

COVER PHOTO:

AN EX-COMBATANT HOLDS UP MUNITIONS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE AFTER A DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) OPERATION CONDUCTED BY UNOCI IN 2012.

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ATT MONITOR 2020 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty	PHR	Physicians for Human Rights	
ATT-BAP	Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project	PrepCom	Preparatory Committee	
CAAT	Campaign Against the Arms Trade	PSV	Post-shipment Verification	
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons	
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations	UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs	
CSP	Conference of States Parties to the ATT	UNRCPD	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States			
EGAI	Expert Group on ATT Implementation		United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	
EUBAM	European Border Assistance Mission in Libya		United Nations Trust Facility Supporting	
EUC	End-user Certificate		Cooperation on Arms Regulation	
FDEA	Swiss Federal Department of	VTF	ATT Voluntary Trust Fund	
	Economic Affairs	WGETI	ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty	
GBV	Gender-Based Violence		Implementation	
IHL	International Humanitarian Law	WGTR	ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting	
IHRL	International Human Rights Law	WGTU	ATT Working Group on Treaty Universalization	
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean	WILPF	Women's International League for Peace	
LNA	Libyan National Army		and Freedom	

THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor is the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The project was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Austria, Australia, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society, and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

The ATT Monitor meets the research needs of ATT stakeholders by:

- Synthesizing information and analysing trends and developments on ATT compliance to advance the Treaty's universalization and implementation
- Assessing standards of national reporting (Article 13) and relevant transparency commitments
- Providing country-by-country analysis on reporting and transfer practices

- Identifying patterns and trends of exports/imports of conventional weapons and reporting them against ATT criteria
- Making research findings available in print and online, in user-friendly formats, and translating key publications into languages other than English
- Maintaining a global network of experts who contribute to ATT Monitor outputs through the International Reference Group (IRG), and contribute to development of ATT Monitor content through the Editorial Team

This information is used to:

- Advance the ATT's universalization and implementation
- Identify key challenges in advancing global acceptance of the ATT's norms and its full implementation, and propose steps to address these challenges
- Provide recommendations for government policy planning and decision-making
- Provide a research-based tool to civil society for use in developing advocacy campaigns and capacitybuilding and training programs





STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW JUNE 2019-MAY 2020

This review covers the period between 1 June 2019 and 31 May 2020, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports.¹ It explores some of the key events and milestones during the past year and assesses their impact on the overall performance of States Parties to the Treaty regarding universalization and compliance.

This review takes stock of an unusual year for all multilateral diplomacy processes, all of which have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the ATT. With this impact in mind, this section first takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the abovementioned period. It then considers the decisions and outputs of the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), which includes three sub-working groups on Articles 6 and 7, diversion and transit and trans-shipment, the latter of which is newly established this year to replace the sub-working group on general implementation. Finally, the review looks at compliance with the ATT's core provisions and assesses whether the cumulative actions of ATT stakeholders contributed to the Treaty's objective of reducing human suffering.

ATT COMPLIANCE AND COVID-19

Preliminary analysis of ATT reports submitted between June 2019 and May 2020 show that challenges raised by COVID-19 may have affected some States Parties' ability to submit reports on time this year.

However, the geographic and systemic diversity of those that were able to report by the deadline demonstrates that lack of political will likely remains the largest impediment to ATT reporting. Ongoing analysis of reporting trends, including the worrying increase in reports not being made public, will need to be further examined in a non-COVID year to determine if there is in fact a continued trend towards less transparency in this regard.

Similarly, the work cycle of the Sixth Conference of States Parties (CSP6) proceeded differently than those in previous years. In March 2020, Ambassador Carlos Foradori of Argentina, President of CSP6, announced the cancellation of the second ATT Working Group and Informal Preparatory meetings. Analysis and summaries presented below account for the changes in this year's cycle, which will need to be considered when conducting analysis over time.

UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

As of 31 May 2020, 106 countries were listed as States Parties by the ATT Secretariat, accounting for more than half (55 per cent) of all United Nations (UN) member states. A further 32 were Signatories.

Four countries became States Parties to the ATT between 1 June 2019 and 31 May 2020. Botswana, Canada and the Maldives acceded, and Namibia ratified the Treaty. This marks a 43 per cent drop in new membership when compared to last year² and closely matches the universalization rate of 2017-2018.³

The pace of new membership to any treaty will eventually slow over time. However, this year's analysis shows a notable decrease in universalization progress and a return to the downward trend reported by the ATT Monitor prior to the sharp increase in States Parties recorded in last year's analysis.

Even with new members, the geographic spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2020, the regions with the lowest number of ATT States Parties were Africa (27 of 54 countries), Asia (eight of 14) and Oceania (five of 14). Europe (39 of 43 countries) and the Americas (26 of 35) have greater regional proportionality of States Parties.⁴

The ATT continues to enjoy particularly strong support among certain sub-regional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), all of whose members are States Parties.
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with 14 of 15 members (93 per cent) being States Parties.
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 12 of 15 members (80 per cent) being States Parties.⁵

¹ States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.


² Between 7 June 2018 and 31 May 2019, seven countries ratified the ATT. See Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 9.

³ Between 7 June 2017 and 31 May 2018, one country ratified and two acceded to the ATT. See ATT Secretariat (2019). 'Treaty Status'. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html?templateId=209883.

⁴ Analysis is based on UN Statistics Division regional groupings. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/.

⁵ CARICOM (N.D.). 'Membership'. http://caricom.org/membership. One of the members of CARICOM, Montserrat, is not a UN member state and so is not a State Party to the ATT.

MAP OF STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS AND STATES PARTIES (AS OF 31 MAY 2020)



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RATIFIED/ACCEDED: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana*, Brazil Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada*, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, State of Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa. San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia.

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SIGNED: Andorra, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Gabon, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

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NOT YET JOINED: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, China, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen.

^{*} Botswana and Canada acceded to the ATT prior to CSP 2019 but were not included in analysis presented in the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report, as the Treaty had not yet entered into force for either State.

National and regional training workshops around the world brought together civil society organizations (CSOs) and government representatives to explore technical challenges and legal requirements of ATT membership and support national capacity-building efforts toward effective implementation of the ATT. For example:

- In Kazakhstan (3-4 July 2019), more than 30 government officials attended the workshop 'ATT Universalization and Implementation Workshop for Central Asia and Mongolia', hosted by Kazakhstan and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD). Participants discussed the elements needed to build national-level institutional capacities to implement the ATT.⁶
- In Namibia (9-12 December 2019), 35 government officials and CSO representatives from nine countries⁷ attended the first in-person session of the Control Arms' ATT Academy in Southern Africa, which provided participants information to support their work on implementing the ATT. Hosted by Namibia in partnership with Control Arms, this training programme covered the scope and general implementation of the ATT, key aspects of Articles 8 and 9, and ways in which the ATT can address wildlife poaching and gender-based violence (GBV), both issues of regional significance.⁸
- In Ireland (22-23 January 2020), 39 participants attended the Eighth Meeting of the Expert Group on ATT Implementation (EGAI), hosted by Germany, Ireland and Saferworld.
 Participants shared their experiences with reporting under the ATT, explored way to operationalize the provisions of Article 7 relating to peace and security, terrorism and transnational organized crime, and discussed the roles and responsibilities of transit states in assessing, preventing and mitigating diversion.
- In Geneva (3 February 2020), 38 government officials and CSO representatives attended the practical workshop on 'Harnessing Information Sharing and Transparency to

Prevent and Respond to Diversion', hosted by Argentina, Canada and Control Arms. Participants discussed a wide range of topics in support of the thematic focus of CSP6.9

Activities in support of universalization efforts have also continued this past year. Mechanisms like the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), the EU ATT Outreach Project and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to provide resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

For the seventh year, UNSCAR disbursed grants to a range of UN agencies, international and regional organizations, CSOs and research institutes. These include the Stimson Center, Control Arms/Nonviolence International and the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC).¹⁰

This year saw the third funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the first Informal Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting of the Conference of States Parties 2020, 25 States Parties had made voluntary contributions totalling US\$8.9million.¹¹ An additional US\$70,231.51 was contributed to the VTF Outreach Programme.¹²

The ATT Secretariat received 39 applications from 30 applicant States Parties for 2019 VTF-funded projects. It approved funding for 20 projects to be implemented in 19 countries in 2019, With a combined budget of US\$2million. By comparison, 10 projects were approved for VTF funding in 2018 and 17 in 2017. Many of these projects were organized with CSOs as implementing partners, reinforcing the vital role partnerships play in meaningfully advancing ATT universalization and implementation efforts.

- 6 United Nations (2019). 'Kazakhstan Hosts Workshop to Promote Universalization of the ATT, 3-4 July'. 15 July 2019. https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/kazakhstan-hosts-workshop-to-promote-universalization-of-the-arms-trade-treaty-3-4-july/.
- 7 The countries that participated in the Control Arms' ATT Academy in Southern Africa are: Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia.
- 8 Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Academy in Southern Africa takes place in Namibia'. 13 December 2019. https://controlarms.org/blog/att-academy-in-southern-africa/.
- 9 Control Arms Secretariat (2020). 'Interactive Diversion Workshop held in Geneva, Switzerland'. 10 February 2020. https://controlarms.org/blog/interactive-diversion-workshop-held-in-geneva-switzerland/.
- 10 United National Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (2019). 'UNSCAR 2019 Call for Proposals selected applications.' 11 November 2019. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/2019-UNSCAR-Call-for-Proposals-Selected-Applications.pdf.
- 11 The States Parties that made voluntary contributions to the VTF are: Argentina, Australia, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Government of Flanders Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Germany and New Zealand also contributed to the VTF outreach programme.
- 12 ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Arms Trade Treaty: Status of VTF Finances'. 7 February 2020. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/200207 - ATT Secretariat - Status of VTF/200207 - ATT Secretariat - Status of VTF.pdf.
- 13 ATT Secretariat (2019). 'Arms Trade Treaty: Status of VTF Finances'. 5 April 2019. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/190405 ATT Secretariat VTF/190405 ATT Secretariat VTF.pdf.
- 14 Project funding was approved for: Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Palau, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Zambia.
- 15 For a complete list of projects, see ATT Secretariat (2019). '3rd VTF Cycle (2019): Overview of projects approved for ATT VTF funding'. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/3RD VOLUNTARY TRUST FUND CYCLE.- list of projects 2019/3RD VOLUNTARY TRUST FUND CYCLE.- list of projects 2019,pdf.
- 16 Control Arms (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019.' 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2018-report/, p. 11.

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

INITIAL REPORTS

As of 31 May 2020, 100 of 106 States Parties were required by Article 13.1 of the ATT to submit their initial reports on implementation.¹⁷ Of these 100, 75 had done so as of June 2020 (a compliance rate of 75 per cent).

In the time since the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report, five States Parties (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Chile, Suriname and Zambia) submitted initial reports to the ATT Secretariat. One State Party (Chile) elected to keep its report private on the ATT Secretariat's website.

Though only required to complete an initial report once within the first year of the entry into force, Article 13.1 also requires States Parties to provide the ATT Secretariat with relevant updates or changes to their national arms-transfer control systems. Two States Parties submitted updated reports since the previous edition of the ATT Monitor Annual Report (New Zealand and Slovenia), joining Japan and Sweden as the only four States Parties to provide these updates to the ATT Secretariat.

An in-depth analysis of the contents of these reports can be found in Chapter 3.2.

ANNUAL REPORTS

Ninety-seven States Parties were required by Article 13.3 of the ATT to submit their 2019 annual reports by 31 May 2020. Of these, only 35 submitted their annual reports on time (a compliance rate of 36 per cent). Maldives also submitted a 2019 annual report, though it was not required to do so, bringing the total number of submitted reports to 36. Six States Parties (Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius and the State of Palestine) opted to keep their reports confidential, representing 17 per cent of reports submitted.

While the COVID-19 pandemic likely impacted States Parties' ability to meet their reporting obligations, this percentage marks the lowest on-time reporting rate of any year, after a slight increase in the previous year. This shift in compliance rates means ongoing reporting analysis will have to take into account challenges presented by COVID-19 when identifying reporting patterns over time, which may make this year an outlier when assessing ATT reporting trends.

A preliminary analysis of the contents of these reports can be found in Chapter 3.1.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

FIFTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Fifth Conference of States Parties (CSP5) was attended by representatives from 86 countries, including 66 States Parties, two states that acceded to the Treaty but for whom it had not yet entered into force, 15 Signatories and three observer states.¹⁹

Also attending the CSP were representatives of eight international and regional organizations, including UN agencies, and 39 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing industry.²⁰

Ambassador Jānis Kārkliņš of Latvia served as the President of the Conference. Procedural decisions adopted included:

- Endorsement of the WGETI Chair's recommendation to initiate work on Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment) in place of Article 5 (general implementation), continue work on Articles 6 and 7, including voluntary sharing of experience on key aspects of the Articles, and conduct further work on Article 11 (diversion).
- Welcoming the thematic discussion on gender and gender-based violence and endorsement of a set of recommendations aimed at assisting States Parties in articulating these issues in the context of the ATT.

¹⁷ Each ATT State Party must submit its initial report within the first year after entry into force of the ATT for that State Party. Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 13.1. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

¹⁸ Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3. (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT Art 13.3. https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

¹⁹ ATT Secretariat (2019). 'Final Report'. ATT/CSP5/2019/SEC/536/Conf.FinRep.Rev1. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/CSP5 Final Report (ATT.CSP5,2019.SEC.536.Con.FinRep.Rev1) - 30 August 2019 (final)/CSP5 Final Report (ATT.CSP5,2019.SEC.536.Con.FinRep.Rev1) - 30 August 2019 (final).pdf, p. 3.

²⁰ Ibid. See also ATT Secretariat (2019). 'List of Participants'. ATT/CSP5/2019/SEC/535/Conf.PartList. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP5_List of Participants (final)/ATT_CSP5_List of Participants (final).pdf.

- Requesting that the Management Committee continue monitoring the status of finances of the Treaty and to review the effectiveness of current financial measures and report on them for consideration at CSP7.
- Agreeing to establish a reserve fund, sourced from voluntary contributions.
- Appointment of Costa Rica, Estonia, Germany, Japan and South Africa as members of the Management Committee for two years, from CSP6 to CSP7.
- Election of Ambassador Carlos Foradori of Argentina as President of CSP6.
- Election of Kazakhstan, Latvia, Nigeria and Switzerland as Vice Presidents of CSP6.
- Setting the dates for CSP6 as 17–21 August 2020.²¹

SIXTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP6 included two series of meetings of the ATT Working Groups and Informal Preparatory (PrepCom) meetings. The first series of meetings took place in February 2020. The President of the CSP cancelled the second set of meetings scheduled for April 2020 due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.²² In place of the cancelled meetings, the CSP President put forward a work plan that allowed the Working Groups and ATT Secretariat to consult with ATT stakeholders remotely, through written submissions, to prepare and finalize the documents to be submitted to CSP6.²³ At the time of analysis, the outcomes of this consultation had yet to be shared with ATT stakeholders and the summaries that follow include work completed up to and during this consultation period.

ATT Working Groups

The WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Jang-Keun Lee of the Republic of Korea, continued to address the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on Articles 6 and 7 (prohibitions and export assessment) and Article 11 (diversion). It began addressing implementation of Article 9 (transit and trans-shipment) after the decision at CSP5 to establish the sub-working group in place of continuing discussion of Article 5 (general implementation). Discussions were led by three appointed facilitators.

The WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7, facilitated by Ambassador Ignacio Sánchez de Lerín of Spain, discussed three documents at the February meetings: a draft multi-year work plan pertaining to the work of the sub-working group, a methodology template for unpacking key concepts and a draft outline of a voluntary guide to be developed by the sub-working group during the course of its work, titled 'Elements of a voluntary guide to implementing Articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty!²⁴ The WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7 decided that States Parties' responses provided through the template for unpacking key concepts would be collated and presented during the CSP7 cycle, and provided revised drafts of the multi-year work plan and voluntary guide in line with the revised working methods for the April Working Group meetings.²⁵

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 11, facilitated by Ms. Stela Petrović of Serbia, postponed its discussion on the first of three parts of the multi-year work plan that was welcomed at CSP5.²⁶ The multi-year plan was subsequently revised, and the facilitator welcomed input from ATT stakeholders on possible revisions to the plan to account for interruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁷

²¹ lbid., p. 10.

²² CSP6 President (2020). 'Announcement: Cancellation of the Working Group Meetings and 2nd CSP6 Informal Preparatory Meeting: 14-17 April 2020'. 18 March 2020. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Announcement by the CSP6 President - Cancellation of WGs and 2nd CSP6 Informal Preparatory Meeting (signed)/Announcement by the CSP6 President - Cancellation of WGs and 2nd CSP6 Informal Preparatory Meeting (signed).pdf?templateId=1315246.

²³ CSP6 President (2020). 'Announcement: Plan of work for the CSP6 Documentation during the Intersessional Period Following Cancellation of the Working Group Meetings and 2nd CSP6 Information Preparatory Meeting: 14-17 April 2020.' 1 April 2020. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Announcement by the CSP6 President - Notification regarding CSP6 intersessional work (for circulation)/Announcement by the CSP6 President - Notification regarding CSP6 intersessional work (for circulation).pdf?templateId=1316334.

²⁴ These documents can be found in the Annexes of ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) (2020). 'Chair Letter and Sub-Working Group documents for CSP6 (April 2020)'. 7 April 2020. ATT/CSP6.WGETI/2020/CHAIR/596/M2. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT WGETI - Chair Letter and Sub-Workgroups Documents for CSP6 (April 2020)_EN/ATT WGETI - Chair Letter and Sub-Workgroups Documents for CSP6 (April 2020)_EN.pdf.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 2

²⁶ For the original work plan, see Annex C of ATT WGETI (2019). 'ATT WGETI Co-Chairs' Draft Report to CSP5.' 26 July 2019. ATT/CSP5.WGETI/2019/ CHAIR/529/Conf.Rep. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP5_WGETI Draft Report_EN/ATT_CSP5_WGETI Draft Report_EN.pdf, p. 52.

²⁷ ATT WGETI (2020). 'Chair Letter and Sub-Working Group documents for CSP6 (April 2020).' 7 April 2020. ATT/CSP6.WGETI/2020/CHAIR/596/M2. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT WGETI - Chair Letter and Sub-Workgroups Documents for CSP6 (April 2020)_EN/ATT WGETI - Chair Letter and Sub-Workgroups Documents for CSP6 (April 2020)_EN.pdf, p. 3.

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 9, facilitated by Mr. Rob Wensley of South Africa, discussed the scope and nature of transit and trans-shipment provisions in Article 9 at the February 2020 meetings. The facilitator then drafted a multi-year work plan to guide the work of the sub-working group in the following CSP cycles and welcomed input from ATT stakeholders on the draft in line with the revised working methods for the April Working Group meetings.²⁸

The WGTR, co-chaired by Mexico and Belgium, pursued an ambitious agenda in the CSP6 intersessional meetings. During the February meetings, the ATT Secretariat provided an update on the state of play concerning compliance with reporting obligations, and the WGTR co-chairs facilitated discussion of States Parties' challenges with reporting and substantive reporting and transparency issues. To address these challenges and substantive issues, the co-chairs implemented, with support from the ATT Secretariat, a peer-to-peer system of voluntary bilateral and regional assistance to

facilitate information sharing by States Parties that convened for the first time during the February meetings.²⁹ On 5 February 2020, States Parties and Signatories participated in an informal meeting to discuss concrete cases of detected or suspected diversion. This was the second informal meeting, as the first occurred at CSP5.³⁰ The WGTR also considered adjustments to the ATT reporting templates that address uncertainties and inconsistencies in reported data. ATT Stakeholders were invited to submit written input on the proposed adjustments in line with the revised working methods for the April Working Group meetings.³¹

The WGTU, co-facilitated by Ambassador Jānis Kārkliņš of Latvia and Ambassador Carlos Foradori of Argentina, discussed the activities of Argentina's CSP Presidency and of ATT Vice Presidents to promote universalization, the status of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty, efforts of civil society and industry to promote universalization, and renewed efforts to reach the goal of 150 States Parties.³²



28 lbid., p. 11.

- 29 ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2020). 'WGTR Draft Annotated Agenda for Meeting of 6 February 2020.' 10 January 2020. ATT/CSP6.WGTR/2020/CHAIR/577/M1.AnnAgenda. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT WGTR Draft annotated agenda for 06 February 2020/ATT WGTR Draft annotated agenda for 06 February 2020.pdf, p. 1.
- 30 ATT WGTR (2020). 'WGTR Co-Chair Report of 06 February 2020 Meeting'. 3 April 2020. ATT/CSP6.WGTR/2020/CHAIR/593/M1.Rep. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP6_WGTR_Co-chair Report of 06 Feb 2020 meeting_EN/ATT_CSP6_WGTR_Co-chair Report of 06 Feb 2020 meeting_EN.pdf, pp. 7-8.
- 31 ATT WGTR (2020). 'Annex B to the WGTR Co-Chairs' Report to CSP6: Proposed Mandate for the WGTR for the Period September 2020 August 2021'. 7 April 2020. ATT/CSP6.WGTR/2020/CHAIR/594/M2.PropMandtoCSP7. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP6_WGTR_Co-chair Report to CSP6_Annex_Proposed mandate_EN/ATT_CSP6_WGTR_Co-chair Report to CSP6_Annex_Proposed mandate_EN.pdf.
- 32 ATT Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU) (2020). "WGTU Work Plan for the CSP6 Preparatory Meetings". 17 January 2020. ATT/CSP6. WGTU/2020/CHAIR/581/M1:WorkPlan. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT WGTU Work Plan for the CSP6 Preparatory Meetings/ATT WGTU Work Plan for the CSP6 Preparatory Meetings.pdf.

Informal Preparatory (PrepCom) Meetings

The first Informal PrepCom meeting for CSP6 was held on 7 February 2020. Ambassador Carlos Foradori of Argentina opened the meeting by highlighting efforts to encourage universalization and implementation of the ATT and introducing the priority theme for Argentina's CSP Presidency, 'Transparency and Information Exchange: Its Role in the Prevention of Diversion'.33 Argentina introduced its draft working paper of the same title for consideration and input by ATT stakeholders as part of the remote work plan set forth after the cancellation of the second Informal PrepCom meeting in April 2020.34 At the first PrepCom, participants also discussed procedural matters, including the status of the operation of the VTF and ATT finances. In response to extensive discussion at CSP5 about the increasing problem of financial liquidity due to unpaid contributions, the Management Committee presented draft guidelines for States Parties to follow in making financial arrangements with the ATT Secretariat.35 The Management committee introduced a revised draft for consideration and input by ATT stakeholders as part of the remote work plan set forth after the cancellation of the second Informal PrepCom meeting in April 2020.36

Overall, the progress made during the Working Group and PrepCom meetings of CSP6 may have been curtailed due to the cancellation of the second group of meetings in April 2020. Notably, the WGTR maintained an ambitious agenda despite challenging circumstances. The WGTR co-chairs and the ATT Secretariat assisted States Parties in fulfilling reporting obligations, participated in information-exchange platforms to help support the implementation of diversion provisions in the ATT and reviewed the effectiveness of ATT reporting templates to increase transparency in the arms

trade. Other Working Groups also made positive steps towards supporting the implementation of Treaty obligations, such as the efforts by the WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7 to develop a means through which States Parties can unpack key terminology to encourage greater cooperation and understanding in implementing risk-assessment obligations. However, there is still work to be done, as States Parties remained reluctant to discuss compliance with, and possible violations of, the ATT in terms of transfer decisions.

TAKING STOCK - ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Ongoing humanitarian crises in conflict areas such as the Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen are fuelled and exacerbated by past and present arms transfers to parties to these conflicts that contribute to violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).

For States Parties implementing ATT provisions in accordance with its object and purpose of reducing human suffering and contributing to international peace and security, these irresponsible transfers pose important questions regarding commitments to Treaty obligations and principles, including obligations to deny transfers if they would violate arms embargoes (Article 6.1), if there is an 'overriding risk' that arms to be transferred could be used to 'commit or facilitate' a serious violation of IHL or IHRL (Article 7.3), or if the arms to be transferred could "be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes" (Article 6.3).³⁷

³³ ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Draft Annotated Agenda: First CSP6 Informal Preparatory Meeting'. 20 January 2020. ATT/CSP6/2020SEC/582/PM1.
AnnAgenda. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT First CSP6 Inf Prep Meeting - Annotated Agenda/ATT First CSP6 Inf Prep Meeting - Annotated Agenda.pdf.

³⁴ See CSP6 President (2020). 'Transparency and Exchange of Information: Its Role in the Prevention of Diversion'. 21 April 2020. ATT/CSP6/2020/ PRES/597/M2.TranspInfExch. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP6_DOCUMENTO Presidencia Argentina - EN/ATT_CSP6_DOCUMENTO Presidencia Argentina - EN.pdf.

³⁵ ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Draft Annotated Agenda: First CSP6 Informal Preparatory Meeting'. 20 January 2020. ATT/CSP6/2020SEC/582/PM1.

AnnAgenda. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT First CSP6 Inf Prep Meeting - Annotated Agenda/ATT First CSP6 Inf Prep Meeting - Annotated Agenda.pdf.

³⁶ ATT Management Committee (2020). 'Draft Elements for a Secretariat's Procedure Regarding Rule 8(1)D (Reference Paper). 06 April 2020. ATT/CSP6/2020/MC/595/PM2.PropArr. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT MC - Draft elements Rule 8.1.d (06.04.2020)/ATT MC - Draft elements Rule 8.1.d (06.04.2020).pdf.

³⁷ Arms Trade Treaty. Article 6.3. (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 6(3). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

TEXT BOX 1: THE EFFECTS OF IRRESPONSIBLE ARMS TRANSFERS AND COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world within a few months. In a statement issued by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu said: "Humanity has faced no challenge greater than COVID-19 since the Second World War. As this rapidly developing global health emergency places unprecedented strain on our medical, economic and social systems, we must work hard to prevent new risks for instability, unrest and conflict." 38

The widespread, global impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic led the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, in March 2020, to call for a global ceasefire, emphasizing the need of countries affected by armed conflict, violence and instability to have greater access to humanitarian aid and health resources.³⁹ In Yemen, for example, airstrikes and shelling by parties to the conflict continue to cause damage and destruction of health facilities, making accessing medical services difficult or impossible for civilians.⁴⁰ According to

Physicians for Human Rights, "These attacks have contributed to the virtual collapse of Yemen's health system, an outcome that has had devastating impacts on the country's civilian population." ⁴¹ The collapse of health infrastructure means that in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be even more difficult for Yemenis to access proper care while only half of the country's health facilities are fully functioning. ⁴²

Ending armed conflict could allow the delivery of muchneeded humanitarian aid, including health workers and medical supplies, and ensure that health infrastructure remains intact as medical facilities face an overwhelming demand for services.⁴³ To further strengthen the international COVID-19 pandemic response, CSOs have advocated for the cessation or reduction of arms transfers worldwide.⁴⁴

The challenges presented by COVID-19 in countries affected by armed violence serve as an important reminder for States Parties to maintain their commitment to the ATT's object and purpose of contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability and reducing human suffering.

The Yemen conflict, and its subsequent humanitarian crisis, remains one of the most concerning cases in which arms transfers continue to facilitate civilian casualties, widespread displacement and human suffering on a massive scale. The Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on Yemen,

created by the UN Human Rights Council, released a statement in September 2019 urging states to "refrain from providing arms that could be used in the conflict," and reminded them of their obligation "to take all reasonable measures to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict."45

³⁸ UNODA (2020). 'A Message from High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu'. 3 April 2020. https://www.un.org/disarmament/how-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-affecting-the-work-of-disarmament/.

³⁹ UN News (2020). 'COVID-19: UN chief calls for global ceasefire to focus on 'the true fight of our lives'. 23 March 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1059972. Relief Web (2020). 'UN Security Council Fails to Support Global Cease Fire, Shows no Response to COVID-19'. 19 May 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/un-security-council-fails-support-global-ceasefire-shows-no-response-covid-19.

⁴⁰ Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and Mwatana for Human Rights (2020). 'I ripped the IV out of my arm and started running": Attacks on Health Care in Yemen'. March 2020. https://phr.org/our-work/resources/i-ripped-the-iv-out-of-my-arm-and-started-running-attacks-on-health-care-in-yemen/.

⁴¹ lbid., p. 10

⁴² International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2019). 'Yemen's healthcare system on the brink of collapse'. 15 October 2019. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/2019/10/15/yemens-healthcare-system-brink-collapse/. See also UN News (2020). 'Yemen: Coronavirus transmission likely widespread, decimating 'collapsed' health system, UN warns'. 22 May 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1064742.

⁴³ Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (2020). 'COVID-19: From Ceasefire to Divestment and Disarmament'. 26 March 2020. https://www.wilpf.org/from-ceasefire-to-divestment-and-disarmament/.

