

**ATT
MONITOR
REPORT
2026**

COVER PHOTO:

**AN ITALIAN ARMY 120MM MORTAR FIRES
DURING A LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE NEAR
VESZPRÉM, HUNGARY, WHERE NATO'S
FORWARD LAND FORCES ARE BASED,
ON 30 JUNE 2025.**

CREDIT: © NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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Control Arms
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CH-1211 Geneva 1

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**HMAS STALWART CONDUCTS
A REPLENISHMENT AT SEA
WITH HMAS CANBERRA OFF
THE COAST OF AUSTRALIA,
ON 29 SEPTEMBER 2025.**

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**A ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE
CF-188 HORNET SITS ON THE RAMP
AT MIHAIL KOGALNICEANU AIR BASE
DURING OPERATION REASSURANCE,
ON 19 OCTOBER 2021.**

CREDIT: © AVIATOR AVERY PHILPOTT,
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ACRONYMS

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty	IHL	International Humanitarian Law
BAFA	Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control	IHRL	International Human Rights Law
CEPAC	La Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale	M23	March 23 Movement
COARM	Conventional Arms Exports Subgroup of the EU Working Party on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports	MANPADS	Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems
CSP	Conference of States Parties	PoA	UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons
CSO	Civil Society Organization	RSF	Rapid Support Forces
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
EWIPA	Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas	UN	United Nations
EU	European Union	UNIDIR	UN Institute for Disarmament Research
FAQ	Frequently Asked Questions	UNODA	UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office	UNROCA	UN Register of Conventional Arms
HS	Harmonized System	VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons	WGETI	Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation
		WGTR	Working Group on Transparency and Reporting
		WGTU	Working Group on Treaty Universalization

THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor is the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The project was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

The research outputs of the ATT Monitor are:

- **ATT Monitor Annual Reports:** the flagship publications of the project that take stock of existing practice, create greater transparency in how the Treaty is implemented, inform the work of the Conferences of States Parties to the ATT and intersessional meetings, and ensure accountability for Treaty commitments
- **Country Profiles:** published as a specific section of the annual reports, they analyze reporting and transfer practices of each reporting State Party and provide suggestions on how to improve national reporting practices
- **ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard:** a user-friendly tool that visually displays the distribution, dimensions, and dynamics of the global arms trade based on information on arms transfers reported publicly by States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in their annual reports
- **Ad hoc research:** case studies, briefing papers and other ad hoc publications that focus on specific aspects of the arms trade that are of relevance for ATT States Parties
- **Resources:** factsheets, guidelines and materials that support effective implementation of the ATT

The ATT Monitor meets the research needs of ATT stakeholders by:

- Synthesizing information and analyzing trends and developments in ATT compliance to advance the Treaty's universalization and implementation
- Assessing standards of national reporting (Article 13) and relevant transparency commitments
- Providing country-by-country analysis of reporting and transfer practices
- Identifying patterns and trends in exports/imports of conventional arms and reporting them against ATT criteria
- Disseminating research findings through public events and making research widely available in print and online, relying on user-friendly formats and translating key publications into languages other than English
- Maintaining a global network of experts who contribute to ATT Monitor outputs and to the development of ATT Monitor content through the Editorial Advisory Committee

This information is used to:

- Advance the ATT's universalization and implementation
- Identify key challenges in advancing global acceptance of the ATT's norms and its full implementation, and propose steps to address these challenges
- Provide recommendations for government policy planning and decision-making
- Provide a research-based tool for civil society to develop advocacy campaigns, capacity-building and training programs



THE 112TH ARMoured INFANTRY BATTALION
CONDUCTS A TACTICAL, TECHNICAL AND
LOGISTICAL EXERCISE WITH THE PUMA
ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER, IN ITS
UPGRADED S1 CONFIGURATION, AT THE REGEN
TRAINING AREA, GERMANY, ON 12 JUNE 2024.

CREDIT: © MARCO DOROW, GERMAN BUNDESWEHR

STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW, JUNE 2025 – MAY 2026

This review covers the period between 1 June 2025 and 31 May 2026, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores key events and milestones over the past year and assesses impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first presents ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the abovementioned period. Second it examines compliance with the core ATT principle of transparency and reporting. It then reviews the work of the ATT's intersessional process, including discussions held within the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) and Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). The latter comprises two sub-working groups: one on exchange of national implementation practices and another on current and emerging implementation issues.

The chapter concludes by assessing how ATT States Parties are meeting their ATT obligations, while global events such as a growth in the number of conflicts, increased human suffering and a persistent detachment from multilateral instruments seem to jeopardise and hinder the achievement of the three main purposes of the Treaty.

UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2026, the ATT Secretariat listed 118 countries as States Parties, accounting for 60 per cent of all United Nations (UN) member states.¹ It listed a further 25 countries as Signatories. Two States, Vanuatu and Ecuador, became ATT States Parties between 2025 and 2026. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties per year between 2015 and 2026.

Table 1 – New ATT membership by 31 May of each year

Year	Acceptance	Accession	Ratification	States Parties
2025–2026	0	1	1	118
2024–2025	0	1	2	116
2023–2024	0	0	0	113
2022–2023	1	0	1	113
2021–2022	0	0	1	111
2020–2021	0	3	1	110
2019–2020	0	3	1	106
2018–2019	0	0	7	102
2017–2018	0	2	1	95
2016–2017	0	1	6	92
2015–2016	0	2	14	85

The geographical spread of States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2026, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 47 per cent (seven of 15 countries) and Africa at 57 per cent (31 of 54 countries).² Europe at 93 per cent (40 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 83 per cent (29 of 35 countries) have the highest proportions of States Parties.


The ATT enjoys particularly strong support in certain subregional blocs, such as:

- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with all 12 members being States Parties

¹ Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN members, they are not counted in this share.

² Analysis based on the UN Statistics Division website, 'Methodology. Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (M49)'. tinyurl.com/3usm3kk9. For more information on Treaty membership, see ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'Treaty Status'. tinyurl.com/mwkdnsps.

MAP OF STATUS OF ATT PARTICIPATION (AS OF 31 MAY 2026)



STATES PARTIES (118): Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia.

SIGNATORIES (25): Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Eswatini, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America*, Zimbabwe.

NOT YET JOINED (52): Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.

* Signed but no longer intends to become a State Party.

UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

2025 saw the ninth funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the Informal Preparatory meeting for the Twelfth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP12) in May 2026, 30 States Parties had made voluntary contributions for a total of approximately US\$13.5m over the course of the fund's lifespan.³ An additional US\$160,000 has been allocated to the VTF Outreach Programme.

The ATT Secretariat received 23 applications from 25 States Parties for the 2025 VTF cycle,⁴ and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for 10 projects with a total budget of approximately US\$950,000.⁵ This marks a decrease from the 27 project applications received for the 2024 VTF cycle.⁶ Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, demonstrating the importance of partnerships in advancing ATT implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF's first year of operation.

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation continued this year, including the EU ATT Outreach Programme. Other initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.

Government representatives and CSOs from around the world met at national and regional training workshops to learn more about the ATT and discuss lessons learnt from national implementation efforts in different States. Discussions included technical challenges, legal requirements and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts for implementing ATT provisions.

Table 2 – Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year⁷

Year	Applications	Projects approved	Total budget for approved projects
2025	23	10	US\$952,000
2024	27	18	US\$1.6m
2023	28	14	US\$1.2m
2022	15	6	US\$612,000
2021	21	13	US\$1.3 million
2020	26	10	US\$964,000
2019	39	19	US\$1.9m
2018	23	9	US\$735,000
2017	21	15	US\$1.1m

Examples of activities that have taken place:

On 20 and 21 November 2025, Expertise France, in collaboration with the Small Arms Survey, organized a training-of-trainer workshop on the intersection between the ATT and gender-based violence. Participants from Liberia, Mexico and Sierra Leone brainstormed how to translate provisions in the ATT related to gender-based violence into concrete risk assessment processes and national transfer control practices.⁸

From 4 to 5 February 2026, the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) organized a national assistance workshop in Colombia. The purpose of the event was to convene representatives from key national institutions and enhance their technical understanding of Article 13 of the Treaty with regards to reporting obligations. Together with experts from Spain and Chile, participants produced a national step-by-step guide to formulate a coordinated, consistent and sustainable ATT reporting procedure.⁹

3 Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP12 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2026. Presentation on file with the ATT Monitor.

4 ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Report on the Work of the ATT. Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2024 to August 2025'. ATT/VTF/2025/CHAIR/830/Conf.Rep. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2s3r4cy2, p. 3.

5 ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF): Projects'. tinyurl.com/2sxxrpjh. ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2024 to August 2025'. ATT/VTF/2025/CHAIR/830/Conf.Rep. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2s3r4cy2, p. 3.

6 ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2024 to August 2025'. ATT/VTF/2025/CHAIR/830/Conf.Rep. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2s3r4cy2, pp. 2–3.

7 Table 2 shows projects and funding approved by the VTF Selection Committee, based on Ibid. pp. 2–3.

8 EU P2P ATT IV—OP—Expertise France (2025). 'Une Session "Train the Trainers" Sur les Violences Fondées sur le Genre dans le Cadre du TCA' [A "Train the Trainers" Session on Gender-Based Violence within the Framework of the ATT] [LinkedIn post]. LinkedIn. December 2025. tinyurl.com/5hfmhvhv; and EU P2P ATT (2025). 'Newsletter'. November-December 2025 | Phase IV, pp. 3–4. Newsletter on file with the ATT Monitor.

9 EU P2P ATT (2026). 'Newsletter'. January-February 2026 | Phase IV, p. 2. Newsletter on file with the ATT Monitor.

Since April 2025, Saferworld and the Security Research Information Centre, with Canadian funding, have been implementing a project entitled 'Promoting Accession to and Implementation of the ATT in East Africa'. East Africa is among the regions with the lowest ATT participation, with States facing a range of challenges exacerbated by the proliferation and misuse of illicit arms. Through research, stakeholder dialogue and expert consultations, the initiative is working to: address States' questions and concerns relating to Treaty accession and membership; strengthen understanding of how ATT implementation can support efforts to reduce armed violence, insecurity and illicit arms proliferation across the region; and raise awareness of the wide range of assistance that is available for States that are seeking to join the Treaty.¹⁰

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

ANNUAL REPORTS

States Parties are required to submit annual reports by 31 May each year detailing their arms exports and imports during the previous calendar year.¹¹ However, they are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2026, 115 of the 118 States Parties were required to submit their 2025 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 46 submitted an annual report by the deadline—a compliance rate of 40 per cent.¹² This rate is lower compared to last year's on-time reporting rate of 44 per cent.

Of the 46 annual reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat website, 13 States Parties made their 2025 reports confidential, representing 28 per cent of on-time submissions.¹³ This marks an increase in private, on-time reporting compared to 26 per cent of 2024 reports submitted on time.

The Gambia and Malawi, which were required to submit their annual report for the first time this year, had not done so by the 7 June deadline. Andorra has not submitted either its first annual report, due on 31 May 2025, nor its 2025 annual report.

INITIAL REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each State Party to submit an initial report to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty within the first year after its entry into force.¹⁴ As of 7 June 2026, 116 of 118 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 94 (81 per cent) had done so.¹⁵

One State Party—Colombia, whose report was due by January 2026—submitted an initial report since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report. The Gambia and Malawi had to submit their initial report by 10 September 2025 and 8 October 2025, respectively, but had not done so as of 7 June 2026. The two newest States Parties—Vanuatu and Ecuador—are required to submit their initial reports by 3 December 2026 and 25 May 2027, respectively.



AS OF 7 JUNE 2026, 115 OF THE 118 STATES PARTIES WERE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR 2025 ANNUAL REPORTS, IN LINE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 13.3. OF THESE, 46 SUBMITTED AN ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DEADLINE—A COMPLIANCE RATE OF 40 PER CENT. THIS RATE IS LOWER COMPARED TO LAST YEAR'S ON-TIME REPORTING RATE OF 44 PER CENT.

10 Saferworld (2025). 'ATT Expert Group: Conflict, Illicit Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty in East Africa'. Briefing no. 10. August 2025. tinyurl.com/237ce6wb.

11 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

12 The ATT Monitor was able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the ATT Secretariat.

13 Albania, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lesotho, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Senegal, Seychelles and State of Palestine.

14 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

15 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Initial Reports. Status: as of 12 February 2026'. tinyurl.com/2sewmav7.

