

CHAPTER 1.1: ARMS TRANSFERS, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE ATT IN AFRICA

African countries have strongly supported the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), first by negotiating strongly for the inclusion of certain thematic issues during its negotiations, and then by voting overwhelmingly for its adoption in 2013.¹ Their strong engagement has also been reflected in sub-regional initiatives, such as the agreement and establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention,² and the Nairobi Protocol.³ These efforts have become more necessary in order to address the increasingly heavy burden of armed violence in Africa, with more than one-third of countries on the continent affected by conflict and/or armed insurgency.⁴ The ready availability of conventional arms, in particular small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, fuels this violence.

Unfortunately since the ATT was adopted in 2013 the level of African engagement has been relatively limited. As of 31 May 2016 there are 19 States Parties in Africa while a further 20 have signed it but are yet to ratify. Implementation progress has also been slow. Chapter 1.2 explores the implementation challenges faced by African States Parties. This chapter provides an overview of the international arms trade as it concerns Africa – in terms of imports, largely from suppliers outside the continent, and in terms of the trade and circulation of arms within the continent itself. This chapter then explores how a lack of transparency and accountability in the 'legal' or government-authorized trade in arms is contributing to the 'grey' and illicit markets that fuel conflict and instability across Africa. This analysis is illustrated by a case study on the Central African Republic. The chapter concludes by exploring ways in which ATT implementation by African governments could address several of the issues and problems highlighted, thereby helping to build peace and security in the continent.

AFRICA AND THE AUTHORIZED ARMS TRADE

Less than a dozen African countries manufacture conventional arms and/or ammunition. Of these, only South Africa could be described as a significant producer, having exported major conventional weapons to at least 30 other African countries over the past two decades.⁵ The vast bulk of arms on the continent as a whole were originally transferred from suppliers in other regions, notably from Russia, China, the US, European Union (EU) members and other Eastern European countries.⁶

Arms imports by African governments are on the rise. Imports of major conventional weapons by States in Africa increased by 19 per cent between 2006–2010 and 2011–2015. Data produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that the continent's share of the global arms trade rose in this period from 7.7 per cent to 8 per cent.⁷ Globally, the arms trade in 2014 was estimated by SIPRI to be worth at least USD \$94.5 billion. If Africa's share of the global arms trade in 2014 was approximately the same as its share in 2011–2015, then transfers of major conventional weapons to Africa in 2014 would have been worth at least USD \$7.6 billion.⁸

Historically, the majority of arms sales to African States have mostly been small arms and light weapons (SALW), their parts and ammunition. African imports of SALW in 2014 were worth at least USD \$242 million, an increase of almost 50 per cent from the value of imports in 2005 according to analysis carried



**TRANSFERS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS TO AFRICA IN 2014 WOULD HAVE
BEEN WORTH AT LEAST USD \$7.6 BILLION.**

1 49 of 54 countries in Africa were present for the vote, of which 47 voted Yes – and the remaining two abstained.

2 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. (adopted 14 June 2006, entered into force 29 September 2009). <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf>

3 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. (adopted 21 April 2004, entered into force 5 May 2006). <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/research/disarmament/dualuse/pdf-archive-att/pdfs/rec-sa-nairobi-protocol-for-the-prevention-control-and-reduction-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-the-great-lakes-region-and-the-horn-of-africa.pdf>

4 See, for example, University of Uppsala Conflict Data Program. <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory>

5 UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) began recording transfers of major conventional arms in 1992. Accessed 1 July 2016. See the individual country data at <https://www.unroca.org/>

6 Ibid.

7 SIPRI (forthcoming 2016), "SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security", Stockholm, <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/>

8 Ibid.

out by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).⁹ However, purchases of major conventional arms systems by African States have also been on the rise for at least a decade, with the volume and value of imports rising significantly in the last five years.¹⁰ All of these figures may well be a considerable underestimate due to poor reporting of data, especially by some countries known to be important exporters to Africa.¹¹

