zealand were the United States (47 per cent), Finland (15 per cent) and Italy (9 per cent).

# **NIGER**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2016 X


2016 X

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X

# **NIGERIA**





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## **NORWAY**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Norway's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Norway continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports. It reported **Numbers** of SALW exports but it did not specify whether they were authorized or as it did in its 2018 report. It did not report exports under voluntary national categories as it did in its 2018 report.

Norway continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports. In one instance it specified it was reporting **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports, though it did not specify whether the remaining SALW imports were actual or authorized. It did not report imports of light weapons in its 2018 report.



Norway provided clear, disaggregated data for most of its reported exports.



#### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Norway in some cases did not provide information on final importing and exporting countries, and in many cases did not specify if it reported actual or authorized transfers.

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Norway excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Norway could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of its reported exports and imports, as it did in its 2018 report.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Norway reported exports to 13 countries in 2019. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Norway reported the export of 32 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. These were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (66 per cent), battle tanks (25 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (9 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Norway were the United States (56 per cent), not specified (31 per cent) and Belgium (9 per cent).
- Norway reported the export of 1,198 SALW, covering six subcategories. Of these, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (68 per cent), rifles and carbines (14 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (10 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Norway were New Zealand (68 per cent), the United States (9 per cent) and Estonia (8 per cent).



- Norway reported imports from one ATT State Party in 2019.
   It did not specify the exporting countries of most of its reported imports.
- Norway reported the import of 14 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. The majority of these were manned combat aircraft (43 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (29 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (21 per cent).
- Norway reported the import of 312 SALW items, covering three sub-categories. These were assault rifles (80 per cent), heavy machine guns (17 per cent) and rifles and carbines (3 per cent).
- Norway reported one import of rifles and carbines from Austria but did not specify exporting countries for its other transfers.

# **PANAMA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	l security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Panama's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Panama submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports. It reported small arms imports in its 2018 report.

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## **GOOD PRACTICES**

PROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Panama submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2019.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2019.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

Panama submitted a 'nil' report for imports in 2019.



## **PARAGUAY**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?		N. C.	Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		A	TT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015 🖍 2016 🗸 2017 🗶	Were submitted reports made publicly availa	2015 🗸 2016 🗸
	2018 /		2018 🗸



## **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Paraguay's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Paraguay submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports. It did not submit 'nil' reports on exports and imports in 2018, though it only reported SALW imports in its 2018 report.

<sup>\*</sup> Report submitted before it was due

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# **GOOD PRACTICES**

PROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Paraguay submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2019.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• Paraguay submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2019.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

• Paraguay submitted a 'nil' report for imports in 2019.



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## **PERU**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2017	Were submitted reports made publicly a	2017 / 2018 / 2019 /



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Peru's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Peru continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Peru reported **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons imports, though it did not report any major conventional weapons imports in its 2018 report.

Peru reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** for small arms imports and **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** for light weapons imports, after reporting in most cases actual and in one case authorized numbers for small arms imports in its 2018 report, along with actual numbers and values for light weapons imports.



Peru provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported imports.

Peru provided numbers and values for all SALW imports.

Peru provided descriptions on all reported imports, as well as some comments describing the nature of its transfers.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Peru could provide more comments describing the nature of its reported imports.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

Peru submitted a 'nil' exports report in 2019.



- Peru reported imports from 12 countries in 2019.
   Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Peru reported the import of 2,308 major conventional weapons items, with a total value of US\$4.3m. In terms of value, these were armoured combat vehicles (51 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (49 per cent).
- In terms of value, the exporters of major conventional weapons items to Peru were Germany (51 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (38 per cent) and Bulgaria (12 per cent).
- Peru reported the import of 9,494 SALW items, covering three sub-categories. In terms of value, these were 'others' (small arms) (65 per cent), portable anti-tank guns (33 per cent) and heavy machine guns (1 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters to Peru were Spain (35 per cent), Austria (30 per cent) and the United States (11 per cent).

# **POLAND**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - Mi	ssed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified -	Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			ATT repo	rting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publi	cly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Poland's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Poland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Poland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports. It did not report imports of light weapons in its 2018 report.



Poland provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2019.

Poland provided descriptions of items for almost all exports of major conventional weapons as well as some comments on the nature of its reported transfers.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Poland did not specify if any 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' data had been withheld from the report.

Poland could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of its SALW exports and all imports.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Poland reported exports to 15 countries in 2019. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and two were non-members (Pakistan and Vietnam).
- Poland reported exports of 95 major conventional weapons items, covering six categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (45 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) (40 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (6 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Poland were the United States (44 per cent), Ukraine (29 per cent) and the Czech Republic (13 per cent).
- Poland reported the export of 17,677 SALW items in 2019, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (67 per cent) and revolvers and selfloading pistols (30 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Poland were the United States (71 per cent) and the Czech Republic (24 per cent).



- Poland reported imports from six countries in 2019. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Poland reported imports of 36 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United States.
- Poland reported 1,430 SALW items, covering eight subcategories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (87 per cent) and sub-machine guns (6 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Poland were the Czech Republic (47 per cent), Austria (42 per cent) and the United States (4 per cent).

## **PORTUGAL**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT rep	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Portugal's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Portugal continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons as it did in its 2018 report. It did not report any exports of light weapons.

Portugal reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons imports, after not having reported any in its 2018 report. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of most of its small arms imports, as well as **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of some small arms and all light weapons imports. It did not report imports of light weapons in its 2018 report.