⁴⁴ See Acheson, R. (2020). 'COVID-19: A Sustainable Ceasefire Means No More "Business as Usual'. 17 April 2020. https://www.wilpf.org/covid-19-a-sustainable-ceasefire-means-no-more-business-as-usual/; Oxfam (2020). 'Arms trade continues despite call for global ceasefire amid Covid-19'. 12 May 2020. http://oxfamapps.org/media/m3hre.

⁴⁵ UN Human Rights Officer of the High Commissioner (2019). 'Yemen: Collective failure, collective responsibility – UN expert report'. Press Release. 3 September 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24937&LangID=E. The Group of Experts' report extensively lists a series of violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law as the basis for these recommendations.

The Group of Experts further reported in December 2019 that the parties to the conflict continued to contribute to serious violations of IHL and IHRL,⁴⁶ citing the use of indiscriminate airstrikes against civilians and the use of indirect-fire weapons and small arms as aggravating factors.⁴⁷ The use of airstrikes in Yemen by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is extensively documented by the UN, international and research organizations and CSOs,⁴⁸ as well as the indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance by Houthi forces.⁴⁹

Analysis of the information provided by States Parties in 2018 ATT annual reports shows that the number of States Parties that reported authorized or actual arms exports to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition declined from the previous year.⁵⁰ This may be an encouraging sign that some States Parties are implementing and amending national policies that increase compliance with ATT obligations, and it could also indicate stronger commitments of some States Parties to the ATT.

There are positive examples of States Parties taking action at a national level that point towards more rigorous compliance with the ATT. In November 2018, the Netherlands extended its presumption of denial policy on arms exports⁵¹ "to all branches of the armed forces of

countries involved in the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia which is party to the conflict in Yemen."52 While this shift extended the presumption of denial to military departments in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Dutch exports may still go to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition if it can be proven that the exported arms would not be used in the Yemen conflict.53 Similarly, Germany extended its ban on arms exports directly to Saudi Arabia in 2019 and then renewed it again until the end of 2020.54

Yet, more efforts are needed to ensure that all States Parties authorize and/or deny transfers in compliance with ATT obligations. In December 2019, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), along with partner CSOs,55 submitted a communication to the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting the investigation of European arms companies executives and government licensing officials in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom for their role in authorizing arms transfers that have been used to commit or facilitate violations of IHL in Yemen that may amount to war crimes.56 Such an investigation undertaken by the ICC would mark a significant step forward in addressing the lack of compliance with ATT Article 6 and 7 obligations.

⁴⁶ UN Security Council (2020). 'Letter dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council'. S/2020/70. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3850088?ln=en.

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ See, for example, Human Rights Watch (2020). 'Yemen: events of 2019', in World Report 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/yemen; UN News (2019). 'Deadly Yemen airstrikes that claim children's lives in capital Sana'a, strongly condemned by UN'. 17 May 2019. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1038651; BBC News (2019). 'Yemen war: More than 100 dead in Saudi-led strike, says Red Cross'. 1 September 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49544559.

⁴⁹ UN Security Council (2019). 'Letter dates 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council'. 25 January 2019. S/2019/83. http://undocs.org/en/S/2019.83.

⁵⁰ Members of the Saudi-led coalition include Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

⁵¹ This policy means that export licences for military goods are not granted unless "it can be incontrovertibly demonstrated that these goods will not be used in the conflict in Yemen." See Maletta, G. (2019). 'Legal challenges to EU member states' arms exports to Saudi Arabia: Current status and potential implications'. SIPRI Topical Backgrounder. 28 June 2019. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/legal-challenges-eu-member-states-arms-exports-saudi-arabia-current-status-and-potential.

⁵² Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and Minister of Foreign Affairs on the export of military goods (2019). 'Dutch Arms Export Policy in 2018'. https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2019/07/01/dutch-arms-export-policy-in-2018, p. 6.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 7

⁵⁴ Bisaccio, D. (2020). 'Germany extends arms embargo on Saudi Arabia'. Defense and Security Monitor. 24 March 2020. https://dsm.forecastinternational. com/wordpress/2020/03/24/germany-extends-arms-embargo-on-saudi-arabia/. However, some reports also noted that during 2019 Germany sold over €1 billion worth of weapons to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. See Deutsche Welle (2020). 'German arms sale approvals jump slightly in first quarter of 2020'. 9 April 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/german-arms-sale-approvals-jump-slightly-in-first-quarter-of-2020/a-53080988.

⁵⁵ Partner CSOs include: Amnesty International, Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), Centre Delàs, Mwatana for Human Rights and Rete Disarmo.

⁵⁶ Amnesty International (2019). 'ICC must investigate arms company executives linked to Yemen war crimes allegations'. 12 December 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/icc-investigate-arms-companies-yemen-war-crimes-allegations/; CAAT (2019). 'Made in Europe, Bombed in Yemen. ICC must investigate the responsibility of European corporate and political actors for complicity in alleged war crimes in Yemen'. Press Release. 12 December 2019. https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/saudi-arabia/icc/2019-12-12.press-release.pdf.

THE 2020 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 seeks to fill gaps in knowledge of key definitions and Treaty provisions related to transparency, information sharing and diversion. It illustrates the need for transparency and increased effective and cooperative action between ATT stakeholders to prevent and mitigate diversion and provides lessons learned and recommendations that may be helpful to States Parties in implementing Treaty provisions to such an end. To effectively illustrate these challenges and responses, this chapter includes discussions on transparency, information sharing and diversion in the ATT formal process and Treaty text, cooperative action on arms transfer control to tackle diversion, and diversion-prevention and mitigation measures. Because investigating, exploring and analysing cases of diversion can help demonstrate the importance of transparency and information sharing in addressing diversion, this chapter provides a number of illustrative case studies.

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth look at 2018 ATT annual reports. It includes an overall analysis of reporting practices, comparing 2017 and 2018 ATT annual reports The analysis identifies changes in reporting practices and assesses whether inconsistencies and gaps identified in the ATT Monitor analysis of 2017 ATT annual reports were addressed and resolved in 2018 reports.

Chapter 2.2 includes country profiles for each State Party obliged to submit a 2018 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, timely reporting, withholding security information),

as well as a summary of good reporting practices and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners, and highlighting the largest transfers reported by that State Party in 2018.⁵⁷

Chapter 2.3 seeks to provide information presented by States Parties in a manner that allows for better comparison across ATT annual reports, including tables that show reporting practices by each State Party obliged to submit a 2018 annual report. By providing easily accessible and comparable information detailing decisions made by each State Party in regard to the way it reports exports and imports, it becomes easier to untangle the varied reporting practices and, in turn, provide more context and understanding of global arms transfers.

Chapter 3.1 includes a summary assessment of 2019 annual reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline.⁵⁸ It is anticipated that more States Parties will submit their report in the window between the legal deadline and the beginning of CSP6. As such, this analysis will be further expanded in next year's ATT Monitor report.

Chapter 3.2 includes a summary assessment of initial reports and updates to them submitted by States Parties as of June 2020. From this assessment comes an analysis of reporting non-compliance, highlighting challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations and the efforts of the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to address them.



CHAPTER 1: ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING TO PREVENT AND ERADICATE THE DIVERSION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO THE ILLICIT MARKET

INTRODUCTION

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) regulates conventional arms transfers by, in part, establishing common standards for States Parties to reduce the illicit international arms trade. The Treaty recognizes the shared responsibility of governments to prevent diversion, both in its object and purpose (Article 1) and in obligations specific to addressing diversion (Article 11).

Since the ATT's adoption in 2013, diversion has been a central concern for States Parties and has provided a considerable amount of material for discussion at the subsequent Conferences of States Parties (CSPs). This has included the creation of an Article 11 sub-working group within the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), and the choice of diversion as a priority theme by the Japanese presidency of CSP4 and the Argentinian presidency of CSP6. The choice by Argentina's presidency of enhancing transparency and information sharing to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional weapons to the illicit market suggests increased recognition among ATT stakeholders of its importance.

Yet, cases of arms diversion continue to occur, showing that the efforts made so far are insufficient. The lack of widespread understanding of the many processes and circumstances that facilitate diversion, and of how the ATT can help prevent and mitigate it, together act as a significant impediment to positive international action. Nevertheless, the ATT and its transparency and information-exchange provisions serve as an important framework for sharing information and experience in tackling diversion, as well as actions to address it.¹

This chapter seeks to fill gaps in understandings around key terminology and Treaty provisions related to transparency, information sharing and diversion. It illustrates the need for greater transparency and increased effective and cooperative action among ATT stakeholders to prevent and mitigate diversion through highlighting diversion cases that provide lessons learned and recommendations. To illustrate these challenges and responses, this chapter includes discussions on:

- Diversion, transparency and information sharing provisions under the ATT
- Cooperation and mutual assistance under the ATT
- Diversion-prevention measures
- Mitigation measures
- Cases of diversion

DIVERSION, TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING PROVISIONS UNDER THE ATT

The diversion of conventional arms and ammunition can occur at any stage of their life cycle – at the end of the production process, during the transfer, after the delivery of the equipment or years after the material was received.² Diversion is the main conduit for the supply of arms and ammunition to non-state armed groups, paramilitary groups and transnational criminal organizations. It also contributes to raised levels of insecurity and instability and reduced levels of sustainable development in countries and regions affected by conflict or showing high levels of criminality.³

Article 1 of the ATT makes clear the Treaty's purpose of promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties.⁴ This provides an overall framework for collaboration among States Parties and reinforces the principle that greater transparency and systematic information sharing must be at the core of the general functioning of the Treaty regime and, in particular, in the context of efforts to tackle diversion.

¹ ATT Expert Group (2015). 'Key issues for ATT Implementation: Preventing and combating diversion'. Saferworld. Briefing No 2. February 2015. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/key-issues-for-att-implementation---preventing-and-combating-diversion.pdf.

² Small Arms Survey (2018). 'Possible Measures to Prevent and Address Diversion: Supporting Effective Implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty'. August 2018. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Regulations_and_Controls/Levels_of_action/International/Diversion infographic.pdf.

³ Camello, C. (2019). 'Tackling (Arms)Diversion: Challenges for European States'. GRIP Insight. 24 February 2020. https://www.grip.org//wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EC_2020-02-24_EN_M-CAMELLO.pdf, p. 1.

⁴ Arms Trade Treaty. Article 1. (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art. 1.

DIVERSION

As with other key terms, the ATT does not propose any definition of the term 'diversion.' However, the Preamble of the Treaty underlines diversion as a multifaceted problem:

Underlining the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end-use and end-users, including in the commission of terrorist acts.⁶


The preamble, therefore, identifies three forms of diversion:

- 1. Diversion from the legal to the illicit market
- 2. Diversion for unauthorized end-use
- 3. Diversion to unauthorized end-users7

The WGETI sub-working group on Article 11 developed a list of 'Possible measures to prevent and address diversion' that identifies four stages in the transfer chain, all of which provide different opportunities for states to take measures to address diversion (see Figure 1.1).8 Because this list draws from experience and input from states and was well received by ATT stakeholders, the ATT Monitor has also adopted this typology for the analysis presented in this chapter.9

Diversion is often the crucial link between the authorized or legal trade (for example, where conventional arms are legally produced, transferred and owned) and the illicit trade (for example, where conventional arms come into the possession of non-state actors, such as armed groups and criminal organizations, and other unauthorized end-users).¹⁰

FIGURE 1.1 - STAGES OF THE TRANSFER CHAIN



- 5 For more information, see Control Arms Secretariat (2018). 'ATT Monitor 2018'. 20 August 2018. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2018-report/, pp. 102-105.
- 6 Arms Trade Treaty. Preamble (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Preamble.
- 7 Small Arms Survey (2019). 'Preventing Diversion: Comparing ATT and African measures for importing states'. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Preventing-Diversion.pdf, p. 3.
- 8 ATT Secretariat (2018). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation Chair's Draft Report to CSP4.' 20 July 2018. ATT/CSP4.WGETI/2018/CHAIR/355/Conf.Rep. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP4_WGETI_Draft_Report_EN1/ATT_CSP4_WGETI_Draft_Report_EN.pdf, pp. 18-24.
- 9 Ibid., p. 4. For more detailed information on the four stages of the transfer chain, see Small Arms Survey (2020). 'Possible measures to prevent and address diversion: supporting effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty'. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Regulations_and_Controls/Levels_of_action/International/Diversion infographic.pdf.

TEXT BOX 1: DIVERSION, TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING IN THE ATT FORMAL PROCESS

Since the ATT entered into force in December 2014, efforts to tackle diversion have gained increasing momentum within the formal Treaty process. After establishing the Article 11 sub-working group during the intersessional period between CSP3 and CSP4, the WGETI set to work in helping States Parties understand and implement Article 11 obligations. To harness and build on diversion-prevention efforts that were implemented by States Parties prior to the ATT, and to identify gaps in these efforts, the sub-working group put forward a work plan, including a series of guiding questions and a request for input from States Parties on desired outcomes. Some States Parties responded with input, feedback and questions during the CSP4 meeting cycle. 11 In response, the sub-working group developed two documents to further identify where and how diversion occurs, and to present possible ways for states to address it. The list of 'Possible measures to prevent and address diversion' identifies the four stages of the transfer chain and includes proposed measures to address diversion at each stage, in relevant national contexts, and the 'Existing Guidance on Diversion Measures' presents sources States Parties could use to assist in addressing and preventing diversion.12

At CSP4, both the Article 11 sub-working group and the WGTR considered the issue of diversion, the priority theme of the conference chosen by the Japanese Presidency. As discussed by the WGTR, the CSP welcomed the development of an information-exchange portal on the ATT Secretariat website to facilitate exchanges between States Parties, and it endorsed a three-tier approach to information sharing on diversion, including: policy-level exchanges on diversion in the Article 11 sub-working group, intersessional exchange of operational information through the information exchange portal, and informal meetings among States Parties and, potentially, Signatories to discuss concrete cases of detected or suspected diversion.¹³

At CSP5, States Parties discussed and endorsed a multi-year work plan for the Article 11 sub-working group to facilitate better discussion on diversion at each stage of the transfer chain, and the CSP hosted the first informal meeting of States Parties and Signatories to discuss concrete cases of detected or suspected diversion, along with an open meeting for all stakeholders. The second informal meeting of States Parties and Signatories took place at the first Working Group and Preparatory Meetings for CSP6, wherein participants considered and discussed the Argentinian Presidency's chosen priority theme of transparency, information sharing, and their role in the prevention of diversion. Argentina submitted a working paper in preparation for CSP6, which included possible recommendations for States Parties.¹⁴

¹¹ See Switzerland (2018). 'Food for thought paper on the topic of the prevention of diversion (Article 11)'. 2 March 2018. ATT/CSP4,WGETI/2018/CHE/256/M1.CHE.Art11. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGETI_CSP4_Food_for_thought_on_the_topic_of_the_prevention_of_diversion_Article_11CHE.pdf; Argentina, et. al. (2018). 'Preventing and fighting the diversion of legally transferred weapons'. 6 March 2018. ATT/CSP4,WGETI/2018/GROUP/257/M1.GROUP.Div. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGETI_CSP4_WP_Diversion_France_et_al/ATT_WGETI_CSP

¹² ATT WGETI (2018). 'Sub-working Group on Article 11 (Diversion) - Work Plan': 15 May 2018. ATT/CSP4,WGETI/2018/CHAIR/303/M2.WorkPlanArt11. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGETI_CSP4_Sub-Working_Group_Art_11/ATT_WGETI_CSP4_Sub-Working_Group_Art_11.pdf, pp. 5-11.

¹³ ATT Secretariat (2018). 'CSP4 Final Report'. 24 August 2018. ATT/CSP4/2018/SEC/369/Conf.FinRep.Rev1. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/CSP4 Final Report- August 2018 (ATT_CSP4_2018_SEC_369_Conf.FinRep.Rev1)/CSP4 Final Report- August 2018 (ATT_CSP4_2018_SEC_369_Conf.FinRep.Rev1).pdf, p. 6.

¹⁴ CSP6 President (2020). 'Transparency and Exchange of Information: Its Role in the Prevention of Diversion'. 21 April 2020. ATT/CSP6/2020/PRES/597/M2.TranspInfExch. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP6_DOCUMENTO Presidencia Argentina - EN/ATT_CSP6_DOCUMENTO Presidencia Argentina - EN.pdf.

DIVERSION PROVISIONS IN THE ATT

As noted above, preventing diversion is one of the objects of the ATT (Article 1). However, it is Article 11 that addresses the detailed responsibilities of States Parties in taking steps and implementing measures to prevent and address diversion. Those provisions specific to information sharing and cooperation in identifying risks and responding to cases of diversion are key to the Treaty's effectiveness in this area.¹⁵

Unlike the risk-assessment provisions of Article 7, the requirement for a diversion risk assessment set out within Article 11 does not incorporate an explicit requirement to consider whether there is an 'overriding' risk of diversion before taking appropriate action. While there is no obligation within Article 11.2 to refuse an export where there is judged to be a risk of diversion, the Article as a whole is clear on the obligations of States Parties to prevent diversion by exploring the possible use of mitigation measures or by refusing

authorization. This obligation is also applicable in situations where information on diversion risks comes to light after an authorization has been granted. In such cases an exporting State Party should follow the provisions of Article 7.7 and undertake a reassessment of the authorization.¹⁶

While Article 11 is expressly applicable only to items listed under Article 2.1, States Parties are urged under Article 5.3 to apply the provisions of the Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms. It is arguable therefore that all States Parties that are committed to tackling the diversion of arms should ensure that all possible measures are taken to prevent and combat the diversion of all conventional arms and related ammunition as well as parts and components.

Figure 1.2 breaks down Article 11 obligations (with emphasis added to highlight transparency and information sharing provisions, where relevant).



¹⁵ ATT Expert Group (2015). 'Key issues for ATT Implementation: Preventing and combating diversion'. Saferworld, Briefing No 2. February 2015. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/key-issues-for-att-implementation---preventing-and-combating-diversion.pdf.

The information-sharing provisions of Articles 11.5 and 11.6 are further supported by Article 13.2, which encourages States Parties to "report" to each other on measures to address diversion, as "States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1)."¹⁷

Article 11 as a whole makes clear the responsibility of all States Parties to prevent diversion and emphasizes the need for cooperative action in doing so. Critically, Article 11.4 implies

that these efforts should be undertaken by any State Party that detects diversion, whether or not it has a direct role in the arms transfer, and could include transfers that originated from states that are not party to the ATT.

Given that the ATT States Parties with the most developed armstransfer control systems are best placed to implement Article 11 provisions, it is important that major exporters share as much information as possible with other states to assist the wider effort to tackle diversion and to help build the capacity of others to take independent action.¹⁸

FIGURE 1.2 - ARTICLE 11



ARTICLE 11: DIVERSION

- **11.1** Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) shall take measures to prevent their diversion.
- 11.2 The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system, established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates, assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.
- 11.3 Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible, in order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

- 11.4 If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include alerting potentially affected States Parties, examining diverted shipments of such conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through investigation and law enforcement.
- 11.5 In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.
- 11.6 States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, on measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

TRANSPARENCY

Transparency – defined by the ATT Monitor generally as 'accessibility of information' – is central to the effective implementation of the ATT's operative articles. ¹⁹ Transparency can be seen as directly linked to a government's willingness to commit to monitoring, oversight and accountability. ²⁰ In the context of the ATT, States Parties have numerous opportunities to express commitments to transparency, including in reporting and information sharing more generally.

While the Treaty's requirements for public reporting on armstransfers and related control systems are the primary tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties, the ATT as a whole provides a broad framework for promoting cooperation, information sharing, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international arms trade.

TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS IN THE ATT

The ATT makes two explicit references to transparency, in Article 1 (object and purpose) and Article 5 (general implementation), as shown in Figure 1.3.

Transparency commitments are also integrated into many of the ATT's substantive obligations beyond Article 11. For example, Article 8 (import), which refers to information exchange and transparency measures in 8.1 and 8.3, allows for importing and exporting states to request information from others (including end-user documentation and information concerning export authorizations).²¹ When implemented by States Parties, these provisions also contribute positively to tackling diversion.

INFORMATION SHARING

In the context of the ATT, information sharing can take place among States Parties or between States Parties and Signatories bilaterally or multilaterally, and on a regular, periodic, or an ad hoc basis, as well as more broadly, including with national legislatures and other relevant stakeholders.²² Information can be transferred in a variety of mediums (for example, electronically, in written submissions or verbally in meetings) and can take place via a third party, such as the ATT Secretariat.

Information sharing can enable State Parties to demonstrate their Treaty implementation efforts to each other by fulfilling their reporting obligations. It can also involve exchanges concerning good practices, lessons learned and ways to help encourage and promote effective Treaty implementation.²³ However, information sharing can be conducted privately or publicly, and only when made public can information sharing also support transparency.

FIGURE 1.3 - TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS IN THE ATT



ARTICLE 1: OBJECT AND PURPOSE

Promoting cooperation, **transparency** and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.



ARTICLE 5: GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION

5.5 Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an **effective and transparent** national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and of items covered under Article 3 and Article 4.

¹⁹ See Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2017-report/, p. 18.

²⁰ Holtom, P. (2008). 'Transparency in Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 22 July 2008. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/PP/SIPRIPP22.pdf, p. 3.

²¹ For more information on transparency commitments in other ATT substantive obligations, see Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017 Report'. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2017-report/, p. 18.

²² ATT Expert Group (2014). 'Key issues for ATT implementation: information exchange under the ATT'. Saferworld. Briefing No 1. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/key-issues-for-att-implementation---preventing-and-combating-diversion.pdf, p. 1.

²³ Ibid.

INFORMATION-SHARING PROVISIONS IN THE ATT

Aside from the diversion-related provisions of Article 11, there are throughout the ATT numerous requirements for information sharing and provisions for interaction among States Parties, including within Article 5 (general implementation) and Article 15 (international cooperation), as shown in Figure 1.4.

These more general information-sharing provisions can also provide opportunities to address diversion. For example, an effective national control system developed in accordance with Article 5 would involve comprehensive measures in order to assess and mitigate diversion risks, thus making way for cooperative action among States Parties.

As noted above, Articles 11.6 and 13.2 encourage States Parties to 'report to other States Parties' via the ATT Secretariat on measures that they have taken to address diversion. The fact that this provision appears twice in the ATT text is reflective of the importance attached to this particular strand of information sharing. Unfortunately, there are as yet few indications that States Parties have taken steps to follow through on this commitment in any coherent or systematic way.

States Parties are also required under Article 13.1 to provide an initial report to the ATT Secretariat within the first year after the entry into force of the Treaty. This document must detail measures taken at the national level to implement the provisions of the Treaty (for example, national laws, control lists, regulations and administrative protocols). At the same time, the initial report template offers an opportunity for States Parties to provide insights into the steps they have taken to prevent arms diversion, including measures to assess the risk of diversion, and to cooperate and exchange information with other States Parties. The initial report template also allows States Parties to provide a range of additional information, including on their use of end-use/end-user documentation and any guarantees that are required from an importing state.²⁴ The initial report template also requests information on national measures taken by States Parties when a case of diversion has been detected (for example, alerting potentially affected states and using international tracing mechanisms to identify points of diversion). When these reports are made publicly available by States Parties, they support the goal of transparency to the benefit of all stakeholders.

FIGURE 1.4 – INFORMATION SHARING PROVISIONS IN THE ATT



ARTICLE 5: GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION

5.6 Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to **exchange information** on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty.



ARTICLE 15: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

- **15.2** States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including **exchanging information** [...]
- **15.7** States Parties are encouraged to **exchange experience and information on lessons learned** in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

Effective action to prevent diversion requires that as many States Parties as possible be adequately informed of the risks and characteristics associated with the issue at hand. For this reason, both information sharing and transparency are essential to tackling diversion, which is more likely to occur when arms transfers are opaque. To address this, ATT States Parties must cooperate and share information with all relevant stakeholders on the risks of diversion that exist at different stages of the transfer chain. This would enhance possibilities for identifying potential points of diversion as well as those actors involved, and to develop effective measures to prevent this from happening.²⁵

COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TO TACKLE DIVERSION

Cooperative action, including information sharing, is a key element of the effective implementation of Article 11 to prevent and combat diversion. Below is an overview of the roles of cooperation and mutual assistance in tackling diversion under the ATT.

COOPERATIVE ACTION AND INFORMATION SHARING

The ATT presents a clear framework that mandates States Parties to obtain information and share experience on diversion. Before a decision is taken on whether or not to authorize an arms transfer, competent authorities must ensure they have access to accurate and detailed information in order to evaluate the risk of diversion and for an informed decision to be made. Often, such information will need to be provided by comparable institutions in other States Parties.

States Parties are also encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. In doing so, those with experience in this field can assist others in taking effective action to prevent diversion. Information shared may include topics such as "illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion."²⁶



This is reinforced by the obligations within Articles 11.6 and 13.2, which encourage States Parties to share, via the ATT Secretariat, information on measures taken to address diversion. In this regard, it may also be useful to consult a range of state and non-state actors (from customs and law-enforcement agencies to shipping agents, research centers and non-governmental organizations) that may have relevant information or practical experience in preventing, identifying or tracing diversion cases. States Parties should, in turn, also be willing, wherever possible, to share information they have with concerned non-state actors to maximize their potential to prevent or uncover cases of diversion. Given that diversion can occur at any stage in the transfer-chain or the life-cycle of a weapon or of ammunition, all States Parties, whether they are involved in the import, transit, trans-shipment, brokering or export of conventional arms must actively pursue efforts to prevent it.

There are also information-sharing provisions for States Parties in terms of responding to cases of diversion once detected. Article 11.4 requires States Parties to take appropriate measures to address cases of diversion that arise, and they may notify other States Parties implicated in the effects of such cases. States Parties can examine diverted shipments and follow up with measures such as investigation and law-enforcement action.²⁷ While States Parties are not obligated to take these actions, they are nonetheless important, as "comprehensive action to combat diversion will require States Parties to implement all provisions of Article 11 to the fullest extent possible and to share experiences and lessons learned as widely as possible."²⁸ In order to do so, States Parties must ensure that there are no obstacles to sharing information at a national level, as well as ensure that they are fulfilling their record-keeping obligations under Article 11.

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE

In the ATT context, mutual assistance between States Parties and potentially involving other stakeholders is envisaged for the purpose of ensuring the effective implementation of the terms agreed in the Treaty, including those relating to diversion. In this regard, Article 15.4 encourages States Parties "to cooperate... in order to assist national implementation of the provisions of [the] Treaty, including through sharing information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate

diversion."²⁹ Such encouragement for States Parties to cooperate could take a variety of forms, including:

- Provision of technical, financial and other assistance
- Cooperation on law enforcement
- Extension of mutual legal assistance in taking action against illicit activities and actors

Taken in conjunction with the complementary provisions of Article 11.3, it is clear that the information sharing and cooperation encouraged in Article 15.4 applies not only to exporters and importers, but also to transit, trans-shipment and brokering States – all of whom are required to "cooperate and exchange information...in order to mitigate the risk of diversion."

Article 16 of the ATT establishes that every State Party can seek assistance in order to guarantee effective implementation of the Treaty. This assistance can take the form of legal, institutional, technical, material or financial assistance and capacity building. This places the onus on every State Party that is in a position to do so to provide assistance to others seeking to prevent or mitigate diversion. State Parties can also request assistance from other actors such as the UN as well as international, regional, sub-regional or national organizations or non-governmental organizations.

Other States Parties, organizations, or CSOs can assist States Parties in drafting, amending and/or implementing relevant legislative and administrative measures that aim to establish preventive or mitigating measures against diversion. Areas in which such assistance has been useful include in the development of end-user certificates and or post-shipment verification (PSV) systems.

PSV systems require cooperation and information sharing between exporting and importing states to check documentation, do on-site visits, conduct inventory checks and investigate suspected violations of transfer conditions (Article 11.2). The introduction of these systems by Germany and Switzerland provide examples of good practice, and at CSP5 Sweden and Spain reaffirmed their intention to introduce post-shipment verifications.³¹

²⁷ ATT Expert Group (2014). 'Key issues for ATT implementation: information exchange under the ATT'. Saferworld. Briefing No 1. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/key-issues-for-att-implementation---preventing-and-combating-diversion.pdf, p. 4.

²⁹ Arms Trade Treaty. Article 15.4 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 15.4.

³⁰ Arms Trade Treaty. Article 11.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 11.3.

³¹ Intervention by the representatives of Sweden and Spain during the side event: Post-Shipment Verifications – a new instrument of arms export controls during the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the ATT, 28 August 2019.

