



**ATT
MONITOR
REPORT
2025**

SUMMARY

COVER PHOTO:

**A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
UKRAINE WATCHES HIS ARCS OF FIRE
DURING THE FINAL TRAINING EXERCISE
AT OPERATION UNIFIER'S ENGINEER
TRAINING ELEMENT, IN POLAND,
ON 20 DECEMBER 2024.**

CREDIT: © CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

(ID: 20241220AKAQ0077D006 - SOURCE:
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THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor, an independent project of Control Arms, was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago.

The project is now the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

THE ATT MONITOR REPORT

The ATT Monitor Report seeks to take stock of existing state practice, create greater transparency in how the ATT is implemented, inform the work of the Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) and intersessional meetings, and support accountability of Treaty commitments.

This summary presents synthesized information from the ATT Monitor 2025 Report and provides examples of analysis and research undertaken in support of strengthening Treaty implementation efforts.



BALTICS, SEPTEMBER 27, 2024. NEW
AUSTRIAN GLOCK 45 AND
17 PISTOLS.

CREDIT: © STOCK.ADOBE.COM / DMITRI

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
**STATE OF THE ARMS
TRADE TREATY:
A YEAR IN REVIEW,
JUNE 2024 –
MAY 2025**

This review covers the period between 1 June 2024 and 31 May 2025, up to and including the one-week grace period for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some key events and milestones over the past year and assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2025, the ATT Secretariat listed 116 countries as States Parties, accounting for 59 per cent of all United Nations (UN) Member States. It listed a further 26 countries as Signatories. Three States, Gambia, Malawi and Colombia, became ATT States Parties between 2024 and 2025. This is the highest number of new States Parties after three years when membership of the ATT stagnated.

**FIGURE 1 - MAP OF STATUS OF ATT PARTICIPATION
(AS OF 31 MAY 2025)**



REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

As of 7 June 2025, 113 of the 116 States Parties were required to submit their 2024 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 50 submitted an annual report by the deadline – a compliance rate of 44 per cent. This rate is equal to last year's on-time reporting rate.

Two States Parties have submitted overdue initial reports since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report: the Bahamas and Andorra, which were due to report in December 2015 and March 2024, respectively. No new ATT State Party had to submit its initial report between 7 June 2024 and 7 June 2025.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

Preparations for CSP11 included meetings of the Working Groups on 25 to 28 February 2025 and an Informal Preparatory Meeting on 20 to 21 May 2025.

The Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices primarily focused on the Treaty's implementation by addressing the first two topics in the multi-year workplan: 'National control system relating to import', and 'Scope / national control list'.

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues addressed the role of industry in responsible international arms trade; the risk of conventional arms being used in violations of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT, including in cases of gender-based violence and violence against women and children; and considered the introduction of gender focal points. Despite some opposition, an ad hoc discussion took place on how rulings of the International Court of Justice and findings of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council are taken into account in the application Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, along with discussions on arms transfers to Myanmar and Sudan.



**THE ATT SECRETARIAT
PRESENTED MEASURES
TO IMPROVE
COMPLIANCE WITH
ATT REPORTING
OBLIGATIONS.**

The Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU) focused on the implementation of the universalization workplan adopted at CSP10, with updates on efforts to expand ATT membership, particularly among Asia-Pacific and Signatory States, and national experiences with ratification, accession and domestication practices.

The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) addressed the current state of compliance with reporting, strategies to support States Parties facing reporting challenges and national practices related to arms transfer reporting. The ATT Secretariat presented measures to improve compliance with ATT reporting obligations, highlighting initiatives such as peer-to-peer support and the role of regional reporting champions in assisting States facing reporting challenges, and the 'Voluntary Guidance on the Practice of Annual Reporting.'

At the CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting held in May 2025, the chairs and co-chairs of ATT subsidiary bodies—WGETI, WGTR and WGTU—provided updates on the discussions held during the February sessions and proposed next steps. Following the ad hoc discussion in the Working Group WGETI meeting in February, States Parties discussed the possibility not to allow anymore Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to propose and raise topics for the ad hoc discussions. States Parties will likely take a decision on the matter at CSP11. The ATT Secretariat presented updates on the operations of the Voluntary Trust Fund. In addition, the Management Committee and delegations discussed the assessment of the revised ATT programme of work. The second day included discussions on the Working Paper on the priority theme of the Argentinian Presidency on 'Universalization as a Priority', followed by an overview of the implementation of the CSP10 decisions, a presentation on the status of gender participation in ATT meetings and an overview on the status of ATT finances.