Portugal provided clear, disaggregated data on all reported exports and imports.

Portugal provided descriptions of some items for of SALW imports.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Portugal could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and all imports.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Portugal reported exports to 38 countries in 2019. Of these, 32 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and two were non-members (Kuwait and Tunisia).
- Portugal did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Portugal reported the export of 97,003 SALW items, covering two sub-categories. The majority of these were rifles and carbines (more than 99 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW items from Portugal were Spain (33 per cent), the United States (31 per cent) and Belgium (29 per cent).



- Portugal reported imports from 20 countries in 2019. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Portugal reported the import of 25 major conventional weapons items, with a total value of €10.3m (US\$11.5m),<sup>40</sup> all of which were armoured combat vehicles from Spain.
- Portugal reported the import of 6,641 SALW, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (52 per cent), rifles and carbines (44 per cent) and assault rifles (3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW items to Portugal were Austria (48 per cent), Italy (18 per cent) and Belgium (13 per cent).

## **REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	security-relate	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		[	ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2018 🗸	Were submitted reports made publicly ava	2018 <b>/</b> 2019 <b>/</b>



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Republic of Korea's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Republic of Korea continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and small arms. It did not report light weapons exports as it did in its 2018 report.

Republic of Korea continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Republic of Korea provided its own definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import', indicating in both instances that its data is based on licenses granted (authorized, signed contracts) and not on actual transfers.



Republic of Korea provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Republic of Korea provided descriptions of most of its reported exports and imports.

Republic of Korea provided its own definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import', indicating in both instances that its data is based on licenses granted (authorized, signing contracts) and not on actual transfers.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Republic of Korea excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Republic of Korea reported exports to three countries in 2019. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Republic of Korea reported the export of 12 major conventional weapon items: four manned combat aircraft to Senegal and eight to Thailand.
- Republic of Korea reported the export of 400 SALW items, all of which were rifles and carbines to Finland.



- Republic of Korea reported imports from four countries in 2019. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and three were Signatories.
- Republic of Korea reported the import of 120 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United States.
- Republic of Korea reported the import of 850 SALW items, covering three sub-categories. These were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (78 per cent), 'others' (light weapons) (12 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (9 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to the Republic of Korea were the United States (78 per cent), Turkey (10 per cent) and Israel (9 per cent).

## **REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/nationa	l security-relate	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		A	ATT reporting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2016	Were submitted reports made publicly avail	2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



#### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Republic of Moldova's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Republic of Moldova reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports, after it reported authorized exports in its 2018 report. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Republic of Moldova reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms imports, after it reported authorized imports in its 2018 report. It did not report imports of light weapons and it did not report imports of major conventional weapons as it did in its 2018 report.



Republic of Moldova provided both numbers and values of all items exported and imported.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Republic of Moldova continued to aggregate data on exporting states for one sub-category of its reported imports.

Republic of Moldova could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and all imports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Republic of Moldova reported exports to one non-member of the ATT (Russia).
- Republic of Moldova reported the export of 282 small arms items, with a total value of MDL2.3m (US\$132,024),<sup>41</sup> all of which were exported to Russia. In terms of value, these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (97 per cent) and rifles and carbines (3 per cent).



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Republic of Moldova reported imports from eight countries in 2019. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Republic of Moldova reported the import of 1,035 small arms items, with a total value of MDL8.9m (US\$510,875).<sup>42</sup> covering three sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority of these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (g2 per cent) and rifles and carbines (8 per cent).
- Information on exporting states for Moldova's imports of small arms was aggregated, so it is impossible to determine the breakdown of quantities among the various exporters.

## **REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015 🗸 2016 🗸 2017 🗸 2018 🗸 2019 🔏	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015 🗸 2016 🗸 2017 🗸 2018 🗸

<sup>41</sup> Currency conversion via Xe data. Because no annual conversion rate was available for MDL, the exchange rate for the date of submission of Moldova's Annual Report was used (9 March 2020). https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=MDL&date=2020-03-09.

# **ROMANIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT on	ine reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Romania's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Romania continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Romania reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons in its 2018 report.



Romania provided clear, disaggregated data on all reported exports and imports.

Romania provided descriptions of all transfers and, in some cases, comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Romania could disaggregate states of origin for all SALW exports and imports.

Romania could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.




### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Romania reported exports to 12 countries in 2019. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Somalia).
- Romania reported the export of 304 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) to the United States.
- Romania reported the export of 52,895 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (62 per cent), rifles and carbines (33 per cent) and assault rifles (2 per cent).
- The main importing countries of SALW from Romania were the United States (91 per cent), Canada (4 per cent) and the Czech Republic (2 per cent).



- Romania reported imports from 17 countries in 2019. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Romania reported the import of 48 major conventional weapons items. These were 32 armoured combat vehicles from Switzerland and 16 missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United States.
- Romania reported the import of 6,607 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (52 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (47 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Romania were the Czech Republic (49 per cent), Germany (19 per cent) and Belgium (9 per cent).

## **SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS**



# **SAINT LUCIA**

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2015 X


2016 X

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X

## SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES



### **SAMOA**

## **SAN MARINO**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?


2016 X

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X

#### **SENEGAL**



# **SERBIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?		Ye	s - Missed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?			ATT reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available	2015 🗸 2016 🗸 2017 🗸 2018 🗸 2019 🗸



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Serbia's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Serbia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Serbia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.



Serbia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Serbia could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.

