ATT MONITOR REPORT 2020

SUMMARY
AN EX-COMBATANT HOLDS UP MUNITIONS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE AFTER A DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) OPERATION CONDUCTED BY UNOCI IN 2012.

CREDIT: © UN PHOTO / PATRICIA ESTEVE
THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor, an independent project of Control Arms, was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Austria, Australia, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago.

The project is now the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

THE ATT MONITOR ANNUAL REPORT

The ATT Monitor 2020 Annual Report seeks to take stock of existing state practice, create greater transparency in how the ATT is implemented, inform the work of the Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) and intersessional meetings, and support accountability of Treaty commitments.

This summary presents synthesized information from the ATT Monitor 2020 Annual Report and provides examples of analysis, research and recommendations made in support of strengthening Treaty implementation efforts.
THE ITALIAN NAVY FRIGATE ITS CARABINIERE DURING NATO EXERCISES IN CATANIA HARBOUR.
CREDIT: © NATO
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This review takes stock of the period between 1 June 2019 and 31 May 2020, up to and including the one week grace period for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some of the key events and milestones during the past year and assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties to the Treaty regarding universalization and compliance.

**UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION**

This year’s analysis shows a notable decrease in universalization progress and a return to the downward trend reported by the ATT Monitor prior to the sharp increase in States Parties recorded in last year’s analysis.

Four countries became States Parties to the ATT between 1 June 2019 and 31 May 2020. Botswana, Canada and the Maldives acceded, and Namibia ratified the Treaty, bringing the total number of States Parties to 106, as listed by the ATT Secretariat. A further 32 were Signatories (see Figure 1). ATT membership remained geographically uneven.

To promote universalization and to assist States Parties in implementing Treaty provisions, civil society organizations and government representatives gathered in different training and capacity building activities in Kazakhstan, Namibia, Ireland and Geneva, among other event locations, and the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) approved funding for 20 projects to be implemented in 19 countries in 2019.

Figure 1 - Map of Status of Ratifications and States Parties (as of 31 May 2020)
Reporting under the ATT is critical to achieving its object and purpose, as well as for increasing transparency in the international arms trade. Article 13 of the Treaty mandates that every State Party submit an initial report that describes measures taken to implement the Treaty, as well as annual reports on national arms exports and imports each year.

ATT Monitor analysis of initial and annual reports shows a concerning trend in which information has been made confidential or withheld by States Parties, including a marked increase in reports kept confidential on the ATT Secretariat website. While a group of States Parties has displayed commitments to comprehensive, public reporting, the lack of effective reporting by many that is described by the ATT Monitor is a matter of concern. Chapters 2 and 3 present further analysis of compliance with reporting obligations, identify trends and highlight efforts made by ATT stakeholders to address challenges to reporting.

Systems and Procedures

Intersessional work prior to CSP6 included two series of meetings of the ATT Working Groups and Informal Preparatory (PrepCom) meetings. The first series of meetings took place in February 2020, and the second was scheduled for April 2020 but was cancelled in light of developments regarding COVID-19. In place of the cancelled meetings, the CSP President put forward a work plan that allowed the Working Groups and ATT Secretariat to consult with ATT stakeholders remotely, through written submissions, to prepare and finalize the documents to be submitted to CSP6. Progress made during the Working Group and PrepCom meetings of CSP6 may have been curtailed by this cancellation. However, the WGTR maintained an ambitious agenda despite challenging circumstances. Efforts made by other Working Groups, including by the WGETI sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7 to develop a means through which States Parties can unpack key terminology to encourage greater cooperation and understanding in implementing risk-assessment obligations, are positive steps towards better monitoring compliance.
TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Ongoing humanitarian crises in conflict areas such as the Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen are fuelled and exacerbated by past and present arms transfers to parties to these conflicts that contribute to violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). The Yemen conflict, and its subsequent humanitarian crisis, remains one of the most concerning cases in which arms transfers continue to facilitate civilian casualties, widespread displacement and human suffering on a massive scale.

The global impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated the consequences of arms transfers to Yemen. Airstrikes and shelling by parties to the conflict have caused damage to and destruction of health facilities, making accessing medical services difficult or impossible for civilians, according to Physicians for Human Rights. The collapse of health infrastructure means that, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be even more difficult for Yemenis to access proper care while health facilities are not fully functioning.