**THE EVENTS FROM
JUNE 2024 TO MAY 2025
TESTED THE TREATY,
IN A WAY THAT HAS
RARELY HAPPENED IN
PREVIOUS YEARS.**

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

The events from June 2024 to May 2025 tested the Treaty, in a way that has rarely happened in previous years. Conflicts in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine continued unabated and new conflicts and tensions started or intensified during the year in several areas of the world. Growing geopolitical tensions meant that world military expenditure rose to US\$2.718tn (US\$2,718bn) in 2024, the highest level ever recorded, with increases in all geographical regions of the world. In parallel, the world experienced a progressive erosion of global norms. This resulted in general distrust in and decreased engagement (including financial) from multilateral instruments that brought some States, including States Parties to the ATT, to withdraw or express the intention to withdraw selectively from some international instruments such as the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Israel's response to the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 resulted in a conflict in Palestine and several Israeli strikes in other countries in the region, including Lebanon, the other ATT State Party of the region. Israeli conduct during the conflict is estimated to have caused over 54,000 deaths among Palestinians in Gaza, the destruction of essential civilian infrastructure and included the limitation or blockade of humanitarian aid. In Sudan the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that the belligerent parties, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, 'and/or their allied militias', were 'responsible for large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law'. According to the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2024 was 'the deadliest year for civilians' in Myanmar.



**IN TODAY'S
INCREASINGLY VOLATILE
AND INSECURE
GLOBAL LANDSCAPE,
THE ATT REMAINS A
VITAL INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT.**

In today's increasingly volatile and insecure global landscape, the ATT remains a vital international instrument. Some ATT States Parties have reconsidered some export authorizations to and imports from some belligerent States, also based on the prohibitions and export assessment criteria of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT. The ATT, however, does not have a mechanism to assess compliance of States Parties with their Treaty obligations, particularly in relation to the application of Articles 6 and 7 in export licensing decisions. Civil Society Organizations have often filled this void.



**A MEMBER OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
FORCE INTERACTS WITH OLD EXPLOSIVES
DISCOVERED IN THE JUNGLE IN MUNDA,
NEW GEORGIA, SOLOMON ISLANDS
DURING OPERATION RENDER SAFE ON
10 SEPTEMBER 2024.**

CREDIT: © MCPL GENEVIEVE LAPOINTE/
CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA,
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

(ID: 20240910ISA0030D061 - SOURCE:
[HTTPS://COMBATCAMERA.FORCES.GC.CA](https://COMBATCAMERA.FORCES.GC.CA))

**CHAPTER 1 – PARTS
AND COMPONENTS
UNDER THE
ATT: TREATY
REQUIREMENTS,
NATIONAL
PRACTICES AND
IMPLEMENTATION
CHALLENGES**

The chapter provides an overview of the requirements that States Parties have under Article 4 of the ATT and how they have reported applying this provision. It then discusses two case studies exemplifying challenges related to the implementation of export controls on parts and components. The first case examines the regulation of transfers of parts and components that take place during the joint development, production and procurement of military systems. The second case focuses on how parts and components that fall beyond the scope of arms and dual-use export controls have been integrated into weapon systems used in ongoing armed conflicts and how States have responded. The chapter concludes with recommendations on how ATT States Parties could carry forward exchanges on how they have interpreted and implemented Article 4 and address some of the challenges created by the global trade in parts and components.

**THE CONTENT AND APPLICATION OF CONTROLS
ON PARTS AND COMPONENTS UNDER THE ATT**

Under Article 4 of the ATT States Parties are required to:

Establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered in Article 2(1).

Article 4 adds that prohibitions (Article 6) and export and export assessment obligations (Article 7) also apply to exports of parts and components. Article 6 obliges ATT States Parties to prohibit certain transfers (defined by the ATT in Article 2(2) as including export, import, transit, transshipment and brokering) of parts and components, and Article 7 requires States Parties to assess the risk posed by, and in some circumstances deny authorization for, non-prohibited exports.



