

**ATT
MONITOR
REPORT
2026**

SUMMARY

COVER PHOTO:

AN ITALIAN ARMY 120MM MORTAR FIRES DURING A LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE NEAR VESZPRÉM, HUNGARY, WHERE NATO'S FORWARD LAND FORCES ARE BASED, ON 30 JUNE 2025.

CREDIT: © NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SOURCE: [HTTPS://WWW.FLICKR.COM/PHOTOS/NATO/54658134191/IN/ALBUM-72177720327572572](https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/54658134191/in/album-72177720327572572)

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THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor, an independent project of Control Arms, was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago.

The project is now the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve transparency in the conventional arms trade.

The ATT Monitor produces research for key audiences, including government policymakers and export officials, civil society and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

THE ATT MONITOR REPORT

The ATT Monitor Report seeks to take stock of existing state practice, promote greater transparency in how the ATT is implemented, inform the work of the Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) and intersessional meetings and foster accountability with regards to Treaty commitments.

This summary presents synthesized information from the ATT Monitor 2026 Report and provides key insights on ATT implementation efforts.

**HMAS STALWART CONDUCTS
A REPLENISHMENT AT SEA
WITH HMAS CANBERRA OFF
THE COAST OF AUSTRALIA,
ON 29 SEPTEMBER 2025.**

CREDIT: © LSIS SUSAN MOSSOP,
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE



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
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AN AS532 COUGAR HELICOPTER
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KURTARAN 2021.

CREDIT: © NATO




**STATE OF THE ARMS
TRADE TREATY:
A YEAR IN REVIEW,
JUNE 2025 –
MAY 2026**

This review covers the period between 1 June 2025 and 31 May 2026, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some key events and milestones over the past year and assesses their impacts on Treaty universalization and compliance.

UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2026, the ATT Secretariat listed 118 countries as States Parties, accounting for 60 per cent of all United Nations (UN) Member States. It listed a further 25 countries as Signatories. Two States, Vanuatu and Ecuador, became ATT States Parties between 2025 and 2026.

**MAP OF STATUS OF ATT PARTICIPATION
(AS OF 31 MAY 2026)**





AS OF 31 MAY 2026, THE ATT SECRETARIAT LISTED 118 COUNTRIES AS STATES PARTIES, ACCOUNTING FOR 60 PER CENT OF ALL UNITED NATIONS (UN) MEMBER STATES. IT LISTED A FURTHER 25 COUNTRIES AS SIGNATORIES. TWO STATES, VANUATU AND ECUADOR, BECAME ATT STATES PARTIES BETWEEN 2025 AND 2026.



THE WORKING GROUP ON EFFECTIVE TREATY IMPLEMENTATION (WGETI) SUB-WORKING GROUP ON EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON TWO TOPICS IN THE MULTI-YEAR WORKPLAN: 'NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM RELATING TO BROKERING' AND 'RISK ASSESSMENT (COVERING ARTICLES 6 & 7)'.

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

As of 7 June 2026, 115 of the 118 States Parties were required to submit their 2025 annual reports. Of these, 46 submitted an annual report by the deadline—a compliance rate of 40 per cent. This rate is lower compared to last year's on-time reporting rate of 44 per cent.

In total, 94 States Parties have submitted an initial report, which represents a share of 81 per cent. Colombia, whose report was due by January 2026, submitted an initial report since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report. The Gambia and Malawi had to submit their initial report by September 2025 and October 2025, respectively, but had not done so as of 7 June 2026. The two newest States Parties—Vanuatu and Ecuador—are required to submit their initial reports by December 2026 and May 2027, respectively.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

Preparations for CSP12 included meetings of the Working Groups from 16 to 19 March 2026 and an Informal Preparatory Meeting on 27 and 28 May 2026.

The Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices focused primarily on two topics in the multi-year workplan: 'National control system relating to brokering' and 'Risk assessment (covering Articles 6 & 7)'.

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues addressed four topics, in accordance with decisions taken at CSP11: challenges related to the scope of the Treaty and the establishment and maintenance of a national control list; the role of industry in responsible international arms transfers; the risk of conventional arms being used for gender-based violence and violence against women and children; and developing or strengthening inter-agency cooperation. Three ad hoc discussions also took place: on maritime security and the ATT; on risk assessment of arms exports to Sudan; and implementation of Article 7 (7) on the reassessment of granted authorizations.

The Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU) welcomed Ecuador as the most recent State Party to the ATT and saw co-chairs, delegations and stakeholders providing updates on their universalisation efforts. Speakers also shared regional perspectives on the status of the Treaty and elaborated on national experiences with ratification/ accession and domestication.

The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) addressed compliance with reporting obligations. It assessed the use of the online reporting tool for submitting initial and annual reports, as well as the information exchange platform; the ATT Secretariat provided some preliminary findings from a survey on the use of the two tools. Delegations and other stakeholders also discussed national experiences with data collection and substantive reporting issues, the utility of information exchange on diversion, and national practices regarding reporting arms transfers to parliaments.

At the CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting held in May 2026, the chairs and co-chairs of ATT subsidiary bodies—WGETI, WGTR and WGTU—provided updates on the discussions held during the Working Group meetings and proposed next steps. The WGETI proposed the endorsement and integration of the additional guidance on the implementation of Article 7 (4) of the Treaty into relevant sections of the Voluntary Guide on Implementing Articles 6 & 7 of the ATT. The Working Group requested that logistical actors be included in future discussions on enforcement and on the regulation of agents involved in arms transfers. It also considered the potential utility of an informal group to advance discussions on scope and national control lists. The WGTU discussed its way forward, and the WGTR considered, among other topics, the possible creation of an informal 'sounding-board' group of interested stakeholders to support the Secretariat's efforts in facilitating reporting compliance. The ATT Secretariat provided an update on the development of a five-year strategy for the ATT, based on consultations held with ATT States Parties and different stakeholders in the preceding months. A report with draft elements of the strategy will be submitted for consideration at CSP12; further consultations will continue until CSP13, when the strategy will be considered by States Parties. Lastly, the Gender Focal Points briefed ATT stakeholders on the survey conducted on their preliminary workplan.



THE ATT SECRETARIAT PROVIDED AN UPDATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIVE-YEAR STRATEGY FOR THE ATT, BASED ON CONSULTATIONS HELD WITH ATT STATES PARTIES AND DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS IN THE PRECEDING MONTHS. A REPORT WITH DRAFT ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION AT CSP12; FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL CSP13, WHEN THE STRATEGY WILL BE CONSIDERED BY STATES PARTIES.



WHILE EVENTS UNTIL MAY 2025 'TESTED THE TREATY, IN A WAY THAT HAS RARELY HAPPENED IN PREVIOUS YEARS', DEVELOPMENTS FROM JUNE 2025 TO MAY 2026 WERE EQUALLY TURBULENT AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE CHALLENGING FOR THE ATT.



AS STATES PARTIES DEVELOP A FIVE-YEAR STRATEGY FOR THE ATT, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY CONTINUE TO DEBATE ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS AND CASES OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 7 UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ATT. THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD HELP DEMONSTRATE HOW THE TREATY SHAPES ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS IN PRACTICAL TERMS.

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

While events until May 2025 'tested the Treaty, in a way that has rarely happened in previous years', developments from June 2025 to May 2026 were equally turbulent and perhaps even more challenging for the ATT. Regional peace, security and stability were at their lowest levels, human suffering remained high, and the threat to international humanitarian law was at 'a critical breaking point'. Transparency and confidence among States did not improve either: the general distrust in and decreased engagement in multilateralism continued, although it has, so far, had a limited impact on the ATT.

Conflicts continued or started in many regions and countries throughout the world. A border dispute erupted between Cambodia and Thailand in 2025. At the same time, tensions and conflict continued in Myanmar and Ukraine, intensified in Sudan, and escalated into a regional war in the Middle East.

Facing an extremely volatile and challenging global situation characterised by an increasing number of global conflicts, several States, including ATT States Parties, have taken measures and policy decisions to stop or limit transfers of military materiel to belligerent parties.