Initial reporting compliance remains low for the Treaty's newest members. Of the six States Parties for whom the Treaty entered into force over the past five years and that had been required to submit an initial report by June 2026, only 50 per cent (Andorra, Colombia and the Philippines) have done so. In August 2025, the United Kingdom submitted an updated version of its initial report, becoming the seventh State Party to do so since the adoption of the Treaty, despite Article 13.1 requesting that 'each State Party shall report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate'.¹⁶ An in-depth analysis of initial reporting is provided in Chapter 3.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Eleventh Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP11) was conducted from 25 to 29 August 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland. Ambassador Carlos Foradori, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, served as President of CSP11. Representatives from 116 countries, comprising 94 States Parties, 18 Signatories and four Observer States attended.¹⁷ Other attendees included representatives of ten international and regional organizations, including UN agencies and 46 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing the industry.¹⁸ The President's thematic focus was 'Universalization as a Priority'. Participants in the thematic discussion underscored the relevance of universalization to the overall success of the Treaty, including its effective implementation, encouraging 'the sharing of experiences, best practices and innovative strategies for promoting adherence' to the Treaty.¹⁹

Decisions adopted included:²⁰

- The endorsement of a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom for CSP11 agreeing to a mandate to elaborate elements of a draft five-year strategy.

- The establishment of gender focal points under the ATT to mainstream gender perspectives across ATT processes and implementation activities.
- The request for the WGTR to conduct an assessment of the Information Exchange Platform and the online reporting tool.
- The welcoming of a working paper submitted by Panama on strengthening youth participation in the ATT.
- The decision to hold one in-person four-day session of the ATT Working Group meetings and one in-person informal CSP preparatory meeting of up to two days per CSP cycle, both with a livestream option, instead of offering a hybrid option for the preparatory meetings.
- The election of Ms. Tsholofelo Tsheole, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the UN Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland, as President of CSP12.
- The election of Latvia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and Uruguay as the four vice-presidents of CSP12.
- The appointment of Latvia, Lesotho, Paraguay, the People's Republic of China and Spain to serve a two-year term as Members of the ATT Management Committee.
- Scheduling of CSP12 for 24–28 August 2026 in Geneva, Switzerland.

TWELFTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES – INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP12 included meetings of the Working Groups on 16 to 19 March 2026²¹ and an Informal Preparatory Meeting on 27 to 28 May 2026.²²

The WGETI, chaired by Colonel Philippe Lejeune from France, addressed the implementation of specific ATT articles in the dedicated sub-working group on exchange of national implementation practices, and other aspects pertinent to the implementation of the Treaty in the sub-working group on current and emerging implementation issues.²³

16 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

17 The ATT Monitor captures attendance at CSPs as indicated by the CSP Final Report each year. See ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Final Report'. 29 August 2025. ATT/CSP11/2025/SEC/834/Conf.FinRep/Rev. tinyurl.com/2pgj6z3j, p.3.

18 Ibid., pp. 3–4.

19 Ibid., p. 5.

20 Ibid., pp. 5–12.

21 ATT Secretariat. (n.d.). 'CSP12–Twelfth Conference of States Parties Working Group Meetings'. tinyurl.com/mtym7dix.

22 ATT Secretariat. (n.d.). 'CSP12–Twelfth Conference of States Parties Informal Preparatory Meeting'. tinyurl.com/343xcfs3.

23 ATT WGETI (2026). '16–18 March 2026 WGETI Meeting: WGETI Chair Introductory Letter'. 18 February 2026. ATT/CSP12/WGETI/2026/CHAIR/835/LetterSubDocs/Rev. tinyurl.com/yxew6bgk.

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices was facilitated by Ms. Essate Weldemichael and Mr. Edward Kawa of Sierra Leone. The sub-working group primarily focused on the Treaty's implementation by addressing two topics in the multi-year workplan: 'National control system relating to brokering' and 'Risk assessment (covering Articles 6 & 7)'.²⁴ Under the first topic, States Parties discussed the different measures undertaken to regulate arms brokering under their jurisdiction. Mr. Robert Hunter-Perkins from Conflict Armament Research highlighted, inter alia, some definitional challenges and understandings surrounding arms brokering and emphasized that, as of mid-2024, only 44 States Parties 'reported that their national legislation contains a definition of a broker or brokering'.²⁵ Canada and Liberia presented their national practices on brokering before States Parties engaged in a wider discussion on key aspects of their brokering controls, common challenges and emerging issues.²⁶ The second topic explored 'Risk assessment (covering Articles 6 & 7)', discussing States Parties' national practices related to prohibitions and export assessment. Mr. Michal Karczmarz from the European External Action Service, Chair of the EU's Working Group on Conventional Arms Export (COARM), explained the criteria of the EU's legally binding Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on Arms Exports and how the accompanying non-binding User's Guide provides coherence, shared standards, converging interpretations and best practices.²⁷ Chile and South Africa also presented their respective approaches to risk assessments, and several States Parties contributed to the discussion by sharing their national experiences.²⁸

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues addressed four different topics, in accordance with CSP11 decisions: challenges related to the scope of the Treaty and the establishment and maintenance of a national control list; the role of industry in responsible international arms transfers; the risk of conventional arms being used for gender-based violence and violence against

women and children; and developing or strengthening inter-agency cooperation.²⁹ The discussions on the scope of the ATT included contributions from El Salvador, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Saferworld. There were also focused presentations on the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) from the United Kingdom and on the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).³⁰ The session on gender included presentations from the newly appointed Gender Focal Points of Mexico, Spain and Togo on their mandate and initial workplan. It also featured discussions among delegations on proposed additional guidance on the implementation of Article 7 (4) of the Treaty for integration into the Voluntary Guide on Implementing Articles 6 & 7.³¹ Three ad hoc discussions also took place: on maritime security and the ATT (raised by the Small Arms Survey, in collaboration with Panama and UNIDIR); on risk assessment of arms exports to Sudan (raised by Maat for Peace, Development, and Human Rights); and implementation of Article 7 (7) on the reassessment of granted authorizations, raised by Control Arms.³² The focus on the topics of the WGETI workplan, combined with the addition of topics and issues taken forward since the CSP11 cycle, created a rich agenda with numerous presentations. At times, this created some difficulties for attending delegations to fully follow and contribute to the wide range of topics.