AVAILABLE INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT MOST STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE ADOPTED A NATIONAL CONTROL LIST HAVE INCLUDED PARTS AND COMPONENTS IN ITS COVERAGE.

HOW DO ATT STATES PARTIES IMPLEMENT CONTROLS ON TRANSFERS AND EXPORTS OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS?

States Parties' initial reports provide useful information on how they have implemented Article 4. Available initial reports indicate that most States Parties that have adopted a national control list have included parts and components in its coverage. Some States Parties that have not reported adopting a national control list have regulated the transfer of certain parts and components covered by the ATT using other instruments.



STATES THAT HAVE REPORTED HAVING A NATIONAL CONTROL LIST AND THAT THEIR NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM COVERS PARTS AND COMPONENTS HAVE USED MULTIPLE INITIAL REPORTING TEMPLATES.

HOW DO STATES PARTIES APPLY ARTICLES 6 AND 7 ON TRANSFERS AND EXPORTS OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS?

The question of whether States Parties apply Articles 6 and 7 to transfers of parts and components is more difficult to assess. States that have reported having a national control list and that their national control system covers parts and components have used multiple initial reporting templates (different versions of the ATT endorsed reporting template, their own templates or the ATT Baseline Assessment Project template), thus limiting comparability.



**PEACEKEEPERS ASSISTING
WITH DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION, AND
REINTEGRATION (DDR) IN
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO IN 2006.**

CREDIT: © UN PHOTO /
MARTIN PERRET



**THE JOINT
DEVELOPMENT,
PRODUCTION AND
PROCUREMENT OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS
EMPHASIZED IN MANY
STATES' NATIONAL
DEFENCE STRATEGIES AS
A MEANS OF ACHIEVING
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
AND ENABLING JOINT
OPERATIONS WITH
ALLIED STATES.**

Case Study 1: Integration and re-export of parts and components

The joint development, production and procurement of military equipment is emphasized in many States' national defence strategies as a means of achieving economies of scale and enabling joint operations with allied States. To support these efforts, NATO and European Union (EU) Member States and other States have either created new measures, or utilized existing ones, to enable simplified export licensing procedures for transfers of parts and components associated with collaborative defence production efforts. At the national level, many States issue 'open' or 'general' licences that facilitate multiple shipments over an extended period. These licences can be used for a range of conventional arms transfers but are often employed to facilitate transfers of parts and components.

EU Member States have also outlined policies to inform situations where decisions about exports of any complete military system are taken by the State where the final integration takes place. These policies emphasize the need to apply export licensing risk assessment criteria to all transfers. However, they also indicate that in certain cases EU Member States may hand over responsibility for deciding on exports of complete systems to the State where the final integration takes place and that this might lead to different policy outcomes than would occur if they retained control.

States that are participating in large scale collaborative defence production projects have also created procedures that combine elements of both the approaches outlined above. The Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program was established in 2001, and involves the production of parts and components by eight partner nations (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States). Transfers of parts and components associated with the programme are managed through general licences and final decisions concerning the approval of any exports of complete F-35 combat aircrafts are taken by the United States, where the final assembly of most of the aircraft takes place. States have also established agreements that are designed to apply across multiple collaborative projects.



**THESE PROCEDURES
AND AGREEMENTS
HAVE GENERATED
QUESTIONS ABOUT IF
AND HOW STATES ARE
APPLYING ARTICLES 6
AND 7 OF THE ATT ON
TRANSFERS OF PARTS
AND COMPONENTS.**

These procedures and agreements have generated questions about if and how States are applying Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT on transfers of parts and components. In its January 2025 report on the 'Impact of arms transfers on human rights' the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that the use of open licences that remain valid for several years 'could result in a situation in which the licence remains valid even when a change of circumstances would mean that exports under the licence would be unlawful under international law'. It also noted that arrangements in which decisions about exports of any complete system are handed over to the State where the final integration is taking place can create 'a principle of least restrictive export standards, limiting the ability of States contributing to the production of the weapon from challenging the export of the final product'. The specific case of the joint production of F-35 combat aircraft is currently or has been the focus of legal proceedings in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