FIGURE 1:
IMPORTS OF SALW BY AFRICAN STATES

2005–2009	2010–2014
813 MILLION	911 MILLION ¹²

Mapping the extent of the authorized arms trade among African countries is difficult primarily due to very low levels of transparency and reporting on their part. Only South Africa produces an annual public report to its Parliament on its arms imports and exports. Across the rest of the continent reporting rates under the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) are low. Thirty per cent of African countries have never reported to the UNROCA in the 24 years since its inception while reporting rates have declined markedly in recent years: between 2010 and 2015 93 per cent of African states failed to submit any report to UNROCA.¹³ Several countries provide information covering categories of small-arms exports/imports to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)¹⁴ although this is not designed as a transparency tool per se.¹⁵

Some information on arms transfers to Africa is provided by exporting countries in their national reports and/or in their returns to the UNROCA. This is often only partial, however, and sometimes contradicts other public sources of information, such as media outlets or research institutions such as PRIO or SIPRI.



IMPORTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BY STATES IN AFRICA INCREASED BY 19 PER CENT BETWEEN 2006–2010 AND 2011–2015.

This increase in government expenditure on arms is the result of ongoing conflict and instability in many parts of Africa, and a rise in the threat presented by armed insurgent groups in some countries. Increasing imports of arms and ammunition risks further exacerbating existing cycles of violence and arms proliferation across Africa. As long as government-sourced information concerning the intra-African trade in conventional arms remains largely absent, there will be questions as to the conduct and legality of much of this trade.

A greater commitment to transparency and accountability will be required on the part of African governments as well as by those countries supplying arms to the continent if these cycles of violence and arms proliferation are to be changed. This necessitates regular public reporting of arms imports and exports by all countries to national parliaments and in line with international commitments, so as to enable proper scrutiny of government arms-transfer policies and practices.

Box 1 (overleaf) presents a case study based on work undertaken in the Central African Republic by Conflict Armament Research. It illustrates the types of systemic failures – in exporting and importing countries – that enable the flow of arms and ammunition into zones of conflict in Africa and elsewhere.

9 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Data obtained from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade), 2005–2014, Accessed 16 June 2016.

10 Poitevin, C. (2016). "Transferts d'armes en Afrique subsaharienne : Au-delà des idées reçues". Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP), 1 March 2016. <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1970>

11 The largest arms exporters to African countries between 2011 and 2015 were Russia, Ukraine and China. See Poitevin, C. (2016). Ibid.

12 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Data obtained from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade), 2005–14, Accessed 16 June 2016. Values are expressed as inflation adjusted 2009 USD.

13 Comoros and Mauritius reported in 2010, Mozambique in 2012, and Comoros and South Africa reported in 2013. South Africa also reported in 2014. All but South Africa submitted 'Nil Reports'. According to the UN Secretary-General's 'Report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development', 'Member States that do not have anything to report should file a "nil report" clearly stating that no exports or imports have taken place in any of the categories during the reporting period'. See: UN General Assembly (1997). "Report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development". <http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Register/a52316.html>

14 See Karim, A. and Marsh, N. (2015). "State positions and practices concerning reporting and the Arms Trade Treaty". ATT Monitor. <http://controlarms.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/02/States-Practices-PT1.pdf>

15 Some categories of weapons in the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) are highly aggregated and countries provide varying levels of detail in terms of quantities and values of arms exported. However, Comtrade can be a source of useful information on exports and imports of small arms.

BOX 2: ARMS AND CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Following nearly 10 years of internal turmoil in the Central African Republic, the overthrow in 2013 of President François Bozizé unleashed a spiral of violence between Muslim and Christian militias that left thousands dead. Under the opposing 'Séléka' and 'anti-Balaka' groupings these militia were able to access a diverse range of weaponry. Investigations and field documentation indicate that the sources of these weapons included:

- Poorly secured national stocks of the former regime
- Equipment ranging from small arms and light weapons to military vehicles from Chad and Sudan
- Hunting ammunition trafficked from neighbouring Cameroon.¹⁶

In all three cases, this included European-manufactured equipment exported to east and central Africa between 2010 and 2014. Much of this recent weaponry was eventually seized from state stocks by Séléka forces when they overthrew the Bozizé regime in 2013, and then found its way to Séléka splinter factions throughout the country as well as into the hands of armed civilians.¹⁷ After Séléka leader Michel Djotodia left power under international pressure in January 2014 and international forces installed a transitional government,

UN and non-governmental specialists faced the task of securing weaponry seized from these groups and communities. The first step was determining the scale of the problem, i.e. identifying what proportion of the Bozizé regime's stockpiles remained within state stocks and what proportion remained in the hands of rebels or armed civilians.