TEXT BOX 2: THE GERMAN POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION (PSV) SYSTEM³²

In 2015, Germany announced the introduction of postshipment controls for war weapons and small arms and light weapons transfers to third countries.³³ This new instrument authorizes on-site inspections to verify that the recipient country respects the provisions established in the end-user certificate (EUC), particularly with regard to end-use and end-user restrictions.³⁴ Note that recipient countries must grant Germany the right to conduct these on-site inspections through the EUC. However, every PSV is subject to prior notification of their date and location. The German authorities used a two-year pilot phase to test this PSV system, which began in May 2017. During this period, on-site inspections were carried out in India (May 2017), United Arab Emirates (December 2017), the Republic of Korea (June 2018), Indonesia (January 2019), Malaysia (April 2019), Brazil (April 2019) and Jordan (June 2019).

While Germany did not publish the results of these inspections, its national authorities have confirmed that no irregularities were found. It is therefore not known what measures Germany may take in situations where it is concluded that an EUC was breached.³⁶ The pilot phase ended in mid-2019 and was followed by an evaluation of the instrument by the German Federal government. The result of this evaluation has not yet been made public.



- 32 Camello, M. (2019). 'Tackling (Arms) Diversion: Challenges for European States'. GRIP Insight. 24 February 2020. https://www.grip.org//wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EC_2020-02-24_EN_M-CAMELLO.pdf.
- 33 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2015), 'Key points for the introduction of post-shipment controls for German arms exports'. 8 July 2015. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/eckpunkte-einfuehrung-post-shipment-kontrollen-deutsche-ruestungsexporte.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile&v=2.
- 34 Deutscher Bundestag (2016). 'Endverbleibserklärungen und Post-Shipment-Kontrollen bei Rüstungsexporten'. 9 March 2016. https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/505880/e8981ce146f5d378c1d98e34ccf3b4e5/wd-2-029-17-pdf-data.pdf.
- 35 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2018). 'Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im ersten Halbjahr 2018'. 2 October 2018. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/ruestungsexport-zwischenbericht-2018. pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=14 and (2019) 'Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im ersten Halbjahr 2019'. 13 November 2019. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/ruestungsexport-zwischenbericht-2019.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile&v=10.
- 36 Intervention by Irina Albrecht (Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control, Germany) and Jan Groschoff (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Germany) during the side event 'Post-Shipment Verifications a new instrument of arms export controls' during the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the ATT, 28 August 2019.

TEXT BOX 3: THE SWISS POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION (PSV) SYSTEM³⁷

The Swiss government implemented a programme for the post-shipment verification of compliance with end-user certificates (EUC) in 2013. As with Germany, the decision to launch the instrument was taken in response to various diversion cases involving Swiss arms transfers.

Due to the level of resources required, not all arms transfers are followed by an on-site inspection. Instead, a selection is made by the Swiss authorities based on an assessment of the risks associated with each specific transfer. A number of factors are taken into account: the type of weapons exported, the situation in the recipient country, the outcomes of past inspections and any past incidents.³⁸ In a six-year period starting in 2012, 36 on-site inspections were carried out in countries of final destination. In 2018, seven took place in:

Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Lebanon, Lithuania, Pakistan and South Africa.³⁹

Unlike in German law, Article 5a, paragraph 4, of the Swiss Ordinance on War Material foresees precautionary measures if there is evidence that the EUC has been violated.⁴⁰

Examples of these measures include:

- Additional obligations are added to the EUC, and if subsequent controls do not bring to light new events of non-compliance, the need for these obligations is re-evaluated
- A suspension of exports for one year, followed by a caseby-case review of exports to the country concerned
- Exports to the country concerned are no longer authorized

DIVERSION-PREVENTION MEASURES

Diversion-prevention measures should be routinely implemented in the context of each proposed arms transfer at each stage in the transfer chain. All parties concerned in an arms transfer should ensure consistent and effective implementation of national arms-transfer controls in respect of all listed military equipment, whether new or decades old. As noted above, while Article 11 is expressly applicable only to items listed under Article 2.1, States Parties are encouraged to apply the provisions of the Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms.

As noted above, it is also important to ensure that relevant enforcement agencies – including police, customs and border security – are fully aware and capable of playing their part in identifying and preventing potential cases of arms diversion.

Examples of routine diversion-prevention requirements that should be adopted at each stage in the transfer chain are listed below 41

BEFORE TRANSFER

- Robust and comprehensive export controls rooted in national law and compliant with national, regional and international obligations and commitments.
- Systematized export/import/transit/trans-shipment/ brokering authorization processes, including a licence application process and requiring the provision of documentation such as contract, end-use certificate, information concerning shipping arrangements and route, and obligation to provide delivery verification certificate post-export.
- Checks to ensure that the end-user has a legitimate need for the arms in question, has the capability and intent to use the arms responsibly, and has the capacity to maintain secure control and storage of the equipment upon delivery.

³⁷ Camello, M. (2019). 'Tackling (Arms) Diversion: Challenges for European States'. GRIP Insight, 24 February 2020. https://www.grip.org//wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EC_2020-02-24_EN_M-CAMELLO.pdf.

³⁸ Intervention by Antonio von Schulthess Rechberg and Nicolas Bieri (Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, Switzerland) during the side event: Post-Shipment Verifications – a new instrument of arms export controls during the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the ATT, 28 August 2019.

³⁹ Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (2019). 'Die Exportkontrolle im Bereich unter der Kriegsmaterialgesetzgebung 2018'. https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/55803.pdf.

⁴⁰ Swiss Federal Council (2015). 'Ordonnance sur le matériel de guerre 514.511'. October 2012. French version of 1 October 2015. Official Publication. https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19980112/index.html

⁴¹ For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, a simplified diversion typology has been used whereby Stages 3 and 4 as identified in the work undertaken by the WGETI are combined into one 'Post-Delivery' phase.

- Appropriate conditions attached to the transfer, including specifying end-use restrictions (for example, no re-export or re-assignment without prior written consent), requiring proof of secure storage on arrival in the importing state and/or secure passage to the end-user, and clear consequences should arms be diverted, re-exported or misused (for example, withholding spare parts or ammunition, suspension of exports, no further exports authorized).
- Effective enforcement by customs, border-security and law-enforcement agencies including clear channels of communication between licensing and enforcement, checks to ensure that shipments are bona fide and that authorization/documentation is correct and in order.

DURING TRANSFER

- Transit/trans-shipment authorizations obtained in advance of any transfer/trans-shipment taking place and adequate security for shipments at transit/transshipment hubs.
- Steps taken by transit/trans-shipment hubs to check the registration of all shipping entering and leaving port.
- Tracking of cargo and ensuring that no unscheduled stops are made by the conveyance.
- Effective enforcement by customs and law enforcement including clear channels of communication between licensing and enforcement agencies, checking that shipments are bona fide and authorization/documentation is correct and in order.
- Authority for enforcement agencies in transit/transshipment states to interdict and/or impound suspect shipments.

POST-DELIVERY

- Delivery verification provided to the exporting State Party in a timely manner.
- Physical checks on correct delivery and assignment and to verify that stockpile security provisions are adequate as per any conditions stipulated by the exporting State Party.
- A combination of random and targeted follow-up checks to ensure that weapons remain with the authorized end-user for the declared end-use.



WHILE STATES PARTIES ARE OBLIGATED TO ASSESS THE RISK OF DIVERSION AND TO PREVENT IT, AT ALL POINTS IN THE TRANSFER CHAIN, THEY ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO CONSIDER WAYS TO PARTICIPATE IN INFORMATION SHARING WITH RELEVANT PARTIES TO MITIGATE DIVERSION RISKS.

MITIGATION MEASURES

While States Parties are obligated to assess the risk of diversion and to prevent it, at all points in the transfer chain, they are also encouraged to consider ways to participate in information sharing with relevant parties to mitigate diversion risks. While concrete action to prevent diversion includes the provisions described above (including national arms-transfer control systems, risk assessment and capacities that should be routinely applied in all arms transfers), mitigation measures are specific measures that can be adopted in response to identified risks of diversion in order to substantially lower these risks.

Reinforcing the risk-assessment provisions of Article 7, Article 11.2 obliges States Parties to assess the risk of diversion and, together with importing States Parties, they are encouraged to consider the establishment of diversion risk-mitigation measures, including confidence-building measures and joint programmes.⁴² State Parties involved in a prospective transfer of conventional arms should individually and jointly consider steps that could be taken.

In order to reduce diversion risks to the point that an arms-transfer authorization may be considered, mitigation measures should be appropriate, targeted and effective. These might include:

- Providing security to arms shipments in transit
- Stockpile security and accountability measures
- Limits on quantities shipped
- Use of remote-disabling technologies
- Training in responsible use43

The three case studies below provide examples of armstransfer diversion and suggest how risks might be identified and possibly mitigated.

⁴² ATT Expert Group (2014). 'Key issues for ATT implementation: information exchange under the ATT.' Saferworld. Briefing No 1. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/key-issues-for-att-implementation---preventing-and-combating-diversion.pdf, p. 4...

⁴³ ATT Expert Group (2018). 'Implementing the ATT: Undertaking an arms transfer risk assessment'. Saferworld. Briefing No 6. August 2018. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1181-implementing-the-att-undertaking-an-arms-transfer-risk-assessment, p. 9.

CASES OF DIVERSION

By investigating, exploring and analysing cases of diversion it is possible to demonstrate, in concrete terms, the importance of transparency, information exchange, mutual assistance and effective action on the part of all States Parties in preventing and mitigating diversion. Below are three case studies that provide diversion scenarios occurring across the main stages of the arms transfer chain: before transfer, during transfer, and post-delivery. The different characteristics of each example help to demonstrate the types of actions by different stakeholders that have facilitated the diversion of arms. The cases also provide examples of action that can be taken by stakeholders to prevent and mitigate diversion in the future.

CASE 1 (DIVERSION BEFORE TRANSFER) – OFFSHORE PATROL VESSEL DIVERTED TO LIBYA

BACKGROUND

In May 2018, the Libyan National Army (LNA) acquired a naval patrol vessel sailing under the name of *Alkamara*. It was previously registered with the Irish Naval Service from 1979 to 2016 under the name *LÉ Aisling*, before being sold under auction in March 2017 to a Dutch broker, Dick van der Kamp Shipsales, for €110,000 (US\$124,294).⁴⁴ Just over one year later, the LNA acquired the ship via a chain of intermediaries involving UAE-registered Universal Satcom Services and Libya-based Ahl al-Thiqa Security.⁴⁵

According to the 2019 UN Panel of Experts Report on Libya pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011), the ship was registered as purchased from the Irish government on 29 March 2017 by Russel Ventures Limited, one of a number of Netherlandsbased companies connected to Dick van der Kamp Shipsales. On the same day, Russel Ventures Limited sold the vessel to Universal Satcom Services, a UAE-registered company, for US\$525,000.46 The ship was subsequently registered as a patrol vessel in Belize between 3 August 2017 and 17 April 2018, when Ahl al-Thiqa Security purchased it from Universal Satcom Services for US\$1.5 million. Several days later, on 23 April 2018, the vessel was re-registered as a recreational vessel in Panama, before being de-registered, and supposedly demolished, two months later, on 23 June 2018. However, the Alkamara was not destroyed, and it left the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands on 4 May 2018 with its declared destination

of port being Alexandria, Egypt, where it was due to arrive on 18 May 2018. However, the vessel arrived in Benghazi, Libya, on 15 May 2018, where it was delivered to the LNA on 17 May 2018. According to the UN Panel, the UAE authorities likely forced the Universal Satcom Services to close in July 2019.

It is not clear if an export license was required for the transfer of the vessel or if brokers provided false end-user information. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, the vessel is a controlled item and would have required an export licence: "the OPV *Alkamara* is classified as a naval vessel, and thus falls under the auspices of military equipment in paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970 (2011)." After its transfer to Libya, the *Alkamara* was refitted with one 40mm cannon and two 20mm cannons – the weapon systems it was originally designed to carry.⁴⁷

DIVERSION POINTS TO CONSIDER

This case highlights the role of intermediaries – specifically arms brokering agents – in the diversion of weapons. Through a complex series of ownerships and changes in documentation, efforts were made to obfuscate the true intended destination and end-user of the *Alkamara*. This case also highlights the need for strict control over the sale of surplus military equipment, no matter how old it is, as outdated equipment can be refitted for military purposes.

POSSIBLE MITIGATION MEASURES

This case highlights the fact that, in some circumstances, mitigation measures may be infeasible or unlikely to be successful in reducing the risks of diversion to a low level. While the specific arrangements that were entered into by the Irish government and the purchasing intermediary (or broker) are not known, this case highlights the risks of selling military equipment, however old, to an intermediary (or broker) given that it is notoriously difficult to track and hold such actors accountable should they act irresponsibly. Diversion risks may be reduced if the intermediary can prove, prior to purchase, that they intend to sell the items to a government that is considered to be a responsible international actor. However, the risks of selling even old military equipment to a broker with no designated end-user does not guarantee that they will be delivered to a legitimate actor and, as such, is likely to present risks that cannot be mitigated.

⁴⁴ Roche, B. (2016). 'Fancy owning a naval ship? 'LÉ Aisling' to be auctioned'. The Irish Times. 24 February 2016. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/fancy-owning-a-naval-ship-l%C3%Ag-aisling-to-be-auctioned-1.2987720; O'Riordan, S. (2018). 'LÉ Aisling finds new lease of life with Libyan warlord'. Irish Examiner. 23 May 2018. https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/le-aisling-finds-new-lease-of-life-with-libyan-warlord-471019.html; Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2017 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

⁴⁵ UN Security Council (2019). 'Final Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011) on Libya'. 9 December 2019. S/2019/914, p. 24. 46 Ibid., p. 23.

CASE 2 (DIVERSION DURING TRANSFER) – EU BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION IN LIBYA

BACKGROUND

On 16 April 2014, Malta notified the EU that a cargo of small arms and ammunition had been lost on its way to the European Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM).⁴⁸ The shipment, which arrived at Tripoli International Airport on 10 March 2014, contained 23 Oberland OA-15 assault rifles and accessories, 70 gmm Glock handguns, 21,200 rounds of .223 Remington and 20,850 rounds of 9 x 19mm ammunition. The intended use was for the "sole protection of EU officials" of EUBAM.⁴⁹ While the EUC was signed by the European Delegation to Libya, the shipment itself was arranged by a private company, GardaWorld. According to the 2015 Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Libya pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011), the shipment was blocked upon arrival due to the alleged absence of documents that had not been requested "on previous occasions".⁵⁰

On 17 March 2014, when GardaWorld returned to Tripoli International Airport with the requested documents in order to collect the shipment, the materiel was missing. According to the UN Panel's Report, it is highly likely that members of the brigades that control the airport were involved in the removal of the equipment. Subsequent to this episode, the EU sent several notes verbale to the Libyan authorities, to no effect.

DIVERSION POINTS TO CONSIDER

This case highlights the risks associated with transferring unsecured military equipment to a high-risk destination such as Libya, together with the risks of entrusting third parties, in this case a private company, with such shipments. Consideration should have been given as to whether the private company had the capacity to secure the shipment and to guarantee its delivery. Any doubts in this regard should have resulted in EUBAM security personnel having full control of or, at least, accompanying the shipment throughout all stages of the transfer.

POSSIBLE MITIGATION MEASURES

This case highlights the risks of transferring unsecured military equipment to a high-risk destination, even if the end-user is legitimate. Moreover, the use of a private company to undertake such a transfer increases these risks, as such an actor is unlikely to be viewed with the same authority as a government entity charged with the same task. A robust risk assessment should have highlighted these risks and could have also identified potential mitigation measures. For example, EUBAM could have minimized the risk of diversion and ensured that the arms were delivered to the relevant personnel by taking responsibility for the physical transfer of the arms in question and/or by ensuring that military personnel were detailed to accompany the shipment, including remaining with it while the necessary documentation was obtained.



CASE 3 (DIVERSION POST-DELIVERY) – SWISS ARMS TO GULF STATES

BACKGROUND

In 2011, the Swiss TV programme Rundschau reported that several boxes of RUAG Ball M80 7.62x51mm ammunition worth CHF1.85m (US\$1.64m),51 exported by the Swiss company FGS Frex AG to Qatar in 2009, had been discovered in the possession of opposition forces in western Libya. According to a news report by 20 Minuten Schweiz, the transfer to Qatar was initially made by a Swiss company called FGS Frex AG, whose managing director was in regular contact with officials in Qatar.⁵² Following the report, the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) ordered a six-month freeze on all arms exports to Qatar pending an inquiry.53 Activities resumed after the Qatari government gave assurances that the equipment's delivery to the Libyan opposition forces was due to "an error in military logistics." 54 According to the FDEA, the export to Qatar was made under an EUC that included a 'no re-export' clause.

In another incident, in 2012, RUAG Ammotec hand grenades were found in the possession of the Free Syrian Army fighting the government of Syria in the town of Marea. 55 The grenades were initially sold by RUAG between 2003 and 2004 to the United Arab Emirates, with a 'no re-export' clause. A joint Swiss-UAE investigation retraced the path of the grenades after their delivery to the United Arab Emirates. According to the FDEA, the United Arab Emirates offered authorities in Jordan part of its stock in 2004 in an effort to support the country in its fight against terrorism. From Jordan, the grenades were transferred then to Syria.

As a result of these incidents, the Swiss government devised a PSV system (see Text Box 3) whereby the authorities of the importing country are required to agree to allow follow-up checks to be carried out to ensure compliance with the terms of any end-use undertakings.

DIVERSION POINTS TO CONSIDER

Both cases highlight the potential for violations of end-user undertakings, even when due diligence in export authorization is carried out. The Swiss experience, moreover, emphasizes the importance of undertaking post-delivery and end-user verification, especially in cases where a robust risk assessment determines that there is an elevated risk of diversion.

POSSIBLE MITIGATION MEASURES

This case is a key example of how, after cases of diversion have come to light, a government takes proactive steps to mitigate diversion risks associated with exports of arms. As above, since November 2012, the Swiss government has had the legal authority to oblige industry to provide an end-user certificate signed by the end-user and containing a clause granting the right to the Swiss authorities to conduct postshipment verification of the delivered items as follows: "We certify that the Swiss authorities have the right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item at any time on their demand."56 The inclusion of this clause is generally applicable to exports of complete weapons systems to all countries except those that are members of the four main international export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement).

⁵¹ Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2011 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

^{52 20} Minuten Schweiz (2011). 'Rebellen schießen mit RUAG Munition'. 20 July 2011. https://www.20min.ch/schweiz/news/story/Rebellen-schießen-mit-Ruag-Munition-21024881.

⁵³ Petignat, Y. (2012). 'Exportations d'armes : la gâchette facile'. Le Temps. 11 April 2012. https://www.letemps.ch/suisse/exportations-darmes-gachette-facile. 54 Ibid.

⁵⁵ RTS INFO (2012). 'Les soupçons sont confirmés pour les grenades suisses en Syrie'. 21 September 2012. https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/4290998-les-soupcons-sont-confirmes-pour-les-grenades-suisses-en-syrie.html.

⁵⁶ Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (2020). 'EUC War Material applicable to countries not listed in Annex 2', Vorlagen für die Nichtwiederausfuhr-Erklärung (EUC)'. https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/ruestungskontrolle-und-ruestungskontrollpolitik--bwrp-/bewilligungswesen/euc.html.

CONCLUSION

The above cases serve to illustrate two key lessons:

- First, comprehensive diversion-prevention measures need to be systematically and faithfully applied at each stage of every international transfer of conventional arms.
- Second, should serious risks of diversion be identified in relation to individual arms transfers, those parties to the transfer with the potential to act should jointly explore specific and targeted mitigation measures in order to effect a reduction in those risks where there is a realistic likelihood of success.

The ATT provides an important framework for States Parties to share information on diversion-prevention and mitigation measures. Fully implemented, the Treaty's provisions can also help them address and prevent diversion through effective, cooperative action. While information exchange and cooperation are important elements in any effective action to prevent diversion, transparency and inclusivity of all stakeholders is also crucial given that information on diversion is relevant not just to States Parties, and all stakeholders have a role to play in tackling diversion.

States Parties can express and reaffirm their commitments to transparency as an important step towards fully implementing Treaty provisions.

- In terms of reporting, States Parties are encouraged to submit both initial and annual reports, and to make them publicly available on the ATT Secretariat website. Reversing the trend of increased confidential reporting could be one important step in tackling diversion, as public information sharing contributes to and supports transparency in the implementation of ATT diversion-provisions.
- In terms of sharing information to prevent and address diversion, States Parties are encouraged to share information with all stakeholders. Ongoing discussions of the WGTR and WGETI Article 11 sub-working group could take stock of the importance of transparency in its proposed work on diversion.

The ATT's transparency measures should be implemented robustly, along with the numerous provisions set forth in this chapter. Without meaningful information sharing among all stakeholders, the Treaty cannot fulfil its full potential to tackle diversion.





CHAPTER 2: ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS - ASSESSING 2018 ANNUAL REPORTS

2.1 - ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS

Transparency in arms transfers is a central component of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and fundamental to achieving its goals and objectives. In order to achieve that aim, Article 13 includes obligations for all States Parties to submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports. Transparency is not just an end in itself. Timely, comprehensive and accurate reporting also facilitates confidence building, responsibility and cooperation by allowing States Parties and civil society to be certain that Treaty commitments have been respected. Information contained in States Parties' annual reports can also help to inform licensing decisions and may be used to identify diversion.¹

Analysis of 2018 annual reports presented in this chapter shows that, despite a slight increase in the overall reporting rate, progress on effective reporting is slow in terms of both the quality and quantity of reports submitted. Of particular concern is the degree to which information has been withheld by States Parties, including a marked increase in reports kept confidential on the ATT Secretariat website. While a group of States Parties has displayed commitments to comprehensive, public reporting, the lack of effective reporting by many that is described in this chapter is a matter of concern as reporting has a vital role to play in the implementation of the Treaty.

QUANTITY OF REPORTS

The rate of reporting improved slightly with 2018 annual reports compared to the previous year,² marking a slight departure from the downward trend in reporting compliance observed in the previous four years. However, the number of reports submitted that were made publicly available decreased significantly with 2018 reports, continuing a steady decline in public reporting.


REPORTING COMPLIANCE RATES

Ninety-two States Parties had a legal obligation to submit by 31 May 2019 a report on their arms imports and exports during 2018.³ By the ATT Monitor's cut-off date for analysis,⁴ 62 States Parties had submitted reports, of which 52 were made publicly available.⁵

One State Party (Chile) submitted a report even though it was not yet obliged to do so, as its first annual report was not due until 2020. In the analysis below, States Parties that submitted reports but were not yet obliged to do so were not included in the determination of compliance rates in order to reflect accurate numbers and percentages only of states that met their reporting obligations.

Of the 92 States Parties due to submit 2018 annual reports, only 61 (66 per cent) submitted a report, and only 51 (55 per cent) made their reports publicly available (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Confidential and publicly available annual reports as a percentage of total reports due



¹ See Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2017-report/, Chapter 1; Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, Chapter 2.

² Burkina Faso, Jamaica, Monaco and Samoa submitted 2017 annual reports after the cut-off date for analysis in the 2019 ATT Monitor Annual Report. Reporting rates in this year's edition include these reports and, therefore, will be different than last year's edition of the ATT Monitor. Readers should note that the analysis presented in this edition of the ATT Monitor is not directly comparable to the previous edition due to late reporting by some States Parties, and analysis may not be comparable to previous editions of the ATT Monitor as methodology has evolved.

³ States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

⁴ The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February 2020 as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in analysis to ensure adequate time for in-depth analysis.

The 52 publicly available reports were submitted by: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuvalu, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.

The 66 per cent compliance rate for 2018 annual reporting marks a slight increase from the previous year's rate of 65 per cent. However, it is significantly below the level seen in the first round of ATT reporting (80 per cent), which was the highest compliance rate of any reporting year. Similarly, the rate of public reporting has dropped to only 55 per cent of States Parties obliged to submit a report, compared to 79 per cent in the first year of reporting.

The reporting rates over time, including rates of public reporting, are summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.



FROM 2015 TO 2018, THE SHARE OF ANNUAL REPORTS THAT ARE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL INCREASED FROM 2 PER CENT TO 11 PER CENT, WITH THE LARGEST INCREASE OCCURRING BETWEEN 2017 TO 2018 REPORTS.

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Table 2.1 Annual reports by number of due reports submitted

Annual report	2018	2017	2016	2015
Total reports due from States Parties	92	89	75	61
Submitted and made public	51	54	50	48
Submitted and confidential	10	4	3	1
Total submitted	61	58	53	49
States Parties that did not submit a report	31	31	22	12

Table 2.2 Annual reports by percentage of total due to submit

Annual report	2018	2017	2016	2015
Submitted reports per cent of total due	66%	65%	71%	80%
Public reports per cent of total due	55%	61%	67%	79%
Confidential reports per cent of total due	11%	4%	4%	2%
Reports not submitted per cent of total due	34%	35%	29%	20%

Thirty-one States Parties with an obligation to do so did not submit a 2018 annual report.⁶

Twenty-seven States Parties submitted neither a 2017 nor a 2018 annual report.⁷ The majority of these are from two regions – Africa and the Americas (specifically the subregions of Western Africa and the Caribbean). Table 2.3 provides a breakdown of these States Parties by region.

Three new States Parties (Benin, Chile and the Republic of Korea) submitted a report for the first time, and two (Paraguay and Uruguay) submitted 2018 annual reports after having not submitted for 2017.

Four States Parties did not submit 2018 annual reports though they had done so in the previous year.⁸

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE AND CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

The increased number of States Parties that submit reports to the ATT Secretariat but request that these are kept confidential is a worrying trend. Despite widespread support for public reporting by 81 per cent of States Parties and Signatories to the ATT when it entered into force in 2014,9 the rate has consistently declined each year. From 2015 to 2018, the share of annual reports that are kept confidential increased from 2 per cent to 11 per cent, with the largest increase occurring between 2017 to 2018 reports. Between these two reporting years, the number kept confidential more than doubled, and thus the percentage of confidential reports increased dramatically compared to that in previous years.

The ATT Monitor has identified two trends that have contributed to this decrease in public reporting:

 A year-on-year increase in the number of States Parties obliged to submit reports has not been matched by a comparable increase in the number of annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat.¹⁰ In general, States Parties that acceded to the Treaty after 2015 have a much lower rate of reporting compared to those that were States Parties when it came into force.¹¹

Table 2.3 – States Parties that did not submit 2017 and 2018 annual reports by region

Region	States Parties that did not submit 2017 and 2018 reports	Percentage of total
Africa	13	48%
Americas	12	45%
Asia	0	0%
Europe	2	7%
Oceania	0	0%

 There has been an increase in the number of annual reports that were submitted to the ATT Secretariat with a request that the report be kept confidential. Only one State Party (2 per cent of all submitted reports) submitted a confidential 2015 annual report, a number that increased to ten for 2018 annual reports (16 per cent of all reports submitted).¹²

Of the ten States Parties that submitted confidential 2018 annual reports:

- Two did not submit 2017 annual reports (Nigeria and Liberia)
- Three submitted confidential 2017 annual reports (Cyprus, Greece and Madagascar)
- Four submitted publicly available 2017 annual reports (Georgia, Lithuania, Mauritius and Senegal)
- One had not been required to report in the previous year, and its first report was kept confidential (Honduras)

Only one State Party (Argentina) improved its level of transparency by making its 2018 annual report publicly available after it had previously submitted a confidential report.

- 6 The 31 States Parties that did not submit a 2018 annual report are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominica, El Salvador, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia.
- 7 The 27 States Parties that did not submit a 2017 or 2018 annual report are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte D'Ivoire, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia.
- 8 The four States Parties that did not submit a 2018 report despite doing so the previous year are: Burkina Faso, Croatia, El Salvador and Malta.
- 9 Of the 130 ATT States Parties or Signatories at this time, 105 had explicitly called for public reporting. See Karim A. and Marsh, N. (2015). 'State positions and practices concerning reporting and the Arms Trade Treaty'. Control Arms. https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/States-Practices-PT1.pdf, p. 1.
- 10 For more information, see Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, Chapter 2.
- 11 Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 38.
- 12 The ten States Parties that submitted confidential 2018 annual reports are: Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Honduras, Liberia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria and Senegal.

LATE REPORTS

ATT States Parties have a legal obligation to submit annual reports detailing their arms imports and exports for the preceding calendar year by 31 May. For 2018 transfers, only 45 reports (49 per cent of submitted reports) were submitted within a week of this deadline. Seventeen states submitted their report late. Four states that submitted late reports in the previous year improved and submitted 2018 reports on time.

ATT REPORTING TEMPLATES

For the first time, States Parties could submit their 2018 annual reports using the ATT Secretariat's online reporting tool. Of the 52 States Parties that made their reports publicly available on the ATT Secretariat website, 11 used the ATT online reporting tool (21 per cent). This number includes Sweden, which submitted reports using both the ATT template and the online tool. The remaining States Parties submitted using the ATT reporting template, with the exception of France and the United Kingdom, who submitted using their UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) reports.