**US AIR FORCE PILOTS IN FIFTH-
GENERATION F-35A FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT HAVE PRACTISED LANDING
ON A HIGHWAY IN EUROPE FOR THE
VERY FIRST TIME.**

CREDIT: © NATO





**A KEY CHALLENGE
THAT MANY STATES
ARE CONFRONTING IS
THE USE OF PARTS AND
COMPONENTS THAT
HAVE BEEN PRODUCED
BY COMPANIES IN THE
CIVILIAN SECTOR FOR
COMMERCIAL USE IN
THE PRODUCTION OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT.**

Case Study 2: Civilian parts and components in military equipment

A key challenge that many States are confronting is the use of parts and components that have been produced by companies in the civilian sector for commercial use in the production of military equipment. These include items that are not considered 'parts and components' of military equipment nor dual-use items and are therefore not captured by national export controls. This trend has been exemplified in the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, where parts and components produced by companies in the civilian sector have been integrated in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles produced by the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea and which have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

A series of investigations during 2022 revealed that military equipment the Russian Federation was using in Ukraine included large numbers of parts and components manufactured abroad, including in States that had imposed or expanded their trade-related sanctions measures on the Russian Federation in 2014. Examples included circuit boards, used in the satellite navigation systems and on-board computers of cruise missiles and attack helicopters. The Russian Federation has been using Iranian-made military equipment in Ukraine since 2022 and North Korean-made military equipment since 2023. Reports indicate that these weapon systems have also utilized parts and components produced by companies in the civilian sector.

In response, States in Europe, North America and other parts of the world have sought to prevent arms manufacturers in the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea from acquiring parts and components manufactured by companies based on their territories. Thirty-eight States and one non-UN Member have joined the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC) and agreed to apply stringent controls on exports of arms and dual-use items to the Russian Federation and Belarus. Efforts by GECC members to regulate exports of these items and prevent them from reaching the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea have faced substantial obstacles. GECC members have sought to improve the effectiveness of their controls and close these loopholes by imposing restrictions on transfers



GECC MEMBERS HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR CONTROLS AND CLOSE THESE LOOPHOLES BY IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF ITEMS TO COMPANIES ACCUSED OF KNOWINGLY ACTING AS POINTS OF TRANSIT OF TRANSFERS OF CONTROLLED ITEMS TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

of items to companies accused of knowingly acting as points of transit of transfers of controlled items to the Russian Federation. They have also tried to encourage companies operating in relevant sectors to adopt due diligence and know-your-customer procedures that would enable them to identify, investigate and address cases where intermediaries might re-export or have re-exported parts and components to the Russian Federation. Within the EU, these recommendations have been supported by the imposition of legal obligations through the use of sanctions measures. Despite these efforts, Ukraine has continued to find components manufactured by companies headquartered in GECC members in military equipment used by the Russian Federation.

The attempt to persuade or require companies in the civilian sector to ensure that the items they are exporting are not repurposed for integration into controlled weapon systems, comes at a time when CSOs and some States have been trying to ensure that companies in the defence sector are more pro-active in adopting human rights due diligence measures. The cases of Iran, North Korea and the Russian Federation indicate there might be scope to expand these discussions by focusing on, and conducting outreach towards, exporting companies that do not view themselves as being part of the defence sector. This includes companies who are not exporting items that are captured by arms and dual-use export control, but whose exported items risk being repurposed as tools of armed conflict or as their parts and components. This could involve an examination of the potential to expand arms export control measures to certain transfers of parts and components manufactured in the civilian sector through the use of catch-all controls and the adoption of due-diligence measures by the companies themselves.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The topic of controls on parts and components has occasionally been addressed within ATT subsidiary bodies. However, there has been no systematic review of which parts and components States include in their national control lists and, more generally, how they have implemented Article 4. Such a review and relevant ATT discussions should also include and be linked to national implementation practices on risk assessments. The linkages between Articles 6 and 7, and Article 4, were not systematically addressed as part of the process that led to the development of the ATT Voluntary Basic Guide on the implementation of Articles 6 and 7. Increased geo-political instability is leading States to raise military spending and engage more actively in joint defence production efforts. In addition, the use of parts and components produced in the civilian sector in the production of military equipment continues to grow. Against this background, the following recommendations are proposed:

- ATT States Parties should submit, review and, where applicable, update their initial reports and use the latest version of the ATT initial reporting template.
- ATT States Parties should carry out a review of the interpretation and scope of Article 4, either alone or as part of a wider review of the ATT's scope.
- ATT States Parties should exchange information on the application of Articles 6 and 7 to exports of parts and components.
- ATT States Parties should think as broadly as possible when reporting on ATT implementation measures.
- The ATT should be used as a forum to discuss and review efforts to prevent the diversion of civilian parts and components to military end-uses and end-users.