This basic accounting was made challenging by the near-total absence of stockpile registers and record-keeping by the previous regime. In addition, data made public by exporting-country governments also often proved insufficient to enable reconstruction of such records since this data very rarely includes details of the exact types and models of weaponry exported or their quantities. Some governments were subsequently able to provide such information on request. For example, Bulgaria and Slovakia provided details about ammunition and weaponry exports to the Central African Republic to the EU's iTrace arms-tracking project.¹⁸

In other cases, the record-keeping of exporting-country governments did not allow tracing of the source or possible quantities of weapons found in the hands of rebel forces. For example, among the large quantities of ammunition recovered from the Séléka by French peacekeeping forces with Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic during 2014 were approximately 100 rounds of 5,56x45mm military small-arms ammunition manufactured by a UK company in 2007.¹⁹ While UK export authorities were able to confirm definitively that no such ammunition had been licensed for export to the Central African Republic since 2007,²⁰ they hold only limited information about where such ammunition had been licensed for export and more data would need to be recorded to identify any possible point of diversion to the Central African Republic.²¹

In light of these concerns, it is particularly encouraging to note that the Central African Republic has recently acceded to the ATT, and is in the process of addressing some of these problems through its national control systems.²² The scale of challenges still facing the country will require considerable international assistance and cooperation efforts if it is to bring its system in line with their ATT obligations. See Chapter 1.3 for more information on available and ongoing activities.

16 Stocks of the former regime included Bulgarian and Slovakian materiel exported in 2010–11; transfers to Séléka from Chad and Sudan included ex-German army KAT-1 military trucks exported from the Netherlands to Sudan in October 2011; hunting ammunition used by anti-Balaka forces was exported from Spain and Italy as late as January 2014. For more information see Conflict Armament Research (2015). "Groupes Armés Non-Etatiques en République Centrafricaine". January 2015. http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/GROUPES_ARMEES_NONETATIQUES_REPUBLIQUE_CENTRAFRICAINE2.pdf

17 Ibid. See also iTrace database. Conflict Armament Research. www.conflictarm.com/itrace/

18 iTrace database. Conflict Armament Research. www.conflictarm.com/itrace/

19 Conflict Armament Research (2015). "Groupes Armés Non-Etatiques en République Centrafricaine". January 2015. http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/GROUPES_ARMEES_NONETATIQUES_REPUBLIQUE_CENTRAFRICAINE2.pdf

20 iTrace database. Conflict Armament Research. www.conflictarm.com/itrace/

21 The UK export authorities do not routinely record the date of manufacture of arms or ammunition licensed for export, nor in general their lot, serial or batch numbers. In addition, the UK records only limited information regarding actual exports (as opposed to export licences), so information about the actual quantities of particular weapons types exported from the UK is often not recorded.

22 Control Arms (2015). "Critics said arms control in this African state was impossible. Now, it's joined the ATT". 29 October 2015. <http://controlarms.org/en/news/critics-said-arms-control-in-this-african-state-was-impossible-now-its-joined-the-att/>

**EXPORT LICENCE AUTHORIZATIONS (VALUE, EUROS) TO THE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FROM EU MEMBER STATES, 2006–13:**

EXPORTING COUNTRY	ML CATEGORIES LICENCED ²³	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
SLOVAKIA	1, 2, 3, 4, 6	1,129,547	0	2,351,293	2,622,062	1,697,062	0	0	0
UNITED KINGDOM	6, 13	0	0	9,240 [^]	0	47,960	0	0	22,879 [^]
FRANCE	6, 10, 13, 20, 22	21,320 [*]	0	0	0	109,987	28,440	0	0
PORTUGAL	10	0	0	0	0	2,869,307	239,664	287,184	207,992 [*]
TOTAL		1,150,867	0	2,360,533	2,622,062	4,724,316	268,104	287,184	230,871