Serbia did not specify if it was providing 'nil' reports by ticking the relevant boxes on the front page of its report, though it provided data for exports and imports.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Serbia reported exports to 43 countries in 2019. Of these, 27 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and 11 were non-members (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Uganda and Vietnam).
- Serbia reported exports of 34,740 major conventional weapons items, covering five categories. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (72 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (28 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from Serbia were the United Arab Emirates (68 per cent), Saudi Arabia (14 per cent) and Lebanon (6 per cent).
- Serbia reported the export of 194,271 SALW items, covering ten sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (94 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Serbia were the United States (82 per cent), Burkina Faso (5 per cent) and Cameroon (4 per cent).



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Serbia reported imports from 18 countries in 2019. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and two were non-members (Belarus and Russia).
- Serbia reported imports of 2,192 major conventional weapons items. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (96 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (4 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional weapons to Serbia were Belarus (96 per cent) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (4 per cent).
- Serbia reported the import of 5,152 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (65 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (31 per cent) and heavy machine guns (3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Serbia were Montenegro (47 per cent), the Czech Republic (15 per cent) and Slovakia (12 per cent).

## **SEYCHELLES**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2017 **X** 

2018 X

2019 🗶

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

# **SIERRA LEONE**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Sierra Leone's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Sierra Leone submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.



Sierra Leone submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2019.





### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for exports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

• Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for imports.



# **SLOVAKIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015 X 2016 V 2017 V 2018 V 2019 V



## **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Slovakia's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Slovakia reported  ${\bf Actual\ Numbers}$  of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Slovakia reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.



Slovakia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Slovakia provided detailed descriptions of major conventional weapons exports and imports, as well as some comments describing the nature of its transfers.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Slovakia could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of its SALW exports and imports.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Slovakia reported exports to 49 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, 36 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and five were non-members (Egypt, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan).<sup>43</sup>
- Slovakia reported the export of 9,893 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. Of these, the majority were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (99 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from Slovakia were Poland (40 per cent), Latvia (30 per cent) and Serbia (25 per cent).
- Slovakia reported the export of 79,373 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (94 per cent) and rifles and carbines (4 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Slovakia were Brazil (32 per cent), Mexico (13 per cent) and South Africa (12 per cent).



- Slovakia reported imports from 20 countries in 2019.
   Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties and five were Signatories.
- Slovakia reported the import of 33 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. These were large-calibre artillery systems (55 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (33 per cent), battle tanks (6 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (6 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional weapons to Slovakia were Bosnia and Herzegovina (45 per cent), the Czech Republic (36 per cent), Israel (6 per cent) and the United States (6 per cent).
- Slovakia reported the import of 18,123 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (56 per cent), rifles and carbines (39 per cent) and sub-machine guns (3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Slovakia were the Czech Republic (31 per cent), Austria (30 per cent) and Germany (17 per cent).

# **SLOVENIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes – On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?			No
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Slovenia's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons as it did in its 2018 report, and instead reported light weapons exports after not doing so in 2018.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It reported imports of major conventional weapons though it did not in its 2018 report, and it did not report light weapons as it did in 2018.



Slovenia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export and both numbers and values of items transferred.

Slovenia provided descriptions of all reported exports and imports, as well as selective comments on transfers.

Slovenia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Slovenia could provide more comments describing the nature of its SALW exports and imports.

Slovenia did not specify which currency it used to report the values of its exports and imports.



### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Slovenia reported exports to 17 countries and territories in 2019. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and three were non-members (Egypt, Oman and Pakistan).<sup>44</sup>
- Slovenia did not report exports of any major conventional weapons items.
- Slovenia reported the export of 3,368 SALW items, covering three sub-categories. It did not report values for all transfers but reported a total of €872,590 (US\$977,144)<sup>45</sup> SALW exports. In terms of value, the majority of these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (82 per cent) and heavy machine guns (18 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Slovenia were the United States (42 per cent), Serbia (15 per cent) and Austria (15 per cent).



- Slovenia reported imports from nine countries in 2019.
   Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Slovenia reported the import of one major conventional weapon item, a large-calibre artillery system from Spain. Slovenia listed itself as the state of origin.
- Slovenia reported imports of 783 SALW items with a total value of €91,057 (US\$101,968),<sup>46</sup> covering four subcategories. In terms of value, the majority of these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (82 per cent), rifles and carbines (16 per cent) and assault rifles (2 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Slovakia (40 per cent), the Czech Republic (38 per cent) and Austria (7 per cent).

<sup>44</sup> Slovenia also reported exports to one non-UN member (Kosovo).

<sup>45</sup> Slovenia did not specify which currency is used for reported values of transfers. For this analysis, the ATT Monitor has assumed the currency to be euros. Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2019 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm. 46 lbid.

# **SOUTH AFRICA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015 🗸 2016 🗸 2017 🗸 2018 🗸



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## **SPAIN**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?				Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified	- Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			ATT repo	orting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publi	cly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Spain's reporting changed in its 2019 annual report.

Spain reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and light weapons exports. It did not report small arms exports as it did in its 2018 report.

Spain reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, after reporting light weapons imports in its 2018 report. It did not report small arms imports.



Spain provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported exports and imports.



### **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Spain did not indicate by ticking the relevant box whether it had excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Spain could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Spain reported exports to six countries in 2019. Of these, three were ATT State Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Pakistan).
- Spain reported the export of 26 major conventional weapons items, all of which were large-calibre artillery systems to Belgium (54 per cent) and El Salvador (46 per cent).
- Spain reported the export of 5,282 light weapons items, all of which were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers.
- The main importers of light weapons from Spain were Estonia (76 per cent), Pakistan (18 per cent) and Turkey (6 per cent).