The decisions of some States to ban or suspend arms transfers are in line with the object and purpose of the Treaty and with States Parties' Treaty obligations, although they were not all primarily and explicitly motivated by the ATT. As States Parties develop a five-year strategy for the ATT, it is important that they continue to debate arms transfer decisions and cases of practical application of Articles 6 and 7 under the framework of the ATT. These discussions could help demonstrate how the Treaty shapes arms transfer decisions in practical terms. Such discussions would also give States Parties an opportunity to prove their compliance with obligations under the ATT to uphold 'the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms'.



THE 112TH ARMoured INFANTRY BATTALION CONDUCTS A TACTICAL, TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL EXERCISE WITH THE PUMA ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER, IN ITS UPGRADED S1 CONFIGURATION, AT THE REGEN TRAINING AREA, GERMANY, ON 12 JUNE 2024.

CREDIT: © MARCO DOROW,
GERMAN BUNDESWEHR

CHAPTER 1 – THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT

At the international level, the regulation of conventional arms transfers and efforts to address the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas have largely developed through separate legal and political processes. Arms transfers, export risk assessments and export controls are governed principally through the 2013 ATT, while efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians arising from the use and humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas are pursued through the 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA).

This chapter examines how coherent implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration can strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It first identifies the shared humanitarian objectives and complementary nature of the two instruments before examining the documented patterns of civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. It then considers how these patterns, alongside commitments and evidence emerging from implementation of the EWIPA Political Declaration, can inform the prospective risk assessments required under article 7 of the ATT. Finally, it identifies practical opportunities for States to strengthen implementation of both instruments in a mutually reinforcing manner, supporting more responsible transfer decisions and reducing civilian harm.

SETTING THE STAGE – EXAMINING THE SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ATT AND THE EWIPA DECLARATION

Although the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration are distinct—one a legally-binding treaty and the other a politically-binding declaration—both are preventative in orientation, seeking to assess risks of, and prevent harm to civilians from the use of weapons before it occurs. Overlap in these shared goals—as well as purpose and principles, membership, and scope—presents an opportunity for States to adopt policy approaches that strengthen civilian protection and better support implementation of both instruments.



**THERE IS CONSIDERABLE
OVERLAP BETWEEN
STATES PARTIES TO
THE ATT AND STATES
THAT HAVE ENDORSED
THE EWIPA POLITICAL
DECLARATION.**

The ATT regulates the international transfer of conventional arms by requiring States Parties to assess the risk that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL) (Article 7). The EWIPA Political Declaration addresses the use of explosive weapons in populated areas by committing endorsing states to 'restrict or refrain' as appropriate, from such use where it may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects. Other obligations and commitments of both instruments reflect additional shared principles.

There is considerable overlap between States Parties to the ATT and States that have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration: as of 31 May 2026, seventy-four States are both Parties to the ATT and have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration, and seven Signatories of the ATT have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration.

The range of conventional arms in the scope of the ATT includes many explosive weapons. Those that are prone to wide area effects can be found in the ATT's major conventional arms categories (a)–(g). Other explosive weapons can be found in the sub-categories of light weapons, including smaller munitions and hand-held or portable delivery systems.

Though not explicitly mentioned in the scope of the ATT, Article 3 makes clear that States Parties must maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition and munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms in Article 2(1) and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 ('Prohibitions') and Article 7 ('Export and Export Assessment') prior to authorizing their export. Article 4 establishes similar obligations in relation to parts and components.



THE SHARED UNDERSTANDING REFLECTED IN THE EWIPA POLITICAL DECLARATION, TOGETHER WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE FORESEEABLE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS, IS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE EVIDENCE BASE UPON WHICH SUCH PROSPECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

EWIPA CONSIDERATIONS AND ATT RISK ASSESSMENT

Under Article 7 of the ATT, States Parties must assess the potential that exported conventional arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL or IHRL and must not authorize an export where, after considering available mitigation measures, there remains an overriding risk of such consequences. As such it is designed as a forward-looking instrument intended to prevent foreseeable harm by requiring prospective assessments of foreseeable risk before an export is authorized. The shared understanding reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, together with the substantial body of evidence concerning the foreseeable humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, is directly relevant to the evidence base upon which such prospective risk assessments should be conducted.