(Source: annual reports according to Article 8.2 of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP/Operative Provision 8 of the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 2006-15)

Note: * Value of actual exports in given year ^ End-user designated UN/international organization

²³ Relevant EU Military List Categories are as follows. ML1: Small arms < 12.7mm or components thereof. ML2: small arms/light weapons > 12.7 mm or components thereof. ML3: ammunition and fuses or components thereof. ML4: Bombs/torpedoes/rockets/missiles/other explosive devices or components thereof. ML6: ground vehicles or components thereof. ML10: aircraft or components thereof. ML13: armoured or protective equipment or components thereof. ML20: cryogenic and 'superconductive equipment'. ML22: technology for the development or use of export-controlled items.



**A BURUNDI SOLDIER
POSTS SECURITY AT THE
BANGUI AIRPORT, CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC.**

CREDIT: © U.S. AIR FORCE
PHOTO BY STAFF SGT.
ERIK CARDENAS

ARMS CIRCULATION WITHIN AFRICA

As noted above, few African countries manufacture arms or ammunition. There is, however, a continual process of arms circulation within Africa, linked to the emergence of new epicentres of armed violence in different parts of the continent and the resurgence of old ones.²⁴ Evidence suggests that some African countries contribute to this process through the (re-)transfer of government-owned weapons to non-state armed groups – as illustrated by the table at the end of this chapter. The failure to prevent diversion of arms from poorly managed government stockpiles is also a significant problem.

Illicit arms transfers are those that are a) not authorized by a competent government authority, b) are authorized in a way that is inconsistent with the country's national and international legal obligations, or c) are diverted during transfer or from government stockpiles. For African governments, international obligations may derive from being a Party to one or more binding agreements,²⁵ including the ATT and sub-regional ones.²⁶ See Chapter 1.2 for further details.

As such, illicit arms transfers can be those that are authorized by a country in violation of UN arms embargoes, or that include weapons that will be used in violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL).²⁷ In addition they can include arms transfers that take place:

- Between unauthorized non-state groups
- Between one state authority and a non-state group located in another jurisdiction where the host state has not approved the transfer
- Between a private individual or corporate entity and another end-user (state or non-state) where either the supplier and/or recipient has not been authorized by relevant state authorities to engage in the transfer.

In addition, 'grey-market' transfers are also significant in Africa. These straddle the line between legal and illicit transfers, and include ones that may have been officially and duly authorized up to a point, but which ultimately are diverted or otherwise find their way into the hands of unauthorized end-users, or are put to illegal use by authorized end-users. The diversion and unauthorized seizure of arms from government stockpiles is a huge issue in conflict zones across Africa and elsewhere. As highlighted in the case study on the Central African Republic, poor stockpile-management security and the failure of government forces to secure arsenals against looting and capture mean that in an unstable situation arms can easily fall into the hands of non-state groups.

The existence of conflict and insurgency within significant parts of Africa, and the ease with which non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations are able to procure weapons and ammunition points to a flourishing illicit and grey-market arms trade. This understanding is confirmed by Figure 2 and the accompanying information source table at the end of this chapter, which draw on open sources and field research, and provide details of 40 separate cases of illicit arms transfers in Africa over the past decade. Over one-third of the transfers identified implicate state authorities in their execution. The remainder involve a variety of non-state groups, arms traffickers and/or individuals. Figure 2 illustrates the flow of illicit and grey-market arms transfers within Africa and, in doing so, also sheds light on an issue of global concern.