The WGTU was co-chaired by the President of CSP12, Ms. Tsholofelo Tsheole from South Africa, and the President of CSP11, Ambassador Carlos Foradori from Argentina. The meeting welcomed Ecuador as the most recent State Party to the ATT. Then, the ATT Secretariat provided a presentation on the status of ATT universalisation, highlighting how participation remains low in Asia, in particular. Co-chairs, different delegations and stakeholders provided updates on their universalisation efforts. Regional perspectives on the status of the Treaty were shared by the Pacific Islands Forum for the Pacific region; the Regional Centre on Small Arms for the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region; Maat for Peace, Development, and Human Rights

24 Ibid., pp. 1–2 and p. 5.

25 Hunter-Perkins, R. (2026). 'Regulating Brokering'. Presentation at ATT WGETI, Geneva, 16 March 2026. tinyurl.com/4ff5fndb, p. 13. The data is also included in Giezendanner H. et al. (2025). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Regulating Brokering to Reduce the Risk of Diversion'. ATT Issue Brief No. 5. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). tinyurl.com/4pxyemgm, p. 45.

26 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12/WGETI/2026/CHAIR/838/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/35jv5yre, p. 3. The presentations are available at: ATT Secretariat. (n.d.). 'Working Group Meetings CSP12 Preparatory Process'. tinyurl.com/bde4yapy.

27 See: Council of the European Union. (2025). 'Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment'. Brussels. 15 April 2025. tinyurl.com/ykfhwt6; and Council of the European Union. (2025). 'User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (as Amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/779) Defining Common Rules Governing the Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment'. No. Doc. 6881/25. Brussels. 14 April 2025. tinyurl.com/2va8ba95.

28 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12/WGETI/2026/CHAIR/838/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/35jv5yre, p. 4.

29 Ibid., pp. 5–10.

30 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

31 Ibid., p. 9.

32 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

for the Middle East and North Africa region; and the Forum on Disarmament and Development in Sri Lanka for South Asia.³³ Further discussions on ratification/accession and national domestication practices included presentations from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Gambia, the Philippines and Angola.³⁴

The WGTR, chaired by Ms. Milagros Winkelried Salazar from Peru, focused on the implementation of ATT reporting obligations.³⁵ The ATT Secretariat presented data on the status of reporting and provided updates on its initiatives conducted under the EU-funded Implementation Support Project. The Working Group discussed and assessed the use of the online reporting tool for submitting initial and annual reports and the information exchange platform, and were provided with some preliminary findings of a survey conducted by the Secretariat on the use of the two tools.³⁶ Under the agenda item of 'Substantive ATT reporting issues', Paraguay (as a State Party) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (as an assistance provider) presented their experiences and recommendations on data collection and decision-making on substantive reporting issues. France recalled the joint Brazil and France working paper on regional and sub-regional meetings on diversion information exchange to support information exchange among States Parties. The Working Group then addressed the agenda item from its multi-year workplan, 'Reports to Cabinet and/or Parliament'. Following presentations from Transparency International Defence and Security, Nigeria, Norway and France, several States Parties' delegations shared their national practices on reporting to national parliaments.³⁷

The CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting was held on 27 to 28 May 2026. The chairs and co-chairs of ATT subsidiary bodies—WGETI, WGTU and WGTR—provided updates on the discussions held during the March sessions and proposed next

steps. The WGETI proposed the endorsement and integration of the additional guidance on the implementation of Article 7 (4) of the Treaty into relevant sections of the Voluntary Guide on Implementing Articles 6 & 7 of the ATT. The Working Group also requested to involve logistical actors in future discussions on enforcement and on the regulation of actors involved in arms transfers and considered the potential utility of an informal group to advance discussions on scope and national control lists. The WGETI Chair proposed to continue discussions and encouraged consideration of a wide range of topics, including the role of industry, the application of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, inter-agency cooperation and maritime-security related aspects.³⁸ The wide range of topics covered brought some delegations to lament a lack of prioritisation and coherence, with the risk of overstressing the resources of the WGETI. The WGTU discussed its way forward, and the WGTR considered, among other topics, the possible creation of an informal 'sounding-board' group of interested stakeholders to support the Secretariat's efforts in facilitating reporting compliance.³⁹ The Management Committee presented its proposal to update the Sponsorship Programme's Administrative Guidelines.⁴⁰ The Chair of the VTF Committee proposed some amendments to the Terms of Reference of the VTF, and the ATT Secretariat provided updates on the status of operations of the VTF.⁴¹

The second day included an overview of the status of implementation of decisions taken by CSP11. The ATT Secretariat also provided an update on the development of a five-year strategy for the ATT, based on consultations held with ATT States Parties and different stakeholders in the preceding months.⁴² A report with draft elements of the strategy will be submitted for consideration at CSP12; further consultations will continue until CSP13, when the strategy will be considered by States Parties.

33 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Treaty Universalization. Co-chairs' Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTU/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/mspz8buj, p. 4.

34 Ibid., p. 5.

35 ATT WGTR (2026). 'Draft Annotated Agenda for Meeting of 19 March 2026'. 17 February 2026. ATT/CSP12CSP12.WGTR/20262026/CHAIR/836/DrAnnAgenda. tinyurl.com/bdey5a6.

36 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTR/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/58y23e27, pp. 3–5. The presentation is available at: ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'WGTR. Assessment of the Online Reporting Tool and the Information Exchange Platform. Secretariat's Survey: Initial Findings'. tinyurl.com/5n7j2u3s.

37 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTR/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/58y23e27, pp. 5–7.

38 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGETI/2026/CHAIR/838/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/35jv5yre, pp. 13–14.

39 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP12. Draft'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.WGTR/2026/CHAIR/840/IPM.DrConf.Rep. tinyurl.com/58y23e27, pp. 11–13.

40 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting (27–28 May 2026): Proposed Amendments to the Administrative Guidelines of the ATT Sponsorship Programme'. 30 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.MC/2026/MC/844/IPM.SponAdminGuide.Prop. tinyurl.com/3nk4cmn5.

41 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting (27–28 May 2026): Proposed Amendments to the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) Terms of Reference (TOR)'. 29 April 2026. ATT/CSP12.VTF/2026/CHAIR/843/IPM.ToR.Prop. tinyurl.com/yzdhakb2.

42 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Development of Elements of a Draft Five-Year Strategy for the Arms Trade Treaty: Summary Report of Contributions and Key Elements'. tinyurl.com/bxwc3be6.

The Gender Focal Points briefed ATT stakeholders on the survey conducted on their preliminary workplan, and the ATT Secretariat provided a presentation on the status of gender participation in ATT meetings, followed by an overview on the status of ATT finances⁴³ (see next section).