QUALITY OF REPORTS

To provide the minimum necessary information needed in order to meaningfully assess a State Party's arms transfers, a publicly available report must, for each transfer:

- Specify weapon type
- Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type
- Clearly name the final exporting/importing country¹⁶

Among the 92 States Parties that had an obligation to submit a 2018 annual report, 36 (39 per cent) submitted a publicly available report that contained the minimum necessary information needed to assess their exports and imports. Among the 56 (61 per cent) that did not meet that threshold, 15 (16 per cent) submitted a report that did not include the minimum necessary information. All 14 (45 per cent) either did not submit a report or submitted one that was kept confidential.

The remainder of this analysis focuses on two other means by which reports fall short of the minimum necessary threshold: some States Parties make it difficult or impossible to meaningfully assess arms transfers by not providing information on imports and by aggregating data.¹⁹

IMPORTS

The Treaty obliges States Parties to report each year on their authorized or actual imports and exports.²⁰ Providing information on both imports and exports is crucial for States Parties to demonstrate commitment to transparency and consistency between arms-trade policies and ATT obligations. For example, control and monitoring of imports is a key part of a State Party's arms-transfer control system, and reporting on imports can be a vital component of efforts to identify diversion and other weaknesses in national control systems. Furthermore, reporting on imports helps to build confidence that all States Parties are meeting their Treaty commitments and helps promote accountability.

In 2018 annual reports, several States Parties reported no or very little information on their imports, or submitted 'nil' import reports.²¹ However, analysis of exports reported by other States Parties suggests that some states did import arms but, for one reason or another, did not submit import data in their reports.

- 13 States Parties that submitted their reports within one week of the 31 May deadline are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Uruguay. Chile also submitted a report on time even though it was not obliged to do so in 2019.
- 14 States Parties that submitted their reports late are: Austria, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, Romania, South Africa and Tuvalu.
- 15 States Parties that had previously submitted late reports but submitted their 2018 annual reports on time are: Australia, the Dominican Republic, the Netherlands and Poland.
- 16 This methodology was adopted by the ATT Monitor in its ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report. See Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 39.
- 17 The States Parties that submitted a publicly available report containing the minimum necessary information needed to assess their exports and imports are: Albania, Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tuvalu and Uruguay.
- 18 The States Parties that submitted publicly available reports that did not meet the minimum necessary threshold are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Monaco, Paraguay, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of North Macedonia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
- 19 Previous editions of the ATT Monitor Annual Report provide in-depth analysis on other ways in which States Parties provide information that is not comprehensive or transparent. For example, see Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 38.
- 20 See Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 13(3).
- 21 A 'nil' report is a declaration that a State Party did not import or export any arms during the reporting period.

In some cases, States Parties indicated that sensitive data was withheld from their reports, which may include import data in the case that a State Party did not make it known where exactly and why such data was withheld. For other States Parties, it may be the case that their national control systems lack the control and monitoring systems necessary to be able to report on their imports of all weapons within the scope of the ATT.

The three most prevalent ways in which import data is missing from 2018 annual reports are described below, along with relevant examples of each.

MISSING IMPORT REPORTS

United Kingdom

As in all previous reporting years, the United Kingdom did not provide information on imports of major conventional weapons or SALW, nor did they submit a 'nil' report. However, other States Parties reported exports to the United Kingdom.

Ten States Parties reported actual arms exports to the United Kingdom in 2018,²² including 106 items of major conventional weapons, and 3,032 items of small arms. Examples of these reported transfers are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.

The United Kingdom provided a possible explanation for its missing imports data in its initial report, which states that it does "not maintain comprehensive records of arms imports." If this remains accurate, then the United Kingdom has not been able to develop the administrative capacity needed to fulfil its Article 13 reporting obligations, seven years since the negotiation of the ATT.

Table 2.3 Examples of reported actual exports of major conventional weapons not reported as imports by the United Kingdom

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Czech Republic	United Kingdom	Battle tanks	1
Czech Republic	United Kingdom	Armoured combat vehicles	1
France	United Kingdom	Large-calibre artillery systems	104




Table 2.4 Examples of reported actual exports of SALW not reported as imports by the United Kingdom

	_		
Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
France	United Kingdom	Revolvers and self-loading pistols	1,603
Austria	United Kingdom	Small arms (aggregated)	670
Norway	United Kingdom	Rifles and carbines	622
Netherlands	United Kingdom	Sub-machine guns	30
Netherlands	United Kingdom	Light machine guns	37

²² Actual exports to the United Kingdom were reported by: Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa and Sweden

Austria

As in all previous reporting years, Austria also did not provide information on imports of major conventional weapons or SALW, nor did they submit a 'nil' report. However, other States Parties reported exports to Austria.

Ten States Parties reported actual arms exports to Austria in 2018,²³ including 15 items of major conventional weapons, and 5,683 items of small arms. Sweden also reported small arms to Austria under voluntary national categories. Examples of these reported transfers are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.

Austria stated in its initial report that its national control system allowed for the provision of information needed to fulfil its Article 13 reporting obligations but it has not provided an explanation as to why it does not submit information detailing imports.

Table 2.5 Examples of reported actual exports of major conventional weapons not reported as imports by Austria

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Czech Republic	Austria	Armoured combat vehicles	1
Sweden	Austria	Armoured combat vehicles	14

Table 2.6 Examples of reported actual exports of SALW not reported as imports by Austria

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Montenegro	Austria	Revolvers and self-loading pistols	3,000
Serbia	Austria	Rifles and carbines	892
Czech Republic	Austria	Sub-machine guns	705
Czech Republic	Austria	Assault rifles	90
Slovenia	Austria	Revolvers and self-loading pistols	399



²³ Actual exports to Austria were reported by: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.

LACKING IMPORT DATA

Finland

In its 2018 annual report, Finland reported the actual import of two major conventional weapons items and no SALW items. However, a number of States Parties reported actual exports of both to Finland, including 28 major conventional weapons items and 313 SALW items. Examples of these reported transfers are provided in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.

Sweden also reported an export of SEK880,096 (US\$101,242)²⁴ worth of small arms to Finland under voluntary national categories.

In its initial report, Finland stated that its national control system allowed for the provision of information needed to fulfil its Article 13 reporting obligations. However, elsewhere in its report, Finland stated that individual police departments granted or revoked permits to import small arms. It is possible that information on imports of these weapons provided in its annual report does not include information collected from individual police departments, and Finland may not have the capacity to aggregate such local level data. Finland also stated in its annual report that sensitive data had been withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty, so it is possible that the above transfers could have been excluded for that reason.

Table 2.7 Examples of reported actual exports of major conventional weapons not reported as imports by Finland

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Austria	Finland	Armoured combat vehicles	6
Germany	Finland	Battle tanks	20
Norway	Finland	Missiles and missile launchers (air defence systems)	2

Table 2.8 Examples of reported actual exports of SALW not reported as imports by Finland

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Czech Republic	Finland	Sub-machine guns	100
Netherlands	Finland	Light machine guns	4
Netherlands	Finland	Light machine guns	22
Netherlands	Finland	Light machine guns	2
Netherlands	Finland	Light machine guns	20



Norway

In its 2018 annual report, Norway reported the actual import of 291 small arms items. However, States Parties reported actual exports of 13,987 small arms items to Norway. Examples of these reported transfers are provided in Table 2.9.

Sweden also reported exports of small arms worth SEK569,681 (US\$65,533)²⁵ to Norway under voluntary national categories, even though Norway did not report any imports of small arms from Sweden.

Comments provided by States Parties in their annual reports detailing the context of these transfers may provide a possible explanation for the discrepancies in information. Norway explained that all the small arms imports it reported were for police procurement. Alternatively, Finland and Japan described their exports as being for sporting purposes, which means they were likely purchased by civilians for recreation. In this case, Norway may not have included weapons transferred for this purpose in its annual report. It is important to note, however, that the ATT does not provide for an exemption for any type of small arm and so all States Parties should report on transfers of arms imported for civilian end-users.

Norway also indicated in its annual report that sensitive commercial or national security data had been withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty, so these transfers may have been withheld for either of these reasons. However, it seems unlikely that such sensitivities would concern imports of sporting guns. In its initial report, Norway stated that its national control system allowed for the provision of information required by the Treaty.

Table 2.9 Examples of reported actual exports of SALW not reported as imports by Norway

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Finland	Norway	Rifles and carbines	12,636
Japan	Norway	Small Arms and Light Weapons (aggregated)	215
Japan	Norway	Small Arms and Light Weapons (aggregated)	1,097

Spain

Spain did not report any imports of major weapons, or of small arms in 2018. However, a number of States Parties reported actual exports of both to Spain, including 14 major conventional weapons items and 10 SALW items. Examples of these reported transfers are provided in Tables 2.10 and 2.11.

As Spain did not indicate that it had withheld sensitive data, one explanation for the discrepancy concerning the missile systems could be found in comments by Slovenia, which stated that the missile systems were "Used in testing purposes." This could mean that the systems were temporarily exported to Spain and returned once the tests were over. In their reports, both countries define an export and import as the physical transfer of items across a national border, transfer of title and transfer of control. However, it is possible that, in practice, Spain and Slovenia used different definitions of a transfer.

Table 2.10 Examples of reported actual exports of major conventional weapons not reported as imports by Spain

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Austria	Spain	Armoured combat vehicles	14
Slovenia	Spain	Missiles and missile launchers (missiles)	10

Table 2.11 Examples of reported actual exports of SALW not reported as imports by Spain

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Czech Republic	Spain	Heavy machine gun	1
Finland	Spain	Rifles and carbines	9

Sweden

In its 2018 annual report, Sweden's only reported imports were a classified quantity of Meteor missiles from the United Kingdom. However, a number of States Parties reported actual exports of major conventional weapons and SALW to Sweden, including four major conventional weapons items and 309 SALW items. Examples of these reported transfers are provided in Tables 2.12 and 2.13.

Sweden has indicated that some sensitive data had been withheld from its report in accordance with the Treaty. It is possible that data on the transfers in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 had been withheld.

Table 2.12 Examples of reported actual exports of major conventional weapons not reported as imports by Sweden

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Finland	Sweden	Armoured combat vehicles	3
Poland	Sweden	Large-calibre artillery systems	1




PROVIDING INFORMATION ON BOTH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IS CRUCIAL FOR STATES PARTIES TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY AND CONSISTENCY BETWEEN ARMS-TRADE POLICIES AND ATT OBLIGATIONS.

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Table 2.13 Examples of reported actual exports of SALW not reported as imports by Sweden

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Poland	Sweden	Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	1
Norway	Sweden	Rifles and carbines	256
Serbia	Sweden	Light machine guns	9



REPORTS OF 'NIL' IMPORTS

States Parties can submit a 'nil' report if they did not import or export any arms in the previous year. The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' import report, but the Czech Republic reported that it had exported 80 revolvers or pistols and ten submachine guns to the Dominican Republic in the same year. A 'nil' import report was submitted by Uruguay, though it reported imports of sniper rifles from Austria. ²⁶ Additionally, Argentina reported the export of 300 revolvers or pistols to Uruguay, and Finland reported the export of 400 rifles or carbines – none of which were reported as imports by Uruguay.

When both the Dominican Republic and Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for both imports and exports, they also stated that they had withheld some commercially sensitive or national security-related data in accordance with the Treaty. It is therefore possible that the above transfers of small arms were excluded from their annual report. In their initial reports, both stated that their national control systems allowed for the provision of information required by the Treaty.



...[C]ONTROL AND MONITORING OF IMPORTS IS A KEY PART OF A STATE PARTY'S ARMSTRANSFER CONTROL SYSTEM, AND REPORTING ON IMPORTS CAN BE A VITAL COMPONENT OF EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY DIVERSION AND OTHER WEAKNESSES IN NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS.

LIKELY ADDITIONAL IMPORTS

The above examples very likely underestimate the true quantity of each State Party's imports. Exports from non-members and Signatories of the ATT – including the United States, China and Russia, three of the world's largest arms exporters – have not been included in the above analysis. In addition, the examples only highlight actual exports, and data on export authorizations was not included in the above analysis as it is possible that the transfer did not take place during 2018.

In terms of export authorizations, the ATT Monitor found other examples where authorized exports reported by one State Party were not reported as imports by other States Parties. This is the case, for example, with Belgium reporting the authorized export of approximately €8.4 million (US\$9.9 million)²7 of small arms to the United Kingdom, reported under the EU Common Military List's criteria ML1.²8 Further examples are given in Table 2.14.

Table 2.14 Examples of reported exports not reported by importing States Parties

Exporter	Importer	Туре	Number of units
Albania	Austria	Rifles and carbines	53,100
Austria	Norway	Small arms and light weapons (aggregated)	60,872
Germany	Sweden	Sub-machine guns	606
Germany	Finland	Assault rifles	90
Portugal	Spain	Rifles and carbines	2,378

²⁶ For discussion on why this may have occurred see the Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2017-report/, pp. 35-36.

²⁷ Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

²⁸ Criterion ML1 includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less, and accessories and specially designed components.

EXCESSIVE AGGREGATION

As mentioned above, reporting must be accurate and comprehensive in order for States Parties to fulfil the aims and objectives of the ATT. Excessively aggregated data in annual reports makes it difficult or impossible to determine if a State Party is abiding by its Treaty obligations.

In 2018 annual reports, some States Parties continued to provide excessively aggregated data, which means information was aggregated to the extent that it was either difficult or impossible to discern the quantity or type or weapons that were transferred to or from a particular state.²⁹

Overall, 14 States Parties used excessive aggregation in their 2018 annual reports.³⁰ In comparison to the previous year, four improved the quality of their reports and stopped using excessive aggregation (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Norway and Panama).³¹ and two started using excessive aggregation (Finland and the Republic of North Macedonia). Unfortunately, three States that had previously used excessive aggregation in their 2017 annual reports either submitted a confidential report (Mauritius) or did not submit a report at all (Croatia and Malta) for 2018.

With the exception of Italy and the Republic of Moldova, excessive aggregation exclusively concerned imports and exports of small arms and light weapons. This is likely to be for two reasons:

- Many States Parties transfer little or no major conventional weapons in a particular year, so they do not have the opportunity to aggregate (whereas almost all import or export small arms).
- Some types of small arms are acquired by civilians (such as pistols or rifles).

In general, major conventional weapons are acquired by national armed forces, exported by them or exported by a small number of arms companies. The existence of a civilian market in small arms complicates monitoring and data collection by governments as there is usually a much wider range of parties involved in transfers of small arms (for example, purchases

by law-enforcement agencies, dealers or private individuals) compared with transfers of major conventional weapons. Aggregation may reflect challenges faced by national authorities in monitoring arms flowing into and out of their borders, even when States Parties also state in their initial reports that their national control systems allow for the provision of information as required by the Treaty (as with Finland and Denmark below).

Finland's 2018 annual report is of note because, despite including excessive aggregation, it is arguably more transparent than the reports it submitted in previous years (which contained little information on light weapons imports). The report includes information on imports of 21,135 items of 'light weapons aggregated' and some information on the states exporting them to Finland. If, as is likely the case with small arms (see below), Finland had previously not reported on its imports of such weapons, then the provision of some data, albeit in an aggregated format, is a step forward.

Denmark's 2018 annual report included excessive aggregation in the sections concerning its imports and exports of small arms and light weapons. For almost all these categories, Denmark just stated the total quantity of arms exported and imported without stating to whom or from where they had been transferred. In addition, it also reported the import of 6,495 small arms, describing them as 'other' and not stating where they had come from.

Italy's 2018 annual report also provides examples of excessive aggregation. Italy reported the total export of 123 battle tanks, 493 armoured combat vehicles and 29 large-calibre artillery systems, among other major conventional weapons, without providing any information on where those weapons were exported. As noted above, the minimum information required to meaningfully assess a report includes the destination of arms exports.

Austria's 2018 annual report included information on the quantity and financial value of exports to each recipient country, but all small arms and light weapons were combined – making it impossible to know whether an export concerned, for example, revolvers and self-loading pistols, sub-machine guns or portable anti-tank guns.

²⁹ For more information on the methodology used by the ATT Monitor in determining which States Parties used excessive aggregation, see Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor Report 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 103.

³⁰ The 14 States Parties that used excessive aggregation in some or all of their reports are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Monaco, Paraguay, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of North Macedonia and Sweden.

³¹ While Panama used less aggregation in its 2018 annual report, the data it reported was still aggregated to such an extent that it could not be determined the number of weapons imported from which country.

Withheld information

In addition to the ten States Parties that submitted confidential reports (see above), 13 others in their public reports indicated, via ticking the relevant box in the ATT reporting template, that some commercially sensitive or national security-related information had been withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty.³² Those 13 reports represent 25 per cent of all the publicly available 2018 reports, a marked increase over the four reports (7 per cent) that indicated in the previous year that data had been withheld (all four by States Parties that did so again in 2018 annual reports).³³ In addition, in their 2018 reports a further seven States Parties did not indicate whether or not information had been withheld, either because they left blank the relevant part of the template,³⁴ or because they did not use the template.³⁵ Therefore the actual level of information being withheld could be much higher.

REPORTING GOOD PRACTICE

The reporting template and other formats allow States Parties to provide more than the minimum necessary information on arms exported and imported. In keeping with previous editions of the ATT Monitor, here we highlight four practices that promote a higher level of transparency.

No single report included all these examples of best practice. Generally speaking, however, Slovenia and Montenegro provided particularly transparent reports. Both included three of the four best practices mentioned below, submitted reports on time, and provided detailed and comprehensive information.

Comments and descriptions

Descriptions of the types of arms transferred can provide important information on what is being transferred. For example, instead of only using the basic template category of 'Large-Calibre artillery system', Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the models it had exported, which included a 120mm Mortar.

Thirty-one states similarly included descriptions of all or many of their arms exports and imports.³⁶

Including a description of the context of each transfer can help explain its circumstances and allay concerns. For example, the United Kingdom explained that exports to Canada of a battle tank and a mortar and anti-aircraft gun, were respectively for a historical vehicle collection and the film and TV industry. Nineteen reports included additional descriptions of the context of all or many of their transfers.³⁷

Additional weapons types

Reports that include data on all types of arms included in the Treaty deserve praise. In particular, the templates do not include a specific row for shotguns despite that type of small arm being covered by the Treaty. Fifteen states used the template to report on transfers of shotguns.³⁸

Clarifying blank spaces in reporting templates

Many reports are submitted with blank spaces in the template. This is likely because the State Party in question did not export or import a specific category of arms. However, as outlined in last year's ATT Monitor, a blank space is ambiguous, and it is often unclear whether no transfers were made or data has been withheld. Some countries have definitively stated that no arms of specific categories had been exported or imported. For example, Estonia wrote '0' while Montenegro used a dash. Overall, ten States Parties used those or similar methods.³⁹ In addition, the Republic of Korea deleted rows in its report, which presumably did not contain any data.

- 32 States Parties that indicated that some commercially sensitive or national security-related information had been withheld are: Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Sweden and Uruguay.
- 33 The States Parties that ticked the box in their 2018 and 2017 reports are: Norway, South Africa, Sweden and Uruguay.
- 34 States Parties that left the relevant part of the template blank are: Monaco, Poland, Samoa and Spain.
- 35 States Parties that did not use the reporting template are: Austria, France and the United Kingdom.
- 36 States Parties that provided descriptions of many or all of their arms exports and imports are: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.
- 37 States Parties that provided descriptions of the context around their arms transfers are: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
- 38 States Parties that included data on imports or exports of shotguns were: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Costa Rica, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Romania, United Kingdom.
- 39 States Parties that definitively stated that no arms of specific categories were exported or imported are: Belgium, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of 2018 annual reports shows that despite a group of States Parties consistently displaying a commitment to detailed, comprehensive and timely reporting, overall progress on effective reporting continues to be disappointing. Though the reporting rate increased slightly for 2018 annual reports, the rate of confidential reporting is also increasing. This increase is particularly worrisome, as annual reports are one of the key tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties, as they help build confidence between states, enable States Parties to demonstrate that their arms-trade policies are consistent with ATT obligations and contribute to transparency in the international arms trade. In order for annual reports to fulfil this role, data must be comprehensive and accurate, as well as publicly available.

The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting has worked diligently to support States Parties in identifying barriers to effective reporting and has provided multiple avenues through which they can seek assistance in meeting reporting obligations.

The remainder of this chapter takes an in-depth look at the reporting practices of States Parties in their 2018 annual reports and provides recommendations to all ATT stakeholders to further support States Parties in fulfilling their commitment to transparency in the ATT.





2.2 - COUNTRY PROFILES

This section examines the annual reports submitted by States Parties to the ATT covering their exports and imports of conventional arms in 2018. It presents analysis of the reporting and transfer practices of each reporting State Party in the form of country profiles. By disaggregating its analysis by country, the ATT Monitor intends to provide easily comparable and nationally relevant findings to help inform future practice.

Ninety-two States Parties were due to submit an annual report for 2018 to the ATT Secretariat by 31 May 2019.¹ As of 1 February 2020,² 62 had done so,³ of which 52 made theirs publicly available. These reports form the basis of the analysis presented here.

Annual reports are one of the key tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. They help to build confidence between countries, and enable States Parties to demonstrate that their arms-trade policies are consistent with their obligations in the ATT. In order for annual reports to fulfil this pivotal role, it is necessary that States Parties complete them in a comprehensive, accurate and public manner.

The ATT Monitor continuously builds on the findings of assessments of each round of annual reporting. The analysis here seeks to supplement and build on the baseline analysis completed by the ATT Monitor in previous reports, which includes an assessment of reporting practices, identification of a baseline of trends, examples of good national practices, and interpretive and practical challenges that are common among States Parties.⁴

METHODOLOGY

All annual reports were downloaded for analysis by 1 February 2020. Any reports submitted subsequently or later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration.

Where applicable, State Parties' reports for 2018 were compared to those for 2017 so as to consider the extent to which national reporting practices changed following last year's round of annual reporting under the ATT, and to assess if the common challenges identified had changed. Reporting practices were assessed for each State Party according to key criteria identified in previous ATT Monitor reports. These criteria are:

- Submitting a report as per each State Party's legal obligation under Article 13.3
- Submitting a report on time (within one week of the 31 May 2019 reporting deadline)
- Making a report publicly available (including not withholding data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security)
- Completing accurate and non-contradictory information
- Providing data that is clearly disaggregated by weapon type and country⁵
- Providing information that goes beyond the minimum requirements specified in Article 13.3 (for example, reporting on exports/imports of ammunition, voluntary national categories, etc.)

Overall, each State Party is considered on the extent to which its annual report contributes to or undermines the objective of increased transparency in the global arms trade. The analysis is not intended to highlight technical errors or as a 'name and shame' exercise, but to present comparable information that is country-specific in order to inform policymakers and civil society in each State Party, and to help support and build knowledge and capacity among officials responsible for filling in ATT annual reports.

¹ States Parties are granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period beyond the deadline set out in Article 13 to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

² The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February 2020 as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in this report to ensure adequate time for in-depth analysis.

³ This number includes the annual report submitted by Chile, which was not yet due to submit.

⁴ See also Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor Report 2017'. 11 September 2017. ttps://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, pp. 33-51.

⁵ In order to be classified here as having provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import, a State Party must clarify if it was reporting an authorized or actual import or export (or both), provide a number or value for each item and clearly name the final exporting/importing country.

The ATT Monitor takes as its reference for timely reports the practice used in previous ATT Monitor Annual Reports that considers reports to be on time if they are received by the ATT Secretariat website within one week of the legal deadline. Some States Parties have indicated that their date of submission for their 2018 annual reports was before the 31 May deadline, although these were only made available after the reported date of submission. The reason for the gap between the stated and actual dates of submission is unclear.

The submission of 2018 annual reports marks the first time States Parties had the option of doing so using the new online reporting tool on the ATT Secretariat website. Therefore, the analysis notes how States Parties chose to submit reports as well as any discrepancies between information provided using the online tool and the ATT reporting template (in the case that States Parties submitted using both methods).

When States Parties included values of transfers in their reports, transfer summaries include a monetary value of their imports or exports. All values have been converted to US dollars using the annual conversion rate for each currency for the 2018 calendar year. In some cases, the type of currency used by States Parties to report values was not specified.

Similarly, in some instances, States Parties used country codes to indicate final exporting and importing countries. The ATT Monitor determined which countries such codes referenced using online sources, though it did not verify with each State Party whether or not such determinations are accurate.

In addition to assessing reporting practices, each country profile includes key baseline data relating to the exports and imports described by States Parties in their annual reports. This data includes:

- Total number of export/import partners and their Treaty status (as of 1 February 2020)⁷
- The number and categories of major conventional weapon items reported, if available⁸
- The number and sub-categories of small arms and light weapons (SALW) reported⁹
- The principal trade relationships reported by the State Party¹⁰

This section looks solely at transfer data as reported by each State Party in its ATT annual report. It does not compare the data with other relevant reporting mechanisms or findings by independent experts, media sources, national reports to parliamentary authorities, or think tanks such as the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).¹¹ Integrating information from such external sources would likely paint a different picture of the global arms trade, particularly in respect of the percentage of trade between countries. In order for the analysis conducted by the ATT Monitor and others to be as accurate as possible, it is critical that States Parties submit clear and comprehensive annual reports and that they consider the fulfilment of their reporting obligations as an opportunity to support the ATT's goal of greater transparency in the global arms trade.



ANNUAL REPORTS ARE ONE OF THE KEY TOOLS FOR TRANSPARENCY AT THE DISPOSAL OF STATES PARTIES. THEY HELP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE BETWEEN COUNTRIES, AND ENABLE STATES PARTIES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEIR ARMS-TRADE POLICIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS IN THE ATT.

- 6 A complete list of States Parties that submitted timely 2018 annual reports can be found in the ATT Monitor's preliminary analysis in the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report. See Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor Report 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 111.
- 7 Where applicable, analysis includes the names of non-ATT members and non-UN members to make clear trade relationships that extend beyond
- 8 Categories of major conventional weapons include: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.
- 9 Sub-categories of small arms include: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns and others. Sub-categories of light weapons include: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, mortars of calibres less than 75mm and others.
- 10 Principal trade relationships are determined by totalling either the number or value of transferred items reported by each State Party, depending on which is used in each report. Where States Parties provided both a number and value for transferred items, the ATT Monitor makes clear which was used in determining principle trade relationships.
- 11 See, for example, SIPRI (2018). 'Arms Transfers Database'. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

ALBANIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

Unspecified - Not ticked

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Albania provided clear, disaggregated information on its exports and imports in 2018.

Albania provided comments on exports and imports reported for 2018, describing the end-use and/or end-user.

Albania provided descriptions of items transferred.



Room for improvement:

Albania indicated on the front page of its 2018 annual report that it used national definitions of categories of arms reported and made reference to the EU Common Military List in Annex 2. It did not, however, provide export or import data under the voluntary national categories section for either exports or imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- · Albania reported exports to one ATT State Party in 2018.
- · Albania did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Albania reported one export of 53,100 small arms, all rifles and carbines, to Austria.
 The state of origin was China.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Albania's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Albania reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports. It did not report exports or imports of light weapons or major conventional weapons as it did in its 2017 annual report.

Albania provided information on both exports and imports of small arms in its 2018 annual report, though it did not indicate whether it was submitting 'nil' reports by checking the relevant boxes on the front page.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

- Albania reported imports from six countries in 2018.
 Of these, five were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Albania did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Albania reported imports of 7,882 small arms items. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (63 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (31 per cent).
- The main exporters to Albania were Italy (65 per cent of reported import items), Austria (27 per cent) and the Czech Republic (5 per cent).

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

ARGENTINA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

Online ATT reporting tool



Good practices:

Argentina provided descriptions of imports of major conventional weapons and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user.

Argentina reported imports under the small arms 'Others' sub-category and clarified in descriptions that it reported shotguns.

Argentina submitted a publicly available 2018 report after keeping its 2017 report confidential.



Room for improvement:

Argentina provided no descriptions of exports or imports of small arms other than the shotguns that were reported as 'Other' small arms imports.

Argentina excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Argentina reported exports to six ATT States Parties and one Signatory in 2018.
- Argentina did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Argentina reported the export of 42,070 small arms items of revolvers and self-loading pistols.
- The main importer of small arms from Argentina was the United States (95 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Argentina submitted a publicly available 2018 report after keeping its 2017 report confidential.

Argentina reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports, as well as imports of major conventional weapons and small arms.

- Argentina reported imports from ten ATT States Parties, two Signatories and one non-member (China).
- Argentina reported imports of major conventional weapons from the United States, including five manned combat aircraft and 19 manned attack helicopters.
- Argentina reported the import of 23,467 items of small arms, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (57 per cent), rifles and carbines (25 per cent) and 'Others' (17 per cent).
- The main exporters to Argentina were the United States (34 per cent), Italy (28 per cent) and Brazil (17 per cent). Argentina reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

AUSTRALIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Australia specified that 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' data had been withheld from its report by ticking the relevant box, after not doing so in its 2017 report. It specified in its report where the information was withheld.