For more than a decade, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and civil society have collected and analyzed evidence on the civilian impact of explosive weapons in conflict. As a result, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been identified as a leading cause of civilian harm in contemporary armed conflicts, and the resulting patterns of harm to civilians are well-documented and recognized in the EWIPA Political Declaration.

The frequency and consistency of these outcomes across different contexts indicate they should not be treated as incidental or context-specific, but as evidence of inherent and foreseeable risk in a number of active armed conflicts throughout the world. Whether through aerial bombardment in Gaza and Ukraine, shelling in Sudan and Myanmar, or the use of rockets and missiles in densely populated areas across the Middle East, the use of explosive weapons has humanitarian consequences and continues to disproportionately impact civilians.



INCORPORATING ANALYSIS ON AN END USER'S PAST AND CURRENT PRACTICES OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPON USE INTO ATT RISK ASSESSMENTS CAN HELP IDENTIFY FORESEEABLE RISKS OF CIVILIAN HARM. PAST PRACTICE IS RELEVANT NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE IT DEMONSTRATES PREVIOUS HARMFUL INCIDENTS, BUT BECAUSE REPEATED PATTERNS OF USE PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF FORESEEABLE FUTURE RISK.

Incorporating analysis on an end user's past and current practices of explosive weapon use into ATT risk assessments can help identify foreseeable risks of civilian harm. Past practice is relevant not simply because it demonstrates previous harmful incidents, but because repeated patterns of use provide evidence of foreseeable future risk. The commitments reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, together with the documentation of the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, provide an important body of evidence that can inform the prospective assessments required under Article 7 of the ATT. This, in turn, assists exporting States in determining whether there is an overriding risk that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL.

Incorporating these EWIPA-related considerations into ATT risk assessments offers a number of practical benefits. First, such analysis enhances the quality of risk analysis by grounding them in empirical evidence of humanitarian consequences concerning how particular weapons are used in populated areas, while ensuring that export decisions reflect up-to-date information about patterns of harm, operational practice and documented incidents. Second, identifying these considerations as specific indicators within article 7 risk assessment can promote greater consistency in the application of the ATT by supporting more structured assessments of whether there is an 'overriding risk' that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL. Third, it encourages greater coherence between implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration, enabling States that are Parties to the ATT and have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration to give practical effect to their shared humanitarian objectives through existing export control processes.



SEVERAL STATES HAVE EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO IHL COMPLIANCE AND ONGOING ARMED CONFLICT AS RISK INDICATORS IN THEIR EXPORT CONTROL FRAMEWORKS. THESE FRAMEWORKS PROVIDE A LOGICAL ENTRY POINT FOR DEVELOPING MORE EXPLICIT POLICIES.

LINKING EWIPA CONSIDERATIONS WITH ATT RISK ASSESSMENT: CURRENT PRACTICES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

AREAS OF CURRENT STATE POLICY AND PRACTICE

Several States have explicit references to IHL compliance and ongoing armed conflict as risk indicators in their export control frameworks. These frameworks provide a logical entry point for developing more explicit policies. Specifically, they allow States to examine an end-user's past and present conduct, assess patterns of civilian harm, and incorporate EWIPA Political Declaration considerations, such as the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, strengthening export assessment criteria ensuring they reflect patterns of harm in current armed conflicts.

In a number of contexts, States have suspended, denied or revoked exports to parties in armed conflict, including Saudi Arabia in relation to the conflict in Yemen and Israel in relation to the conflict in Gaza. In several instances, governments have referred to concerns regarding international humanitarian law, the humanitarian situation, or the potential use of transferred weapons in military operations in populated areas. However, States rarely explain in detail how evidence of civilian harm, legal and political obligations are weighed in individual export decisions. Greater transparency about the reasoning behind a denial would allow States to demonstrate compliance with their ATT obligations and commitment to the EWIPA Political Declaration.



IN A NUMBER OF CONTEXTS, STATES HAVE SUSPENDED, DENIED OR REVOKED EXPORTS TO PARTIES IN ARMED CONFLICT.

Parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review and litigation have become increasingly important mechanisms through which States' arms export decisions are examined. These processes have highlighted the importance of the humanitarian and civilian harm evidence underpinning export risk assessments, including documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. However, this trend is not uniform: in some jurisdictions, oversight of these processes has narrowed rather than expanded.



