CHAPTER 1.1: ARMS TRANSFERS, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE ATT IN AFRICA

African countries have strongly supported the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), first by negotiating strongly for the inclusion of certain thematic issues during its negotiations, and then by voting overwhelmingly for its adoption in 2013. Their strong engagement has also been reflected in sub-regional initiatives, such as the agreement and establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention and the Nairobi Protocol. These efforts have become more necessary in order to address the increasingly heavy burden of armed violence in Africa, with more than one-third of the countries on the continent affected by conflict and/or armed insurgence. The ready availability of conventional arms, in particular small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, fuels this violence.

Unfortunately since the ATT was adopted in 2013 the level of African engagement has been relatively limited. As of 31 May 2016 there are 19 States Parties in Africa while a further 20 have signed it but are yet to ratify. Implementation progress has also been slow. Chapter 1.2 explores the implementation challenges faced by African States Parties. This chapter provides an overview of the international arms trade as it concerns Africa – in terms of imports, largely from suppliers outside the continent, and in terms of the trade and circulation of arms within the continent itself. This chapter then explores how a lack of transparency and accountability in the ‘legal’ or government-authorized trade in arms is contributing to the ‘grey’ and illicit markets that fuel conflict and instability across Africa. This analysis is illustrated by a case study on the Central African Republic. The chapter concludes by exploring ways in which ATT implementation by African governments could address several of the issues and problems highlighted, thereby helping to build peace and security in the continent.

AFRICA AND THE AUTHORIZED ARMS TRADE

Less than a dozen African countries manufacture conventional arms and/or ammunition. Of these, only South Africa could be described as a significant producer, having exported major conventional weapons to at least 30 other African countries over the past two decades. The vast bulk of arms on the continent as a whole were originally transferred from suppliers in other regions, notably from Russia, China, the US, European Union (EU) members and other Eastern European countries.

Arms imports by African governments are on the rise. Imports of major conventional weapons by States in Africa increased by 19 per cent between 2006–2010 and 2011–2015. Data produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that the continent’s share of the global arms trade rose in this period from 7.7 per cent to 8 per cent. Globally, the arms trade in 2014 was estimated by SIPRI to be worth at least USD $94.5 billion. If Africa’s share of the global arms trade in 2014 was approximately the same as its share in 2011-2015, then transfers of major conventional weapons to Africa in 2014 would have been worth at least USD $7.6 billion.

Historically, the majority of arms sales to African States have mostly been small arms and light weapons (SALW), their parts and ammunition. African imports of SALW in 2014 were worth at least USD $242 million, an increase of almost 50 per cent from the value of imports in 2005 according to analysis carried out by the University of Uppsala Conflict Data Program. As of 31 May 2016 there are 19 States Parties in Africa while a further 20 have signed it but are yet to ratify.
out by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).\(^9\) However, purchases of major conventional arms systems by African States have also been on the rise for at least a decade, with the volume and value of imports rising significantly in the last five years.\(^{10}\) All of these figures may well be a considerable underestimate due to poor reporting of data, especially by some countries known to be important exporters to Africa.\(^{11}\)

FIGURE 1: IMPORTS OF SALW BY AFRICAN STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>813 MILLION</td>
<td>911 MILLION(^{12})</td>
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</table>

Mapping the extent of the authorized arms trade among African countries is difficult primarily due to very low levels of transparency and reporting on their part. Only South Africa produces an annual public report to its Parliament on its arms imports and exports. Across the rest of the continent reporting rates under the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) are low. Thirty per cent of African countries have never reported to the UNROCA in the 24 years since its inception while reporting rates have declined markedly in recent years: between 2010 and 2015 93 per cent of African states failed to submit any report to UNROCA.\(^{13}\) Several countries provide information covering categories of small-arms exports/imports to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)\(^{14}\) although this is not designed as a transparency tool per se.\(^{15}\)

Some information on arms transfers to Africa is provided by exporting countries in their national reports and/or in their returns to the UNROCA. This is often only partial, however, and sometimes contradicts other public sources of information, such as media outlets or research institutions such as PRIO or SIPRI.

This increase in government expenditure on arms is the result of ongoing conflict and instability in many parts of Africa, and a rise in the threat presented by armed insurgent groups in some countries. Increasing imports of arms and ammunition risks further exacerbating existing cycles of violence and arms proliferation across Africa. As long as government-sourced information concerning the intra-African trade in conventional arms remains largely absent, there will be questions as to the conduct and legality of much of this trade.