Australia provided the number of authorizations (permits granted) along with the number of items in its exports of small arms.

Australia provided data on the import of shotguns and air firearms in the 'Others' small arms sub-category.



Room for improvement:

Australia did not provide comments on reported transfers, with the exception of a clarifying description for aggregated small arms imports. It had provided comments on major conventional weapons transfers in its 2017 report.

Australia aggregated more information in its 2018 report than its 2017 report, including aggregated values for each sub-category of exports. It continued to provide aggregated numbers for each sub-category of small arms imports.

Australia continued to aggregate all states from which it imported small arms and reported them only as 'Various'.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Australia reported exports to 23 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and six were non-members (Belarus, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Tonga).¹²
- Australia reported the export of 16 major conventional weapons items of armoured combat vehicles and two unmanned combat aircraft.
- Australia's exports of armoured combat vehicles to four countries were worth approximately AU\$6.1m (US\$4.6m), and exports of unmanned combat aircraft to two countries were worth approximately AU\$0.7m (US\$0.5m).¹³
- Australia reported the export of 5,204 items of small arms, worth a total of AU\$2.5m (US\$1.9m),¹⁴ from a total of 1140 export permits granted. Australia did not disaggregate data by weapons sub-category.
- In terms of number of items exported, the main importers of small arms from Australia were New Zealand (54 per cent) and the United States (32 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Australia's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Australia reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports. It did not report light weapons exports. It reported aggregated values for each export sub-category after providing disaggregated values in its 2017 report.

Australia reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports. It provided an aggregated number of each sub-category of small arms imports after providing disaggregated numbers in its 2017 report, and it did not specify whether these were Authorized or Actual transfers. It did not report light weapons imports as it did in its 2017 report.

- Australia reported imports of 137 items of major conventional weapons from one State Party and one Signatory, covering four categories. Of these, 92 per cent were large-calibre artillery systems, all of which were from the United States.
- The main exporter of major conventional weapons to Australia was the United States (99 per cent). Australia withheld the number of missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) imported from the United States.
- Australia reported the import of 106,065 small arms items, covering three sub-categories: rifles and carbines (51 per cent), 'Others' (37 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (12 per cent). Australia withheld the number of items transferred in one reported import of 'Others'.
- Australia aggregated data for each sub-category of small arms and referred to exporting states as 'Various'.

¹² Australia also reported exports to one non-UN member (Macao).

¹³ Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

AUSTRIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

Unspecified - Did not submit a front page

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Austria reported the Number and Value of its exports of major conventional weapons and SALW in its 2018 report.



Room for improvement:

Austria did not include the front page of its 2018 report. It is therefore unclear why Austria has not reported on imports, nor if any information has been withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Austria provided no information on how it defines the term 'export'.

Austria aggregated all SALW sub-categories in its 2018 report, in some cases aggregating SALW, and in some cases reporting on small arms and light weapons separately.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Austria reported exports to 92 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 61 were ATT States Parties, 10 were Signatories and 14 were non-members (Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Tunisia).¹⁵
- Austria reported the export of ten major conventional weapons items: six armoured combat vehicles to Finland and four to Spain, with a total value of €134,400 (US\$158,677).¹⁶
- Austria reported the export of 2,476,518 SALW items, with a total value of €172.9m (US\$204.1m).¹⁷ Austria aggregated data such that it is impossible to determine the relevant sub-categories of SALW exports.
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Austria were the United States (46 per cent) and Canada (12 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Austria's reporting practice remained the same in its 2018 annual report

Austria reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of exports of major conventional weapons. It reported in some cases **Authorized** and in other cases **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of exports of SALW.

Austria did not report imports in 2018.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

· Austria did not report import data in 2018.

¹⁵ Austria also reported arms exports to seven non-UN members (Greenland, Holy See, Hong Kong, Kosovo, Macau, New Caledonia and Taiwan).

¹⁶ The total value of armoured combat vehicles reported by Austria may not reflect the actual value of these items. It is unclear why the total value reported is relatively low. Austria did not specify which currency is used for reported values of transfers. For this analysis, the ATT Monitor has assumed the currency to be euros. Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

¹⁷ Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

BAHAMAS

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

BARBADOS

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.



BELGIUM

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Belgium provided descriptions of all reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons and/or comments describing the end-use and/or end-user, after doing so selectively in 2017.

Belgium provided both numbers and values of reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons, after mostly providing only values in 2017. It also reported additional small arms imports and exports aggregated by exporting/importing countries, which it did not do in 2017.

Belgium continued to report on voluntary national categories in 2018, though it did not indicate it was doing so by checking the relevant box on the front page of its report. These were reported under the EU Common Military List's criterion ML1.¹⁸



Room for improvement:

Belgium reported aggregated numbers and values of small arms exports and imports in addition to transfers reported under voluntary national categories, making it impossible to determine the relevant sub-categories of small arms reported. Belgium provided very few comments or descriptions in relation to its transfers of small arms.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Belgium reported exports to 61 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 43 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and ten were non-members (Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia).
- Belgium reported major conventional weapon exports valued at €23m (US\$27.2).²⁰
 It reported two exports of major conventional weapons: 18 armoured combat
 vehicles to Indonesia (United States was the state of origin), and 63 manned combat
 aircraft to the United States (France was the state of origin).
- Belgium reported aggregated numbers and values of small arms in 2018 that totalled 1,211 items with a total value of €403,156 (\$US475,981).²¹
- Belgium's reported exports of ML1 items in 2018 totalled €326.7m (US\$385.7m).²²
- In terms of value, the main importers of ML1 items from Belgium were Saudi Arabia (60 per cent), Australia (9 per cent) and Switzerland (8 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Belgium's reporting practice changed in its 2018 report.

Belgium reported **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapon exports, after only providing Values in its 2017 report. It reported Authorized Numbers and Values of small arms exports aggregated by importing country, after not reporting this information in 2017. It continued to report **Authorized Values** of exports under voluntary national categories.

Belgium reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapon imports, after having provided **Values** in its 2017 report. It reported Actual Numbers and **Values** of small arms imports aggregated by exporting country, after not reporting this information in 2017. It continued to report **Actual Values** of imports under voluntary national categories.

- Belgium reported imports from 31 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and six were non-members (China, Equatorial Guinea, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Russia).²³
- The only import of major conventional weapons reported by Belgium was of 94 armoured combat vehicles from the United Kingdom.
- Belgium reported imports of 14,108 small arms items, all of which were aggregated by exporting country except for 12 items of rifles and carbines from the United States. The total value of Belgium's small arms imports was €12.2m (US\$14.4m).²⁴
- In terms of value, the main exporters of small arms to Belgium were Germany (31 per cent), Italy (22 per cent) and the United States (17 per cent).
- Belgium's reported imports of ML1 items totalled €28.2m (US\$33.3m).²⁵ The highest value exporters of ML1 items to Belgium were Japan (48 per cent), the United States (32 per cent) and Turkey (9 per cent).
- 18 Criterion ML1 includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components.
- 19 Belgium also reported exports to one non-UN member in 2018 (Taiwan).
- 20 Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid
- 23 Belgium also reported imports from one non-UN member in 2018 (Taiwan).
- 24 Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

BELIZE

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

BENIN

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Benin provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported imports in 2018.

Benin provided descriptions for each reported import.



Room for improvement:

Benin did not provide a cut-off date for its report.

Benin could provide comments on reported transfers to indicate end-use and/or end-users.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

This is Benin's first ATT annual report.

Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports. It reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports and did not report any major conventional weapon imports.

- Benin reported imports from two countries in 2018.
 One was an ATT State Party and one was a non-member (China).
- Benin reported 2,920 SALW imports in four subcategories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (68 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (28 per cent).
- The main exporter to Benin was China (75 per cent).

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Yes

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

Yes

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported imports in 2018 after aggregating destination countries in 2017.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided both numbers and values of all exports and imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided descriptions of all items exported and imported, as well as some comments.



Room for improvement:

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not specify whether it was reporting Authorized or Actual exports or imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's descriptions of small arms imports do not correspond clearly with exporting states, making it difficult to determine which items were imported from which states.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported exports to six countries in 2018. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 568 major conventional weapons items with a total value of €2.4m (US\$2.83m),²⁶ all of which were large-calibre artillery systems.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 1,459 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Collectively, these exports were worth €189,683 (US\$212,411).²⁷ Most light weapons were indicated to be 'non-perspective, outdated and surplus weapons'.
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Bosnia and Herzegovina were Turkey (92 per cent) and Croatia (5 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Bosnia and Herzegovina's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided **Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapon and SALW items exported, though it had not reported major conventional weapon exports in its 2017 report. It continued not to specify whether exports were Authorized or Actual transfers.

On the front page of its 2018 report, Bosnia and Herzegovina ticked the relevant box to indicate it was submitting a 'nil' report for imports. However, it reported **Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports but did not specify whether imports were Authorized or Actual transfers.

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported imports from 19 countries in 2018. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of 9,686 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Collectively, these reported imports were worth €5m (US\$5,9m).²⁸ In terms of value, the majority were rifles and carbines (43 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (36 per cent) and assault rifles (13 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Bosnia and Herzegovina were the United States (22 per cent), Serbia (21 per cent) and Italy (11 per cent).

BULGARIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Bulgaria provided clear, disaggregated data for every reported export and import in 2018.

Bulgaria provided descriptions and/or comments on all of its reported exports and imports of major conventional weapons.

In some cases, Bulgaria provided in its descriptions of reported imports and exports the number of items transferred per each described weapon-type.



Room for improvement:

Bulgaria excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld

Bulgaria could provide comments on its exports and imports of SALW.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Bulgaria reported exports to 35 countries in 2018. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories, and 12 were non-members (Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda and Uzbekistan).
- Bulgaria reported the export of 43 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (53 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (35 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Bulgaria were the United States (35 per cent), Saudi Arabia (28 per cent) and Poland (21 per cent).
- Bulgaria reported the export of 81,270 SALW items in 2018, covering ten sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were assault rifles (71 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (16 per cent) and light machine guns (8 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW exports were India (49 per cent), Saudi Arabia (19 per cent) and the United States (13 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Bulgaria's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Bulgaria reported **Actual Numbers** of exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

- Bulgaria reported imports from 22 countries in 2018. Of these, 19 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories, and one was a non-member (Belarus).
- Bulgaria reported the import of 114 major conventional weapons items: two armoured combat vehicles and 112 large-calibre artillery systems. Of the large-calibre artillery systems, 100 came from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Bulgaria reported imports of 8,235 SALW items in 2018, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (40 per cent), assault rifles (24 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (21 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Bulgaria were Romania (26 per cent), Germany (12 per cent) and Austria (12 per cent).

BURKINA FASO

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

CABO VERDE

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

CHAD

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

CHILE





Good practices:

Chile submitted its first ATT annual report despite not being due to submit

Chile provided descriptions of its reported imports of major conventional weapons.



Room for improvement:

Chile did not specify whether it was reporting Authorized or Actual imports.

Chile excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Chile did not provide a cut-off date for its report.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

This is Chile's first ATT annual report. It was submitted before its first report was due on 31 May 2021.

Chile submitted a 'nil' report for exports. It reported **Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons but did not specify whether they were Actual or Authorized transfers.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

Chile submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2018.

- Chile reported imports from two countries in 2018.
 Of these, one was an ATT State Party and one was a Signatory.
- Chile reported the import of 12 items of major conventional weapons: six manned combat aircraft from Brazil and six manned attack helicopters from the United States.

COSTA RICA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Costa Rica provided clear, disaggregated data for every reported export and import in 2018.

Costa Rica reported disaggregated imports of ammunition under voluntary national categories.

Costa Rica provided descriptions for all small arms exports and imports under voluntary national categories, as well as comments for exports.



Room for improvement:

Costa Rica did not indicate on the front page of its report by ticking the relevant box that it was including national definitions of categories of conventional arms reported.

Costa Rica could provide comments on its reported imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

Costa Rica reported an export of one small arms item to Colombia in voluntary
national categories. The comment on this transfer specifies that the gmm pistol was
transferred along with a private citizen who moved from Costa Rica to Colombia.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Costa Rica's reporting remained the same in 2018.

Costa Rica reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and imports under voluntary national categories and did not report exports or imports of major conventional weapons.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

- Costa Rica reported imports from seven countries in 2018. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Costa Rica reported the import of 4,621 small arms items under voluntary national categories. Of these, the majority were 'pistolas' (87 per cent).
- The main small arms exporters were the United States (82 per cent), Austria (12 per cent) and the Czech Republic (3 per cent).
- Costa Rica reported the import of 16.3m units of ammunition under voluntary national categories.
- The main exporter of ammunition to Costa Rica was the United States (97 per cent).

COTE D'IVOIRE

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

CROATIA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

CYPRUS

No, missed deadline Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019? No. report kept confidential Was the Annual Report made public?

CZECH REPUBLIC

Yes Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019? Yes Was the Annual Report made public? Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018? No Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons? No ATT online reporting tool What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Czech Republic provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2018.

Czech Republic provided comments for some major conventional weapons exports describing the end-use and/or end-user.



Room for improvement:

Czech Republic did not provide comments on exports and imports of SALW, as well as on imports of major conventional weapons.

Czech Republic could provide descriptions of exports and imports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Czech Republic's reporting remained the same in 2018.

Czech Republic reported Actual Numbers of major conventional weapons and SALW exports and imports.

Czech Republic reported imports of major conventional weapons in 2018, though it did not do so in 2017.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Czech Republic reported exports to 59 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 34 were ATT States Parties, 12 were Signatories and 12 were non-members (Bhutan, Bolivia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Uganda).29
- Czech Republic reported the export of 160 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (54 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (40 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons items from the Czech Republic were Ukraine (44 per cent), Poland (18 per cent) and Cyprus (13 per cent).
- Czech Republic reported the export of 79,383 SALW items, covering ten subcategories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (58 per cent), assault rifles (21 per cent) and sub-machine guns (10 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW items from the Czech Republic were Hungary (33 per cent), the United States (19 per cent) and Slovakia (8 per cent). The largest reported export was for 19,596 revolvers and self-loading pistols to Hungary.

- Czech Republic reported imports from eight countries in 2018. Of these, three were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-members (Belarus and China).
- Czech Republic reported one import of major conventional weapons: nine battle tanks from Serbia.
- Czech Republic reported the import of 3,133 SALW items. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (88 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Czech Republic were Belarus (54 per cent), Canada (11 per cent) and China (9 per cent).

DENMARK





Good practices:

Denmark provided descriptions of some items, including all exports and imports of major conventional weapons, and some small arms imports.

Denmark reported exports of hand grenades under voluntary national categories.

Denmark provided a note with its definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import' to make clear that reported transfers included in its annual report included only permanent exports and imports of conventional arms and not exports or imports for repair or for 'national material for use by forces abroad'.



Room for improvement:

Denmark continued to aggregate countries supplying its small arms imports in 2018, reporting the exporting states collectively as 'Multiple exporting states', making it impossible in some cases to analyse the number of items from specific source countries.

Denmark did not provide information on final importing states in its reported exports of small arms.

While Denmark provided more information about imports reported under the small arms and light weapons sub-categories 'Others', it did not provide details of the final exporting states or types of weapons of exports reported in the small arms sub-category 'Others'.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Denmark reported the export of 405 major conventional weapons items: three warships to Ukraine, and 300 missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) and 102 missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) to Latvia (the United States was the state of origin for the MANPADS).
- Denmark reported the total export of 6,108 small arms items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (57 per cent) and 'Others' (38 per cent). It did not name the importing countries or provide any further information.
- Denmark also reported under voluntary national categories the export of 80 hand grenades to Austria.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Denmark's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Denmark reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons exports, though it reported only Authorized major conventional weapons exports in its 2017 report. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports, and no exports of light weapons, though it reported Actual Numbers of SALW exports in its 2017 report. It also reported **Authorized Numbers** of exports under voluntary national categories, which it did not do in its 2017 report.

Denmark reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, though it reported Actual Numbers of imports in its 2017 report. It reported a combination of Authorized and Actual Numbers of small arms imports, though it reported Actual Numbers of small arms imports in its 2017 report. It reported **Actual Numbers** of light weapons imports, though it did not report any light weapons imports in its 2017 report.

- Denmark reported the import of 43 major conventional weapons items: 32 armoured combat vehicles from Switzerland, and eight missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) and three missiles and missile launchers (MANPADS) from the United States.
- Denmark reported the import of 24,012 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (38 per cent), 'Others' categories for both small arms and light weapons (33 per cent), and rifles and carbines (29 per cent).
- Denmark aggregated information on exporting states of SALW, with the exception of Norway in the light weapons 'Others' sub-category. It reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

DOMINICA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC





Good practices:

 $\label{lem:pominican} Dominican \ Republic \ reported \ imports \ of \ ammunition \ under \ voluntary \ national \ categories.$



Room for improvement:

Dominican Republic excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Dominican Republic did not include information on exporting countries in its report of ammunition imports under voluntary national categories.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Dominican Republic's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports and reported both **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of imports of ammunition in voluntary national categories. It did not report small arms imports as it did in its 2017 report.

Dominican Republic indicated the cut-off date for its report to be 24 December 2018. It indicated the cut-off was an unspecified date in December 2017 in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

 Dominican Republic reported the import of 5,078,000 pieces of ammunition under voluntary national categories. It did not give details of the exporting countries.

EL SALVADOR

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

ESTONIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Estonia provided a few descriptions and/or comments describing the enduse and/or end-user of imports.



Room for improvement:

Where there was more than one exporting or importing state involved in a small arms export or import, Estonia continued to aggregate all countries together within each weapons sub-category, making it impossible to identify the quantities of small arms that were exported to or imported from each country.

Estonia only provided comments on some imports. It could provide descriptions and/or comments for all reported exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Estonia reported exports to 12 countries in 2018. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Kyrgyzstan).
- · Estonia did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Estonia reported the export of 524 small arms items in 2018. These covered three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (60 per cent), rifles and carbines (35 per cent) and 'Others' (4 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Estonia's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Estonia reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. Though it did not report any exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons, it indicated its practice was to report **Authorized Numbers**.

Estonia reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. Though it did not report any imports of light weapons, it indicated its practice was to report **Authorized Numbers**.

- Estonia reported imports from 19 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Estonia reported the import of eight armoured combat vehicles from the Netherlands.
- Estonia reported the import of 1,716 small arms in 2018.
 Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (47 per cent), rifles and carbines (all for civilian use) (37 per cent) and 'Others' (also all for civilian use) (15 per cent).

FINLAND

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Finland provided clear, disaggregated data for every reported export and import in 2018.

Finland provided descriptions of items for major conventional weapons and small arms exports.



Room for improvement:

Finland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Finland aggregated much of the information it provided for light weapons imports, making it impossible to determine which types of weapons were imported from the exporting states provided.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Finland reported exports to 49 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 39 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and three were non-members (India, Jordan and Uzbekistan).³⁰
- Finland reported exports of five major conventional weapons items, all armoured combat vehicles, from Belgium, Slovakia and Sweden.
- Finland reported the export of 161,289 small arms items, all of which were rifles and carbines
- The main importing states were Canada (62 per cent), Australia (19 per cent) and Norway (8 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Finland's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Finland continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports, and it continued not reporting exports of light weapons.

Finland reported **Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons imports and did not indicate whether they were Authorized or Actual transfers, though it reported Actual Numbers of these imports in its 2017 report. Finland did not report small arms imports, though it did in its 2017 report. Instead, it reported **Authorized Numbers** of aggregated light weapons imports and did not specify Actual or Authorized imports for other categories of light weapons, after it did not report light weapon imports in its 2017 report.

- Finland reported imports from 10 countries in 2018.³¹
 Of these, five were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and one was a non-member (China).
- Finland reported the import of two large-calibre artillery systems from the Republic of Korea with a total value of €6m (US\$7.1m).³²
- Finland reported the import of 24,138 aggregated light weapons items, most of which were aggregated by exporting states.

³⁰ Finland also reported imports from two non-UN members in 2018 (Kosovo and New Caledonia).

³¹ Finland reported an import of 10,106 aggregated light weapons and listed the exporting state as '10,106'. As a result, the total number of exporting countries to Finland is one more than is included in this analysis.

³² Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

FRANCE

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

Unspecified - National reporting template

What type of report was submitted?

National reporting template



Good practices:

France included an additional column in its national reporting template to allow for comments on each reported transfer.

France provided descriptions of items for all reported exports and imports. These descriptions named the sub-category of weapons and, in some cases, provided additional details such as calibre. France also provided some comments describing the end-use and/or end-user.

France included a detailed national report as additional information along with the submission of its ATT annual report.



Room for improvement:

France did not specify whether reported exports of attack helicopters were manned or unmanned. Similarly, France did not specify whether reported exports of missiles and missile launchers were missiles or MANDPADs, though this may be inferred from the descriptions provided.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- France reported exports to 31 countries in 2018. Of these, 19 were ATT States
 Parties, four were Signatories, and eight were non-members (Egypt, India,
 Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan).
- France reported the export of 1,433 major conventional weapons items, covering five categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (47 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (38 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (13 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from France were Saudi Arabia (42 per cent), India (17 per cent) and Botswana (10 per cent).
- France reported the export of 3,505 SALW items, covering five sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (54 per cent) and assault rifles (45 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from France were the United Kingdom (47 per cent), the Central African Republic (40 per cent) and Gabon (5 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

France's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

France reported **Actual Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW. It reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of SALW, and did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

- France reported imports from six countries in 2018.
 Of these, five were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- France did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- France reported the import of 18,636 SALW items, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (86 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to France were Germany (g1 per cent of items) and Belgium (7 per cent).

GEORGIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

No, missed deadline

No, report kept confidential

GERMANY

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Germany provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Germany included a 'national disclaimer' on the front page of its report further clarifying what kinds of information may or may not be inferred through its reporting of authorized transfers.



Room for improvement:

Germany only provided comments on some SALW imports. It could provide descriptions and/or comments for all reported exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Germany reported exports to 36 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 29 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and three were non-members (Jordan, Pakistan and Qatar).³³
- Germany reported the export of 50 major conventional weapons items, covering four categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (52 per cent) and battle tanks (40 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Germany were Jordan (50 per cent) and Singapore (36 per cent).
- Germany reported the export of 44,357 SALW items, covering seven subcategories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (66 per cent) and recoilless rifles (23 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Germany were France (44 per cent),
 Switzerland (18 per cent) and the United States (14 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Germany's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Germany reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports and reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports.

Germany reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports, though it reported Authorized Numbers in its 2017 report. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.

Germany indicated that information had not been withheld on grounds of commercial sensitivity and/or national security in its 2018 report, though it had withheld information in its 2017 report.

- Germany reported imports from 13 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Germany reported the import of 19 major conventional weapons items: 17 battle tanks from the Netherlands and two armoured combat vehicles from Austria.
- Germany reported the import of 5,834 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (87 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Germany were the United Kingdom (86 per cent) and the United States (7 per cent).

GHANA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

GREECE

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

No, missed deadline

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

GRENADA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

GUATEMALA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

GUINEA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

GUYANA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

HONDURAS

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

HUNGARY





Good practices:

Hungary provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export.

Hungary provided descriptions and/or comments describing the end-use and/or end-user for all reported exports and imports.

Hungary provided full names for the countries designated as exporting or importing states after providing undefined country codes in its 2017 report.



Room for improvement:

Hungary could clearly indicate that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant spaces blank.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Hungary reported exports to nine countries in 2018. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Egypt).
- · Hungary did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Hungary reported the export of 467 SALW items, covering three sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (89 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Hungary were Slovakia (34 per cent), Croatia (30 per cent) and Romania (24 per cent). The Soviet Union³⁴ was the state of origin for all light weapons exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Hungary's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Hungary did not report exports of major conventional weapons, though it did in its 2017 report. It reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports.

Hungary reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It did not report light weapons imports, though it did in its 2017 report.

- Hungary reported imports from 12 countries in 2018.
 Of these, nine were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Hungary reported the import of four major conventional weapons items: one battle tank from the Czech Republic (for demilitarization/exhibition) and three armoured combat vehicles from Slovakia (for spare parts). The Soviet Union³⁵ was the state of origin for both transfers.
- Hungary reported the import of a total of 35,466 small arms items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (72 per cent), assault rifles (10 per cent) and submachine guns (10 per cent).
- The main exporter of small arms to Hungary was the Czech Republic (90 per cent). Hungary reported different states of origin for two reported small arms imports.

ICELAND

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

IRELAND

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Ireland provided descriptions and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user for most of its reported transfers.

Ireland reported some Values of small arms exports in addition to the Number of items transferred.



Room for improvement:

Ireland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Ireland continued to aggregate the final importing countries under some small arms exports and imports sub-categories, so it is impossible to analyse how many items within reported transfers were exported to which specific country.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Ireland's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Ireland did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It reported Authorized Numbers and Values of exports of small arms, though it reported only Numbers of small arms exports in its 2017 report.

Ireland did not report imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons, though it reported light weapons imports in its 2017 report. It reported Authorized Numbers of small arms imports.

Ireland indicated that information had been withheld on grounds of commercial sensitivity and/or national security in its 2018 report, after it did not indicate whether or not information was withheld in its 2017 report. Ireland also changed the definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import' in its 2018 report to include transfer of title in addition to physical transfer of items across a national border, as these terms were defined in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Ireland reported exports to 12 countries in 2018. Of these, ten were ATT States
 Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Pakistan).³⁶
- · Ireland did not report exports of major conventional weapons.
- Ireland reported the export of 1,267 small arms items, covering three subcategories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (82 per cent) and 'Others' (17 per cent), the latter of which were all sporting shotguns and air and combo guns.
- In some cases, Ireland aggregated information for importing countries for these sub-categories so it is unclear to where these items were exported.

- Ireland reported imports from 20 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Ireland reported the import of 3,662 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (47 per cent) and 'Others' (47 per cent), the latter of which were air guns, shotguns and combo guns.
- In most cases, Ireland aggregated information for exporting countries for these sub-categories so it is unclear from where these items were imported.

³⁶ Ireland reported exports to Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and the United Kingdom under four separate 'EU Member States' entries. In its 2017 annual report, Ireland also reported exports to 'EU Member States' but did not specify which countries were involved in the transfers.

ITALY

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

ATT online reporting tool



Good practices:

Italy indicated that each reported export and import was Authorized and provided numbers of items transferred.



Room for improvement:

Italy named all export destinations and import sources for SALW in a separate annex, making it difficult, in most cases, to determine which weapons were transferred to which country.

Italy provided no descriptions or comments describing any reported transfers.

Italy excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Italy reported the export of 1,082 major conventional weapons items, covering seven categories. Of these, the majority were armoured combat vehicles (46 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (missiles, etc.) (32 per cent) and battle tanks (11 per cent).
- Italy did not report the final importing states for its exports of major conventional weapons.
- Italy reported the export of SALW to 34 countries. Of these, 15 were ATT States
 Parties, six were Signatories and 13 were non-members (Algeria, Bolivia, India,
 Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar and Saudi
 Arabia). It reported the destinations for its SALW exports in a separate annex so it
 is unclear which types were transferred to which country.
- Italy reported the export of 81,748 SALW items, covering six sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (64 per cent) and assault rifles (32 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW were Qatar (43 per cent), Mexico (32 per cent) and Pakistan (7 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Italy's reporting practice changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Italy reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Italy reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports, though it did not report any imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons as it did in its 2017 report.

Italy reported the cut-off date for its report to be 23 May 2019. However, the terms 'export' and 'import' were defined as 'Other – Licenses authorized in 2018'.

- Italy did not report the import of any major conventional weapons items.
- Italy reported the import of small arms from two countries in 2018, one ATT State Party and one Signatory. It reported the exporting states for its SALW imports in a separate annex so it is unclear which types were transferred from which country.
- Italy reported the export of 534 small arms, covering two sub-categories: rifles and carbines (58 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (42 per cent).
- The two exporters of small arms to Italy were Switzerland (86 per cent) and the United States (14 per cent).

JAMAICA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Jamaica provided comments on most reported transfers describing the end-use and/or end-user.

Jamaica indicated that exports and imports reported in the small arms 'Others' sub-categories were shotguns.



Room for improvement:

Jamaica aggregated numbers of small arms items exported and imported by weapons sub-categories, making it impossible to analyse how many of each weapon went to each importing or exporting state.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Jamaica reported exports to 14 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-members (Ecuador and Venezuela).³⁸
- Jamaica did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Jamaica reported the export of 271 small arms items, covering four sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (74 per cent), rifles and carbines (13 per cent) and 'Others' (shotguns) (11 per cent).
- Jamaica aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple importing states in most cases.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Jamaica's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report. $^{\rm 37}$

Jamaica reported Authorized Numbers of small arms exports and imports.