STATUS OF ATT FINANCES

States Parties to the ATT, as well as Signatory and Observer States attending CSPs, contribute to the costs of ATT conferences and of the ATT Secretariat. In-kind support from Switzerland has slightly increased and included a refund of conference room costs. As of 18 May 2026, the percentage of the budget contributions received for 2026 was 89 per cent. The proportion of States Parties that made their payments in 2026 dropped to 56 per cent, with outstanding contributions from 61 States. As of May 2026, the total outstanding contributions were more than US\$443,000, signalling a small improvement of around US\$20,000 compared to 2025. The adoption of some cost-saving measures by the ATT Secretariat lowered the annual deficit to 4 per cent, compared to 5 per cent in 2025. The operational budget remains reduced, but there are sufficient funds to operate until the end of 2026. While guidelines for making financial arrangements were adopted by CSP7, no formal requests for financial arrangements had been submitted until May 2026.⁴⁴

TAKING STOCK – ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Article 1 of the ATT identifies three main purposes for the Treaty: 'Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; Reducing human suffering; [and] Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'.⁴⁵

While events until May 2025 'tested the Treaty, in a way that has rarely happened in previous years',⁴⁶ developments from June 2025 to May 2026 were equally turbulent and perhaps even more challenging for the ATT and the effective achievement of its three purposes. Regional peace, security and stability were at their lowest levels: in 2025, the Peace Research Institute Oslo recorded 'the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946', with 65 conflicts in 35 countries and an increase in the number of interstate conflicts.⁴⁷ Human suffering did not reduce: data released by the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner in June 2025 showed that civilian deaths in conflict increased 40 per cent in 2024.⁴⁸ Likewise, a survey of 23 armed conflicts conducted by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights warned that the threat to international humanitarian law, which aims to limit the effect of war, was at 'a critical breaking point'.⁴⁹ Transparency and confidence among States has not improved either: the general distrust and decreased engagement in multilateralism continued, although it has, so far, had a limited impact on the ATT. Five ATT States Parties, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, withdrew from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention between December 2025 and February 2026, in accordance with the provisions for withdrawal contained in the Convention and in response to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, while Ukraine decided to suspend the implementation of the Convention in July 2025.⁵⁰

43 ATT Secretariat (2026). 'Draft Annotated Agenda CSP12 Informal Preparatory Meeting'. 24 April 2026. ATT/CSP12/2026/SEC/841/IPM.DrAnnAgenda/Rev. tinyurl.com/2w237hb7.

44 Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP12 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2026. Information on file with the ATT Monitor.

45 Arms Trade Treaty. Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

46 Control Arms Secretariat (2025). ATT Monitor Report 2025. Geneva. 25 August 2025. tinyurl.com/yyhtbn2p, p. 17.

47 Rustad, S.A. (2026). 'Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2025'. PRIO Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). tinyurl.com/4kdun24w, p. 7.

48 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2025). 'Human Rights Count: Delivering Insights with UN Human Rights Data'. June 2025. tinyurl.com/5a8xjne3.

49 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2026). 'War Watch: IHL in Focus Report – 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2025'. February 2026. tinyurl.com/47yw7hcz, p. 1. See also: Sabbagh, D. (2026). 'International Law Meant to Limit Effects of War at Breaking Point, Study Finds'. The Guardian. 2 February 2026. tinyurl.com/yc4ekjkh.

50 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (n.d.). 'Membership'. tinyurl.com/yypfguv7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2025). 'Statement of the MFA of Ukraine on the Decision to Suspension from the Ottawa Convention'. 29 June 2025. tinyurl.com/5h6fu6b3; and Docherty, B. and Wareham, M. (2025). 'Ukraine 'Suspends' Vital Mine Ban Treaty: Respect Global Prohibition on Antipersonnel Landmines'. Human Rights Watch. 24 July 2025. tinyurl.com/3vc6xd3x. Another ATT State Party, Lebanon, joined the Convention in May 2026. See MAG (Mines Advisory Group) (2026). 'Lebanon Joins the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention'. 6 May 2026. tinyurl.com/47zh6ac7.

The US President issued, in January 2026, a Memorandum stating the intention to withdraw from a number of international organizations, conventions and treaties, including the transparency instrument, UNROCA.⁵¹ At the same time, world military expenditure, which was already at the highest level ever recorded in 2024, rose for the 11th consecutive year in 2025 by a further 2.9 per cent to US\$2,887b.⁵² Similarly, the global volume of major arms transferred between States in 2021–25 recorded its biggest increase since 2011–15 and reached its highest level in the last 35 years.⁵³

Conflicts continued or started in many regions and countries throughout the world. A border dispute erupted between Cambodia and Thailand in 2025. At the same time, tensions and conflict continued in Myanmar and Ukraine, intensified in Sudan, and escalated into a regional war in the Middle East.

Israel's military campaign in Gaza in response to Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 continued. In September 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel reported that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.⁵⁴ Although a ceasefire was announced in October 2025, the situation in Gaza and in Palestine remained unstable and the human toll on civilians continued to increase. UN Women reported that more than 38,000 women and girls, an average of at least 47 per day, were

killed in Gaza between October 2023 and December 2025.⁵⁵ In January 2026, Israel Defense Forces 'accepted the estimate of the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry that approximately 71,000 Palestinians were killed during the Israel-Gaza war'.⁵⁶ The same Ministry of Health, however, estimated that 591 Palestinians were killed and 1,578 injured between the ceasefire of October 2025 and mid-February 2026.⁵⁷ Israel announced a ban on some humanitarian non-governmental organizations working in Gaza,⁵⁸ and 21 States—all States Parties to the ATT—released a joint statement calling for humanitarian access in Gaza.⁵⁹

Instability and conflict did not remain limited to the State of Palestine but spread across the whole Middle East. In February 2026, the United States and Israel started a war against Iran, which responded by attacking US bases in the region and regional allies. Concerned by the actions of the United States, which included the strike on Minab Primary School resulting in the deaths of 168 people, many of them children, over 100 US-based international law experts signed an open letter stating that American strikes on Iran may amount to war crimes.⁶⁰

At the same time, Israel continued and intensified its bombing campaign in Lebanon against the Iranian-backed armed group Hezbollah. It conducted numerous airstrikes and ground attacks, particularly in the South of Lebanon, that caused a humanitarian crisis, displaced hundreds of thousands of people and damaged critical civilian infrastructure.⁶¹

51 The White House (2026). 'Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States'. Presidential Memoranda. 7 January 2026. tinyurl.com/3fjzchhr.