24 See Kinsella, D. (2014). "Illicit arms transfers to Africa and the prominence of the former Soviet bloc: a social network analysis". *Crime, Law and Social Change*, Vol. 62, No 5, pp 523–47

25 For example, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. (adopted 31 May 2001, entered into force 3 July 2005). https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/18-12_c_E.pdf; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. (adopted 18 September 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999). <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/>; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (adopted 30 May 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010). <http://www.clusterconvention.org/>

26 For example, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. (adopted 14 June 2006, entered into force 29 September 2009). <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf>; the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. (adopted 21 April 2004, entered into force 5 May 2006). <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/research/disarmament/dualuse/pdf-archive-att/pdfs/recsa-nairobi-protocol-for-the-prevention-control-and-reduction-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-the-great-lakes-region-and-the-horn-of-africa.pdf>; the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development (SADC) Region. (adopted 14 August 2001, entered into force 3 July 2005). http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8361/Protocol_on_the_Control_of_Firearms_Ammunition2001.pdf

27 See Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI). "Arms Embargoes". <https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes>

FIGURE 2:
ILLUSTRATIVE MAP OF ILLICIT ARMS TRANSFERS IN AFRICA (BETWEEN 2006 AND 2016)



MAKING THE ATT WORK FOR AFRICA

African countries, particularly sub-Saharan ones, have long been a driving force behind the ATT. Leaders such as President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf were vocal proponents for a treaty,²⁸ and Kenya was one of the seven 'co-author' countries that lead the UN process from 2006. African countries played a crucial role in treaty negotiations, and their strong voice was instrumental in ensuring that small arms and light weapons and ammunition were included in its scope and are also reflected in its Object and Purpose.²⁹ If the ATT can fulfil its mission, Africa will be one of the primary beneficiaries.

However, significant supporters of the Treaty – most notably Kenya – so far remain outside the regime. It is vital that African countries maintain and strengthen their involvement in the ongoing life of the Treaty, which has seen one African (Ambassador Emmanuel Imohe of Nigeria) elected president of the Conference of States Parties (CSP) for 2016 and another (Dumisani Dladla of South Africa) appointed interim head of the ATT Secretariat. Ensuring that the Treaty has maximum impact on the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms is even more important, and this will require renewed commitment to greater transparency and accountability in the African arms trade by all countries.

In order to make the ATT work for the continent, African countries should:

- Work towards accession and/or full implementation of the Treaty at the earliest opportunity, while recognizing that for many States, its full implementation will take time and may require external assistance to build the requisite capacities
- Support efforts towards universalization of the ATT on the continent by engaging governments at bilateral and sub-regional levels in order to build support for ratification or accession, and provide targeted assistance based on a full analysis of need
- Establish arms-transfer transparency and accountability mechanisms in governments and parliaments; including, for example, the production of an annual public report to be debated in parliament, the establishment of a dedicated parliamentary committee to oversee the policy and practice of arms-transfer control, and the development of an interdepartmental structure to co-ordinate government policy and practice

- Submit full annual returns in a timely fashion to the ATT and the UNROCA detailing all imports, exports and other relevant information under each of the relevant categories listed
- Take all necessary steps to prevent illicit arms transfers taking place from or through their territories to non-state groups and embargoed entities by, for example, establishing clear governmental procedures for authorization of arms transfers, including a comprehensive risk assessment in line with ATT obligations, and strengthened provisions for stockpile management and security.

For its part, the wider international community, and in particular ATT States Parties and Signatories, should:

- Ensure that the Treaty is implemented in spirit and letter, has a measurable impact on arms transfers, and is not used as a cover for 'business as usual' in the continuation of arms transfers to regions of conflict and instability or human-rights crisis zones
- Establish arms-transfer transparency and accountability mechanisms within governments and national parliaments (as described above)
- Submit full annual returns in a timely fashion to the ATT and the UNROCA (as described above). Support efforts towards universalization of the ATT, including those undertaken by the ATT Secretariat and civil society, in Africa and elsewhere by engaging with and addressing the specific concerns of outlier countries
- Support African countries in their accession to, and implementation of, the ATT through bilateral initiatives as well as through establishment of and support for a substantial Voluntary Trust Fund under the auspices of the ATT Secretariat. Such efforts should be coordinated with existing initiatives, such as the EU ATT Outreach Project,³⁰ so as to ensure tailor-made comprehensive and integrated needs-assessment, outreach and capacity-building programmes.