A greater commitment to transparency and accountability will be required on the part of African governments as well as by those countries supplying arms to the continent if these cycles of violence and arms proliferation are to be changed. This necessitates regular public reporting of arms imports and exports by all countries to national parliaments and in line with international commitments, so as to enable proper scrutiny of government arms-transfer policies and practices.

Box 1 (overleaf) presents a case study based on work undertaken in the Central African Republic by Conflict Armament Research. It illustrates the types of systemic failures – in exporting and importing countries – that enable the flow of arms and ammunition into zones of conflict in Africa and elsewhere.

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11 The largest arms exporters to African countries between 2011 and 2015 were Russia, Ukraine and China. See Poitevin, C. (2016). Ibid.
12 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Data obtained from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade), 2005-14, Accessed 16 June 2016. Values are expressed as inflation adjusted 2009 USD.
15 Some categories of weapons in the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) are highly aggregated and countries provide varying levels of detail in terms of quantities and values of arms exported. However, Comtrade can be a source of useful information on exports and imports of small arms.
BOX 2: ARMS AND CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Following nearly 10 years of internal turmoil in the Central African Republic, the overthrow in 2013 of President François Bozizé unleashed a spiral of violence between Muslim and Christian militias that left thousands dead. Under the opposing ‘Séléka’ and ‘anti-Balaka’ groupings these militia were able to access a diverse range of weaponry. Investigations and field documentation indicate that the sources of these weapons included:

- Poorly secured national stocks of the former regime
- Equipment ranging from small arms and light weapons to military vehicles from Chad and Sudan
- Hunting ammunition trafficked from neighbouring Cameroon.

In all three cases, this included European-manufactured equipment exported to east and central Africa between 2010 and 2014. Much of this recent weaponry was eventually seized from state stocks by Séléka forces when they overthrew the Bozizé regime in 2013, and then found its way to Séléka splinter factions throughout the country as well as into the hands of armed civilians.17 After Séléka leader Michel Djotodia left power under international pressure in January 2014 and international forces installed a transitional government, UN and non-governmental specialists faced the task of securing weaponry seized from these groups and communities. The first step was determining the scale of the problem, i.e. identifying what proportion of the Bozizé regime’s stockpiles remained within state stocks and what proportion remained in the hands of rebels or armed civilians.

This basic accounting was made challenging by the near-total absence of stockpile registers and record-keeping by the previous regime. In addition, data made public by exporting-country governments also often proved insufficient to enable reconstruction of such records since this data very rarely includes details of the exact types and models of weaponry exported or their quantities. Some governments were subsequently able to provide such information on request. For example, Bulgaria and Slovakia provided details about ammunition and weaponry exports to the Central African Republic to the EU’s iTrace arms-tracking project.18

In other cases, the record-keeping of exporting-country governments did not allow tracing of the source or possible quantities of weapons found in the hands of rebel forces. For example, among the large quantities of ammunition recovered from the Séléka by French peacekeeping forces with Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic during 2014 were approximately 100 rounds of 5.56x45mm military small-arms ammunition manufactured by a UK company in 2007.19 While UK export authorities were able to confirm definitively that no such ammunition had been licensed for export to the Central African Republic since 2007,20 they held only limited information about where such ammunition had been licensed for export and more data would need to be recorded to identify any possible point of diversion to the Central African Republic.21

In light of these concerns, it is particularly encouraging to note that the Central African Republic has recently acceded to the ATT, and is in the process of addressing some of these problems through its national control systems.22 The scale of challenges still facing the country will require considerable international assistance and cooperation efforts if it is to bring its system in line with their ATT obligations. See Chapter 1.3 for more information on available and ongoing activities.

16 Stocks of the former regime included Bulgarian and Slovakian materiel exported in 2010–11; transfers to Séléka from Chad and Sudan included ex-German army KAT-1 military trucks exported from the Netherlands to Sudan in October 2011; hunting ammunition used by anti-Balaka forces was exported from Spain and Italy as late as January 2014. For more information see Conflict Armament Research (2015). “Groupes Armés Non-Étatiques en République Centrafricaine”. January 2015. http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/GROUPES_ARMEES_NONETATIQUES_REPUBLIQUECENTRAFRICAINEz.pdf
17 Ibid. See also iTrace database. Conflict Armament Research. www.conflictarm.com/itrace/
21 The UK export authorities do not routinely record the date of manufacture of arms or ammunition licensed for export, nor in general their lot, serial or batch numbers. In addition, the UK records only limited information regarding actual exports (as opposed to export licences), so information about the actual quantities of particular weapons types exported from the UK is often not recorded.
### EXPORT LICENCE AUTHORIZATIONS (VALUE, EUROS) TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FROM EU MEMBER STATES, 2006–13:

- **SLOVAKIA**: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
  - **2006**: 1,129,547
  - **2007**: 2,351,293
  - **2008**: 2,622,062
  - **2009**: 1,697,062
  - **2010**: 0
  - **2011**: 0
  - **2012**: 0
  - **2013**: 0
- **UNITED KINGDOM**: 6, 13
  - **2006**: 0
  - **2007**: 9,240
  - **2008**: 0
  - **2009**: 47,960
  - **2010**: 0
  - **2011**: 0
  - **2012**: 22,879
  - **2013**: 0
- **FRANCE**: 6, 10, 13, 20, 22
  - **2006**: 21,320
  - **2007**: 0
  - **2008**: 0
  - **2009**: 109,987
  - **2010**: 28,440
  - **2011**: 0
  - **2012**: 0
  - **2013**: 0
- **PORTUGAL**: 10
  - **2006**: 0
  - **2007**: 0
  - **2008**: 0
  - **2009**: 0
  - **2010**: 2,869,307
  - **2011**: 239,664
  - **2012**: 287,184
  - **2013**: 207,992
- **TOTAL**: 1,150,867
  - **2006**: 0
  - **2007**: 2,360,533
  - **2008**: 2,622,062
  - **2009**: 4,724,316
  - **2010**: 268,104
  - **2011**: 287,184
  - **2012**: 230,871

(Source: annual reports according to Article 8.2 of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP/Operative Provision 8 of the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 2006-15)

Note: * Value of actual exports in given year   ^ End-user designated UN/international organization

23 Relevant EU Military List Categories are as follows. ML1: Small arms < 12.7mm or components therefor. ML2: small arms/light weapons > 12.7 mm or components therefor. ML3: ammunition and fuses or components therefor. ML4: Bombs/torpedoes/rockets/missiles/other explosive devices or components therefor. ML5: ground vehicles or components therefor. ML10: aircraft or components therefor. ML13: armoured or protective equipment or components therefor. ML22: cryogenic and 'superconductive equipment'. ML22: technology for the development or use of export-controlled items.
ARMS CIRCULATION WITHIN AFRICA

As noted above, few African countries manufacture arms or ammunition. There is, however, a continual process of arms circulation within Africa, linked to the emergence of new epicentres of armed violence in different parts of the continent and the resurgence of old ones. Evidence suggests that some African countries contribute to this process through the (re-)transfer of government-owned weapons to non-state armed groups – as illustrated by the table at the end of this chapter. The failure to prevent diversion of arms from poorly managed government stockpiles is also a significant problem.

Illicit arms transfers are those that are a) not authorized by a competent government authority, b) are authorized in a way that is inconsistent with the country’s national and international legal obligations, or c) are diverted during transfer or from government stockpiles. For African governments, international obligations may derive from being a Party to one or more binding agreements, including the ATT and sub-regional agreements.

As such, illicit arms transfers can be those that are authorized by a country in violation of UN arms embargoes, or that include weapons that will be used in violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL).

In addition they can include arms transfers that take place:

- Between unauthorized non-state groups
- Between one state authority and a non-state group located in another jurisdiction where the host state has not approved the transfer
- Between a private individual or corporate entity and another end-user (state or non-state) where either the supplier and/or recipient has not been authorized by relevant state authorities to engage in the transfer.

In addition, ‘grey-market’ transfers are also significant in Africa. These straddle the line between legal and illicit transfers, and include ones that may have been officially and duly authorized up to a point, but which ultimately are diverted or otherwise find their way into the hands of unauthorized end-users, or are put to illegal use by authorized end-users. The diversion and unauthorized seizure of arms from government stockpiles is a huge issue in conflict zones across Africa and elsewhere. As highlighted in the case study on the Central African Republic, poor stockpile-management security and the failure of government forces to secure arsenals against looting and capture mean that in an unstable situation arms can easily fall into the hands of non-state groups.

The existence of conflict and insurgency within significant parts of Africa, and the ease with which non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations are able to procure weapons and ammunition points to a flourishing illicit and grey-market arms trade. This understanding is confirmed by Figure 2 and the accompanying information source table at the end of this chapter, which draw on open sources and field research, and provide details of 40 separate cases of illicit arms transfers in Africa over the past decade. Over one-third of the transfers identified implicate state authorities in their execution. The remainder involve a variety of non-state groups, arms traffickers and/or individuals. Figure 2 illustrates the flow of illicit and grey-market arms transfers within Africa and, in doing so, also sheds light on an issue of global concern.

