




POLICY BRIEF

ATT MONITOR REPORT 2026

The turbulent state of affairs over the past year has put the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) under strain. Regional peace, security and stability are arguably at their lowest levels since the Treaty's entry into force in 2014 and the threat to international humanitarian law is at a critical breaking point. Transparency and confidence among States did not improve either: the general distrust and decreased engagement in multilateralism continued.

Against this backdrop, the forthcoming policy brief provides an overview of current state practice as it relates to transparency in the international arms trade and summarizes the key takeaways from the 2026 ATT Monitor Report.

STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW, JUNE 2025 – MAY 2026

- As of 31 May 2026, 118 countries are States Parties to the ATT, accounting for 60 per cent of all United Nations (UN) Member States. A further 25 countries are Signatories. Two States, Vanuatu and Ecuador, became ATT States Parties between 2025 and 2026.
- Transparency remains one of the core principles of the Treaty. Each year, States Parties are obligated to submit a national report on their arms transfers during the preceding calendar year to the ATT Secretariat. This year, 115 of the 118 States Parties were required to submit annual reports for 2025. Of these, 46 submitted an annual report by the deadline—a compliance rate of 40 per cent. This rate is lower compared to last year's on-time reporting rate of 44 per cent.
- In line with Article 13.1 of the Treaty, States Parties are obligated to submit an initial report detailing measures taken to implement the ATT. Three States Parties were required to submit initial reports since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Report: The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia. Only Colombia has submitted its initial report as of 7 June 2026. Of the 116 States Parties required to submit initial reports as of 31 May 2026, only 94 States Parties have done so, reflecting a compliance rate of 81 per cent.
- The eleventh Conference of State Parties (CSP) in August 2025 endorsed a proposal by the United Kingdom to elaborate elements of a five-year strategy for Treaty implementation. During the preparatory process for CSP12, the ATT Secretariat provided an update on the development of the strategy, based on consultations held with ATT States Parties and different stakeholders. A report with draft elements of the strategy has been submitted for consideration at CSP12; further consultations will continue until CSP13, when the strategy will be considered by States Parties.

ANALYSIS OF 2024 NATIONAL ANNUAL REPORTS

- Analysis of 2024 annual reports reveals persistent challenges in achieving accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. Despite an increase in the submission of overdue reports, both the overall reporting rate and the proportion of annual reports considered meaningfully transparent for 2024 were the lowest recorded since the Treaty entered into force.
- In total, 113 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on exports and imports for 2024 by 31 May 2025. Of these, 77 (68 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2026 cut-off date for analysis.
- Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2024. These States Parties submitted public annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline and included data on arms exports and imports or 'nil' reports.
- Only 26 annual reports for 2024 (23 per cent of all reports due) met the criteria to be meaningfully transparent. This is the lowest percentage of meaningfully transparent annual reports recorded since the Treaty's entry into force. The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent and to contribute to the objective and purpose of the ATT, an annual report should, at a minimum:
 1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.
 2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
 3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.
 4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).
 5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.
- Twenty-four States Parties (31 per cent of the submitted reports) provided a confidential report for 2024. While this is higher than the 21 (27 per cent) confidential reports submitted last year, it remains lower than the three preceding years.
- No State Party used every transparency tool available. Sixteen States Parties did more than the minimum required and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.
- One State Party, Peru, provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency.


SPOTLIGHT: THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been identified as a leading cause of civilian harm in contemporary armed conflicts. In light of this, in 2022, 83 States endorsed the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) to help better protect civilians from the effects of urban warfare.

Although the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration are distinct—one a legally-binding treaty and the other a politically-binding declaration—both are preventative in orientation, seeking to assess risks of, and prevent harm to civilians from the use of weapons before it occurs. Overlap in these shared goals—as well as purpose and principles, membership, and scope—presents an opportunity for States to adopt policy approaches that strengthen implementation of both instruments.

There is considerable overlap between States Parties to the ATT and States that have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration: as of 31 May 2026, seventy-four States are both Parties to the ATT and have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration.

GOOD TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES IN STATES PARTIES' 2024 ANNUAL
REPORT SUBMISSIONS



Seven Signatories of the ATT have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration.

Under Article 7 of the ATT, States Parties must assess the potential that exported conventional arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law and must not authorize an export where, after considering available mitigation measures, there remains an overriding risk of such consequences. As such, it is designed as a forward-looking instrument intended to prevent foreseeable harm by requiring prospective assessments of foreseeable risk before an export is authorized. The EWIPA Political Declaration is therefore directly relevant to the evidence base upon which such prospective risk assessments should be conducted.

Incorporating analysis of an end user's past and current practices of explosive weapon use into ATT risk assessments can help identify foreseeable risks of civilian harm. Past practice is relevant not simply because it demonstrates previous harmful incidents, but because repeated patterns of use provide evidence of foreseeable future risk. The commitments reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, together with the documentation of the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, provide an important body of evidence that can inform the prospective assessments required under Article 7 of the ATT. This, in turn, assists exporting States in determining whether there is an overriding risk that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL.

Incorporating these EWIPA-related considerations into ATT risk assessments offers a number of practical benefits. First, such analysis enhances the quality of risk analysis by grounding them in empirical evidence of humanitarian consequences concerning how particular weapons are used in populated areas, while ensuring that export decisions reflect up-to-date information about patterns of harm, operational practice and documented incidents. Second, identifying these considerations as specific indicators within article 7 risk assessment can promote greater consistency in the application of the ATT by supporting more structured assessments of whether there is an 'overriding risk' that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL. Third, it encourages greater coherence between implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration, enabling States that are party to the ATT and have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration to give practical effect to their shared humanitarian objectives through existing export control processes.

Several States have explicit references to IHL compliance and ongoing armed conflict as risk indicators in their export control frameworks. Moreover, some governments have referred to concerns regarding international humanitarian law, the humanitarian situation, or the potential use of transferred weapons in military operations in populated areas. However, States rarely explain in detail how evidence of civilian harm, legal and political obligations are weighed in individual export decisions. Greater transparency about the reasoning behind a denial would allow States to demonstrate compliance with their ATT obligations and commitment to the EWIPA Political Declaration.

Additional opportunities exist to strengthen coherence in implementation at both the national and multilateral levels. At the national level, States that are Parties to the ATT and have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration could jointly review export control policies, military doctrine and civilian protection policies, ensuring that implementation of one instrument informs implementation of the other.

At the multilateral level, States could draw more explicitly on the relationship between these instruments during Conferences of States Parties and Working Group meetings under the ATT, as well as during international conferences and intersessional meetings held under the EWIPA Political Declaration. ATT discussions could examine how documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas are incorporated into Article 7 risk assessments. Conversely, discussions under the EWIPA Political Declaration could consider responsible arms transfer policy as one practical means through which endorsing States may seek adherence to the Declaration's commitments by all parties to armed conflict.

Access the full 2026 ATT Monitor Report on our website (attmonitor.org) or by scanning this QR code.