**ATT STATES PARTIES
SHOULD CARRY OUT
A REVIEW OF THE
INTERPRETATION AND
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 4,
EITHER ALONE OR
AS PART OF A WIDER
REVIEW OF THE
ATT'S SCOPE.**



A MARINE FIRES AN M4 CARBINE DURING AN ANNUAL RIFLE QUALIFICATION AT PUULOA RANGE TRAINING FACILITY, MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII, APRIL 10, 2025. THE THREE-DAY EVENT TESTED MARINES' MARKSMANSHIP SKILLS IN A DYNAMIC SHOOTING ENVIRONMENT.

CREDIT: © DOD / MARINE CORPS
CPL. HUNTER JONES

*THE APPEARANCE OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) VISUAL INFORMATION DOES NOT IMPLY OR CONSTITUTE DOD ENDORSEMENT.

CHAPTER 2 – ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 2023 ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS

The analysis of 2023 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and assesses reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as to a higher standard of transparency. Analysis of 2023 annual reports reveals a persistent struggle to achieve accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. In particular, the percentage of due annual reports submitted and the proportion of meaningfully transparent reports declined.

COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Article 13.3 of the ATT requires States Parties to submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports by 31 May. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if it:

1. Is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
2. Is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).
3. Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 and/or relevant 'nil' reports indicating that no arms were transferred.



IN TOTAL, 112 STATES PARTIES WERE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT ON THEIR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR 2023 BY 31 MAY 2024. ONLY 69 (62 PER CENT) DID SO BY THE ATT MONITOR'S 1 FEBRUARY 2025 CUT-OFF DATE FOR ANALYSIS. THIS IS THE LOWEST REPORTING RATE SINCE THE PROCESS BEGAN IN 2015.

In total, 112 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on their exports and imports for 2023 by 31 May 2024. Only 69 (62 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2025 cut-off date for analysis. This is the lowest reporting rate since the process began in 2015.

Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2023, compared to 35 States Parties (32 per cent) for 2022. They submitted annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline, and reports that were made public included data on arms exports and imports or were 'nil' reports.



ONLY 27 ANNUAL REPORTS FOR 2023 (24 PER CENT OF ALL REPORTS DUE) MET ALL THE ABOVE CRITERIA AND WERE THUS MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT. THIS IS THE LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT REPORTS RECORDED SINCE THE TREATY'S ENTRY INTO FORCE.


MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent and to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT, an annual report should at minimum:

1. Be submitted and made publicly available on the ATT Secretariat website.
2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.
4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).
5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

Only 27 annual reports for 2023 (24 per cent of all reports due) met all the above criteria and were thus meaningfully transparent. This is the lowest percentage of meaningfully transparent reports recorded since the Treaty's entry into force. The continued decrease in transparency reflects a persistent challenge in achieving accurate and comprehensive reporting among States Parties.

FIGURE 2.1 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS THAT WERE MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT



CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

Sixteen States Parties (23 per cent of the submitted reports) submitted a confidential annual report for 2023. The number and percentage of confidential reports for 2023 is the lowest level in the last five years.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE ATT MONITOR MEANINGFUL TRANSPARENCY CRITERIA

Twenty-one States Parties (19 per cent of all reports due) required to submit an annual report for 2023 submitted a meaningfully transparent report on time. This rate is higher than the previous year when 14 per cent met these criteria.



PARATROOPERS ASSIGNED TO
1ST SQUADRON, 91ST CAVALRY
REGIMENT, 173RD AIRBORNE
BRIGADE, FIRE A 120MM MORTAR
DURING A LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE
AT THE 7TH ARMY TRAINING
COMMAND'S GRAFENWOEHR
TRAINING AREA, GERMANY,
JAN. 22, 2025.