52 Liang, X. et al. (2026). 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). April 2026. tinyurl.com/4a8w7fsj, p. 1.

53 George, M. et al. (2026). 'Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). March 2026. tinyurl.com/mryww453, p. 1.

54 Human Rights Council (2025). 'Legal Analysis of the Conduct of Israel in Gaza Pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel'. 16 September 2025. A/HRC/60/CRP.3. tinyurl.com/m2jtk8dt; and United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2025). 'Israel Has Committed Genocide in the Gaza Strip, UN Commission Finds'. Press Release. 16 September 2025. tinyurl.com/4fezywfp.

55 UN Women (2026). 'Advocacy Brief: The Cost of the War in Gaza on Women and Girls'. 17 April 2026. tinyurl.com/mnn8j8wz; and Le Poidevin, O. (2026). 'Average of 47 Women and Girls Killed Daily During Gaza War, UN Says'. Reuters. 17 April 2026. tinyurl.com/yjrpdk5n.

56 Kubovich, Y. and Hasson, N. (2026). 'IDF Accepts Gaza Health Ministry Death Toll of Over 71,000 Palestinians Killed During the War'. Haaretz. 29 January 2026. tinyurl.com/4pbk9pna.

57 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2026). 'Gaza Humanitarian Response | Situation Report No. 67'. 13 February 2026. tinyurl.com/4pfe79ty.

58 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2026). 'Israel: Ban on 37 Aid Groups Makes Life Unbearable for Genocide Survivors in Palestine, Say UN Experts'. Press Release. 15 January 2026. tinyurl.com/mtzpz4cu.

59 Government of the Netherlands (2026). 'Joint Statement on Humanitarian Access in Gaza and the Registration Law Affecting INGOS'. Diplomatic Statement. 8 June 2026. tinyurl.com/yjnrsvr. The statement was also signed by the European Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management.

60 Dannenbaum, T. et al. (2026). 'Over 100 International Law Experts Warn: U.S. Strikes on Iran Violate UN Charter and May Be War Crimes'. Just Security. 13 April 2026. tinyurl.com/ms45xd3b; and Singh, K. (2026). 'US Experts Say American Strikes on Iran May Amount to War Crimes'. Reuters. 2 April 2026. tinyurl.com/yb56p2d6.

61 Christou, W. (2026). 'Vision of Destruction: Israel's Assault on Southern Lebanon in Video, Maps and Charts'. The Guardian. 11 May 2026. tinyurl.com/4bn7stw6; and Ward, E. (2026). 'Nearly 700,000 Displaced by War in Lebanon, U.N. Says'. The New York Times. 10 March 2026. tinyurl.com/2y89tey.

The conflict in Sudan continued unabated. In February 2026, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that the scale, severity and impact of the acts of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) presented 'indications pointing to genocide in and around El-Fasher', as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁶² Reports published by non-governmental organizations and research institutes indicated that military materiel used in the Sudan war also included equipment originating from ATT States Parties such as Bulgaria, China, France, and Serbia.⁶³ In particular, some military materiel, including materiel from European States, appeared to have been originally exported to the United Arab Emirates and, from there, allegedly transferred to the RSF.⁶⁴

Facing an extremely volatile and challenging global situation characterised by an increasing number of global conflicts, several States, including ATT States Parties, have taken measures and policy decisions to stop or limit transfers of military materiel to belligerent parties. Switzerland decided that, in line with its principle of neutrality, the export of war materiel to countries involved in the international armed conflict with Iran, including exports of war materiel to the United States, 'cannot be authorised for the duration of the conflict'.⁶⁵ Other States Parties stopped or suspended arms transfers to Israel. For instance, Spain approved an arms embargo on Israel,⁶⁶ Slovenia banned arms trade with Israel,⁶⁷ and Canada suspended new export authorizations for arms transfers that could be used in Gaza.⁶⁸ Following court decisions and efforts from civil society organizations, the Netherlands halted the export of F-35 aircraft

components to Israel and Belgium prohibited the transit of military equipment destined for Israel.⁶⁹ Similarly, Colombia and South Africa co-chaired a meeting of States in The Hague Group that presented a series of measures to ensure accountability and the enforcement of international law in Palestine. These included 'prevent the transfer, transit, or carriage of arms, munitions, military fuel, and dual-use items to Israel—including through export restrictions, port controls, and flag-state responsibilities—in full compliance with international law'.⁷⁰

The decisions of some States to ban or suspend arms transfers are in line with the object and purpose of the Treaty and with States Parties' Treaty obligations, although they were not all primarily and explicitly motivated by the ATT. As States Parties are developing a five-year strategy for the ATT, it is important that they continue to debate arms transfer decisions and cases of practical application of Articles 6 and 7 under the framework of the ATT and particularly in the WGETI. These discussions can help demonstrate how the Articles of the Treaty and their related legal obligations shape arms transfer decisions in practical terms. Such discussions will also give States Parties an opportunity to prove that, in their day-to-day export and transfer decisions, they are fulfilling obligations under the ATT to uphold 'the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms'.⁷¹ In doing so, States Parties can provide illustrations of how they are striving to achieve the object and purpose of the Treaty, through practical case studies that can be utilised in the ATT strategy to demonstrate the Treaty's effectiveness and impact.

62 United Nations Human Rights Council (2026). 'Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher'. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan. 17 February 2026. [A/HRC/61/77. tinyurl.com/3c3ewb33](https://tinyurl.com/3c3ewb33), p. 18. See also: United Nations Human Rights Council (2026). 'Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher Reveals Genocidal Campaign, Targeting Non-Arab Communities. UN Fact-Finding Mission Says'. 17 February 2026. tinyurl.com/428vedxy; and Townsend, M. (2026). 'Heroism, Horror and the 'Pits of Hell': Inside the Last Days of El Fasher'. The Guardian. 25 March 2026. tinyurl.com/7rys78uv.

63 Brabant, S. (2025). 'Who is Fuelling the Sudan 2023 Civil War?'. Focus Paper 56. Royal Higher Institute for Defence. Brussels: Belgium. tinyurl.com/2x66jbe3; and Devoto, M.P. (2026). 'Sudan's Forgotten Catastrophe'. SANE Policy Institute. 12 May 2026. tinyurl.com/4uessdt9.