Despite encouraging signs that some States Parties are implementing and amending national policies that increase compliance with Article 6 and 7 obligations, more efforts are needed to ensure that all States Parties authorize and/or deny transfers in compliance with ATT obligations. The challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic in countries affected by armed violence, like Yemen, serve as an important reminder for States Parties to maintain their commitments to the Treaty’s object and purpose of contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability and reducing human suffering.

THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ARMED VIOLENCE, LIKE YEMEN, SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT REMINDER FOR STATES PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE TREATY’S OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY AND REDUCING HUMAN SUFFERING.
PARTICIPANTS DURING A SIDE EVENT DURING CSP4 IN TOKYO, JAPAN.

CREDIT: © CONTROL ARMS / AKRAM AL-WAHABI
One of the objects of the ATT is to “prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion.” Yet, the lack of widespread understanding of the many processes and circumstances that facilitate diversion, and of how the ATT can help prevent and mitigate it, together act as a significant impediment to positive international action. This chapter seeks to fill gaps in understandings around key terminology and Treaty provisions related to transparency, information sharing and diversion. It illustrates the need for greater transparency and increased effective and cooperative action among ATT stakeholders to prevent and mitigate diversion through highlighting diversion cases, providing lessons learned and recommendations, and by discussing ATT provisions, diversion-prevention and mitigation measures.

DIVERSION, TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING PROVISIONS UNDER THE ATT

While the ATT does not propose a clear definition of diversion, the preamble implicitly considers that diversion occurs in three ways: from the legal to the illicit market, for unauthorized end-use, and to unauthorized end-users. Further, the WGETI sub-working group on Article 11 has identified four stages in the transfer chain, all of which provide different opportunities for states to take measures to address diversion and serve as the typology adopted by the ATT Monitor in this chapter (Figure 2).

Figure 2 - Stages of the Transfer Chain
11.1 Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) shall take measures to prevent their diversion.

11.2 The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system, established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States. Other prevention measures may include examining parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates, assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.

11.3 Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible, in order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

11.4 If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include alerting potentially affected States Parties, examining diverted shipments of such conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through investigation and law enforcement.

11.5 In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

11.6 States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, on measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).
Article 11 of the ATT addresses the detailed responsibilities of States Parties in taking steps and implementing measures to prevent and address diversion, while emphasizing the need for cooperative action in doing so. The provisions specific to information sharing and cooperation in identifying risks and responding to cases of diversion are key to the Treaty’s effectiveness in this area. Figure 3 highlights these provisions in Article 11.

The ATT as a whole provides a broad framework for promoting cooperation, information sharing, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international arms trade. Transparency – defined by the ATT Monitor generally as ‘accessibility of information’ – is central to the effective implementation of the ATT’s operative articles and can be seen as directly linked to a government’s willingness to commit to monitoring, oversight and accountability. In the context of the ATT, States Parties have numerous opportunities to express commitments to transparency, including in reporting and information sharing more generally.

While the ATT makes two explicit references to transparency, in Article 1 (object and purpose) and Article 5 (general implementation), as shown in Figure 4, transparency commitments are also integrated into many of the ATT’s substantive obligations beyond Article 11. Additionally, there are throughout the ATT numerous requirements for information sharing and provisions for interaction among States Parties, including within Article 5 (general implementation) and Article 15 (international cooperation), as shown in Figure 5.

**Figure 4 - Transparency Provisions in the ATT**

**ARTICLE 1:**
**OBJECT AND PURPOSE**

Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.

**ARTICLE 5:**
**GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION**

5.5 Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and of items covered under Article 3 and Article 4.

**Figure 5 - Information Sharing Provisions in the ATT**

**ARTICLE 5:**
**GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION**

5.6 Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty.

**ARTICLE 15:**
**INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

15.2 States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging information [1].

15.7 States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.
COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TO TACKLE DIVERSION

The ATT presents a clear framework that mandates States Parties to obtain information and share experience on diversion. They are also encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. In doing so, those with experience in this field can assist others in taking effective, preventive action.

Mutual assistance between States Parties and potentially other stakeholders is envisaged for the purpose of ensuring the effective implementation of the terms agreed in the Treaty, including those relating to diversion. Such encouragement, as found in Article 15.4, could take many forms, including cooperation on law enforcement and the provision of technical, financial and other assistance. Additionally, other States Parties, organizations, and CSOs can assist States Parties in drafting, amending and/or implementing relevant legislative and administrative measures that aim to establish preventive or mitigating measures against diversion. Areas in which such assistance has been useful include in the development of end-user certificates and/or post-shipment verification (PSV) systems.