28 See Oxfam (2012). "President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate calls for a robust Arms Trade Treaty". 16 July 2012. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2012-07-16/president-ellen-johnson-sirleaf-liberia-and-nobel-peace-prize>

29 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 1. <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>

30 Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control – Germany (2014). "The EU ATT Outreach Project". August 2014. http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/eu-outreach/publications/information_on_programmes/eu_att_op_programme_overview_eng.pdf

SOURCE EVIDENCE AND DATA FOR FIGURE 2

Flow Number	Country / conflict	Weapon user	Provenance of illicit weapons	Route	Transfer type	Date(s) of illicit transfer ³¹	Information source
1	SOUTH SUDAN	SPLA-IO	Sudan	By air, Khartoum – Jonglei	State to non-state	2014	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
2	SOUTH SUDAN	Armed civilians	Kenya	By land, northern Kenya Eastern and Central Equatoria	Ant trade	2006-09	James Bevan, Blowback: Kenya's illicit ammunition problem in Turkana North district (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, 2008), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP22-Kenya.pdf
3	SOUTH SUDAN	Aparanga Aguanza ('Arrow Boys')	Sudan	Likely by land from Darfur to Western Equatoria	Ant trade	2006-present	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
4	SOUTH SUDAN	Aparanga Aguanza ('Arrow Boys') Armed civilians Poachers	Democratic Republic of Congo	Likely by land from northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to Western Equatoria	Ant trade	2006-present	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
5	SOUTH SUDAN	Aparanga Aguanza ('Arrow Boys') Armed civilians Poachers	Central African Republic	Likely by land from western Central African Republic to Western Equatoria	Ant trade	2006-present	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
6	SUDAN (DARFUR)	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-MM faction)	Libya	By land from Kufra region to northern Darfur	State to non-state	2006-11	UN Panels of Experts on Sudan, various years.
7	SUDAN (DARFUR)	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-MM faction)	Libya	By land from Kufra region to northern Darfur via Sudan/Chad border area	Cross-border smuggling	2011-15	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
8	SUDAN (DARFUR)	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-MM faction)	Chad	By land from eastern Chad to western Darfur	State to non-state	2007, 2008, 2009, 2010	UN Panels of Experts on Sudan, various years.
9	SUDAN (DARFUR)	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	Eritrea	Unknown (possibly by air)	State to non-state	2006, 2007	UN Panels of Experts on Sudan, various years.

³¹ Where dates of transfers are known through documentation, they are given as single years. Where precise dates are not known, a date-range is given indicating the logical limits of the transfer dates.

Flow Number	Country / conflict	Weapon user	Provenance of illicit weapons	Route	Transfer type	Date(s) of illicit transfer ³¹	Information source
10	SOMALIA	Islamic Courts Union, Al-Shabaab, Hib'ul Islam, Ogaden National Liberation Front Arms dealers Armed civilians	Yemen	By sea to various seaports in northeastern Somalia (especially Bosasso), eastern Sanaag, and elsewhere.	Cross-border smuggling	2006-present	UN Panels of Experts on Somalia, various years.
11	DJIBOUTI	FRUD-Combattant (FRUD-C)	Eritrea	By road across Eritrea-Djibouti border	State to non-state	2008-11	UN Panel of Experts on Somalia (S/2011/433)
12	SOMALIA	Islamic Courts Union, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)	Eritrea	Eritrea	By air from Asmara to Mogadishu and other locations; by sea to various ports (2007-2009)	2006-09	UN Panels of Experts on Somalia, various years.
13	ETHIOPIA	Ogaden National Liberation Front Oromo Liberation Front Afar Liberation Front Afar Revolutionary People's Democratic Front (Ugugumo) Sidamo Liberation Front Tigrayan People's Democratic Movement	Eritrea	By land across Eritrea-Ethiopia border (also via Somalia)	State to non-state	2006-present	UN Panels of Experts on Somalia (S/2011/433)
14	EGYPT	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Libya	By land across the Libya-Egypt border	Cross-border smuggling	2011-present	UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.
15	LIBYA	General National Congress regime, Tripoli Arms traffickers around Misrata – end-user unknown.	Sudan	By air to Kufrah and Tripoli	State to semi-state (contrary to embargo)	2011-present	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research); UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.
16	CHAD	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Libya	By land across Libya-Chad border	Cross-border smuggling	2011-present	UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.