- Jamaica reported imports from 19 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-members (Ecuador and Venezuela).39
- Jamaica did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Jamaica reported the import of 6,004 small arms items, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68 per cent), sub-machine guns (17 per cent) and 'Others' (shotguns) (10 per cent).
- Jamaica aggregated the numbers of items for each sub-category of small arms, listing multiple exporting states in all cases.

³⁷ Jamaica submitted a 2017 annual report after the cut-off date for the report to be included in the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report. Its 2017 annual report was reviewed ahead of the analysis of its 2018 annual report.

³⁸ Jamaica also reported exports to one non-UN member in 2018 (Cayman Islands).

³g Jamaica also reported imports from two non-UN members in 2018 (Cayman Islands and Montserrat).

JAPAN

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Japan provided clear, disaggregated data for all of its reported exports and imports.

Japan provided descriptions for imports of major conventional weapons.

Japan included both Numbers and Values of its small arms exports after only providing numbers in its 2017 annual report.



Room for improvement:

Japan's use of HS Codes for reporting its small arms exports and imports meant that the data provided did not correspond directly to the categorization within the ATT reporting template, making it difficult to comparatively analyse its transfer data.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Japan reported exports to nine countries in 2018. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Japan reported the export of 95,284 small arms items with a total value of ¥6.9m (US\$62,719).40
- In terms of value, the main importers of small arms from Japan were the United States (74 per cent) and Belgium (19 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Japan's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Japan did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons. It reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports, though it only provided Numbers in its 2017 report.

Japan reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports. It provided **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of its small arms imports. It did not report imports of light weapons.

Japan continued to provide information on small arms exports and imports organized according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Code) of the World Customs Organization.

Japan indicated the cut-off date for its report to be 31 March 2019.

- Japan reported imports from 12 countries in 2018.
 Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Japan reported the import of 25 major conventional weapons items, including 15 armoured combat vehicles and 10 manned combat aircraft. The two exporters of major conventional weapons items to Japan were the United States (84 per cent) and Australia (16 per cent).
- Japan reported the import of 2,691 small arms items with a total value of ¥1,7m (US\$15,786).⁴¹
- In terms of value, the main exporters of small arms to Japan were the United States (54 per cent), Sweden (28 per cent) and Italy (12 per cent).

LATVIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Latvia provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2018.

In most cases Latvia provided both the Number and Value of SALW exports and imports.

Latvia specified which currency (euro) is used for reported values of transfers, after not doing so in its 2017 report.



Room for improvement:

Latvia did not provide descriptions of items or comments on any of its exports and did so for only a select few of its imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Latvia reported exports to two ATT States Parties in 2018: three rifles and carbines to Estonia and 154 rifles and carbines to Lithuania.
- The total value of small arms exports was €366,502 (US\$432,706).⁴²

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Latvia's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Latvia did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons, though it reported light weapons in its 2017 report. It reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports.

Latvia reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports and **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports.

- Latvia reported imports from 14 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Latvia reported two imports of major conventional weapons: 23 armoured combat vehicles from the United Kingdom and 31 large-calibre artillery systems from Austria, with the United States as the state of origin for the latter.
- Latvia reported the import of a total of 8,632 SALW items with a total value of €804,658 (US\$950,009),⁴³ covering seven sub-categories. Values were not included for all reported SALW imports. In terms of numbers, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (47 per cent) and assault rifles (31 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of SALW to Latvia were Austria (46 per cent) and Germany (45 per cent). Latvia reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

LESOTHO

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

LIBERIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

LIECHTENSTEIN

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Was the Annual Report made public?

Yes

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

No

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No


What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Liechtenstein provided descriptions of exports and imports and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user. It noted that all small arms exports and imports were non-commercial.



Liechtenstein's reporting practice remained the same in its 2018 annual report. It reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.



Room for improvement:

Liechtenstein could clearly indicate that there were no reported exports or imports in specific weapons categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant spaces blank.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

 Liechtenstein reported only two exports in 2018: three rifles and carbines to Germany, and one rifle and carbine to Austria. Both were hunting rifles and non-commercial.

- Liechtenstein reported imports from four countries in 2018, all of which were ATT States Parties.
- Liechtenstein reported imports of 20 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (70 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (25 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Liechtenstein were Austria (60 per cent), Germany (25 per cent) and France (10 per cent).

LITHUANIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Yes

No

No

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

LUXEMBOURG

No, missed deadline Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019? Was the Annual Report made public? Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

ATT online reporting tool



Good practices:

What type of report was submitted?

Luxembourg provided descriptions for all reported exports and imports.



Room for improvement:

Luxembourg did not indicate if it reported Authorized or Actual transfers.

Luxembourg aggregated some information on reported exports by small arms sub-category, making it impossible to analyse how many weapons in eachsubcategory were transferred to the multiple importing states.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Luxembourg's reporting changed in its 2018 annual

Luxembourg reported **Numbers** of small arms exports and did not specify whether they were Actual or Authorized transfers, though it provided this information in its 2017 report. It did not report major conventional weapons or light weapons exports.

Luxembourg reported **Numbers** of small arms imports and did not specify whether they were Actual or Authorized transfers, though it submitted a 'nil' report for imports in its 2017 report. It did not report major conventional weapons or light weapons imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Luxembourg reported small arms exports to three countries in 2018. Of these, one was an ATT State Party, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Qatar). Luxembourg was not the state of origin for any of its exports.
- Luxembourg reported the export of six small arms items: four rifles and carbines, and two revolvers and self-loading pistols.

- · Luxembourg reported small arms imports from two countries, both of which were ATT States Parties.
- Luxembourg reported the export of 337 small arms items, covering three sub-categories: assault rifles (70 per cent), sub-machine guns (18 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (12 per cent).

MADAGASCAR

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

MALI

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

MALTA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

MAURITANIA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

MAURITIUS

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

MEXICO

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

No. missed deadline

Yes

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Mexico provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2018.

Mexico provided descriptions and comments on the transfers for each reported export and import describing the end-use and/or end-user.



Room for improvement:

Mexico excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Mexico submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Mexico's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Mexico submitted a 'nil' report for exports, though it reported small arms exports in its 2017 report.

Mexico reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons, though it did in its 2017 report.

Mexico specified that 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' data had been withheld from its report, after not ticking the box in its 2017 report.

- Mexico reported imports from ten countries in 2018.
 Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Mexico did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Mexico reported the import of 46,160 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (62 per cent), rifles and carbines (13 per cent) and 'Others' (11 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Mexico were Israel (40 per cent), Italy (20 per cent) and the United States (11 per cent). United States was the state of origin of one reported import of hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers.

MONACO





Good practices:

Monaco clearly indicated in its report where it had zero exports and imports to report.



Room for improvement:

Monaco withheld data on the Numbers and/or Values of its reported imports, along with the exporting states, ultimately providing little information about the transfers.

Monaco did not tick the relevant box on the front page of its report to indicate that information was withheld.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Monaco's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.⁴⁴

Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Monaco reported **Authorized** imports of small arms and withheld the Number and/or Value of the transfers. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

 Monaco reported imports of revolvers and self-loading pistols and rifles and carbines. It withheld the Numbers and/or Values of these items, as well as the information on exporting states.

MONTENEGRO

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

Yes

Ves

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Montenegro provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2018, after it did not for all transfers in its 2017 report.

Montenegro provided descriptions and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user for most of its reported exports and imports.

Montenegro provided both Numbers and Values for all reported exports and imports.



Room for improvement:

Montenegro did not tick the relevant boxes on the front page of its report to indicate it was not submitting 'nil' reports for exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Montenegro reported exports to seven countries in 2018. Of these, five were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Vietnam).
- · Montenegro did not report any exports of major conventional weapons.
- Montenegro reported the export of 31,633 items of SALW with a total value of
 €5.9m (US\$6.9m),⁴⁵ covering three sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority
 of these items were revolvers and self-loading pistols (76 per cent) and rifles and
 carbines (24 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Montenegro were Germany (66 per cent) and Ghana (24 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Montenegro's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Montenegro reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW exports. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons, though it did in its 2017 report.

Montenegro reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports. It did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.

- Montenegro reported imports from 13 countries in 2018. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Vietnam).
- Montenegro did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Montenegro reported the import of 4,440 SALW items with a total value of €3.1m (US\$3.7m),⁴⁶ covering six sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority of items were revolvers and self-loading pistols (41 per cent), rifles and carbines (37 per cent), and sub-machine guns (21 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Montenegro were Italy (33 per cent), the Czech Republic (22 per cent) and Austria (17 per cent). Montenegro reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

NETHERLANDS

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Netherlands provided clear, disaggregated information for most of its reported exports and imports.

Netherlands provided descriptions for all exports of major conventional weapons and comments for all imports of major conventional weapons.



Room for improvement:

Netherlands provided only some descriptions of SALW exports and imports. It did not provide comments on any SALW exports and imports.

Netherlands did not indicate whether or not reported imports of rifles and carbines were Actual or Authorized transfers.

Netherlands did not provide a cut-off date for its report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Netherlands reported exports to 27 countries in 2018. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-member (Uganda).
- Netherlands reported the export of 42 major conventional weapons items, covering two categories. Of these, 81 per cent were battle tanks (Germany was the state of Origin) and 19 per cent were armoured combat vehicles (Sweden was the state of origin).
- Netherlands reported the export of 2,095 small arms items, covering five subcategories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (39 per cent), rifles and carbines (38 per cent) and light machine guns (21 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from the Netherlands were Belgium (31 per cent), the United States (15 per cent) and the United Kingdom (10 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Netherland's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Netherlands reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports and imports. It did not report exports of light weapons.

Netherlands reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.

- Netherlands reported imports from 25 countries in 2018. Of these, 24 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Netherlands reported the import of 11 armoured combat vehicles: ten from Germany and one from Australia.
- Netherlands reported the import of 24,112 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68 per cent), and rifles and carbines (23 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to the Netherlands were Austria (63 per cent), Portugal (12 per cent) and Germany (5 per cent).

NEW ZEALAND





Good practices:

New Zealand provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

New Zealand reported exports and imports under voluntary national categories, and provided extensive information in Annex 2 to clarify specific national definitions of Category VIII weapons (SALW), and of its voluntary national categories.



Room for improvement:

New Zealand did not provide any comments or descriptions on exports or imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- New Zealand reported exports to 37 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, eight were Signatories and eight were non-members (China, Fiji, Indonesia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka and Tonga).⁴⁷
- · New Zealand did not report the export of any major conventional weapons.
- New Zealand reported the export of 1,789 small arms, covering four sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (64 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (21 per cent), and shotguns reported under voluntary national categories (12 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from New Zealand were Australia (32 per cent), China (15 per cent) and the United States (12 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

New Zealand's reporting remained the same in its 2018 report.

New Zealand reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and exports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

New Zealand reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports and imports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

- New Zealand reported imports from 28 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and two were non-members (China and Russia).⁴⁸
- New Zealand did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- New Zealand reported the import of 6,221 SALW items, covering 11 sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (41 per cent), revolvers and selfloading pistols (36 per cent) and shotguns reported under voluntary national categories (16 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to New Zealand were the United States (38 per cent), Turkey (14 per cent) and Australia (12 per cent).

NIGER

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

NIGERIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

No, missed deadline

Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential



NORWAY





Good practices:

Norway disaggregated the names of the final importing countries for its exports after having provided aggregated information in its 2017 report.

Norway provided descriptions and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user for all of its reported exports and imports, with the exception of voluntary national categories.

Norway reported aggregate exports of ammunition under voluntary national categories.



Room for improvement:

Norway did not provide information on final importing states in its reported aggregate exports of ammunition under voluntary national categories.

Norway excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Norway reported exports to 15 countries in 2018. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Norway reported the export of 13 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Norway were Chile (38 per cent), Finland (15 per cent) and Poland (15 per cent).
- Norway reported the export of 1,112 SALW, all of which were either rifles and carbines (99 per cent) or portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems.
- The main importers of SALW from Norway were the United Kingdom (56 per cent), Sweden (23 per cent) and Germany (12 per cent).
- Norway also reported the export of NOK949,529 (US\$116,750)⁴⁹ worth of ammunition but did not provide information on importing states.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Norway's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report, though it changed its definition of the term 'import' slightly to only 'physical transfer of items across a national border'.

Norway reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports. It reported **Values** of its exports of ammunition under voluntary national categories but did not specify if Actual or Authorized exports.

Norway reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It did not report imports of light weapons.

- Norway reported imports from four countries in 2018.
 Of these, three were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Norway reported the import of eight major conventional weapons items: two armoured combat vehicles from Sweden and six manned combat aircraft from the United States.
- Norway reported the import of 291 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (77 per cent) and rifles and carbines (16 per cent).
- The two exporters of small arms to Norway were Germany (84 per cent) and Austria (16 per cent).

PANAMA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

Was the Annual Report made public?

Yes

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Yes (for exports)

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Panama provided both a description and comment describing the end-use and/or end-user of its one reported small arms import.



Room for improvement:

Panama aggregated information on exporting states for its one reported small arms import, making it impossible to analyse the breakdown of imports by origin.

Panama did not provide a cut-off date for its report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Panama's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Panama submitted a 'nil' exports report for exports.

Panama reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports, though it reported Authorized imports in its 2017 report. Panama did not report any imports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

 Panama reported the import of 46 revolvers and self-loading pistols in 2018 from Germany and the United States.



PARAGUAY

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Paraguay provided descriptions and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user of all of its reported SALW imports.



Room for improvement:

Paraguay aggregated information on exporting states for its one reported import of revolvers and self-loading pistols, making it impossible to analyse the breakdown of imports by origin.

Paraguay did not provide Numbers or Values for its reported imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

• Paraguay did not report any exports in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Paraguay submitted a 2018 annual report after not submitting one for 2017.

Paraguay did not report any exports, though it indicated it was not submitting a 'nil' report for exports on the front page of its report.

Paraguay reported Authorized SALW imports. It did not provide a Number or Value for the reported imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

- Paraguay reported imports from seven countries in 2018. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Paraguay did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Paraguay reported SALW imports, covering five sub-categories.

PERU





Good practices:

Peru provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported imports.

Peru provided Values for all SALW imports, after having done so for a select number in its 2017 report.

Peru provided descriptions on all reported imports.



Room for improvement:

Peru reported one import as an Authorized transfer while others were reported as Actual. It could instead provide all Actual transfers or all Authorized transfers so information remains consistent.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Peru submitted a 'nil' exports report in 2018.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Peru's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Peru submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Peru reported mostly **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports, though one reported import was for an **Authorized** transfer. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

- Peru reported imports from ten countries in 2018.
 Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Peru did not report imports of major conventional weapons.
- Peru reported the import of 9,693 SALW items, covering five sub-categories. Of these items, the majority were reported in the 'Others' sub-category (97 per cent).
- The main exporters to Peru were Austria (45 per cent), the United States (16 per cent) and Italy (14 per cent).

POLAND





Good practices:

Poland provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports in 2018.

Poland provided descriptions of items for almost all exports of major conventional weapons.



Room for improvement:

Poland did not specify if 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' data had been withheld from the report.

Poland did not provide descriptions and/or comments for SALW that were exported or for major conventional weapons or SALW that were imported.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Poland reported exports to 12 countries in 2018. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Iraq).
- Poland reported exports of 187 major conventional weapons items, covering five categories. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (78 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (13 per cent).50
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from Poland were Ukraine (58 per cent), Bulgaria (21 per cent) and Chile (13 per cent).
- Poland reported the export of 16,624 SALW items in 2018, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (68 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (30 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Poland were the United States (48 per cent) and Czech Republic (42 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Poland's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Poland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Poland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports. It did not report imports of light weapons, though it did in its 2017 report.

Poland indicated that the cut-off date for its 2018 report was 28 May 2019. The cut-off date was 21 June 2018 in its 2017 report.

- Poland reported imports from 13 countries in 2018.
 Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Poland reported imports of 144 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.).
- The exporters of major conventional weapons to Poland were Ukraine (64 per cent), Serbia (28 per cent) and Norway (8 per cent).
- Poland reported 3,742 SALW items, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (93 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Poland were the Czech Republic (55 per cent), Slovenia (26 per cent) and Austria (11 per cent).

PORTUGAL

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Portugal provided clear, disaggregated data on all reported exports and imports. Portugal provided descriptions of items for major conventional weapons exports.



Room for improvement:

Portugal did not provide comments describing the end-use and/or end-user for any of its transfers, and it provided fewer descriptions of items than it did in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Portugal reported exports to 35 countries in 2018. Of these, 31 were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.
- Portugal reported the export of 47 major conventional weapons items, with a total value of €2.9m (US\$3.2m),⁵¹ all of which were armoured combat vehicles.
- In terms of value, the two importers of major conventional weapons from Portugal were Guatemala (68 per cent) and Panama (32 per cent).
- Portugal reported the export of 61,613 SALW items, covering three sub-categories.
 were rifles and carbines (99 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW items from Portugal were the United States (45 per cent) and Belgium (40 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Portugal's reporting changed in its 2018 annual report.

Portugal reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons exports. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of most small arms exports, as well as one transaction with **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports. It did not report any exports of light weapons.

Portugal did not report any imports of major conventional weapons, thought it did in its 2017 report. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of some small arms imports, as well as **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of some small arms imports. It did not report any imports of light weapons.

- Portugal reported imports from 20 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-member (Venezuela).
- Portugal did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Portugal reported the import of 5,035 SALW, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (44 per cent) and revolvers and pistols (42 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW items to Portugal were Austria (26 per cent), Italy (25 per cent) and Germany (19 per cent).

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Republic of Korea provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Republic of Korea provided descriptions of all reported exports and imports.



Room for improvement:

Republic of Korea excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Republic of Korea reported exports to three countries in 2018. Of these, two were ATT Signatories and one was a non-member (Indonesia).
- Republic of Korea reported the export of one major conventional weapon item, a warship to Thailand.
- Republic of Korea reported the export of 1,130 SALW items, covering four subcategories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (38 per cent), submachine guns (35 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (18 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from the Republic of Korea were Thailand (62 per cent) and Indonesia (35 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

This is the Republic of Korea's first ATT annual report.

Republic of Korea reported **Authorized Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Republic of Korea reported **Authorized Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Republic of Korea provided its own definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import', indicating in both instances that its data is based on licenses granted (authorized, signing contracts) and not on actual transfers.

- Republic of Korea reported imports from three countries in 2018. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and two were Signatories.
- Republic of Korea reported the import of 70 major conventional weapons items: six manned combat aircraft and 64 missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) from the United States.
- Republic of Korea reported the import of 748 SALW items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were sub-machine guns (44 per cent) and assault rifles (42 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to the Republic of Korea were Germany (86 per cent) and Turkey (12 per cent).

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA





Good practices:

Republic of Moldova provided descriptions of all reported exports and imports.

Republic of Moldova indicated that it had not withheld data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons after having not provided this information in its 2017 report.



Room for improvement:

Republic of Moldova continued to aggregate data on exporting states for each sub-category of its reported imports of small arms.

Republic of Moldova did not provide comments describing the end-use and/or end-user on any of its transfers after having done so selectively in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

 Republic of Moldova reported one small arms export of 1,600 rifles and carbines to Germany with a total value of MDL17,880 (US\$322,465).⁵² Germany and Russia were the states of origin for this transfer.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Republic of Moldova's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Republic of Moldova reported **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports, though it only provided Numbers and no Values in its 2017 report. It did not report exports of major conventional weapons or light weapons.

Republic of Moldova reported **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports, though it only provided Numbers and did not report any imports of major conventional weapons in its 2017 report. It did not report imports of light weapons.

- Republic of Moldova reported imports from 11 countries in 2018. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-member (Russia).
- Republic of Moldova reported the import of 71 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) from Russia and Romania with a total value of MDL2.7m (US\$48.6m).⁵³
- Republic of Moldova reported the import of 2,938 small arms items, covering three sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (77 per cent) and rifles and carbines (20 per cent).
- Information on exporting states of Moldova's imports of small arms was aggregated, so it is impossible to determine the breakdown of quantities among the various exporters.

⁵² Currency conversion via Xe data. Because no annual conversation rate was available for MDL, the exchange rate for the date of submission of Moldova's Annual Report was used (25 May 2019). https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=MDL&date=2019-05-27.

REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Republic of North Macedonia provided descriptions of all its reported exports and imports after having done so only for light weapons exports in its 2017 report.



Room for improvement:

Republic of North Macedonia aggregated information on final importing and exporting states after having provided clear, disaggregated information in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Republic of North Macedonia submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Republic of North Macedonia's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 report.

Republic of North Macedonia submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Republic of North Macedonia reported both **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons or light arms.

- Republic of North Macedonia reported imports from nine countries in 2018. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Republic of North Macedonia did not report the import of any major conventional weapons.
- Republic of North Macedonia reported imports of a total of 829 SALW items, covering three subcategories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (76 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (24 per cent).
- Information on exporting states of Republic of North Macedonia's imports of small arms was mostly aggregated, so it is impossible to determine the breakdown of quantities among the various exporters in most instances. It reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

ROMANIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Romania provided clear, disaggregated data on all reported exports and imports.

Romania provided descriptions of all reported transfers and in some cases comments describing the end-use and/or end-user.



Room for improvement:

Romania aggregated states of origin for many reported SALW imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Romania reported exports to 13 countries in 2018. Of these, nine were ATT States
 Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-members (Afghanistan and Somalia).
- Romania reported the export of 96 major conventional weapons items, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) to the United States.
- Romania reported the export of 54,413 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (55 per cent), assault rifles (21 per cent) and rifles and carbines (20 per cent).
- The main importing countries of SALW from Romania were the United States (87 per cent), Bulgaria (5 per cent) and Czech Republic (3 per cent). Germany and Italy were the states of origin for one reported export of rifles and carbines.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Romania's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Romania reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports, though it did not report exports of major conventional weapons in its 2017 report.

Romania reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons, though it did in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

- Romania reported imports from 15 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Romania did not report imports of any major conventional weapons.
- Romania reported the import of 5,979 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (49 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (33 per cent), and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (10 per cent). Romania reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

SAINT LUCIA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

SAMOA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Yes

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

Unspecified - Not ticked

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Samoa clearly indicated it was submitting 'nil' reports for both exports and imports by checking the relevant boxes on the front page of its report.



Room for improvement:

Samoa did not indicate if it withheld data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons by ticking the relevant boxes on the front page of its report.

Samoa did not provide a cut-off date for its report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

Samoa submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Samoa's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.⁵⁴ It submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

• Samoa submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

SAN MARINO

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

SENEGAL

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Yes

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Was the Annual Report made public?

No, report kept confidential

⁵⁴ Samoa submitted a 2017 annual report after the cut-off date for the report to be included in the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report. Its 2017 annual report was reviewed ahead of the analysis of its 2018 annual report.

SERBIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

Ves

Ves

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Serbia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.



Room for improvement:

Serbia only selectively provided descriptions of items for its exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW. Only one description described the end-use and/or end-user of the transfer.

Serbia did not specify if it was providing 'nil' reports by ticking the relevant boxes on the front page of its report, though it provided data for exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Serbia reported exports to 41 countries and territories in 2018.⁵⁵ Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and 13 were non-members (Armenia, Belarus, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uganda and Vietnam).⁵⁶
- Serbia reported exports of 23,514 major conventional weapons items, covering three
 categories. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (63 per cent),
 and missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) (37 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from Serbia were the United Arab Emirates (60 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (35 per cent). The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)⁵⁷ was listed as the state of origin of one transfer of large-calibre artillery systems.
- Serbia reported the export of 81,863 SALW items, covering ten sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (77 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (9 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (7 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Serbia were Saudi Arabia (36 per cent), the United Arab Emirates (32 per cent) and Burkina Faso (7 per cent). Serbia was not the state of origin for a number of SALW exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Serbia's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Serbia reported **Actual Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

Serbia reported **Actual Numbers** of imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

- Serbia reported imports from 18 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and three were non-members (China, Iraq and Russia).
- Serbia reported imports of 12 major conventional weapons items: 11 manned combat aircraft from Russia and one warship from Montenegro (the state of origin was Croatia).
- Serbia reported the import of 2,756 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (36 per cent), rifles and carbines (31 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (25 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Serbia were Belgium (33 per cent) and the United States (16 per cent). Serbia reported different states of origin for a number of SALW imports.

SEYCHELLES

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

SIERRA LEONE





Good practices:

Sierra Leone indicated it submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports by ticking all of the relevant boxes.



Room for improvement:

Sierra Leone did not provide a cut-off date for its report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Sierra Leone's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Sierra Leone submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

· Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

SLOVAKIA





Good practices:

Slovakia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Slovakia provided detailed descriptions of major conventional weapons exports and imports. In some cases, it also provided comments describing the end-use and/or end-user.

Slovakia specified the cut-off date for its report.



Room for improvement:

Slovakia provided very few descriptions and comments describing the end-use and/or end-user on reported exports and imports of SALW.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Slovakia reported exports to 52 countries and territories in 2018. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, 11 were Signatories and three were non-members (Bolivia, Indonesia and Kyrgyzstan).⁵⁸
- Slovakia reported the export of 7,428 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. Of these, the majority were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) (99 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from Slovakia were Poland (82 per cent) and Cyprus (16 per cent).
- Slovakia reported the export of 37.844 SALW items, covering eight sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (87 per cent), assault rifles (6 per cent) and rifles and carbines (4 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Slovakia were Thailand (27 per cent), Bolivia (16 per cent) and Israel (10 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Slovakia's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Slovakia reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

Slovakia reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports.

- Slovakia reported imports from 22 countries in 2018. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and one was a non-member (Belarus).
- Slovakia reported the import of 16,866 major conventional weapons items, covering five categories. Of these, the majority were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) (over 99 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional weapons to Slovakia were the Czech Republic (70 per cent) and Belarus (30 per cent).
- Slovakia reported the import of 19,688 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (36 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (32 per cent) and portable antitank guns (30 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Slovakia were Romania (30 per cent), Austria (22 per cent) and Germany (17 per cent).

SLOVENIA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Slovenia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported import and export in 2018 including both Numbers and Values of items transferred.

Slovenia provided descriptions of almost all reported exports and imports, as well as selective comments on transfers.



Room for improvement:

Slovenia only provided comments describing the end-use and/or end-user on a small number of transfers.

Slovenia did not specify which currency is used to report the values of its exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Slovenia reported exports to ten countries and territories in 2018. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and two were non-members (Egypt and Kuwait).⁵⁹
- Slovenia reported exports of 22 major conventional weapons items with a total value of €297,680 (US\$351,452)⁶⁰, all of which were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.).
- In terms of value, the two importers of major conventional weapons from Slovenia were Spain (57 per cent) and Germany (43 per cent). It specified in the comment section all items were for 'testing purposes'.
- Slovenia reported the export of 5,118 SALW items with a total value of €2.2m (US\$2.6m),⁶¹ covering five sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority of these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (96 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main importers of SALW from Slovenia were the United States (73 per cent), Poland (16 per cent) and Austria (9 per cent). Austria was the state of origin for a number of these reported exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Slovenia's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional weapons and small arms exports. It did not report exports of light weapons, though it did in its 2017 report.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports. It did not report imports of major conventional weapons.

- Slovenia reported imports from five countries in 2018.
 All five were ATT States Parties.
- Slovenia did not report any imports of major conventional weapons.
- Slovenia reported imports of 350 SALW items with a total value of €600,328 (US\$708,770),62 covering seven sub-categories. In terms of value, the majority of these were recoilless rifles (83 per cent) and assault rifles (11 per cent).
- In terms of value, the main exporters of SALW to Slovenia were Sweden (83 per cent) and Poland (11 per cent). Slovenia reported different states of origin for two reported imports of assault rifles from Poland.

⁵⁹ Slovenia also reported exports to one non-UN member (Kosovo).

⁶⁰ Slovenia did not specify which currency is used for reported values of transfers. For this analysis, the ATT Monitor has assumed the currency to be euros. Currency conversion via OECD Data, reflecting 2018 annual conversion rate. https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

SOUTH AFRICA

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

No. missed deadline

Yes

No. missed deadline

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

South Africa provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported exports and imports.



Room for improvement:

South Africa withheld some data from its annual report for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and did not specify where or how much information was withheld.

South Africa provided no descriptions and only two comments describing the end-use and/or end-user of its exports and imports.