Effective action to prevent diversion requires that as many States Parties as possible be adequately informed of the risks and characteristics associated with the issue at hand. For this reason, both information sharing and transparency are essential to tackling diversion, and ATT States Parties must cooperate and share information with all relevant stakeholders on the risks of diversion that exist at different stages of the transfer chain.

DIVERSION-PREVENTION AND MITIGATION MEASURES

Diversion-prevention measures should be routinely implemented in the context of each proposed arms transfer at each stage in the transfer chain. Concrete action to prevent diversion at each stage includes, for example:

**Before transfer**: Robust and comprehensive export controls and systematized import/transit/trans-shipment/brokering authorization processes

**During transfer**: Transit/transhipment authorizations obtained in advance of any transfer, tracking of shipments and effective enforcement by customs and law enforcement agencies

**Post-delivery**: Delivery verification and physical checks to verify correct delivery and stockpile security

While States Parties are obligated to assess the risk of diversion and to prevent it, at all points in the transfer chain, they are also encouraged to consider ways to participate in information sharing with relevant parties to mitigate diversion risks. Mitigation measures are specific measures that can be adopted in response to identified risks of diversion in order to substantially lower these risks. These measures should be appropriate, targeted and effective and might include: providing security to arms shipments in transit; stockpile security and accountability measures; limits on quantities shipped; use of remote-disabling technologies; and training in responsible use.

...INFORMATION SHARING AND TRANSPARENCY ARE ESSENTIAL TO TACKLING DIVERSION, AND ATT STATES PARTIES MUST COOPERATE AND SHARE INFORMATION WITH ALL RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS ON THE RISKS OF DIVERSION THAT EXIST AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE TRANSFER CHAIN.

BY INVESTIGATING, EXPLORING AND ANALYSING CASES OF DIVERSION IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE, IN CONCRETE TERMS, THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND EFFECTIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF ALL STATES PARTIES IN PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DIVERSION.
By investigating, exploring and analysing cases of diversion it is possible to demonstrate, in concrete terms, the importance of transparency, information exchange, mutual assistance and effective action on the part of all States Parties in preventing and mitigating diversion. The three case studies in this chapter provide diversion scenarios occurring across the main stages of the arms transfer chain:

**Before transfer:** Offshore patrol vessel diverted to Libya

**During transfer:** EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya

**Post-delivery:** Swiss arms to Gulf States

These cases demonstrate the types of actions by different stakeholders that have facilitated the diversion of arms. The cases also provide examples of further action that can be taken by stakeholders to prevent and mitigate diversion in the future.

The ATT provides an important framework for States Parties to share information on diversion-prevention and mitigation measures. Fully implemented, the Treaty’s provisions can also help them address and prevent diversion through effective, cooperative action. While information exchange and cooperation are important elements in any effective action to prevent diversion, transparency and inclusivity of all stakeholders is also crucial given that information on diversion is relevant not just to States Parties, and all stakeholders have a role to play in tackling diversion.

CREDIT: © UN PHOTO / MARTIN PERRET
This chapter takes an in-depth look at 2018 annual reports and presents analysis of compliance with reporting obligations, identifies reporting challenges and examples of good practice, disaggregates reporting data on a country-specific basis, and gives a comprehensive overview of reporting practices.

The Treaty’s reporting obligations in Article 13 are the primary tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. Compliance with reporting obligations has declined since the first round of reporting in 2015, and analysis of 2018 annual reports shows that, despite a slight increase in the overall reporting rate, progress on effective reporting is slow in terms of both the quantity and quality of reports submitted.

QUANTITY OF REPORTS

Ninety-two States Parties had a legal obligation to submit within one week of 31 May 2019 a report on their arms imports and exports during 2018. By the ATT Monitor’s cut-off date for analysis, 62 States Parties had submitted reports, of which 52 were made publicly available. The reporting compliance rate for 2018 (66 per cent) is slightly higher than the previous year (65 per cent) but below the levels seen in the first round of ATT reporting (80 per cent).

Figure 6 - Confidential and publicly available annual reports as a percentage of total reports due
The increasing number of States Parties that request that their annual reports are kept confidential is a worrying trend. From 2015 to 2018, the share of annual reports that were kept confidential increased from 2 per cent to 11 per cent, with the largest increase occurring between 2017 to 2018 reports.