FIGURE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE MAP OF ILLICIT ARMS TRANSFERS IN AFRICA (BETWEEN 2006 AND 2016)

MAP ELEMENTS
- State-non-state transfer
- State-non-state transfer (air)
- Cross-border smuggling
- Ant trade*

*See Source Table for specifics of transfers (at the end of this chapter)
MAKING THE ATT WORK FOR AFRICA

African countries, particularly sub-Saharan ones, have long been a driving force behind the ATT. Leaders such as President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf were vocal proponents for a treaty, and Kenya was one of the seven “co-author” countries that lead the UN process from 2006. African countries played a crucial role in treaty negotiations, and their strong voice was instrumental in ensuring that small arms and light weapons and ammunition were included in its scope and are also reflected in its Object and Purpose. If the ATT can fulfill its mission, Africa will be one of the primary beneficiaries.

However, significant supporters of the Treaty – most notably Kenya – so far remain outside the regime. It is vital that African countries maintain and strengthen their involvement in the ongoing life of the Treaty, which has seen one African (Ambassador Emmanuel Imohe of Nigeria) elected president of the Conference of States Parties (CSP) for 2016 and another (Dumisani Dladla of South Africa) appointed interim head of the ATT Secretariat. Ensuring that the Treaty has maximum impact on the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms is even more important, and this will require renewed commitment to greater transparency and accountability in the African arms trade by all countries.

In order to make the ATT work for the continent, African countries should:

• Work towards accession and/or full implementation of the Treaty at the earliest opportunity, while recognizing that for many States, its full implementation will take time and may require external assistance to build the requisite capacities

• Support efforts towards universalization of the ATT on the continent by engaging governments at bilateral and sub-regional levels in order to build support for ratification or accession, and provide targeted assistance based on a full analysis of need

• Establish arms-transfer transparency and accountability mechanisms in governments and parliaments; including, for example, the production of an annual public report to be debated in parliament, the establishment of a dedicated parliamentary committee to oversee the policy and practice of arms-transfer control, and the development of an interdepartmental structure to co-ordinate government policy and practice

• Submit full annual returns in a timely fashion to the ATT and the UNROCA detailing all imports, exports and other relevant information under each of the relevant categories listed

• Take all necessary steps to prevent illicit arms transfers taking place from or through their territories to non-state groups and embargoed entities by, for example, establishing clear governmental procedures for authorization of arms transfers, including a comprehensive risk assessment in line with ATT obligations, and strengthened provisions for stockpile management and security.

For its part, the wider international community, and in particular ATT States Parties and Signatories, should:

• Ensure that the Treaty is implemented in spirit and letter, has a measurable impact on arms transfers, and is not used as a cover for ‘business as usual’ in the continuation of arms transfers to regions of conflict and instability or human-rights crisis zones

• Establish arms-transfer transparency and accountability mechanisms within governments and national parliaments (as described above)

• Submit full annual returns in a timely fashion to the ATT and the UNROCA (as described above). Support efforts towards universalization of the ATT, including those undertaken by the ATT Secretariat and civil society, in Africa and elsewhere by engaging with and addressing the specific concerns of outlier countries

• Support African countries in their accession to, and implementation of, the ATT through bilateral initiatives as well as through establishment of and support for a substantial Voluntary Trust Fund under the auspices of the ATT Secretariat. Such efforts should be coordinated with existing initiatives, such as the EU ATT Outreach Project, so as to ensure tailor-made comprehensive and integrated needs-assessment, outreach and capacity-building programmes.