South Africa provided data on exports and imports in the 'Others' categories of small arms but did not provide descriptions of these items.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- South Africa reported exports to 29 countries in 2018. Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties, eight were Signatories and eight were non-members (Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nepal, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Uganda).
- South Africa reported exports of 1,123 major conventional weapons items, covering three categories. Of these, the majority were large-calibre artillery systems (91 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (9 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from South Africa were Saudi Arabia (89 per cent) and the United Arab Emirates (3 per cent).
- South Africa reported the export of 1,278 SALW items, covering four subcategories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (48 per cent), rifles and carbines (36 per cent), and 'Others' (15 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from South Africa were the United Kingdom (22 per cent), Zimbabwe (16 per cent) and Lesotho (12 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

South Africa's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

South Africa reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports.

South Africa reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW imports, though it did not report major conventional weapons imports in its 2017 report.

- South Africa reported imports from 26 countries in 2018. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-members (China, Kenya and Russia).
- South Africa reported the import of five major conventional weapons items: four large-calibre artillery systems from Kenya and one armoured combat vehicle from Finland.
- South Africa reported the import of 63,960 SALW items, covering three sub-categories: revolvers and self-loading pistols (81 per cent), rifles and carbines (11 per cent), and 'Others' (8 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to South Africa were the United States (41 per cent), Austria (11 per cent) and China (10 per cent).

SPAIN

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Yes

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Unspecified - Not ticked

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

Unspecified - Not ticked

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Spain provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported exports and imports.



Room for improvement:

Spain did not indicate by ticking the relevant boxes if it was including 'nil' reports for its imports or exports, though it provided data for both.

Spain could provide descriptions of items or comments on its exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Spain reported exports to six countries in 2018. Of these, two were ATT State Parties and four were non-members (Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia).
- Spain reported the export of 21 major conventional weapons items, all of which were large-calibre artillery systems to Saudi Arabia.
- Spain reported the export of 2,952 SALW items, covering three sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (99 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW exports from Spain were Pakistan (49 per cent), Estonia (34 per cent) and Indonesia (16 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Spain's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Spain reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and SALW exports, though it did not report exports of small arms in its 2017 report.

Spain reported **Actual Numbers** of light weapons imports, though it did not report any in its 2017 report. It did not report any imports of major conventional weapons or small arms, though it did report small arms imports in its 2017 report.

- Spain reported imports from two countries in 2018. One was an ATT State Party and one was a Signatory.
- Spain reported the import of 29 light weapons items: five heavy machine guns from the United States and 24 portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems from Germany.

SWEDEN





Good practices:

Sweden made extensive use of 'Section C: Voluntary National Categories' to report data under 19 out of 22 EU Common Military List categories. It reported aggregate **Actual Values** of items exported to individual destinations under each category.⁶³

Sweden provided descriptions of items for exports and imports reported in ATT major conventional weapons and SALW categories.



Room for improvement:

Sweden submitted 2018 reports using both the ATT reporting template and online reporting tool. However, information reported under voluntary national categories was included only in the ATT reporting template and not the online version.

Sweden could provide comments on its exports and imports describing the end-use and/or end-user.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Sweden reported exports under sections A and B to ten countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Sweden reported the export of 14 major conventional weapons items under sections A and B, all of which were armoured combat vehicles to Austria.
- Sweden reported light weapon exports under sections A and B, covering two sub-categories. It kept the amounts of each classified.
- Under voluntary national categories, Sweden also provided data covering 19 categories of the EU Common Military List. Under ML1 items, which include small arms, it reported exports worth SEK17.3m (US\$2m).⁶⁴ In terms of value, the majority of ML1 exports were to the Netherlands (35 per cent), South Africa (17 per cent) and France (10 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Sweden's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Sweden reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons and light weapons exports. It reported **Actual Values** of exports under voluntary national categories. It did not report any small arms exports.

Sweden reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons imports. It did not report imports of SALW.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

 Sweden reported one import of a classified number of missiles and missile launchers (missiles) from the United Kingdom.

⁶³ Of the items reported by Sweden under voluntary national categories, only ML1 items (smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less) are considered for analysis here, as Sweden indicated in its report that these items corresponded to Small Arms (aggregated).

SWITZERLAND

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

No

What type of report was submitted?



Good practices:

Switzerland provided clear, disaggregated data on each reported export and import.

Switzerland provided descriptions and comments on exports and imports of major conventional weapons.



Room for improvement:

Switzerland could provide descriptions and/or comments on its SALW exports or small arms imports.

Switzerland indicated on the front page of its report that it used national definitions, though it did not provide information to clarify these definitions in Annex 2 of its 2018 annual report as it did in its 2017 report.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- Switzerland reported exports to 46 countries in 2018. Of these, 36 were ATT States
 Parties, four were Signatories and six were non-members (India, Indonesia, Jordan,
 Kuwait, Oman and Pakistan).
- Switzerland reported exports of 76 major conventional weapons items: 73 armoured combat vehicles and three large-calibre artillery systems.
- The main importers of major conventional weapons exports from Switzerland were Denmark (38 per cent), Germany (37 per cent) and Romania (13 per cent).
- Switzerland reported exports of 14,779 SALW items, covering seven sub-categories.
 Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (36 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (26 per cent), and assault rifles (21 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW items from Switzerland were the United States (61 per cent), Italy (9 per cent) and Germany (8 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Switzerland's reporting changed slightly in its 2018 annual report.

Switzerland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional weapons exports. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports.

Switzerland reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional weapons and small arms imports, though it did not report imports of major conventional weapons in its 2017 report.

Switzerland reported exports and imports using the ATT reporting template, but provided information in Annex 2 to clarify that it reported exports and imports under UN Registry Categories I-VIII, including a detailed description of its Category VIII definition.

- Switzerland reported imports from 26 countries in 2018.
 Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.
- Switzerland reported the import of 65 major conventional weapons items: 63 armoured combat vehicles and two battle tanks.
- The main exporter of major conventional weapons to Switzerland was Ireland (92 per cent).
- Switzerland reported the import of 14,561 small arms items in 2018, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (76 per cent), assault rifles (10 per cent) and rifles and carbines (9 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Switzerland were Austria (28 per cent), Germany (27 per cent) and the United States (17 per cent).

TOGO

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.

TUVALU

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

No. missed deadline

Yes

Yes

Yes

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Tuvalu indicated it submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports by ticking the relevant boxes on the front page of its report after having not done so in its 2017 report.

Tuvalu indicated that it did not withhold data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons by ticking the relevant boxes on the front page of its report after having not done so in its 2017 report.



Room for improvement:

Tuvalu did not indicate the calendar year for which it was reporting or provide a cut-off date.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Tuvalu submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Tuvalu's reporting remained the same in its 2018 annual report.

Tuvalu submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

• Tuvalu submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

UNITED KINGDOM

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

Unspecified - UNROCA template

What type of report was submitted?

UNROCA report



Good practices:

United Kingdom provided clear, disaggregated data for each export of major conventional weapons and SALW.

United Kingdom provided detailed descriptions of items and/or some comments on transfers for many of its exports.



Room for improvement:

United Kingdom provided no data on imports for major conventional weapons or SALW and did not indicate if it submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

United Kingdom did not specify whether the reported exports of attack helicopters were manned or unmanned.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

- United Kingdom reported exports to 77 countries for 2018. Of these, 49 were ATT States Parties, 13 were Signatories and 15 were non-members (Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam).
- United Kingdom reported the export of 319 major conventional weapons items, covering eight categories. Of these, the majority were missiles and missile launchers (missiles etc.) (50 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (32 per cent) and attack helicopters (7 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional weapons from the United Kingdom were Saudi Arabia (49 per cent), the United States (18 per cent) and Norway (7 per cent).
- United Kingdom reported the export of 41,307 SALW items, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (90 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from the United Kingdom were the United States (79 per cent) and Australia (5 per cent).

Reporting practice summary - 2018

United Kingdom changed its reporting in its 2018 annual report. It submitted its UNROCA report in place of the ATT reporting template that it used in its 2017 report.

United Kingdom reported **Authorized Numbers** of exports of major conventional weapons and SALW.

United Kingdom did not report any imports.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

· United Kingdom did not report imports.

URUGUAY

Was an annual report submitted by 31 May 2019?

Was the Annual Report made public?

Was a 'nil' report submitted for exports or imports in 2018?

Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?

What type of report was submitted?

ATT reporting template



Good practices:

Uruguay provided clear, disaggregated data for its one reported small arms import and included a description of the reported items.



Room for improvement:

Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for imports but reported data for one import of small arms.

Transfer summary - 2018: Export Data

· Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Reporting practice summary - 2018

Uruguay did not submit a 2017 annual report.

Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for imports but reported **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of one small arms import.

Transfer summary - 2018: Import Data

• Uruguay reported one import of small arms of 40 rifles and carbines from Austria.

ZAMBIA

Did not submit an ATT Annual Report for 2018.



UGANDAN SOLDIER SERVING WITH THE AMISOM HOLDS A ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADE OUTSIDE OF MOGADISHU, SOMALIA.

CREDIT: © UN PHOTO / STUART PRICE

While the country profiles in the previous section provide analysis of reporting practice disaggregated on a country-specific basis (which allows for year-to-year analysis of the ways in which reporting practice has changed), the tables presented here seek to provide information presented by States Parties in a manner that allows for better comparison across Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. By providing easily accessible and comparable information detailing decisions each State Party has made with regard to the way it reports exports and imports, it becomes easier to untangle the varied reporting practices and provide more context and understanding of global arms transfers.

REPORTING PRACTICE

Accurate, comprehensive and timely reporting is an essential transparency tool that States Parties can use to demonstrate that their arms-trade control systems, policies and practices are consistent with their ATT obligations. Such reporting can help enhance awareness of regional and global trends in arms transfers and facilitate assessment of States Parties' compliance with the Treaty. Considering one of the central objectives of the ATT is to provide greater transparency in the global arms trade and a more comprehensive understanding of global arms transfers, it is notable that, overall, annual reports submitted by States Parties do not provide enough information to paint a clear picture of the global arms trade.¹

"

...[I]T IS PREFERABLE THAT STATES PARTIES'
DECISIONS REGARDING REPORTING
PRACTICE, ONCE MADE, REMAIN STABLE
OVER TIME.

Both the Treaty and the suggested reporting templates provide ample room for variation in reporting practice. The Treaty also states that annual reports "may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks," including the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).² States Parties are not required to submit information in any one way and can report using their own national format.³ States Parties can report authorizations or actual exports and imports, or both, as well as the quantity or value of arms transferred, or both. This spectrum of options creates significant challenges for efforts to analyse trends in international arms transfers.⁴

The ATT Monitor has conducted in-depth analysis of the comparability of information provided in these reports, looking at the extent to which reported exports by one State Party could be compared to reported imports of another. Comparing information in this way is challenging, given the variation in the way in which States Parties report on authorized or actual exports and imports afforded by the Treaty. In 2016 and 2017,5 the ATT Monitor found that only approximately 1.6 per cent of exports could be compared exactly with imports reported by States Parties.5

Comparability of information is important beyond the exercise of comparing exports and imports. To effectively monitor trends in the global arms trade and States Parties' progress in implementing Treaty obligations over time, it is preferable that States Parties' decisions regarding reporting practice, once made, remain stable over time. Each year, States Parties present new and/or different kinds of information in annual reports, and effective analysis of each report must first take stock of reporting practice before analysing transfer information.

- 1 Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 101.
- 2 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 13(3).
- 3 See Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) (2020). 'The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations'. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Reporting-Templates-Challenges-and-Recommendations_Web-Version.pdf, p. 4.
- 4 Ibid., p. 9
- 5 The ATT Monitor also conducted a discrepancy analysis of 2015 annual reports. However, the methodology was different to the extent that information cannot be compared with analysis of 2016 and 2017 reports.
- 6 For more information on methodology, see Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 100.
- 7 For example, if a State Party reports authorized SALW exports one year, it should consistently from year-to-year also report authorized SALW. If its national control or record-keeping systems change so that actual exports, rather than authorized, become the primary measure of weapons exports and/or imports, the State Party should be sure to update this information in its initial report, if relevant, to reflect that change.

The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) is actively discussing the importance of States Parties providing publicly available annual reports that contain comprehensive information, disaggregated and accurate to a level that provides for meaningful transparency and analysis. The WGTR has undertaken a number of initiatives to support States Parties in providing such information, including facilitating

the process of making possible amendments to reporting templates that could help clarify and streamline information reported in annual reports. Similarly, the ATT Secretariat has worked closely with the WGTR co-chairs to provide support to States Parties through, among other initiatives, the establishment of the peer-to-peer project of voluntary practical bilateral and regional assistance.

TEXT BOX 1: ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATES PARTIES

In addition to initiatives by the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to support States Parties' efforts in effective implementation of ATT transparency and reporting obligations, the ATT Monitor has also made recommendations that may be helpful, based on work done in consultation with States Parties by the Stimson Center's ATT Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP).¹⁰

To provide data to a level of disaggregation and accuracy that provides for meaningful transparency and analysis across ATT annual reports and year-to-year, States Parties should:

- Make decisions regarding reporting practice in annual reports and, once made, maintain stable practice over time.
- Provide both actual and authorized transfer data as well as number and value. However, if only one data point can be provided, actual transfers is a preferable metric to authorized transfers and the number of items transferred is preferable to the value of the transfer.¹¹

- Ensure that reporting officials receive training and education regarding the nature of 'nil' reports.
- Take the necessary measures to fulfil Article 13 obligations, including reporting on imports.
- Make annual reports publicly available.
- Review information on a case-by-case basis to determine whether information is commercially sensitive or has implications for national security, rather than determining an entire report is sensitive.¹²
- Provide descriptions of items and comments on transfers where space is given in the ATT reporting template. End-use and end-user information, in particular, is helpful in understanding decisionmaking rationale in regards to categorization and definition of weapons.
- Provide, where relevant, additional definitions of SALW and conventional weapons.
- Create a national structure that defines specific roles and responsibilities that enables officials to collect and share relevant data; complete, submit, and update national reports; and share good practices and lessons learned.¹³

⁸ See ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Background Paper on the Voluntary Reporting Templates'. ATT/CSP6.WGTR/2020/ATTS/579/M1.BPRepTemp. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATTS - Background Paper on Issues with existing templates (16 January 2020)/ATTS - Background Paper on Issues with existing templates (16 January 2020).pdf

⁹ For more information on reporting initiatives begun and facilitated by the WGTR and ATT Secretariat, see ATT Secretariat (2020). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting Co-Chair Report of 06 February 2020 Meeting'. ATT/CSP6.WGTR/2020/CHAIR/593/M1.Rep. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP6_WGTR_Co-chair Report of 06 Feb 2020 meeting_EN/ATT_CSP6_WGTR_Co-chair Report of 06 Feb 2020 meeting_EN.pdf.

¹⁰ For more recommendations, see Control Arms Secretariat (2019). 'ATT Monitor 2019'. 26 August 2019. https://attmonitor.org/en/the-2019-report/, p. 103.

¹¹ Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) (2020). 'The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations'. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Reporting-Templates-Challenges-and-Recommendations_Web-Version.pdf, p. 9.

¹² Stimson Center's ATT-BAP (2019). 'Lessons Learned from ATT Reporting'. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ATT-BAP_LESSONS-LEARNED-FROM-REPORTING_ATT.pdf, p. g.

¹³ Ibid., p. 9.

TABLES METHODOLOGY

This section provides an overview of information presented by States Parties in 2018 annual reports, detailing exports and imports in the calendar year 2018. Information is separated into seven thematic sections representing different kinds of relevant information reported by States Parties in their reports:

- Contents and scope of report
- Definitions of the terms 'export' and 'import'
- Exports of major conventional weapons
- Exports of SALW
- Imports of major conventional weapons
- Imports of SALW
- Voluntary national categories¹⁴

Ninety-two States Parties were due to submit an annual report for 2018 to the ATT Secretariat within one week of 31 May 2019. As of 1 February 2020, 15 62 had done so, 16 of which 52 made theirs publicly available. These reports form the basis of the analysis presented here.

State Party responses are denoted by check marks (), X, and dashes. Check marks represent 'yes' responses, X represent 'no' responses, and dashes represent when a State Party did not provide a response to a given question.

In the case of exports and imports of major conventional weapons and SALW reported by each State Party, **X** may represent the reporting of '0', 'nil' or '/' in respective fields of annual reports, which indicate in clear, concrete terms that no items were transferred. Dashes indicate no information was provided, but it may be assumed that no items were transferred.

Plus signs (+) in the table represent special situations, where a reporting practice is unique to the individual State Party. For more details on special situations, the ATT Monitor country profiles provide information on reporting practices disaggregated on a country-specific basis.

Information reflects what States Parties self-reported and was not independently verified.



¹⁴ States Parties included in this thematic section are only those that reported under voluntary national categories in their 2018 annual reports.

¹⁵ All annual reports were downloaded for analysis by 1 February 2020. Any that were subsequently submitted or amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration.

¹⁶ This number includes an annual report submitted by one State Party, Chile, that was not yet due to submit a report.

CONTENTS AND SCOPE OF REPORT

State Party	Nil report on exports of conventional arms	Nil report on imports of conventional arms	Annual report on exports of conventional arms	Annual report on imports of conventional arms	National definitions of categories of conventional arms reported	Sensitive information excluded
Albania	-	-	1	1	✓	Х
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA						
Argentina	Х	×	1	1	Х	✓
Australia	×	×	1	1	Х	1
Austria +	-	-	-	-	-	-
BAHAMAS						
BARBADOS						
Belgium	Х	Х	/	1	_	Х
BELIZE						
Benin	1	×	×	1	-	Х
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Х	J	J	×	✓	Х
Bulgaria	×	×	J	1	Х	✓
BURKINA FASO						
CABO VERDE						
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC						
CHAD						
Chile	1	×	×	1	Х	✓
Costa Rica	×	×	1	1	-	Х
CÔTE D'IVOIRE						
CROATIA						
Cyprus*						
Czech Republic	×	Х	1	1	Х	Х
Denmark	×	×	1	1	Х	Х
DOMINICA						
Dominican Republic	/	/	×	/	_	/

^{*}Report is private Has submitted public report HAS NOT SUBMITTED REPORT

CONTENTS AND SCOPE OF REPORT (CONTINUED)

State Party	Nil report on exports of conventional arms	Nil report on imports of conventional arms	Annual report on exports of conventional arms	Annual report on imports of conventional arms	National definitions of categories of conventional arms reported	Sensitive information excluded
EL SALVADOR						
Estonia	Х	Х	1	1	Х	Х
Finland	Х	Х	1	1	Х	1
France +	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia*						
Germany	Х	Х	1	1	✓	Х
GHANA						
Greece*						
GRENADA						
GUATEMALA						
GUINEA						
GUYANA						
Honduras*						
Hungary	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
ICELAND						
Ireland	Х	Х	1	1	Х	1
Italy	Х	Х	1	1	Х	1
Jamaica	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
Japan	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
Latvia	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
LESOTHO						
Liberia*						
Liechtenstein	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
Lithuania*						
Luxembourg	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
Madagascar*						

CONTENTS AND SCOPE OF REPORT (CONTINUED)

State Party	Nil report on exports of conventional arms	Nil report on imports of conventional arms	Annual report on exports of conventional arms	Annual report on imports of conventional arms	National definitions of categories of conventional arms reported	Sensitive information excluded
MALI						
MALTA						
MAURITANIA						
Mauritius*						
Mexico	✓	×	×	1	X	✓
Monaco	✓	×	×	1	X	-
Montenegro	-	-	1	1	-	Х
Netherlands	Х	×	1	1	X	Х
New Zealand	Х	×	1	1	✓	Х
NIGER						
Nigeria*						
Norway	Х	×	1	1	X	✓
Panama	1	×	×	1	X	Х
Paraguay	Х	×	1	1	X	Х
Peru	1	×	-	1	X	Х
Poland	Х	×	J	1	Х	-
Portugal	Х	Х	1	1	X	Х
Republic of Korea	Х	Х	1	1	X	1
Republic of Moldova	Х	×	1	1	Х	Х
Republic of North Macedonia	1	×	×	1	×	х
Romania	Х	×	1	✓	X	Х
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS						
SAINT LUCIA						
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES						

CONTENTS AND SCOPE OF REPORT (CONTINUED)

State Party	Nil report on exports of conventional arms	Nil report on imports of conventional arms	Annual report on exports of conventional arms	Annual report on imports of conventional arms	National definitions of categories of conventional arms reported	Sensitive information excluded
Samoa	1	1	×	Х	Х	-
SAN MARINO						
Senegal*						
Serbia	-	-	1	1	-	Х
SEYCHELLES						
Sierra Leone	√	1	×	×	Х	Х
Slovakia	×	×	1	1	Х	Х
Slovenia	×	×	1	1	Х	Х
South Africa	×	×	1	1	✓	1
Spain	-	-	1	1	-	-
Sweden	×	×	1	1	✓	1
Switzerland	×	×	1	1	✓	Х
TOGO						
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO						
Tuvalu	√	1	-	-	_	Х
United Kingdom	-	_	-	-	_	_
Uruguay	✓	1	×	1	✓	1
ZAMBIA						

DEFINITIONS OF EXPORT & IMPORT

State Party		DEFINITIO	N OF EXPORT			DEFINITIO	N OF IMPORT	
	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other
Albania	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA								
Argentina	✓	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
Australia	1	Х	1	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
Austria +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	_
BAHAMAS								
BARBADOS								
Belgium	1	Х	Х	Х	1	-	-	-
BELIZE								
Benin	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Bulgaria	1	✓	1	-	1	1	1	-
BURKINA FASO								
CABO VERDE								
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC								
CHAD								
Chile	-	-	_	-	1	1	1	-
Costa Rica	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
CÔTE D'IVOIRE								
CROATIA								
Cyprus*								
Czech Republic	1	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	1
Denmark	1	✓	1	Х	1	1	1	Х
DOMINICA								

DEFINITIONS OF EXPORT & IMPORT (CONTINUED)

State Party		DEFINITIO	N OF EXPORT			DEFINITION OF IMPORT			
	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other	
Dominican Republic	-	-	-	-	1	✓	1	-	
EL SALVADOR									
Estonia	1	Х	Х	Х	✓	×	Х	Х	
Finland	1	1	1	-	1	Х	1	-	
France +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Georgia*									
Germany	1	Х	Х	Х	1	×	Х	Х	
GHANA									
Greece*									
GRENADA									
GUATEMALA									
GUINEA									
GUYANA									
Honduras*									
Hungary	1	✓	1	Х	1	✓	1	X	
ICELAND									
Ireland	1	1	-	-	✓	✓		-	
Italy	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	1	
Jamaica	1	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	
Japan	1	Х	Х	Х	1	×	Х	Х	
Latvia	✓	✓	1	-	✓	✓	1	-	
LESOTHO									
Liberia*									
Liechtenstein	✓	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	
Lithuania*									

DEFINITIONS OF EXPORT & IMPORT (CONTINUED)

State Party		DEFINITIO	N OF EXPORT			DEFINITIO	N OF IMPORT	
	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other
Luxembourg	1	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	-
Madagascar*								
MALI								
MALTA								
MAURITANIA								
Mauritius*								
Mexico	-	-	-	-	✓	1	1	Х
Monaco	-	-	-	1	-	-	_	1
Montenegro	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Netherlands	1	1	1	Х	✓	1	1	Х
New Zealand	1	Х	Х	×	1	Х	Х	Х
NIGER								
Nigeria*								
Norway	✓	Х	1	Х	✓	Х	Х	X
Panama	-	-	-	-	✓	Х	Х	Х
Paraguay	✓	✓	1	Х	✓	✓	✓	Х
Peru	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-
Poland	1	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
Portugal	1	1	1	Х	✓	1	1	Х
Republic of Korea	Х	Х	Х	1	Х	Х	Х	1
Republic of Moldova	1	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
Republic of North Macedonia	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	1	х
Romania	1	1	1	Х	✓	1	1	Х
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS								

DEFINITIONS OF EXPORT & IMPORT (CONTINUED)

State Party		DEFINITIO	N OF EXPORT			DEFINITIO	N OF IMPORT	
	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other	Physical transfer of items across a national border	Transfer of title	Transfer of control	Other
SAINT LUCIA								
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES								
Samoa	-	-	-	-	-	-	_	-
SAN MARINO								
Senegal*								
Serbia	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-
SEYCHELLES								
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	✓	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
Slovenia	1	✓	1	Х	✓	1	1	Х
South Africa	✓	✓	1	-	✓	✓	1	-
Spain	✓	✓	1	-	✓	✓	1	-
Sweden	1	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
Switzerland	✓	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
TOGO								
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO								
Tuvalu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	_	-
Uruguay	Х	Х	Х	Х	✓	Х	Х	Х
ZAMBIA								

EXPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS

State Party	Exports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Albania	-	-	-	-	-
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA					
Argentina	-	-	_	-	_
Australia	✓	1	-	✓	✓
Austria +	✓	-	1	✓	✓
BAHAMAS					
BARBADOS					
Belgium	✓	1	-	1	1
BELIZE					
Benin	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	-	-	1	1
Bulgaria	1	-	1	1	-
BURKINA FASO					
CABO VERDE					
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC					
CHAD					
Chile	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	×	-	-	1	1
CÔTE D'IVOIRE					
CROATIA					
Cyprus*					
Czech Republic	✓	-	1	1	-
Denmark	1	1	/	1	✓
DOMINICA					
Dominican Republic	Nil report	-	-	-	-
EL SALVADOR					

EXPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

State Party	Exports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Estonia	Х	1	-	1	1
Finland	✓	-	1	1	-
France +	1	-	✓	/	-
Georgia*					
Germany	1	-	1	/	-
GHANA					
Greece*					
GRENADA					
GUATEMALA					
GUINEA					
GUYANA					
Honduras*					
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-
ICELAND					
Ireland	Х	-	-	1	-
Italy	✓	1	-	1	-
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	Х	-	1	1	✓
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-
LESOTHO					
Liberia*					
Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania*					
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar*					
MALI					
MALTA					

EXPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

State Party	Exports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
MAURITANIA					
Mauritius*					
Mexico	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Monaco	Nil report	-	-	✓	1
Montenegro	Х	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	1	-	✓	✓	-
New Zealand	Х	-	1	✓	-
NIGER					
Nigeria*					
Norway	1	-	1	✓	-
Panama	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Poland	1	-	✓	✓	-
Portugal	1	-	1	✓	✓
Republic of Korea	✓	✓	_	✓	
Republic of Moldova	-	-	-	-	-
Republic of North Macedonia	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Romania	1	-	✓	✓	-
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS					
SAINT LUCIA					
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES					
Samoa	Nil report	-	-	-	-
SAN MARINO					
Senegal*					

EXPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

State Party	Exports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Serbia	1	-	✓	✓	-
SEYCHELLES					
Sierra Leone	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	✓	-	✓	✓	-
Slovenia	/	-	✓	✓	1
South Africa	/	-	✓	✓	-
Spain	✓	-	✓	✓	-
Sweden	/	-	✓	✓	-
Switzerland	/	-	✓	✓	-
TOGO					
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO					
Tuvalu	Nil report	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	1	✓	-	✓	-
Uruguay	Nil report	-	-	-	-
ZAMBIA					

EXPORTS OF SALW

State Party	Exports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Albania	1	1	-	1	-
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA					
Argentina	✓	-	✓	1	-
Australia	✓	1	-	1	✓
Austria +	✓	1	✓	1	1
BAHAMAS					
BARBADOS					
Belgium	✓	1	-	1	1
BELIZE					
Benin	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	-	-	1	1
Bulgaria	1	-	1	1	-
BURKINA FASO					
CABO VERDE					
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC					
CHAD					
Chile	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	Х	-	-	✓	✓
CÔTE D'IVOIRE					
CROATIA					
Cyprus*					
Czech Republic	1	-	1	1	-
Denmark	1	✓	-	1	-
DOMINICA					
Dominican Republic	Nil report	-	-	-	-
EL SALVADOR					

EXPORTS OF SALW (CONTINUED)

State Party	Exports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Estonia	1	1	-	1	-
Finland	✓	-	1	1	-
France +	✓	-	1	1	-
Georgia*					
Germany	✓	1	-	1	-
GHANA					
Greece*					
GRENADA					
GUATEMALA					
GUINEA					
GUYANA					
Honduras*					
Hungary	✓	-	1	1	-
ICELAND					
Ireland	✓	1	-	1	1
Italy	1	1	-	1	-
Jamaica	1	1	-	1	-
Japan	1	-	1	1	1
Latvia	1	-	1	1	1
LESOTHO					
Liberia*					
Liechtenstein	✓	-	1	1	-
Lithuania*					
Luxembourg	1	-	-	1	-
Madagascar*					
MALI					
MALTA					

EXPORTS OF SALW (CONTINUED)