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Spain reported imports from one ATT Signatory in 2019.
- Spain reported the import of four major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United States.
- Spain did not report SALW imports.

#### STATE OF PALESTINE

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Yes - On time

No

## **SWEDEN**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		ATT reporting ter	nplate and online reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made pub	2015 \( \sqrt{2016} \) 2016 \( \sqrt{2017} \) 2018 \( \sqrt{2019} \)



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Sweden's reporting remained the same in its 2019 annual report.

Sweden reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and light weapons exports. It reported **Actual Values** of exports under voluntary national categories. It did not report any small arms exports.

Sweden reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, though the amount was classified. It did not report imports of SALW.



Sweden made extensive use of 'Section C: Voluntary National Categories' to report data under 19 out of 22 EU Common Military List categories. It reported aggregate values of items exported to individual destinations under each category.<sup>47</sup>

Sweden provided descriptions of most items for exports and imports reported in ATT major conventional weapons and SALW categories.



### ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Sweden could provide comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.



# TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Sweden reported exports under sections A and B to nine countries in 2019. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (India).
- Sweden reported the export of 18 major conventional weapons items under sections A and B, which were armoured combat vehicles to Austria. It also reported exports of missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) to Brazil, Lithuania and Singapore. It kept the numbers of each classified.
- Sweden reported exports of light weapons under sections A and B, covering two sub-categories to Australia, India, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. It kept the numbers of each classified.
- Under voluntary national categories, Sweden also provided data covering 19 categories of the EU Common Military List. Under ML1 items, which include small arms, it reported exports worth SEK14.5m (US\$1.5m).<sup>48</sup> In terms of value, the majority of ML1 exports were to Germany (15 per cent), South Africa (13 per cent) and the United Kingdom (13 per cent).



- Sweden reported imports from one ATT State Party in 2019.
- Sweden reported one import of a classified number of missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) from the United Kingdom.

<sup>47</sup> Of the items reported by Sweden under voluntary national categories, only ML1 items (smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less) are considered for analysis here, as Sweden indicated in its report that these items corresponded to Small Arms (aggregated).

### **SWITZERLAND**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relate	ed' reasons?	No
What reporting template was used?		ATT on	ine reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015 🗸* 2016 🗸 2017 🗸 2018 🗸 2019 🗸	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



### **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Switzerland's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Switzerland continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports.

Switzerland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, though it reported authorized numbers in its 2018 report. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports, though it did not report imports of light weapons in its 2018 report.

In Annex 2 of the online reporting tool, Switzerland clarified its national definitions for reported exports and imports, including a detailed description of its Category VIII definition.

<sup>\*</sup> Report submitted before it was due



#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

Switzerland provided clear, disaggregated data on each reported export and import.

Switzerland clarified its national definitions for reported exports and imports in Annex 2 of the online reporting tool, including a detailed description of its Category VIII definition.



## **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

Switzerland could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.



#### TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- Switzerland reported exports to 51 countries in 2019.
   Of these, 41 were ATT States Parties, four were
   Signatories and six were non-members (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).
- Switzerland reported exports of 162 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (92 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (7 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from Switzerland were Denmark (57 per cent), Romania (16 per cent) and Ireland (10 per cent).
- Switzerland reported exports of 25,362 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (33 per cent), sub-machine guns (32 per cent) and rifles and carbines (24 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW items from Switzerland were the United States (79 per cent), Germany (6 per cent) and Italy (5 per cent).



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

- Switzerland reported imports from 24 countries in 2019. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Switzerland reported the import of six major conventional weapons items, all of which were large-calibre artillery systems from Spain.
- Switzerland reported the import of 9,596 SALW items in 2019, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (55 per cent), assault rifles (24 per cent) and rifles and carbines (8 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Switzerland were the United States (27 per cent), Germany (27 per cent) and the Czech Republic (13 per cent).

## **TOGO**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2017 
Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2018 
2019 
2019 
2019

## **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO**

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2015 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?


2016 X

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X

## **TUVALU**





## **UNITED KINGDOM**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - M	1issed deadline
Was the 2020 annual report made public?				Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/nationa	l security-relat	ed' reasons?	Unspecified	- Not indicated
What reporting template was used?			UNI	ROCA template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publ	icly available?	2015



## **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

United Kingdom's reporting remained the same in its 2019 report.

United Kingdom reported **Authorized Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

United Kingdom did not report any imports.



#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

United Kingdom provided clear, disaggregated data for each export of major conventional weapons and SALW.

United Kingdom provided detailed descriptions of items and/or some comments on transfers for many of its exports.



## **ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

United Kingdom provided no data on imports for major conventional weapons or SALW and did not indicate if it submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

185

United Kingdom did not specify whether the reported exports of attack helicopters were manned or unmanned, per UN Registry Definitions of Categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT.<sup>49</sup>



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

- United Kingdom reported exports to 77 countries for 2019.
   Of these, 50 were ATT States Parties, 14 were Signatories and 13 were non-members (Armenia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia).
- United Kingdom reported the export of 826 major conventional weapons items, covering six categories.
   Of these, the majority were missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (43 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (38 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) (12 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from the United Kingdom were Belgium (21 per cent), Qatar (21 per cent) and Latvia (15 per cent).
- United Kingdom reported the export of 39,304 SALW items, covering 11 sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (89 per cent), 'others' (small arms) (5 per cent) and assault rifles (3 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from the United Kingdom were the United States (69 per cent), Australia (7 per cent) and Germany (4 per cent).




## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

United Kingdom did not report imports.

<sup>49</sup> The UN Register definitions of weapons categories include attack helicopters that are: (a) manned rotary-wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions; and (b) unmanned rotary-wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons. For more information, see ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiEzk, p. 26.

## **URUGUAY**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?			Yes - On time
Was the 2020 annual report made public?			Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national	al security-relat	ed' reasons?	Yes
What reporting template was used?		ATT re	porting template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2015	Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2015



## **REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2019**

Uruguay's reporting changed slightly in its 2019 annual report.

Uruguay again submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Uruguay reported **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of one small arms import. It did not submit a 'nil' report for imports as it did in its 2018 report.



## **GOOD PRACTICES**

Uruguay provided clear, disaggregated data for its one reported small arms import and included a description of the reported items.



## ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Uruguay could include comments describing the nature of its imports.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: EXPORT DATA

• Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for exports.



## TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2019: IMPORT DATA

 Uruguay reported one import of small arms of 40 rifles and carbines from Austria.

## **ZAMBIA**

Was the 2020 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2017 X

2018 X

2019 X



# CHAPTER 4: ATT REPORTING UPDATES AND INSIGHTS FROM 2020

## 4.1 – PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2020 ANNUAL REPORTS

#### INTRODUCTION

Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) requires every State Party to submit an annual report, by 31 May each year, on its national arms exports and imports that occurred during the previous calendar year. ATT annual reports serve as a critical tool for increasing transparency and providing greater understanding of the global arms trade, as well as for building confidence in responsible and accountable government actions when making armstransfer decisions.

The Treaty requires States Parties to submit their first annual report following the first full calendar year after its entry into force for that State Party, and then every year thereafter. The ATT Secretariat grants States Parties a seven-day grace period to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

#### PREVIEW OF 2020 ANNUAL REPORTS

Of the 110 States Parties to the ATT, only 105 were required to submit their 2020 annual reports on arms exports and imports. Forty-six States Parties did so by the 7 June 2021 deadline, representing an on-time compliance rate of 44 per cent. This reflects a notable increase in ontime reporting compliance from the previous year when States Parties submitted reports in the early waves of the COVID-19 pandemic, though nevertheless underscores the persistent challenge with low compliance rates in ATT reporting overall.

Uneven reporting compliance may be the result of several factors, including the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, competing government priorities, limited resources, and/or enduring questions or uncertainties about the ATT's reporting requirements.

Table 4.1: ATT annual reports on-time reporting rates

Reporting Year	Number of On-Time Reports Submitted	On-Time Completion Rate	
2015	28	46%	
2016	32	43%	
2017	36	40%	
2018	45	49%	
2019	36	37%	
2020	46	44%	

The following 46 States Parties submitted their 2020 ATT annual reports on time:

 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden and Switzerland

Thirteen States Parties (Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Benin, El Salvador, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Maldives, Mauritius, the Republic of North Macedonia and the State of Palestine) elected to make their 2020 reports private, representing approximately 28 per cent of on-time submissions. By comparison, 17 per cent of reports submitted on time in the previous year were private. This continues a worrying trend towards increased private reporting.

Private reporting continues to pose a challenge to transparency, and at least eight States Parties shifted their reporting patterns towards more privacy. Six States Parties (Albania, Georgia, Greece, Lithuania, Mauritius and the Republic of Macedonia) continued to submit their annual reports privately despite having previously submitted public reports. Two States Parties (Benin and El Salvador) for the first time made their annual reports private, after submitting public annual reports in previous years.

The growing practice and increasing rate of private reporting not only challenges transparency – a core object and purpose of the ATT – but also hinders public accounting of global armstransfer dynamics and obstructs efforts to identify problematic sales or potentially dangerous accumulations.

#### **REPORTING UPDATES**

In 2021, eight States Parties (Botswana, Canada, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, the Maldives, Mozambique, Palau and Suriname) were required to submit their first annual reports, capturing arms exports and imports that occurred during the 2020 calendar year. As of 7 June 2021, three of these (Canada, the Maldives and Palau) had done so.¹ The relatively low rate of compliance among first-time reporters this year may reflect the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has disrupted work dynamics, delayed scheduling, and hampered the reporting capacities of many States Parties, particularly those that did not have a standard and systematic process for reporting to the ATT Secretariat already in place.

Reporting compliance rates have varied each year since ATT reporting began. At the time of publication, 41 States Parties had submitted their annual report for every year they were required to do so, not including the three States Parties (Canada, the Maldives and Palau) that were required to report for the first time this year and did so.<sup>2</sup> Commendably, one State Party (Barbados) submitted an ATT annual report for the first time this year, while it had been required to do so every year for the last five years.

Meanwhile, 26 States Parties have never submitted an annual report, despite being required to do so for one or more years (not including those States Parties that were required to report

for the first time this year).<sup>3</sup> The number of States Parties that have been consistently non-compliant with their annual reporting obligations has remained constant over the last two years. This years-long lack of reporting by 26 States Parties highlights the extent to which faltering ATT reporting is an enduring challenge and one that cannot be explained solely by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor, 27 States Parties submitted their 2019 annual reports, bringing the total number of 2019 annual reports received by the ATT Secretariat to 63. At least two of these 27 States Parties (Antigua and Barbuda and Croatia) also belatedly submitted past-due annual reports for previous years. In the past year, Antigua and Barbuda submitted all of its five past-due annual reports after years of non-compliance, covering arms exports and imports from 2015 through 2019. Additionally, Croatia not only submitted its 2020 annual report as required by the de facto 7 June 2021 deadline, but also submitted its 2018 and 2019 annual reports.