**INTEGRATING SPECIFIC
EWIPA-RELATED
CONSIDERATIONS
INTO ATT DECISION-
MAKING SUPPORTS
THE TREATY'S
PURPOSE OF REDUCING
HUMAN SUFFERING,
IMPROVES LEGAL
RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND REINFORCES
THE EWIPA POLITICAL
DECLARATION'S
OBJECTIVE OF
PROTECTING CIVILIANS
FROM THE HARMFUL
EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVE
WEAPONS IN
POPULATED AREAS.**

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Building on current practice, several practical opportunities exist for States to strengthen coherence between implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration. None of these measures would create new legal obligations or additional export criteria. Rather, they would strengthen the evidence base upon which existing Article 7 risk assessments are conducted by drawing more systematically on documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

Eighty-one States that have joined or signed the ATT have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration. This overlap creates an opportunity for more coherent implementation. Exporting states could strengthen prospective risk assessments by drawing more systematically on a recipient's past and current use of explosive weapons in populated areas, patterns of damage to civilian infrastructure, foreseeable reverberating effects, military doctrine and operational practice including those reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration. Such information provides a stronger evidential basis for assessing foreseeable risk under Article 7.

Strengthening the evidence available to support these assessments is equally important. Integrating specific EWIPA-related considerations into ATT decision-making supports the Treaty's purpose of reducing human suffering, improves legal risk management, and reinforces the EWIPA Political Declaration's objective of protecting civilians from the harmful effects of explosive weapons in populated areas.

Additional opportunities exist to strengthen coherence in implementation at both the national and multilateral levels. At the national level, States that are Parties to the ATT and have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration could review export control policies, military doctrine and civilian protection policies together, ensuring that implementation of one instrument informs implementation of the other.



BY SYSTEMATICALLY INCORPORATING EVIDENCE AND COMMITMENTS REFLECTED IN THE EWIPA POLITICAL DECLARATION INTO EXPORT RISK ASSESSMENTS, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY SURROUNDING EXPORT DECISIONS AND CONTINUING TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN HARM TRACKING AND ANALYSIS, STATES CAN REINFORCE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH INSTRUMENTS IN A MUTUALLY REINFORCING MANNER AND STRENGTHEN THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT.

At the multilateral level, States could draw more explicitly on the relationship between these instruments during Conferences of States Parties and Working Group meetings under the ATT, as well as during international conferences and intersessional meetings held under the EWIPA Political Declaration. ATT discussions could examine how documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas are incorporated into Article 7 risk assessments. Conversely, discussions under the EWIPA Political Declaration could consider responsible arms transfer policy as one practical means through which endorsing States may seek adherence to the Declaration's commitments by all parties to armed conflict.

CONCLUSION

The ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration have largely developed through separate legal and political processes. Yet they are complementary instruments that seek, through different means, to reduce human suffering and strengthen the protection of civilians. Read together, they provide mutually reinforcing frameworks through which States can strengthen the protection of civilians before harm occurs. By systematically incorporating evidence and commitments reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration into export risk assessments, strengthening transparency surrounding export decisions and continuing to improve civilian harm tracking and analysis, States can reinforce implementation of both instruments in a mutually reinforcing manner and strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict.



DETAILED SHOT OF A US MILITARY
AMMO BELT DRAPED OVER A
MACHINE GUN, SHOWCASING
BULLETS AND MILITARY GEAR.

CREDIT: © MICHAEL VILLANUEVA

CHAPTER 2 – ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 2024 ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS

The analysis of 2024 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and lists States Parties that have met meaningful and higher standards of transparency in their reports. Analysis of 2024 annual reports reveals persistent challenges in achieving accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. In particular, both the overall submission rate and the proportion of annual reports considered meaningfully transparent for 2024 were the lowest recorded since the Treaty entered into force.

COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Article 13.3 of the Treaty requires States Parties to submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports during the previous calendar year by 31 May of each year. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if:

1. It is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
2. It is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).
3. Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or relevant 'nil' reports indicating that no arms were transferred.