### QUALITY OF REPORTS

A key feature of the analysis of 2018 annual reports is the variation in the quality of the information provided by States Parties. To make a meaningful assessment of arms transfers, the ATT Monitor considers that, at minimum, a State Party should:

- Specify weapon type
- Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type
- Clearly name the final exporting/importing country

Analysis of the 2018 reports shows that, of the 92 States Parties with an obligation to submit an annual report, only 36 submitted a publicly available report that met the minimum requirements needed to meaningfully assess their exports and imports.

For the remaining States Parties that did not meet the threshold, two elements stand out: very little detailed information on imports and excessive aggregation of reported data.

### Imports

Several States Parties reported no or very little information on their imports, or submitted ‘nil’ import reports. However, analysis of exports reported by other States Parties suggests that some states did import arms but, for one reason or another, did not submit import data in their reports.

### Excessive aggregation

Some States Parties continued to provide excessively aggregated data, which means information was aggregated to the extent that it was either difficult or impossible to discern the quantity or type of weapons that were transferred to or from a particular state. Overall, 14 States Parties used excessive aggregation in their 2018 annual reports.

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**Table 1 - Annual reports by percentage of total due to submit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual report</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submitted reports per cent of total due</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public reports per cent of total due</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential reports per cent of total due</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports not submitted per cent of total due</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GOOD PRACTICE
A group of States Parties consistently displays commitments to comprehensive and timely reporting. The ATT reporting templates and online reporting tool allow States Parties to provide more than the minimum necessary information on arms exported and imported. The ATT Monitor identifies and provides examples of good practice in this area, including: providing comments and descriptions on reported transfers, including additional types of weapons, and clarifying blank spaces in reporting templates by indicating ‘nil’ or writing in ‘0’ to indicate where no transfers were made.

COUNTRY PROFILES
By disaggregating analysis of 2018 annual reports on a country-specific basis, the ATT Monitor seeks to provide easily comparable and nationally relevant findings to help inform future practice. Chapter 2 includes country profiles for each State Party obliged to submit a 2018 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, timely reporting, withholding security information), as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners, and highlighting the largest transfers reported by each State Party in 2018.

REPORTING PRACTICES AND ADDRESSING REPORTING CHALLENGES
While the country profiles provide analysis of reporting practices disaggregated on a country-specific basis (which allows for year-to-year analysis), the tables presented by the ATT Monitor in Chapter 2.3 seek to provide information presented by States Parties in a manner that allows for better comparison across annual reports. By providing easily accessible and comparable information detailing decisions each State Party has made in how it reports exports and imports, it becomes easier to untangle the varied reporting practices and provide more context and understanding of global arms transfers. Each year, States Parties present new and/or different kinds of information, and effective analysis of each report must first take stock of reporting practice before analysing transfer information.

The WGTR is actively discussing the importance of States Parties providing publicly available annual reports that contain comprehensive information, disaggregated and accurate to a level that provides for meaningful transparency and analysis. The WGTR has undertaken a number of initiatives to support States Parties in providing such information. Similarly, the ATT Secretariat has worked closely with the WGTR co-chairs to provide support to States Parties through, among other initiatives, the establishment of the peer-to-peer project of voluntary practical bilateral and regional assistance.
Text Box 2 - Additional Recommendations for States Parties

In addition to initiatives by the WGTR and ATT Secretariat to support States Parties’ efforts in effective implementation of ATT transparency and reporting obligations, the ATT Monitor has also made recommendations that may be helpful, based on work done in consultation with States Parties by the Stimson Center’s ATT Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP).

To provide data to a level of disaggregation and accuracy that provides for meaningful transparency and analysis across ATT annual reports and year-to-year, States Parties could, for example:

- Make decisions regarding reporting practice in annual reports and, once made, maintain stable practice over time.
- Take the necessary measures to fulfil Article 13 obligations, including reporting on imports.
- Provide descriptions of items and comments on transfers where space is given in the ATT reporting template. End-use and end-user information, in particular, is helpful in understanding decision-making rationale in regards to categorization and definition of weapons.
SPENT 7.62MM CASES FROM A HEAVY WEAPONS TRAINING EXERCISE CARRIED OUT BY THE UK ROYAL NAVY.

CREDIT: © CROWN / BEN SHREAD
ATT reporting is one of the key tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. Annual Reports on national arms exports and imports contribute to greater transparency of the global arms trade and facilitate confidence-building, responsibility and accountability in national arms-transfer decisions. Initial reports, which describe measures taken by States Parties to implement the Treaty, shed light on national control systems and can be used to identify implementation gaps and good practice.