CREDIT: © U.S. ARMY / MARKUS
RAUCHENBERGER

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

States Parties are encouraged to provide more information that contributes to an even higher standard of transparency. This is supported by several of the Treaty's provisions. Article 5.3, for instance, encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if, for example, States Parties provide descriptions and/or comments of reported transfers, include 'o', 'nil', '/' or any indication that no transfers were made in relevant weapons categories or include any other kind of additional information (see report for full methodology).

Thirty-eight States Parties provided descriptions of some or all transfers and 27 of the reports contained comments covering some or all transfers, compared to 39 and 27 that did so in their 2022 annual report.


MOST TRANSPARENT REPORTS

Similarly to previous years, no State Party submitting a 2023 annual report used all transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Fourteen States Parties complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1 and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency. Of these, two States Parties (Canada and Peru) provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency.



**TWO STATES PARTIES
(CANADA AND PERU)
PROVIDED THE
MOST INFORMATION
IN SUPPORT OF A
HIGHER STANDARD OF
TRANSPARENCY.**

FIGURE 2.2 – CLASSIFICATION OF ATT STATES PARTIES BY ANNUAL REPORTING PRACTICE (2023)



EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TRENDS

The following key findings summarize major trends in arms exports and imports reported by ATT States Parties that submitted a public annual report containing exports and/or imports in 2023.

Exports of major conventional arms: 113,964 major conventional arms exports were reported in 2023.

Exports of SALW: 1,456,779 SALW exports were reported in 2023.

Imports of major conventional arms: 78,117 major conventional arms imports were reported in 2023.

Imports of SALW: 560,811 SALW imports were reported in 2023.

More information in the report and in its Annex: Country Profiles.

Since 2024, the ATT Monitor provides a graphical and interactive representation of the distribution, dimensions, and dynamics of the arms trade, as reported by States Parties' annual reports, in its ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard.

Please consult the Dashboard at: attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard.

Data on transfers reported in 2023 annual reports will be included in the Dashboard by 31 December 2025.



COUNTRY PROFILES (ANNEX)

The annex includes country profiles for each State Party obliged to submit a 2023 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, timely reporting, withholding security information), as well as a summary of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners, and highlighting the largest transfers reported by that State Party in 2023.



**MARINES FIRE AN M240B
MACHINE GUN DURING A MEDIUM
MACHINE GUN LIVE-FIRE RANGE
AT CAMP HANSEN, OKINAWA,
JAPAN, FEB. 27, 2025.**

CREDIT: © DOD / MARINE CORPS
CPL. MICHAEL TAGGART

*THE APPEARANCE OF U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)
VISUAL INFORMATION DOES
NOT IMPLY OR CONSTITUTE DOD
ENDORSEMENT.



U.S. ARMY ARTILLERYMEN
WITH 3RD BATTALION, 7TH
FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT,
25TH DIVISION ARTILLERY,
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION,
PREPARE FOR THE HELICOPTER
TO SLING LOAD A M119 A3
105MM HOWITZER DURING
SUPER GARUDA SHIELD 2024
AT PUSLATPUR 5, INDONESIA
ON SEPT. 01, 2024.

CREDIT: © U.S. ARMY / SPC.
THOMAS MADRZAK

CHAPTER 3 – PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2024 ATT ANNUAL REPORTS AND NEW INITIAL REPORTS

This chapter presents preliminary analysis on 2024 annual reports, an update on the status of initial reporting, and an appraisal of ATT reporting compliance as of 7 June 2025.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2024 ANNUAL REPORTS

One hundred and thirteen of the 116 States Parties (all except The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia) to the ATT were required to report to the ATT Secretariat on their 2024 arms exports and imports by 7 June 2025. Fifty States Parties submitted their 2024 annual reports on-time, equalling an on-time reporting rate of 44 per cent. Four of the past five years have seen 44 per cent on-time reporting rates. The only exception was the 2022 report submissions, which saw an on-time compliance rate of 35 per cent.

Of the 50 States Parties that submitted on-time 2024 annual reports, 13 (26 per cent) chose to report privately – meaning that these reports are available only to the ATT Secretariat and other States Parties. While this marks an increase in confidential, on-time reporting when compared to the 22 per cent of on-time 2023 reports submitted last year, it is still a welcome decline from the 32 per cent of 2021 on-time reports submitted privately.