**IN TOTAL, 113 STATES
PARTIES WERE
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT
AN ANNUAL REPORT
ON EXPORTS AND
IMPORTS FOR 2024 BY
31 MAY 2025. ONLY 77
(68 PER CENT) DID SO
BY THE ATT MONITOR'S
1 FEBRUARY 2026 CUT-
OFF DATE FOR ANALYSIS.**

In total, 113 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on exports and imports for 2024 by 31 May 2025. Only 77 (68 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2026 cut-off date for analysis.

Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2024. These States Parties submitted public annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline, which included data on arms exports and imports or 'nil' reports.

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent and to contribute to the object and purpose of the ATT, an annual report should, at a minimum:

1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.
2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.
4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).
5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

Only 26 annual reports for 2024 (23 per cent of all reports due) met the above criteria and were therefore considered to be meaningfully transparent. This is the lowest percentage of meaningfully transparent annual reports recorded since the Treaty's entry into force.




ONLY 26 ANNUAL REPORTS FOR 2024 (23 PER CENT OF ALL REPORTS DUE) WERE CONSIDERED TO BE MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT. THIS IS THE LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS RECORDED SINCE THE TREATY'S ENTRY INTO FORCE.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

Twenty-four States Parties (31 per cent of the submitted reports) submitted a confidential report for 2024. While this is higher than the 21 (27 per cent) confidential reports submitted last year, it remains lower than the three preceding years.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE ATT MONITOR MEANINGFUL TRANSPARENCY CRITERIA

Twenty States Parties (18 per cent of all reports due) required to submit an annual report for 2024 submitted a meaningfully transparent report on time. This rate is slightly lower than in the previous year, when 19 per cent of States Parties required to submit a report met these criteria.



**CAPTAIN STEVEN MORRIS
STANDS AT THE DOOR
OF A CH-148 CYCLONE
HELICOPTER FLYING OVER
JUNO BEACH IN FRANCE
DURING A TRAINING FLIGHT
AS PART OF OPERATION
REASSURANCE.**

CREDIT: © CPL LAURA LANDRY,
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

The ATT encourages States Parties to provide additional information in their annual reports, thereby contributing to a higher standard of transparency. For example, Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including those on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if, for example, States Parties include descriptions and/or comments on their reported transfers, indicate when no transfers were made in relevant weapon categories or sub-categories, or include any other kind of additional information (see report for full methodology).

Thirty-eight States Parties provided descriptions of some or all transfers and 30 of the reports contained comments covering some or all transfers, compared to 39 and 28 that did so in their 2023 annual report.


MOST TRANSPARENT REPORTS

Like previous years, no State Party submitting a 2024 annual report used all transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Sixteen States Parties complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency. Of these, one State Party, Peru, provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency.



**ONE STATE PARTY,
PERU, PROVIDED THE
MOST INFORMATION
IN SUPPORT OF A
HIGHER STANDARD
OF TRANSPARENCY.**

GOOD TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES IN STATES PARTIES' 2024 ANNUAL
REPORT SUBMISSIONS



EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TRENDS

The following key findings summarize major trends in arms exports and imports reported by ATT States Parties that submitted a public annual report containing exports and/or imports in 2024.

Exports of major conventional arms: 476,825 major conventional arms exports were reported in 2024.

Exports of small arms and light weapons (SALW): 1,809,668 SALW exports were reported in 2024.

Imports of major conventional arms: 27,103 major conventional arms imports were reported in 2024.

Imports of SALW: 629,991 SALW imports were reported in 2024.

More information in the report and in its Annex: Country Profiles.

Since 2024, the ATT Monitor is providing a graphical and interactive representation of the reported arms trade via its ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard.

Please consult the Dashboard at: attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard. Data on transfers reported in 2024 annual reports will be included in the Dashboard by 31 December 2026.

COUNTRY PROFILES (ANNEX)

The annex includes country profiles for each State Party obligated to submit a 2024 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, timely reporting, withholding security information etc.), as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number of transfers and status of export/import partners.