This chapter presents preliminary analysis on 2019 annual reports, as well as updates on initial reports and monitoring implementation during the past year. Of particular concern is the trend towards private reporting, which continues to pose a challenge to transparency. This trend is equally as troubling for annual reports as it is for initial reports, as private reports create a challenge for identifying global arms exports and imports, prevent a public accounting of arm sales and impede identification of irresponsible transfers.

Preliminary analysis of ATT reports submitted in the last year shows that challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic may have affected some States Parties’ ability to submit reports on time. However, the geographic diversity and varying levels of capacity for managing national transfer control systems of those that were able to report by the deadline demonstrate that political will likely remains the largest impediment to ATT reporting. Nonetheless, certain trends - including the increase in private reporting - may need to be further examined in a non-COVID year to see if there is in fact an upward trend towards less transparency in this regard.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2019 ANNUAL REPORTS

Ninety-seven States Parties were required to submit their 2019 annual report on arms exports and imports. Thirty-five of these did so by 7 June 2020, reflecting an on-time compliance rate of 36 percent, the lowest rate of any year since the ATT entered into force. The Maldives also submitted a 2019 annual report, though it was not required to do so, bringing the total number of submitted reports to 36 at the time of writing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Year</th>
<th>Number of On-Time Reports Submitted</th>
<th>On-Time Reporting Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Six States Parties elected to make their 2019 annual reports private, representing 17 per cent of those submitted by 7 June 2020. By comparison, approximately 11 per cent of States Parties reporting on time chose to make their 2018 annual reports private. Private reporting continues to pose a challenge to transparency, and several States Parties appear to have altered their reporting behaviors towards more privacy this year.

Five States Parties were required to report on their annual arms exports and imports for the first time by submitting 2019 annual reports, but only two submitted reports on time. Preliminary analysis of 2019 annual reports show that several States Parties remain consistently in compliance with their reporting obligations, as 31 submitted an annual report every year they were required to do so. By comparison, 26 States Parties have never reported, despite being required to do so for one or more years.

Over time, examples of good practice are emerging from the annual reports. If States Parties continue to provide more, rather than less, information in their annual reports, a better and more helpful picture of global arms exports and imports may emerge. However, significant work is still required to not only adjust the reporting templates to facilitate improved reporting, but also to share best practices and have States Parties incorporate such practices into their data collection and reporting systems.

**UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS AND MONITORING TREATY IMPLEMENTATION**

ATT initial reports on Treaty implementation are crucial for shedding light on how the ATT is implemented around the world. Compliance with initial reporting obligations in the ATT is far from universal. This chapter presents analysis on updates since the previous edition of the ATT Monitor Annual Report, including the submission of six new initial reports and two new updated reports.

Of the six States Parties who submitted new reports, two submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat within the last year. An additional four States Parties belatedly submitted their initial reports to the ATT Secretariat on time within the last year. Of the six newly submitted initial reports, four States Parties made their reports public and two elected to make their initial reports private on the ATT Secretariat’s website.

There remains an upward trend towards private reporting for ATT initial reports. As Figure 7 demonstrates, private reports represent an increasing share of overall initial reports. In May 2016, two of the 47 initial reports submitted were private, representing 4 per cent of all submitted reports. In June 2020, 14 of the 76 initial reports submitted were private, representing 18 per cent of all submitted reports.
Twenty-four States Parties have not submitted an initial report on ATT implementation to the ATT Secretariat, and many of these States Parties are several years delinquent on their initial reporting requirement. Twenty-one of these 24 States Parties were required to submit their initial reports between 2015 and 2017. There are regional variations in terms of compliance that deserve attention. For example, higher rates of non-compliance are observed in Africa and the Americas.

Since the previous edition of the ATT Monitor Annual Report, two States Parties submitted updates to their initial reports. Only four States Parties have submitted updates to date. No clear process or mechanisms yet exist to facilitate updating initial reports in a consistent and standardized manner, though the WGTR and the ATT Secretariat have continued their efforts to assist States Parties in better understanding and complying with reporting obligations, including the obligation to update initial reports.

**Figure 7 - Comparing the Number of Public vs Private Initial Reports**

- **Public reports**
- **Private reports**

**THERE REMAINS AN UPWARD TREND TOWARDS PRIVATE REPORTING FOR ATT INITIAL REPORTS... PRIVATE REPORTS REPRESENT AN INCREASING SHARE OF OVERALL INITIAL REPORTS.**