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### SOURCE EVIDENCE AND DATA FOR FIGURE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow Number</th>
<th>Country / conflict</th>
<th>Weapon user</th>
<th>Provenance of illicit weapons</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Transfer type</th>
<th>Date(s) of illicit transfer</th>
<th>Information source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>SPLA-IO</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>By air, Khartoum – Jonglei</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>Aparanga Aguanza ('Arrow Boys')</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Likely by land from Darfur to Western Equatoria</td>
<td>Ant trade</td>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>Aparanga Aguanza ('Arrow Boys')</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Likely by land from northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to Western Equatoria</td>
<td>Ant trade</td>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>Aparanga Aguanza ('Arrow Boys')</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Likely by land from western Central African Republic to Western Equatoria</td>
<td>Ant trade</td>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SUDAN (DARFUR)</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (UEM)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land from Kufra region to northern Darfur</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2006-11</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Sudan, various years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SUDAN (DARFUR)</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (UEM)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land from Kufra region to northern Darfur via Sudan/Chad border area</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011-15</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SUDAN (DARFUR)</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (UEM)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>By land from eastern Chad to western Darfur</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2007, 2008, 2009, 2010</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Sudan, various years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SUDAN (DARFUR)</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (UEM)</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Unknown (possibly by air)</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2006, 2007</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Sudan, various years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Where dates of transfers are known through documentation, they are given as single years. Where precise dates are not known, a date-range is given indicating the logical limits of the transfer dates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow Number</th>
<th>Country / conflict</th>
<th>Weapon user</th>
<th>Provenance of illicit weapons</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Transfer type</th>
<th>Date(s) of illicit transfer</th>
<th>Information source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 DJIBOUTI</td>
<td>FRUD-Combatant (FRUD-C)</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>By road across Eritrea-Djibouti border</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2008-11</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on Somalia (S/2011/433)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front Oromo Liberation Front Afar Liberation Front Afar Revolutionary People’s Democratic Front (Ugugumo) Sidamo Liberation Front Tigrayan People’s Democratic Movement</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>By land across Eritrea-Ethiopia border (also via Somalia)</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Somalia (S/2011/433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 EGYPT</td>
<td>Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land across the Libya-Egypt border</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 LIBYA</td>
<td>General National Congress regime, Tripoli Arms traffickers around Misrata – end-user unknown</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>By air to Kufrah and Tripoli</td>
<td>State to semi-state (contrary to embargo)</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research); UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16 CHAD</td>
<td>Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land across Libya-Chad border</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flow Number</td>
<td>Country / conflict</td>
<td>Weapon user</td>
<td>Provenance of illicit weapons</td>
<td>Route</td>
<td>Transfer type</td>
<td>Date(s) of illicit transfer</td>
<td>Information source</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land via Agadez/ Tahoua/ Tillaberi axis (Niger)</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>Private arms traffickers</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>Private arms traffickers – ultimate end-user unknown</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>By road (Gao-Gossi axis)</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>Ancar Dine</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>By land (northern Cdl to Sikasso region, Mali)</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2007-14</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, various years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>By air to Bouakè</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (S/2015/252)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</td>
<td>Pro-Gbagbo forces</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Unknown, possibly by air</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (S/2013/228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Séléka</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>By land via Ami Dafok (South Darfur)</td>
<td>State to non-state; cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Séléka</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Anti-Balaka</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling; ant trade</td>
<td>2014, 2015</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research); UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic (S/2014/762)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>National Congress for the defence of the People (CNDP)</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2008/773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) – a Burundian armed group present in DRC</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>By boat (through Lake Tanganyika)</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow Number</td>
<td>Country / conflict</td>
<td>Weapon user</td>
<td>Provenance of illicit weapons</td>
<td>Route</td>
<td>Transfer type</td>
<td>Date(s) of illicit transfer</td>
<td>Information source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>M-23</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348, S/2012/843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>M-23</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348, S/2012/843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Anti-Balaka Armed civilians</td>
<td>Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Ant trade</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td>Armed civilians</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Ant trade</td>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2008/785 et seq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td>Libyan mercenaries and Ivorian militia</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>By land</td>
<td>Cross-border smuggling</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2011/757; S/2013/683)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>LIBYA</td>
<td>Armed groups aligned with Fajr Libya</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>By air to Kufrah and Tripoli</td>
<td>State to semi-state (contrary to embargo)</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research); UN Panels of Experts on Libya, various years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Séléka</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>By air to Bangui</td>
<td>State to non-state</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>iTrace field documentation (Conflict Armament Research)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES

1) This table contains only cross-border illicit transfers, rather than instances of intra-state diversion.
2) It reflects only transfers since 2006.
3) It is confined to weapons physically evidenced in a seizure or in the hands of an illicit user, rather than testimonies of smuggling routes and transfers alone.
4) It covers weapons trafficking between African countries or their neighbours, rather than illicit deliveries from countries not within or contiguous to the African continent.
5) In the context of this table and associated infographic, the term ‘State’ means the involvement of some government agency (whether sanctioned at the highest levels or not is sometimes difficult to verify in all cases).
6) In the context of this table and associated infographic, the term ‘ant trade’ refers to numerous shipments of small numbers of weapons that, over time, result in the accumulation of large numbers of illicit weapons by unauthorized end users.32