64 Gadeva, E. and Peschard, Q. (2025). 'European Weapons in Sudan (1/5): Bulgarian Mortar Shells in Darfur's Desert'. France 24. 17 April 2025. tinyurl.com/48br82ub. See also: Amnesty International (2025). 'Sudan: Advanced Chinese Weaponry Provided by UAE Identified in Breach of Arms Embargo – New Investigation'. 8 May 2025. tinyurl.com/3zt55dcg; Amnesty International (2024). 'Sudan: French-manufactured Weapons System Identified in Conflict – New Investigation'. 14 November 2024. tinyurl.com/2zctknzh; and Kaamil, A. (2024). 'French Military Systems in Sudan May Break UN Arms Embargo, Says Amnesty'. The Guardian. 14 November 2024. tinyurl.com/2s48ut5v.

65 The Federal Council (2026). 'Iran Conflict: Impact on War-relevant Exports'. Press Release. 20 March 2026. tinyurl.com/4tufj5nb.

66 Le Monde with AFP (2025). 'Spanish Parliament Approves Israel Arms Embargo'. Le Monde. 8 October 2025. tinyurl.com/5axa5nnu.

67 Zerdin, A. (2025). 'Slovenia Bans Arms Trade with Israel over Its Actions in Gaza'. AP. 1 August 2025. tinyurl.com/hsdv9b49.

68 Cecco, L. (2024). 'Canada to Halt Arms Sales to Israel after Non-Binding Vote in House of Commons'. The Guardian. 19 March 2024. tinyurl.com/2ukbp965. The decision does not influence indirect transfers and purely defensive goods. Germany also halted arms exports to Israel that could be used in Gaza from August to November 2025. See Knolle, K. and Alkousaa, R. (2025). 'Germany Halts Arms Exports that Israel Can Use in Gaza'. Reuters. 8 August 2025. tinyurl.com/5ecc5rs3; and Al Jazeera Staff and News Agencies (2025). 'Germany Lifts Curbs on Arms Exports to Israel, Citing Gaza Ceasefire'. Al Jazeera. 17 November 2025. tinyurl.com/5xp5hbbt.

69 Fuller, H. (2026). 'Belgium Halts UK Military Shipment Bound for Israel Amid Legal Scrutiny'. Military.com. 18 April 2026. tinyurl.com/4xsemcsv; Mulla, I. (2026). Belgium Seizes Arms Shipment Sent from Britain to Israel'. Middle East Eye. 15 April 2026. tinyurl.com/2pd42bby; and PAX (2025). 'Crucial Victory: Export of F-35 Parts to Israel Remains Prohibited'. 14 November 2025. tinyurl.com/5agbh57h. In November 2025, the Netherlands government decided that the export of F-35 parts to Israel remained prohibited. In June 2026, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reassessed and confirmed this decision, see PAX (n.d.). 'Rechtszaak Tegen Nederlandse Staat: Stop Levering Voor F-35's' [Lawsuit Against Dutch State: Halt Delivery of F-35s]. tinyurl.com/452wtcc.

70 The Hague Group (2026). 'Co-Chairs' Statement: The Hague Group Meeting on Accountability and the Enforcement of International Law in Palestine—The Hague, 4 March 2026'. Emergency Meeting, March 2026 The Hague. tinyurl.com/4yej9e5j.

71 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

THE 2026 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 focuses on the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) and the ATT. The chapter highlights synergies between both instruments and explores how the use and humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas can and should inform and shape arms export risk assessments. It analyses how commitments to the EWIPA Political Declaration can strengthen ATT implementation in practice, identifying practical entry points for enhancing coherent implementation of the two frameworks.

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth look at the 2024 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties' reporting practices that contribute to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty, as well as to a higher standard of transparency. Despite an increase in the number of annual reports submitted compared with the same time last year, both the overall reporting rate for 2024 and the proportion of States Parties submitting meaningfully transparent reports hit their lowest levels.

Chapter 3 conducts a summary assessment of 2025 annual reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline of 31 May. The chapter includes an overview of the United Kingdom's experience in updating its initial report, providing valuable lessons for States Parties that plan to update their initial reports.

The Annex includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2024 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting practice metrics (public reporting, on-time reporting and withholding information for commercial sensitivity or national security-related reasons), as well as a summary of areas of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number of transfers and status of export/import partners.



A CC-130J HERCULES STATIONED ON THE AIRFIELD IN SUPPORT OF AIR TASK FORCE PRESTWICK PRIOR TO FLIGHT ON 31 JANUARY, 2023, IN SCOTLAND, UNITED KINGDOM.

CREDIT: © MASTER CORPORAL DESIREE BOURDON, CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

**SOLDIER IN TACTICAL GEAR DURING
MILITARY EXERCISES IN ARGENTINA.**

CREDIT: © VALENTIN ANGEL FERNANDEZ



CHAPTER 1 – THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

The supply of arms has a direct bearing on the means and methods of warfare available to States and other actors when violence escalates. Decisions about which arms are transferred, and to whom, shape the tools available for use in situations of crisis or armed conflict. Patterns of weapon use, and the harm inflicted on civilian populations, are therefore highly relevant indicators for decisions concerning the supply and transfer of weapons. Where particular weapons or practices have been associated with civilian harm, this knowledge should be included in risk assessments that shape decision-making on arms exports.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas presents distinct and foreseeable humanitarian risks. When explosive weapons are used in these areas, civilians are killed and injured, and civilian infrastructures damaged or destroyed. The reverberating effects stemming from the resulting disruption or collapse of essential services extend well beyond the point of impact and can persist for weeks, months, or even years after a conflict ends. These patterns of harm have been documented across multiple conflicts and are widely recognized as predictable consequences of the use of such weapons in urban environments.¹

At the international level, however, the regulation of conventional arms transfers and efforts to address the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas have largely developed through separate legal and political processes. Arms transfers, export risk assessments and export controls are governed principally through the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), while efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians arising from the use and humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas are pursued through the 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA).

Despite this separation at the global policy level, there is significant overlap in terms of the conventional weapons addressed by both instruments and the shared humanitarian objective of reducing civilian harm.