The approach of Antigua and Barbuda and Croatia to submitting their overdue reports serves as an example of good practice towards improving compliance with the ATT's reporting requirements as well as demonstrating a positive commitment towards transparency in the global arms trade.



THE APPROACH OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA AND CROATIA TO SUBMITTING THEIR OVERDUE REPORTS SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE OF GOOD PRACTICE TOWARDS IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATT'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS DEMONSTRATING A POSITIVE COMMITMENT TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY IN THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE.

<sup>1</sup> The Maldives also submitted a 2019 ATT annual report last year, despite not being required to do so at the time.

<sup>2</sup> The 41 States Parties that, as of 7 June 2021, have consistently complied with their annual reporting obligations are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden and Switzerland.

<sup>3</sup> The 26 States Parties that have never reported are: Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia.

#### **INITIAL ASSESSMENT**

A preliminary review of the contents of the publicly available 2020 ATT annual reports received by 7 June 2021 offers the following observations:

- Eight of the 32 States Parties that submitted publicly available 2020 annual reports by 7 June 2021 used the online reporting tool.<sup>4</sup> Of these, seven States Parties (the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland) also used the online reporting tool in the previous year. By comparison, nine States Parties used the online reporting tool in 2019.<sup>5</sup>
- Three States Parties (Palau, Peru and Sierra Leone) submitted 'nil' reports for exports and three (Palau, Sierra Leone and Sweden) submitted 'nil' reports for imports.
- Six States Parties (Argentina, Finland, Mexico, Montenegro, the Republic of Korea and Sweden) – approximately 18 per cent of publicly available reports – indicated that some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related data was withheld from their 2020 annual reports. By comparison, approximately 20 per cent of States Parties reporting on time indicated that such information was withheld in the previous year.
- Five States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland) indicated their 2020 reports included information on national definitions and categories of conventional arms, the same number as for States Parties reporting on time in the previous year.



<sup>4</sup> The eight States Parties that used the online reporting tool to submit their 2020 annual reports are: Argentina, Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland.

<sup>5</sup> The nine States Parties that used the online reporting tool to submit their 2019 annual reports are: Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland.

#### **EXPORTS**

- Fifteen States Parties (Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) reported exports of major conventional weapons. Of these, 12 States Parties reported actual exports of major conventional weapons and two (Belgium and Italy) reported on export authorizations.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, one State Party (Bosnia and Herzegovina) did not indicate whether it reported actual exports or authorizations, complicating comparative analyses and review.
- Thirty States Parties reported exports of SALW.7 Of these, 17 States Parties reported actual exports of SALW, nine reported SALW export authorizations, and two (Ireland and Spain) reported both authorizations and actual exports for SALW. It is unclear if two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro) intended to report authorizations, actual SALW exports or both. Bosnia and Herzegovina left the field blank in its annual report and Montenegro selected both boxes when reporting SALW exports.
- Three States Parties reported differently on exports of major conventional weapons and of SALW. Germany and Switzerland reported actual exports of major conventional weapons and authorizations of SALW exports. Spain reported actual exports of major conventional weapons and a combination of authorizations and actual SALW exports.
- Twenty-three States Parties reported only the number of items exported.<sup>8</sup> One State Party (Sweden) reported publicly only the value of items exported, and six reported both the number and value of items exported to varying extents.<sup>9</sup> For example, Belgium reported the number of major conventional systems exported but the value of its SALW exports. Ireland, by comparison, reported the number and value of its SALW export authorizations and only the number of its actual SALW exports.

#### **IMPORTS**

- Eighteen States Parties reported imports of major conventional weapons. Of these, two States Parties (Italy and Peru) reported import authorizations and 14 reported actual imports.<sup>10</sup> It is unclear if two States Parties (Montenegro and Portugal) reported import authorizations or actual imports as they either selected both boxes in the reporting form or left the field blank.
- Thirty States Parties reported imports of SALW. Of these, 16 States Parties reported actual SALW imports, seven reported SALW import authorizations, and three (Belgium, Denmark and Liechtenstein) reported both authorizations and actual SALW imports.<sup>11</sup> It is unclear if four States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Peru and Portugal) reported import authorizations or actual imports, as they either selected both boxes in the reporting form or left the field blank.
- Two States Parties reported differently on imports of major conventional weapons and of SALW. Denmark reported actual imports of major conventional weapons and reported both actual SALW imports and authorizations. Spain reported actual imports of major conventional weapons but reported SALW import authorizations.
- Twenty-four States Parties reported only the number of items imported. One State Party (Belgium) reported only the value of items imported.<sup>12</sup> Five States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Latvia, Peru and Slovenia) reported both the number and value of items imported, to varying extents. For example, Japan and Latvia reported only the number of major conventional weapons imported and reported both the number and value of SALW imports. Peru, by comparison, reported the number and value for all reported imports.

<sup>6</sup> The 12 States Parties that reported actual exports of major conventional weapons are: Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

<sup>7</sup> The 30 States Parties that reported SALW exports are: Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

<sup>8</sup> The 23 States Parties that reported only the number of items exported are: Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland.

<sup>9</sup> The six States Parties that reported, to varying extents, both the number and value of items exported are: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, Japan, Latvia and Slovenia.

<sup>10</sup> The 14 States Parties that reported actual imports of major conventional weapons are: Argentina, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.

<sup>11</sup> The 16 States Parties that reported actual imports of SALW are: Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.