Flow Number	Country / conflict	Weapon user	Provenance of illicit weapons	Route	Transfer type	Date(s) of illicit transfer ³¹	Information source
17	MALI	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) Al Mourabitoune Other groups	Libya	By land via Agadez/ Tahoua/ Tillabéri axis (Niger)	Cross-border smuggling	2011-present	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
18	ALGERIA	Private arms traffickers	Libya	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2011-present	UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.
19	TUNISIA	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Libya	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2011-present	UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.
20	MALI	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Burkina Faso	By road (Gao-Gossi axis)	Cross-border smuggling	2015	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
21	MALI	Ancar Dine	Côte d'Ivoire	By land (northern Cdl to Sikasso region, Mali)	Cross-border smuggling	2015	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
22	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Armed civilians	Mali	By land (shot-gun ammunition)	Cross-border smuggling	2009	UN Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire (S/2009/521)
23	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Forces Nouvelles	Burkina Faso	By land	State to non-state	2007-14	UN Panels of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire, various years.
24	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Forces Nouvelles	Sudan	By air to Bouaké	State to non-state	2011	UN Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire (S/2015/252)
25	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Pro-Gbagbo forces	Sudan	Unknown, possibly by air	State to non-state	2010-11	UN Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire (S/2013/228)
26	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Séléka	Sudan	By land via Am Dafok (South Darfur)	State to non-state ; cross-border smuggling	2013	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
27	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Séléka	Chad	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2013	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
28	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Anti-Balaka Armed civilians	Cameroon	By land	Cross-border smuggling; ant trade	2014, 2015	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research); UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic (S/2014/762)
29	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	National Congress for the defence of the People (CNDP)	Rwanda	By land	State to non-state	2008	UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2008/773)
30	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) – a Burundian armed group present in DRC	Tanzania	By boat (through Lake Tanganyika)	Cross-border smuggling	2011	UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348)

Flow Number	Country / conflict	Weapon user	Provenance of illicit weapons	Route	Transfer type	Date(s) of illicit transfer ³¹	Information source
31	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	M-23	Rwanda	By land	State to non-state	2012	UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348, S/2012/843)
32	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	M-23	Uganda	By land	State to non-state	2012	UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348, S/2012/843)
33	GHANA	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Côte d'Ivoire	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2015	Information provided by Ghanaian security authorities to media, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35101131
34	GHANA	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Burkina Faso	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2015	Information provided by Ghanaian security authorities to media, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35101131
35	GHANA	Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown	Niger	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2015	Information provided by Ghanaian security authorities to media, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35101131
36	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Anti-Balaka Armed civilians	Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)	By land	Ant trade	2014	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)
37	LIBERIA	Armed civilians	Guinea	By land	Ant trade	2006-present	UN Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2008/785 et seq)
38	LIBERIA	Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia	Côte d'Ivoire	By land	Cross-border smuggling	2011	UN Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2011/757; S/2013/683)
39	LIBYA	Armed groups aligned with Fajr Libya	Sudan	By air to Kufrah and Tripoli	State to semi-state (contrary to embargo)	2011-present	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research); UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.
40	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Séléka	Sudan	By air to Bangui	State to non-state	2013	iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)

NOTES

- 1) This table contains only cross-border illicit transfers, rather than instances of intra-state diversion.
- 2) It reflects only transfers since 2006.
- 3) It is confined to weapons physically evidenced in a seizure or in the hands of an illicit user, rather than testimonies of smuggling routes and transfers alone.
- 4) It covers weapons trafficking between African countries or their neighbours, rather than illicit deliveries from countries not within or contiguous to the African continent.
- 5) In the context of this table and associated infographic, the term 'State' means the involvement of some government agency (whether sanctioned at the highest levels or not is sometimes difficult to verify in all cases).
- 6) In the context of this table and associated infographic, the term 'ant trade' refers to numerous shipments of small numbers of weapons that, over time, result in the accumulation of large numbers of illicit weapons by unauthorized end users.³²

32 Small Arms Survey, "Illicit Trafficking". <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html>