State Party	Exports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
MAURITANIA					
Mauritius*					
Mexico	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Monaco	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Montenegro	1	-	1	1	✓
Netherlands	1	-	1	1	-
New Zealand	1	1	-	1	-
NIGER					
Nigeria*					
Norway	1	-	1	1	-
Panama	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	Х	-	-	-	-
Peru	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Poland	1	-	1	1	-
Portugal	1	1	1	1	✓
Republic of Korea	1	✓	-	1	-
Republic of Moldova	1	1	-	1	✓
Republic of North Macedonia	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Romania	1	-	1	✓	-
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS					
SAINT LUCIA					
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES					
Samoa	Nil report	-	-	-	-
SAN MARINO					
Senegal*					
Serbia	1	_	1	1	-

EXPORTS OF SALW (CONTINUED)

State Party	Exports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
SEYCHELLES					
Sierra Leone	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	1	-	✓	✓	-
Slovenia	1	-	1	1	1
South Africa	1	-	1	1	-
Spain	1	-	1	1	-
Sweden	1	-	1	1	-
Switzerland	1	✓	-	1	-
TOGO					
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO					
Tuvalu	Nil report	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	1	✓	-	✓	-
Uruguay	Nil report	-	-	-	-
ZAMBIA					

IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS

State Party	Imports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Albania	-	-	-	-	-
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA					
Argentina	✓	-	1	✓	-
Australia	✓	-	1	✓	-
Austria +	-	-	-	-	-
BAHAMAS					
BARBADOS					
Belgium	1	-	1	1	-
BELIZE					
Benin	Х	-	-	-	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	1	-	1	1	-
BURKINA FASO					
CABO VERDE					
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC					
CHAD					
Chile	✓	-	-	✓	-
Costa Rica					
CÔTE D'IVOIRE					
CROATIA					
Cyprus*					
Czech Republic	✓	-	1	1	-
Denmark	✓	1	1	1	-
DOMINICA					
Dominican Republic	Nil report	-	-	-	-
EL SALVADOR					

IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

State Party	Imports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Estonia	√	1	-	1	-
Finland	1	-	-	1	✓
France +	Х	-	-	-	-
Georgia*					
Germany	1	-	1	1	-
GHANA					
Greece*					
GRENADA					
GUATEMALA					
GUINEA					
GUYANA					
Honduras*					
Hungary	1	-	1	1	-
ICELAND					
Ireland	Х	-	-	1	-
Italy	Х	-	-	1	-
Jamaica	×	-	-	-	-
Japan	1	-	1	1	✓
Latvia	1	-	1	1	-
LESOTHO					
Liberia*					
Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania*					
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar*					
MALI					
MALTA					

IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

State Party	Imports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
MAURITANIA					
Mauritius*					
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-
Monaco	Х	-	-	✓	✓
Montenegro	Х	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	✓	-	1	1	-
New Zealand	Х	-	1	1	-
NIGER					
Nigeria*					
Norway	✓	-	1	✓	-
Panama	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	-	_	-	-	-
Peru	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	1	-	1	✓	-
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-
Republic of Korea	✓	1	-	1	-
Republic of Moldova	1	1	-	✓	1
Republic of North Macedonia	-	-	-	-	-
Romania	-	_	-	-	-
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS					
SAINT LUCIA					
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES					
Samoa	Nil report	_	-	-	-
SAN MARINO					
Senegal*					
Serbia	✓	-	✓	√	-

IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

State Party	Imports of Major Conventional Weapons Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
SEYCHELLES					
Sierra Leone	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	✓	-	✓	✓	-
Slovenia	Х	-	-	✓	1
South Africa	✓	-	✓	/	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	✓	-	✓	✓	-
Switzerland	✓	✓	-	/	-
TOGO					
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO					
Tuvalu	Nil report	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	_
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-
ZAMBIA					

IMPORTS OF SALW

State Party	Imports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Albania	1	-	1	/	-
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA					
Argentina	✓	-	✓	1	-
Australia	✓	-	-	✓	-
Austria +	-	-	-	-	-
BAHAMAS					
BARBADOS					
Belgium	1	-	✓	1	✓
BELIZE					
Benin	1	-	1	1	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	-	-	1	1
Bulgaria	1	-	1	✓	-
BURKINA FASO					
CABO VERDE					
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC					
CHAD					
Chile	-	-	-	_	-
Costa Rica	×	-	-	✓	-
CÔTE D'IVOIRE					
CROATIA					
Cyprus*					
Czech Republic	1	-	✓	1	-
Denmark	1	✓	✓	1	-
DOMINICA					
Dominican Republic	Nil report	-	-	-	-
EL SALVADOR					

IMPORTS OF SALW (CONTINUED)

State Party	Imports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Estonia	1	1	-	1	-
Finland	1	✓	-	1	-
France +	1	-	✓	1	-
Georgia*					
Germany	1	✓	-	1	-
GHANA					
Greece*					
GRENADA					
GUATEMALA					
GUINEA					
GUYANA					
Honduras*					
Hungary	1	-	1	1	-
ICELAND					
Ireland	1	✓	-	1	-
Italy	1	✓	-	1	-
Jamaica	1	✓	-	1	-
Japan	1	-	1	1	1
Latvia	1	-	✓	1	✓
LESOTHO					
Liberia*					
Liechtenstein	1	✓	-	1	-
Lithuania*					
Luxembourg	1	-	-	1	-
Madagascar*					
MALI					
MALTA					

IMPORTS OF SALW (CONTINUED)

State Party	Imports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
MAURITANIA					
Mauritius*					
Mexico	1	-	✓	1	-
Monaco	1	1	-	-	-
Montenegro	1	-	✓	1	✓
Netherlands	1	-	1	1	-
New Zealand	1	✓	-	1	-
NIGER					
Nigeria*					
Norway	✓	-	✓	✓	-
Panama	✓	_	1	✓	-
Paraguay	✓	1	-	-	-
Peru	✓	✓	✓	✓	√
Poland	✓	-	1	✓	-
Portugal	✓	1	✓	✓	√
Republic of Korea	✓	1	-	✓	-
Republic of Moldova	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Republic of North Macedonia	/	/	√	✓	-
Romania	✓	_	✓	✓	-
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS					
SAINT LUCIA					
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES					
Samoa	Nil report	-	-	-	-
SAN MARINO					
Senegal*					
Serbia	1	-	✓	1	-

IMPORTS OF SALW (CONTINUED)

State Party	Imports of SALW Reported	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
SEYCHELLES					
Sierra Leone	Nil report	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	1	-	✓	/	-
Slovenia	1	-	✓	1	1
South Africa	1	-	1	1	-
Spain	1	-	1	1	-
Sweden	Х	-	-	1	-
Switzerland	1	1	-	1	-
TOGO					
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO					
Tuvalu	Nil report	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	1	1	✓	1	-
ZAMBIA					

VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES

State Party	Exports under Voluntary National Categories				Imports under Voluntary National Categories					
	Exports under Voluntary National Categories	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value	Imports under Voluntary National Categories	Authorized	Actual	Number	Value
Belgium	1	1	-	-	1	✓	-	1	-	1
Costa Rica	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	-
Denmark	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	-	-	-	_	-	1	1	1	1	-
New Zealand	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-
Norway	1	-	-	-	✓	-	_	-	-	-
Sweden	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-



CHAPTER 3: ATT REPORTING UPDATES AND INSIGHTS FROM 2019

3.1 - PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2019 ANNUAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

Reporting under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is critical to achieving its object and purpose as well as for increasing transparency in the international arms trade. Article 13.3 of the ATT mandates that every State Party submit an annual report on its national arms exports and imports each year, capturing information from the previous calendar year.1 A State Party is required to submit its first ATT annual report capturing arms exports and imports that occurred during the first full calendar year after the Treaty's entry into force for that State Party. The decision to have ATT annual reports reflect transfers that occurred during the first full year following the Treaty's entry into force for a given State Party came as a result of discussions during the preparatory process for the first Conference of States Parties (CSP1).2 These reports contribute to greater transparency of the global arms trade and help key stakeholders monitor arms flows around the world, as well as facilitate confidence building, responsibility and accountability in national arms-transfer decisions.

PREVIEW OF 2019 ANNUAL REPORTS

ATT annual reports are due by 31 May each year, reflecting arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year. However, States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat to submit their reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year. Of the 106 States Parties to the ATT, 97 were required to submit their 2019 annual report on arms exports and imports. Thirty-five of these did so by 7 June 2020, reflecting an on-time compliance rate of 36 per cent. The Maldives also submitted a 2019 annual report, though it was not required to do so, bringing the total number of submitted reports to 36 at the time of writing.

The on-time completion rate for 2019 annual reports is the lowest of any year, as shown in Table 1. However, the low rate could be the result of several factors, such as strains on personnel, time and resources amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The public-health crisis forced many governments and institutions to reorient their work patterns to focus on other, at times more immediate, priorities and to accommodate an

almost entirely virtual environment. Moreover, government officials may have had limited capacities and/or limited access to the information and data systems necessary to complete their 2019 annual report. In this respect, given the unprecedented effects of COVID-19, this year may ultimately turn out to be an outlier when assessing ATT reporting trends.

States Parties that submitted their reports on time represent a relatively geographically diverse range, which may indicate positive trends towards established reporting processes that facilitate efficient and on-time reporting around the world. These States Parties are:

Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.³

Six States Parties elected to make their 2019 annual reports private, representing 17 per cent of those submitted by 7 June 2020.4 By comparison, approximately 11 per cent of States Parties reporting on time chose to make their 2018 annual reports private.

Table 1: ATT Annual Reports On-Time Reporting Rates

Reporting Year	Number of On-Time Reports Submitted	On-Time Completion Rate		
2015	28	46%		
2016	32	43%		
2017	36	40%		
2018	45	49%		
2019	36	37%		

¹ Article 13.3 states: "Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1. Reports shall be made available and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat."

² For additional details on this point, see Casey-Maslen, S., Clapham, A., Giacca, G. and Parker, S. (2016). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³ While Burkina Faso and Uruguay met the deadline, questions remained as to whether their 2019 annual reports would be publicly available or not, so their reports were not yet available on the ATT Secretariat's website at the time of writing.

⁴ The six States Parties that elected to make their 2019 reports private are: Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, the Maldives, Mauritius and the State of Palestine.

Private reporting continues to pose a challenge to transparency, and several States Parties appear to have altered their reporting behaviours towards more privacy. For example, Albania chose, for the first time, to make its annual report private this year, after reporting publicly in its 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 annual reports. And some States Parties that submitted private reports for the first time last year – including Georgia, Lithuania and Mauritius – continued that practice for their 2019 annual reports, despite having submitted public reports in previous years. The continued trend of private reporting is concerning, as private reports create a challenge for identifying global arms exports and imports, prevent a public accounting of arm sales, and impede the identification of particularly troubling transfers or potentially troubling arms accumulations.

REPORTING UPDATES

In 2020, five States Parties were required to report on their annual arms exports and imports for the first time by submitting 2019 annual reports.⁵ Two of these (Chile and the State of Palestine) met the reporting deadline. Chile had previously submitted an annual report for its 2018 arms exports and imports, even though it was not required to do so at the time. An additional State Party (Maldives) reported on its annual arms exports and imports to the ATT Secretariat for the first time and submitted a 2019 annual report although it was not required to do so.

Several States Parties remain consistently in compliance with their reporting obligations. As of 7 June 2020, 31 submitted an annual report every year they were required to do so.⁶

By comparison, 26 States Parties have never reported, despite being required to do so for one or more years.⁷ This is a slight improvement from last year, in which one State Party (Nigeria) submitted its first annual report after not fulfilling reporting obligations in previous years, reflecting its exports and imports in the 2018 calendar year.

Two States Parties have also provided updates to some of their previously submitted annual reports, even though there is not a specific Treaty requirement to do so. As noted in last year's ATT Monitor, Japan provided an update of its previously submitted 2018 report. More recently, Belgium submitted a revised version of its 2017 annual report to the ATT Secretariat. These examples could serve as good practice for States Parties to provide clarifications and corrections when new or more accurate information becomes available on earlier transfers.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

A preliminary review of the contents of the publicly available 2019 annual reports received by 7 June 2020 offers the following observations:

- Ten States Parties submitted their 2019 annual reports using the online reporting tool made available by the ATT Secretariat.⁸ Eight of these also utilized the online reporting tool last year to submit their 2018 annual reports.⁹ By comparison, nine States Parties that submitted their 2018 annual report on time last year used the online reporting tool. The online reporting tool first became available for use in 2019 (to support States Parties in submitting their 2018 annual reports).
- Four States Parties noted that they submitted 'nil' reports for arms exports, indicating they did not export any weapons covered by Article 2.1 of the Treaty during the 2019 calendar year.¹⁰
- Two States Parties (Panama and Sierra Leone) indicated that they submitted 'nil' reports for arms imports, indicating they did not import any weapons covered by Article 2.1 of the Treaty during the 201g calendar year.
- Seven States Parties indicated some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related data was withheld from their 2019 annual reports in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty, representing approximately 20 per cent of reporting States Parties.¹¹ This is compared to approximately 27 per cent of States Parties reporting on time last year.
- 5 The five States Parties required to submit their first annual reports in 2020 are: Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Kazakhstan and the State of Palestine.
- 6 The 31 States Parties that submitted an annual report every year they were required to do so are: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 7 The 26 States Parties that have never reported are: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, the Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia.
- 8 The ten States Parties that submitted 2019 annual reports using the online reporting tool are: Argentina, Belgium, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland.
- g The eight States Parties that submitted both 2019 and 2018 annual reports using the online reporting tool are: Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 10 The eight States Parties that indicated that they submitted 'nil' reports for arms exports are: Benin, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Sierra Leone.
- 11 The seven States Parties that indicated they withheld some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related data are: Chile, Finland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Sweden.

 Five States Parties indicated that their reports included information on national definitions and categories of conventional arms, compared to six States Parties that reported on time last year.¹²

EXPORTS

- Twelve States Parties reported exports of major conventional weapons. Of these, nine reported actual exports¹³ and two (Italy and the Republic of Korea) reported export authorizations. One State Party (Finland) did not appear to indicate whether it reported actual exports or export authorizations.
- Twenty-four States Parties reported exports of SALW.
 Of these, 15 reported actual SALW exports¹⁴ and eight reported SALW export authorizations.¹⁵ One State Party (Norway) did not appear to indicate whether it reported authorizations or actual SALW exports.
- One State Party (Switzerland) reported on actual exports of major conventional weapons and authorizations of SALW exports.
- Nineteen States Parties reported only the number of items exported,¹⁶ four reported both the number and the value of items exported,¹⁷ and one (Belgium) reported only the value of items exported.

IMPORTS

- Fifteen States Parties reported imports of major conventional weapons. Of these, 12 reported actual imports¹⁸ and three (Belgium, Latvia and the Republic of Korea) reported import authorizations.
- Twenty-four States Parties reported on imports of SALW.
 Of these, 13 reported on actual SALW imports, 19 seven
 reported import authorizations 20 and two (Belgium and
 Portugal) reported on both actual SALW imports and
 authorizations. It is unclear whether two States Parties
 (Dominican Republic and Finland) reported actual SALW
 imports or authorizations based on how information is
 presented in their reports.
- Four States Parties reported differently for imports of major conventional weapons and SALW.²¹ For example, Belgium reported import authorizations for major conventional weapons, but appears to have reported on both authorizations and actual imports for SALW. Latvia also reported import authorizations for major conventional weapons and actual imports for SALW. Portugal, by comparison, reported actual major conventional weapons imports and reported on both authorizations and actual imports for SALW. And Switzerland reported actual imports for major conventional weapons and SALW import authorizations.
- Twenty States Parties reported the number of items imported²² and six reported both the number and the value of items imported.²³ No State Party only reported the value of its arms imports.
- 12 The five States Parties that indicated their reports included information on national definitions and categories of conventional arms are: Belgium, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 13 The nine States Parties that reported actual exports of major conventional weapons are: the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 14 The 15 States Parties that reported actual exports of SALW are: Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
- 15 The eight States Parties that reported authorized exports of SALW are: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, Portugal, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland.
- 16 The 19 States Parties that reported the number of items exported are: Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 17 The four States Parties that reported the number and value of items exported are: Japan, Latvia, the Republic of Moldova and Slovenia.
- 18 The 12 States Parties that reported actual imports are: Benin, the Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 19 The 13 States Parties that reported actual exports of SALW are: Argentina, Benin, Chile, the Czech Republic, France, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Norway, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
- 20 The seven States Parties that reported authorized imports of SALW are: Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland.
- 21 The four States Parties that reported differently for imports of major conventional weapons and SALW are: Belgium, Latvia, Portugal and Switzerland.
- 22 The 20 States Parties that reported the number of items imported are: Argentina, Benin, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland
- 23 The six States Parties that reported both the number and value of items imported are: Belgium, Japan, Latvia, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova and Slovenia.

CONCLUSION

Over time, examples of good practice are emerging from the annual reports. We can discern the benefits of reporting on both the value and number of arms exports or imports as well as both actual and authorized exports/imports. If States Parties continue to provide more, rather than less, information in their annual reports, a better and more helpful picture of global arms exports and imports may emerge. However, significant work is still required to not only adjust the reporting templates, but also to share best practices and have States Parties incorporate such practices into their data collection and reporting systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic likely had an impact on the submission of States Parties' 2019 ATT annual reports. However, the geographic diversity and varying levels of capacity for managing national transfer control systems of those that were able to report by the deadline demonstrate that political will likely remains the largest impediment to ATT reporting. Moreover, the worrying trend towards private reports, particularly among States Parties that have reported publicly in the past, will need to be further examined in a non-COVID year to see if there is in fact an upward trend towards less transparency in this regard.





3.2 - UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS AND MONITORING TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Reporting on Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) implementation remains one of few means by which to examine how States Parties understand and incorporate their Treaty obligations in their national transfer control systems and to monitor Treaty universalization. Therefore, ATT initial reports on Treaty implementation are critical for shedding light on how the ATT is implemented around the world. The ATT obliges States Parties to submit an initial report "within the first year after entry into force" of the ATT for that State Party. Therefore, the submission deadline will vary by State Party. As of 24 June 2020, 100 of the 106 ATT States Parties were due to submit their initial reports, according to the ATT Secretariat. In total, 76 have done so, representing an overall compliance rate of 76 per cent.

This chapter includes a brief analysis of six newly submitted initial reports, as well as an overview of two updated reports received by the ATT Secretariat. It also analyses reporting non-compliance and highlights efforts led by the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and the ATT Secretariat to improve reporting.


RECENT REPORTS

In the period following the publication of the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report, six States Parties were due to submit their initial reports.² Of these, two (Chile and Suriname) submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat within the last year. An additional four States Parties also belatedly submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat within the last year. Of these four, Antigua and Barbuda and Malta were required to submit initial reports in 2015, Belize in 2016 and Zambia in 2017. Their recent reporting may serve as an early indicator towards a longer-term positive trend of improved reporting compliance from previously non-compliant States Parties.

Of the above six newly submitted initial reports, four were made public on the ATT Secretariat website.³ By comparison, Chile and Malta elected to make their initial reports private, thereby inhibiting a public review of their Treaty implementation practices.

There remains an upward trend towards private reporting for ATT initial reports. As Figure 1 demonstrates, private reports represent an increasing share of overall initial reports.

Figure 1: Comparing the Number of Public vs Private Initial Reports⁴



¹ As the ATT Secretariat website further explains, for those States Parties "that ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the Treaty after 24 December 2014, the Treaty enters into force ... ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with Article 22. The deadline for submission of its initial report is twelve months after that date."

² The following States Parties were due to submit their ATT initial reports between March 2019 and April 2020: Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Suriname.

³ The four States Parties that made their newly submitted initial reports public are: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Surname and Zambia.

⁴ For more information on these figures see ATT Monitor, 'Annual Reports'. https://attmonitor.org/en/research-reports/annual-reports/.

In May 2016, two of the 47 initial reports submitted were private, representing 4 per cent of all submitted reports. In June 2020, 14 of the 76 initial reports submitted were private, representing 18 per cent of all submitted reports. Private reports pose a challenge for monitoring and assessing Treaty implementation. For States Parties that submit them, it is not possible to conduct a public review of their implementation practices, to compare their national control systems with those of other States Parties, to assess potential areas of strength and/or weakness, or to identify opportunities for support and/or cooperation to facilitate Treaty implementation.


States Parties have a variety of methods for submitting their initial reports. In 2019, an online reporting tool developed by the ATT Secretariat became available for the first time. The majority of States Parties continue to use the recommended ATT reporting template endorsed by the WGTR. As of 24 June 2020, of those States Parties that made their ATT initial reports public, 53 used the recommended ATT reporting template, seven used the ATT Baseline Assessment Survey developed by the Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline

Assessment Project (ATT-BAP), and two used a national format. The variation is noteworthy, as different reporting methods complicate comparative analyses of the initial reports.

The four newly submitted reports that are publicly available contain good practice in reporting on preliminary steps to implement the ATT, even if distinct measures have yet to be established. These approaches to reporting provide a baseline of understanding for current efforts, potential gaps and areas for assistance for each State Party. For example, while Antigua and Barbuda indicated that it does not yet have the means to comprehensively implement the ATT, it noted that several elements of its national control system are in the process of being developed. Similarly, Suriname and Zambia provided details on legislation and regulations that are being established to develop national control lists, among other items, and to incorporate ATT provisions into their national transfer control systems to facilitate Treaty implementation. Therefore, monitoring these States Parties' future reports for updates on implementation progress would be well-advised.



The States Parties that elected to make their initial reports private are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chile, Cyprus, Greece, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, the State of Palestine and Tuvalu. Two States Parties (the Republic of Korea and Togo) initially submitted private initial reports but later requested the ATT Secretariat make them publicly available.



NON-COMPLIANCE

Twenty-four States Parties have not submitted an initial report on ATT implementation to the ATT Secretariat, and many of these are several years delinquent on their initial reporting requirement. Twenty-one of these 24 States Parties were required to submit initial reports between 2015 and 2017.

Of the 24 States Parties that have yet to submit their initial reports, 13 are from Africa, ten are from the Americas and one is from Europe. Furthermore, nine of these 24 States Parties are among the least developed countries, according to UN figures, and 11 are small island developing states. Eighteen of these 24 States Parties have experience reporting on their national arms-transfer control systems in other forums, particularly through national reports for the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Figure 2: Initial Report Submissions by Region (as of 24 June 2020)⁷

Region	Number of States Parties Due to Report	Number of States Parties That Have Reported	Regional Reporting Rates
Africa	25	12	48%
Americas	26	16	62%
Asia	6	6	100%
Europe	39	38	95%
Oceania	4	4	100%



TWENTY-FOUR STATES PARTIES HAVE NOT SUBMITTED AN INITIAL REPORT ON ATT IMPLEMENTATION TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT, AND MANY OF THESE ARE SEVERAL YEARS DELINQUENT ON THEIR INITIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

⁶ For example, Guinea Bissau is identified as one of the world's least developed countries as well as a small island developing state. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, 'Methodology'. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m4g/.

⁷ Analysis is based on UN Statistics Division regional groupings. See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. 'Methodology', https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/.

UPDATED REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires States Parties to update their initial reports and to provide the ATT Secretariat with information "on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate." Since the publication of the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report, two States Parties (New Zealand and Slovenia) submitted updates to their initial reports. They join Japan and Sweden as the only four States Parties to have submitted updates to date.

According to the ATT Secretariat, New Zealand provided an update to its report in August 2019 and had previously announced its intention to provide updates following the enactment of new brokering legislation. New Zealand's original initial report noted that "New Zealand expects to provide an update in relation to brokering controls once national

legislation has been enacted."8 New Zealand's Ambassador for Disarmament H.E. Dell Higgie announced at the fourth Conference of States Parties (CSP4) that "New Zealand has recently passed legislation enhancing our compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty by enacting new brokering legislation" and that "we [...] will update our initial report accordingly."9 The new report helpfully includes the words 'Updated Initial Report' in its title. However, New Zealand did not provide cover-sheet information indicating which parts of its initial report had been updated, nor did it date its report to reflect when the updates were submitted. Such steps were taken by Japan and Sweden in their updated initial reports, and the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report highlighted these steps as good practice for States Parties to incorporate when updating their reports, particularly in the absence of a standardized process and/or mechanism for providing updates.



⁸ Government of New Zealand (N. D.). 'Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty'. [Accessed 13 April 2020]. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/17472dcc-e8b1-3964-a5df-1fcbae8bf3bc.

⁹ Government of New Zealand (2018). 'Statement by H.E. Dell Higgie, Ambassador for Disarmament'. Fourth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. 21 August 2018. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/CSP4 Treaty Implementation - New Zealand.pdf.

A comparison of New Zealand's originally submitted initial report and its updated version reveals several substantive changes. Many changes relate to the country's new brokering legislation, as expected. Additionally, New Zealand updated information on its national control system to reflect recent amendments to legislation governing arms imports and exports. Smaller edits were also made to clarify terminology and practice in various other sections in its report, such as clarifying that New Zealand "may require" certain supporting documents be included in an application for an export authorization and that its Strategic Goods regime applies to "all goods in New Zealand territory," compared to all goods exported from New Zealand territory, as indicated in its originally submitted initial report.

Slovenia provided an update to its initial report in October 2019, in which it indicated updates to relevant national laws and provided updated links to relevant content such as its national control list (which is informed by the EU Common Military List) and its annual reports on import, export, brokering, transit

or trans-shipment licenses. Slovenia also updated language describing its transfer review process by clarifying that requests to issue any license (export, brokering or transit and transshipment) "may seek a prior opinion" by the Inter-Ministerial Export Control Commission, rather than be obliged to consult the Commission, as was indicated in Slovenia's originally submitted initial report. The same revision was made when detailing the decision-making processes for export authorizations, for transit or trans-shipment authorizations and for control measures related to brokering. To indicate its updates, Slovenia used red text to identify new content, which could serve as good practice in the absence of a standardized reporting update process.

No clear process or mechanisms yet exist to facilitate updating initial reports in a consistent and standardized manner. Since the publication of the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report, the WGTR has continued its efforts to assist States Parties in better understanding and complying with reporting obligations, including the obligation to update initial reports.



CONCLUSION

As ATT States Parties continue to complete and submit their initial reports, key stakeholders continue to consider how best to support these efforts and improve reporting processes and practices. Of particular note, the WGTR co-chairs collected comments and suggestions for possible amendments to the reporting templates from participants at WGTR meetings in January and April 2019, on the information-exchange platform in the restricted area of the ATT website and via email.10 These comments and suggestions were compiled in an annex to the WGTR co-chairs' draft report to the fifth Conference of States Parties (CSP5). Pursuant to its mandate agreed to by States Parties at CSP5, the WGTR is considering "adjustments to the reporting templates deemed necessary to address uncertainties and inconsistencies to ensure compatibility between the online reporting tool and the proposed public searchable database that allows for queries and extracting data," taking into account comments and suggestions from States Parties and other key stakeholders, including civil society.11

The WGTR also prepared a draft amended template for the initial report and held remote consultations on the amended templates during the intersessional period in advance of the sixth Conference of States Parties (CSP6). The Working Group co-chairs will collate the received responses, but it is not yet clear when and how the discussions on the reporting templates will move forward due to the disruption to meeting schedules because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Discussions surrounding the reporting templates may need to be delayed until 2021, when meetings may be able to move forward with all stakeholders. In coordination with the ATT Secretariat, the WGTR also continues to review the status of reporting, to monitor and assess the use of the online reporting tool and information-

exchange platform on the ATT Secretariat's website, and to offer opportunities to discuss reporting challenges, information exchange mechanisms, and projects to harness information from the initial and annual reports.¹²

While States Parties have not offered any new information on reporting challenges since the ATT Monitor 2019 Annual Report, they have previously offered insights on obstacles to reporting that are intended to be addressed by the WGTR.

The January 2019 ATT-BAP publication, 'Lessons Learned from Arms Trade Reporting', describes the different kinds of challenges experienced by States Parties with regard to reporting.¹³ These include:

- Limited resources and capacity
- Difficulty in accessing and compiling relevant information
- Difficulty in maintaining awareness of reporting obligations and deadlines

Moreover, States Parties often have to balance their many reporting obligations, strained government resources and overworked staff. In addition, some governments have not yet established the bureaucratic mechanisms necessary for effective and efficient reporting, and they may not have internal processes for data collection, storage and sharing. It also may be the first time States Parties are collecting information on national practices when they compile their initial report and they may not know where and how to collect inter-agency information on national practices. States Parties may have technical challenges and limited capacity and resources that can also prevent them from compiling and completing their reports.

¹⁰ ATT WGTR (2019). 'Co-Chairs' Draft Report to CSP5'. 29 August 2019. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGTR_CSP5_Co-chair's%20report_ENRev1/ATT_WGTR_CSP5_Co-chair's%20report_ENRev1.pdf, p. 3.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 40.

¹² Ibid., p. 40.

¹³ Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) (2019). 'Lessons Learned from Arms Trade Reporting'. January 2019. http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ATT-BAP_LESSONS-LEARNED-FROM-REPORTING_ATT.pdf.