<sup>12</sup> The 24 States Parties that reported only the number of items imported are: Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland.

#### CONCLUSION

Throughout more than a year of disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have adapted their processes and are starting to return their attention to issues of Treaty compliance. While annual reporting rates have increased from the lowest point – the submission of 2018 annual reports during the early waves of the COVID-19 pandemic – the reporting rate remains troublingly low.

States Parties need to be reminded of the importance and necessity of fulfilling their ATT reporting requirements. Equally problematic is the increasing rate of private reporting, preventing analysis of a growing number of annual reports. Without a comprehensive picture of global arms transfers, it is impossible to identify trade trends or potentially worrisome accumulations.

Still there were some positive developments in this year's round of annual reporting. States Parties that submitted past-due reports are a positive example for others to follow. Reporting compliance with first-time reporters is also a good sign of new States Parties recognizing and meeting their reporting obligations. Continued emphasis of the importance of reporting by the ATT Secretariat, the Working Group Chairs, and States Parties will be essential in ensuring that the Treaty's transparency objectives are met.



A CF-188 HORNET AT MIHAIL KOGLNICEANU AIR BASE, ROMANIA.

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# 4.2 – UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS AND MONITORING TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

#### INTRODUCTION

Initial reports, which allow States Parties to report on the measures they are taking to implement the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), are essential to understanding how States Parties interpret their obligations and where crucial gaps remain. Initial reports are the only required reports that demonstrate how States Parties describe their national practices in fulfilling the ATT's obligations and shed light on critical capacity strengths and weaknesses. Article 13.1 of the ATT requires States Parties to submit an initial report 'within the first year after entry into force' of the Treaty for that State Party.¹ Although submission deadlines differ for each State Party, many long-time States Parties have yet to complete their initial reports, leading to a less-than-complete picture of ATT implementation.

As of 7 June 2021, 105 States Parties were required to submit to the ATT Secretariat their initial reports on Treaty implementation. By that date, 81 States Parties had done so, representing a compliance rate of approximately 77 per cent. The compliance rate has remained relatively constant over the last two years.

This chapter provides a brief update on the current status of initial reporting, offering an overview of newly submitted initial reports as well as on reporting non-compliance. The chapter also provides insights on recent and ongoing efforts to improve ATT reporting by the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the ATT Secretariat.

#### **RECENT REPORTS**

Five States Parties submitted their initial reports between June 2020 and June 2021, the period following the publication of the 2020 ATT Monitor Report. Five States Parties (Botswana, Canada, Lebanon, the Maldives and Palau) were due to submit their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat within that period. Of these, three (Canada, the Maldives and Palau) did so. Two additional States Parties (Cameroon and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) also belatedly submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat within the last year.

Cameroon and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were required to submit their initial reports in September 2019 and December 2015, respectively. Their past-due reporting marks the second year in a row in which multiple States Parties submitted an overdue initial report to the ATT Secretariat. This is a positive shift for reporting compliance and eases the stigma of late reporting. The ATT Secretariat, States Parties and civil society could use these examples in their presentations to the Working Groups and the Conference of States Parties (CSP) to encourage other States Parties to submit overdue reports.


The submission of more initial reports offers a greater understanding of the ways in which States Parties from all regions and with varying capacities are implementing the ATT. From May 2019 to May 2021, at least six previously noncompliant States Parties submitted their initial reports (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cameroon, Malta, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zambia). This trend may also underscore the usefulness of regular, direct outreach from the President of the CSP process and the ATT Secretariat to States Parties reminding them of their reporting obligations and deadlines.

However, three of the five States Parties that submitted their initial reports within the last year (Cameroon, Maldives and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) elected to make their reports private, increasing a concerning trend in private reporting on ATT implementation. Two States Parties (Canada and Palau) reported publicly.

Of the 81 submitted initial reports, 17 are private, representing approximately 21 per cent of all submitted reports. Private reporting presents a growing challenge for efforts to monitor and assess the ATT's impact, and to identify any gaps in – as well as highlight available capacity to support – comprehensive implementation.

The question remains as to why certain States Parties choose to report privately. This is worth further examination and could be included as part of efforts of the WGTR to understand challenges to reporting. In addition, it may be worthwhile asking States Parties that report privately their reasons for doing so, so as to better understand potential challenges to, or variations in, ATT reporting and to identify strategies to support public reporting.

<sup>1</sup> As the ATT Secretariat website explains, States Parties 'that ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the Treaty after 24 December 2014, the Treaty enters into force [...] ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with Article 22. The deadline for submission of its initial report is twelve months after that date.' See Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat (2021). 'Reporting Requirements'. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/reporting.html.



States Parties have the option of using different methods to compile information on their Treaty implementation efforts. As of 7 June 2021, 55 of the 64 States Parties that made their initial report public, or nearly 86 per cent, used the recommended ATT reporting template. Seven States Parties used the ATT Baseline Assessment Survey developed by the Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) and two used a national format.

In 2019, the ATT Secretariat launched an online reporting tool that States Parties can use to submit their initial reports. To date, however, no State Party has utilized the online tool. While the majority of States Parties continue to use the recommended ATT reporting template endorsed by the WGTR, the variation in submission methods is worth continued monitoring due to the fact that this can complicate past and future analyses comparing ATT implementation across countries.

The initial reports of Canada and Palau, the only newly submitted reports made publicly available, offer examples of good practice for both reporting and Treaty implementation. For example, Canada indicated that its national risk-assessment procedure includes the consideration of risk-mitigation measures and identified what these may include (for example, end-use documentation, post-export reporting and permit restrictions, and targeting and examination of high-risk shipments, among other measures). Palau indicated that its national control system includes measures to regulate transit

and trans-shipment, and it offered relevant details from its Customs Regulations as to how it implements these regulations.