CHAPTER 3 – PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2025 ATT ANNUAL REPORTS AND NEW INITIAL REPORTS

This chapter assesses the current state of initial and annual reporting, general reporting trends and States Parties' compliance with reporting obligations. It provides a preliminary analysis of the annual reports for the 2025 calendar year, as well as any overdue annual reports submitted since last year's reporting deadline. It also evaluates submissions of new initial reports.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2025 ANNUAL REPORTS

One hundred and fifteen of the 118 States Parties (all except Colombia, Vanuatu and Ecuador) to the ATT were required to report to the ATT Secretariat on their 2025 arms exports and imports by 31 May 2026. Forty-six States Parties submitted their 2025 annual reports on-time, an on-time reporting rate of 40 per cent—a decrease from the 44 per cent on-time reporting rate for both the 2023 and 2024 reports. The Central African Republic submitted an on-time 2025 report, marking its first-ever annual report submission.

Of the 46 States Parties that submitted on-time annual reports for 2025, 13 (28 per cent) reported privately, making the reports available only to the ATT Secretariat and other States Parties. The percentage is in line with recent years; on-time private annual reporting has hovered in the high 20 to low 30 per cent range since 2021.

In the time since the submission deadline for the 2024 reporting period, a total of 30 States Parties have submitted overdue annual reports. Twenty-eight States Parties submitted overdue annual reports covering 2024 transfers and nine States Parties submitted a total of 19 annual reports covering transfers authorized or delivered in previous years. Guyana submitted its first-ever annual report for 2024.

As of 7 June 2026, 42 of the 115 ATT States Parties obligated to submit at least one report (37 per cent) have submitted each of their required reports. This marks a decline from last year, when the overall compliance rate was 48 out of 113 (42 per cent). Twenty-four States Parties (21 per cent) have never submitted an annual report; this marks a slight decrease compared to the past two years.



**FORTY-SIX STATES
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2024 REPORTS.**



**INITIAL REPORTING
COMPLIANCE
CONTINUES TO
REMAIN LOW FOR
THE TREATY'S
NEWEST MEMBERS.**

UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS

Three States Parties were required to submit initial reports since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Report: The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia. Of the three, only Colombia has submitted its initial report as of 7 June 2026. Initial reporting compliance continues to remain low for the Treaty's newest members. Furthermore, no States Parties submitted overdue initial reports in the year since publication of the 2025 ATT Monitor Report.


One-hundred and sixteen of the current 118 States Parties to the ATT were required to submit initial reports as of 31 May 2026. According to the ATT Secretariat's website, 94 States Parties have done so, reflecting a compliance rate of 81 per cent. This year represents a plateau in initial reporting rates following an eight-year period of small but steady gains. Twenty-two States Parties have yet to fulfil their initial reporting obligation, with most several years past their due dates. The two newest States Parties, Vanuatu and Ecuador, are required to submit their initial reports by 3 December 2026 and 25 May 2027, respectively.



**TO DATE, ONLY SEVEN
STATES PARTIES
(HUNGARY, JAPAN, NEW
ZEALAND, ROMANIA,
SLOVENIA, SWEDEN
AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM) HAVE
SUBMITTED UPDATED
REPORTS, WITH THE
UNITED KINGDOM
UPDATING ITS REPORT
IN AUGUST 2025.**

Although many States Parties have indicated at formal and informal ATT meetings that they have made changes to their national control systems since submitting their initial reports, to date, only seven States Parties (Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have submitted updated reports, with the United Kingdom updating its report in August 2025. The lack of updated initial reports raises practical concerns that go beyond compliance with States Parties' international legal obligations. Because many of the older initial reports likely contain outdated information, the Treaty's repository of annual reports is less reliable as a tool for identifying implementation challenges, highlighting good practices, assessing the ATT's long-term impact on strengthening national control systems, or evaluating progress made.

As of 7 June 2026, 24 of the 94 initial reports (26 per cent) available on the ATT Secretariat's website are private. All three initial reports submitted in the past two years (by Colombia, Bahamas and Andorra) were submitted privately. With private reporting rates accounting for a quarter of all initial reports, many stakeholders face significant limitations in their ability to evaluate national control systems, tailor support and assistance initiatives and assess the status and impact of Treaty implementation.



**CLOSE-UP OF INDIAN
SOLDIERS IN UNIFORM
HOLDING RIFLES,
STANDING IN FORMATION.**

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