A total of 43 overdue reports were submitted between 7 June 2024 (last year's de facto reporting deadline) and 7 June 2025. Of these reports, 25 were 2024 reports covering 2023 transfers and 18 were from prior years. With these States Parties submitting overdue reports, the number of States Parties that have submitted an annual report for every year they were required to do so has increased. As of 7 June 2025, 48 of the 113 States Parties (42 per cent) due to report had submitted all their required annual reports. This is a slight improvement from last year, when as of 7 June the full compliance rate was 44 out of 112 (39 per cent). The number of States Parties that have not fulfilled their annual reporting obligations has remained static. As of 7 June 2025, 25 States Parties (22 per cent of the 113 due to have reported at least once) had yet to submit any of their required annual reports, the same in absolute numbers from this time last year.



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Of the 2024 on-time reporters that submitted their reports publicly, 11 States Parties (30 per cent) indicated that they had withheld information. Several States Parties made efforts to specify the nature of their information withholdings.

UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS

While no new States Parties were required to submit an initial report since last year's ATT Monitor Report (between 7 June 2024 and 7 June 2025), two States Parties submitted overdue reports: the Bahamas (report due December 2015) and Andorra (report due March 2024). Although States Parties should be encouraged to submit their reports on time, the submission of overdue reports remains crucial.

One hundred and thirteen of the current 116 States Parties to the ATT were required to submit initial reports by 7 June 2025. According to the ATT Secretariat's website, 93 States Parties have done so, which represents a compliance rate of 82 per cent. Overall, this year marks a four-year period of steady gains in initial reporting compliance, from 77 per cent in 2021 to 78 per cent in 2022, 79 per cent in 2023, and 81 per cent in 2024. Twenty States Parties have yet to meet their initial reporting obligations, all of whom are several years past their due date.



TO DATE, ONLY SIX STATES PARTIES (HUNGARY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, ROMANIA, SLOVENIA AND SWEDEN) HAVE EVER SUBMITTED UPDATED REPORTS – DESPITE MULTIPLE STATES PARTIES HAVING INDICATED AT FORMAL AND INFORMAL ATT MEETINGS THAT THEY HAVE MADE CHANGES TO THEIR NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS SINCE SUBMITTING THEIR INITIAL REPORTS, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED OVER NINE YEARS AGO.

The ATT's newest States Parties – The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia – are required to submit their initial reports by 10 September 2025, 8 October 2025 and 12 January 2026, respectively. As initial reporting compliance remains low for the Treaty's newest members – only half of the States Parties required to submit an initial report since January 2021 have done so – a concerted effort should be made to support these three States Parties in submitting their reports over the next year.

Although States Parties are required under Article 13.1 to 'report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate,' it does not appear as though any updated reports were submitted to the ATT Secretariat since the 2024 ATT Monitor Annual Report. To date, only six States Parties (Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden) have ever submitted updated reports – despite multiple States Parties having indicated at formal and informal ATT meetings that

they have made changes to their national control systems since submitting their initial reports, and despite the fact that 50 per cent of current reports were submitted over nine years ago.

As of 7 June 2025, 23 of the 93 initial reports (25 per cent) available on the ATT Secretariat's website are confidential. Notably, this year's two new initial reports (Bahamas and Andorra) submitted their initial reports privately. With a quarter of total initial report submissions only available to the ATT Secretariat and ATT States Parties, it is difficult for other ATT stakeholders to evaluate national control systems, tailor support and assistance approaches, or holistically assess the standing and impact of Treaty implementation.



**AN AIR FORCE F-35A LIGHTNING II CONDUCTS
A SITE SURVEY BEFORE LANDING AT DAVIS-
MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, ARIZ., FEB. 25, 2025,
FOR HERITAGE FLIGHT TRAINING.**

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*THE APPEARANCE OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(DOD) VISUAL INFORMATION DOES NOT IMPLY OR
CONSTITUTE DOD ENDORSEMENT.



SHIP DOCKED AT THE PORT OF
TURKU DURING EXERCISE
FREEZING WINDS 24.

CREDIT: © NATO