With regard to good reporting practices, Canada and Palau provided links to their national control lists as well as links to relevant legislation and resources that inform these lists. Canada also elaborated on how its national control system aligns with the specific prohibitions enumerated in Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATT – providing information beyond what is requested in the ATT reporting template.

#### **NON-COMPLIANCE**

The number of States Parties that are non-compliant with their initial reporting requirement remains constant, as 24 States Parties have not submitted their reports to the ATT Secretariat (the same number that had not done so at this time last year).

Two of these 24 States Parties (Botswana and Lebanon) are six-months to one-year delinquent on their initial reporting requirement. Three (Brazil, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique) are one-year to two-years delinquent, and 19 are more than three-years delinquent (Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino and the Seychelles).

Notably, nine of these 19 States Parties that are more than three-years delinquent in submitting their initial reports – approximately 47 per cent – have submitted a UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN PoA) national report within the last three years. The UN PoA national report contains many synergies with the ATT initial report and captures information on States Parties' national arms-transfer control systems. Of the 24 States Parties that have yet to submit their initial reports, 18 have experience reporting on their national arms-transfer control systems in other forums, particularly through national reports for the UN PoA. Five of these 18 States Parties submitted a 2020 UN PoA national report.

#### **UPDATED REPORTS**

Article 13.1 of the Treaty requires States Parties to update their initial reports and to provide the ATT Secretariat with information on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this

Treaty, when appropriate: Since the publication of the 2020 ATT Monitor Annual Report, one State Party (Hungary) has submitted updates to its initial report, joining Japan, New Zealand, Slovenia, and Sweden as the only five States Parties to have submitted updates to date.

Hungary updated the names and contact information for its national points of contact for the ATT, details on legislation that had been updated in the years since first submitting its initial report that contains its national control list (providing a new link to its control list as well), and the names of the national authorities responsible for controlling arms exports, imports, transit/transshipment, and brokering. Hungary also clarified language in its definition of brokering.

No standard template or mechanism for updating initial reports has yet been established or encouraged by the WGTR or the ATT Secretariat.



#### **OUTSTANDING CHALLENGES TO INITIAL REPORTING**

States Parties have identified several enduring obstacles to reporting on ATT implementation that continue to impact the efficacy and universalization of ATT reporting. The 2019 ATT-BAP publication 'Lessons Learned from Arms Trade Reporting' offers insights on the challenges experienced by different States Parties in their efforts to report comprehensively on – and consistently assess – their Treaty implementation efforts.<sup>2</sup> These challenges include difficulty in maintaining awareness of reporting obligations and deadlines, difficulty in accessing and compiling relevant information, and limited resources and capacity to complete reporting obligations.

Moreover, continued challenges with the ATT reporting templates have exacerbated existing problems and led to confusion. The 2020 ATT-BAP report 'The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations' highlights these issues and provides recommendations for updates to the initial reporting template as being considered by the WGTR.<sup>3</sup>

States Parties have to balance their ATT reporting obligations with similar reporting requirements for several other agreements and regimes, which can compound the challenges posed by already strained government resources and staff. Additionally, several governments may still be working to establish the internal processes and mechanisms to support effective and efficient reporting, such as those that guide data collection, data storage and information sharing across relevant agencies. Moreover, there is not yet an accurate accounting of the impact of the COVID-19 global pandemic on ATT reporting.

# CONCLUSION: EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ATT INITIAL REPORTING

ATT initial reporting remains stagnant, with just over three-quarters of States Parties meeting their reporting obligations. As a result, a less-than-complete picture of Treaty implementation hampers efforts to develop strategies to support ATT implementation. States Parties often talk about Treaty universalization, but reporting universalization remains an elusive challenge, despite the submission of initial reports being an obligation.

Different regions struggle with reporting in unequal ways and thus it remains important to ensure States Parties in lower-compliance regions are encouraged to report, no matter how overdue reports are. States Parties should be encouraged to utilize reporting synergies with other reports, such as the voluntary national reports for the UN PoA. Equally concerning is that the rate of private reporting is growing each year. Private reporting limits knowledge about implementation efforts, gaps and needs, and good practice.

The WGTR continues to focus on several of these issues towards improving reporting efforts and increasing reporting submissions. The COVID-19 pandemic paused these efforts, but the WGTR will continue its initiative to update the initial reporting template during the CSP7 and CSP8 process. Other efforts to improve reporting undertaken by the WGTR include working to encourage States Parties that are not compliant with their ATT reporting obligations to provide insights on their reporting challenges, and offering a platform for States Parties to share good practices in reporting and potential solutions to identified reporting challenges. Additionally, the WGTR will continue to examine and address challenges raised by concerning reporting trends and invite stakeholders to volunteer and discuss substantive issues related to ATT reporting obligations that could benefit from closer examination and dedicated discussion. These are all crucial steps to ensure the universalization of ATT reporting and that the reports fulfil the promise of transparency and confidence building as articulated in Article 1 of the Treaty.

<sup>2</sup> ATT-BAP (2019). 'Lessons Learned from Arms Trade Reporting', January 2019. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ATT-BAP\_LESSONS-LEARNED-FROM-REPORTING\_ATT.pdf.

<sup>3</sup> Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) (2020). 'The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations'. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Reporting-Templates-Challenges-and-Recommendations\_Web-Version.pdf.