This chapter examines how coherent implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration can strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It first identifies the shared humanitarian objectives and complementary nature of the two instruments before examining the documented patterns of civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. It then considers how these patterns, alongside commitments and evidence emerging from implementation of the EWIPA Political Declaration, can inform the prospective risk assessments required under article 7 of the ATT. Finally, it identifies practical opportunities for States to strengthen implementation of both instruments in a mutually reinforcing manner, supporting more responsible transfer decisions and reducing civilian harm.

SETTING THE STAGE – EXAMINING THE SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ATT AND THE EWIPA DECLARATION

The ATT was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in April 2013 with the aim of establishing the highest standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms and preventing their illicit trade and diversion. This object is set out with the purpose to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability; reduce human suffering; and promote cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among them.²

In November 2022, the EWIPA Political Declaration was developed and endorsed by 83 States as a response to the unprecedented levels of civilian harm arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in contemporary armed conflicts.³ The Declaration was negotiated in recognition that, despite existing international humanitarian law (IHL), recurring patterns of civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas persisted. It therefore establishes shared political commitments aimed at strengthening civilian protection through national policy, military doctrine and operational practice, with a particular focus on preventing foreseeable civilian harm before it occurs. As this use continues to be a major cause of civilian death, injury,

1 See, for instance: Explosive Weapons Monitor (2025). 'Explosive Weapons Monitor 2024'. May 2025. tinyurl.com/mtww68vr; ICRC (2022). 'Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas'. January 2022. tinyurl.com/22eykpmn; and Wille, C. and Malaret Baldo, A. (2021). 'Menu of Indicators to Measure the Reverberating Effects on Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas'. UNIDIR. 23 February 2021. tinyurl.com/3yhjff2.

2 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

3 Explosive Weapons Monitor (2025). 'Explosive Weapons Monitor 2024'. May 2025. tinyurl.com/mtww68vr, p. 6.

displacement and the destruction of homes, infrastructure and livelihoods, the EWIPA Political Declaration seeks to comprehensively address these humanitarian consequences by committing endorsing States to develop national policies and practices to strengthen the protection of civilians.⁴

The EWIPA Political Declaration establishes specific political commitments that endorsing States are expected to implement. Among these, the central normative contribution of the Declaration is the commitment to 'restrict or refrain', as appropriate, from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when such use 'may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects'.⁵ Particular concern has been expressed regarding explosive weapons with wide area effects⁶ (sometimes referred to as 'heavy explosive weapons'), as extensive evidence demonstrates that these weapons pose the greatest risk of civilian harm when used in populated areas. More broadly, the EWIPA Political Declaration seeks to strengthen the protection of civilians by promoting policies and practices that support more effective implementation of existing obligations under IHL.

The EWIPA Political Declaration also reflects a shared recognition by States of two well-established realities. First, the risk of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is influenced by characteristics such as explosive power, the accuracy of delivery and the number of munitions used. Weapons possessing these characteristics—particularly those capable of producing wide area effects—pose especially severe risks. Second, both the direct and indirect (reverberating) effects of these weapons on civilians and civilian objects have been extensively documented across a wide range of armed conflicts. Together, this recognition means that States can no longer credibly argue that the humanitarian consequences associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas are uncertain or unforeseeable. The documentation of these patterns of harm, together with the shared understanding reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, provides an important body of evidence concerning foreseeable civilian harm.

The significance of the EWIPA Political Declaration extends beyond the conduct of military operations by endorsing States themselves. Commitment 4.8 requires endorsing States to 'seek adherence' to the EWIPA Political Declaration and to practices consistent with it by all parties to armed conflict, reflecting the Declaration's broader ambition to influence State practice globally.⁷ Together with commitment 3.1,⁸ which requires endorsing States to implement, review, develop or improve national policies and practices to strengthen the protection of civilians during armed conflict, commitment 4.8 provides a basis for considering responsible arms transfer policy as one means of giving practical effect to the EWIPA Political Declaration. Although the Declaration does not explicitly regulate arms transfers, endorsing States should therefore consider, before authorizing the export of explosive weapons, whether a proposed recipient may reasonably be expected to use those weapons—particularly explosive weapons with wide area effects—in populated areas, taking into account its past conduct, military doctrine and operational practice. Where there is a foreseeable risk that transferred weapons may be used in ways that are inconsistent with the commitments reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, restraint in arms transfers provides one practical means through which States can seek broader adherence to those commitments.

Although the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration are distinct—one a legally-binding treaty and the other a politically-binding declaration—both are preventative in orientation, seeking to assess risks of, and prevent harm to civilians from the use of weapons before it occurs. Overlap in these shared goals—as well as purpose and principles, membership, and scope—presents an opportunity for States to adopt policy approaches that strengthen civilian protection and better support implementation of both instruments.

SHARED PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

Despite taking very different regulatory approaches, both instruments are preventative in orientation. The ATT regulates the international transfer of conventional arms by requiring States Parties to assess the risk that exported arms

4 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (adopted 18 November 2022). tinyurl.com/bdhdjbbd.

5 Ibid., para 3.3.

6 See ICRC (2022). 'Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas'. January 2022. tinyurl.com/22eykpmn; and Boillot, L. (2025). 'Avoiding Civilian Harm by Restricting or Refraining from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas'. Policy Briefing. May 2025. tinyurl.com/mrg76hsh.

7 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (adopted 18 November 2022). tinyurl.com/bdhdjbbd, para 4.8.

8 Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) (2026). 'Civilian Harm and Arms Transfers: A Primer on International Law and Policy'. June 2026. tinyurl.com/6u7dfdt.

could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL or international human rights law (IHRL) (Article 7).⁹ The EWIPA Political Declaration addresses the use of explosive weapons in populated areas by committing endorsing States to 'restrict or refrain' as appropriate, from such use where it may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects.¹⁰ Both instruments are grounded in the protection of civilians during armed conflict and seek to influence State behaviour in ways that strengthen respect for IHL and reduce human suffering.

Other obligations and commitments of both instruments reflect additional shared principles. Both instruments explicitly recognize the duty of States to respect IHL and IHRL—and, under IHL, the broader duty to ensure respect for it by others. International cooperation, transparency and information sharing are fundamental to both instruments. In this regard, the role of data collection, research and analysis is central to strengthening ATT implementation efforts and improving the transparency of the conventional arms trade. Data collection is likewise essential to progress on implementation of the EWIPA Political Declaration, which facilitates learning and changes to military policy and practice that strengthen the protection of civilians.

OVERLAP IN MEMBERSHIP OR ENDORSEMENT

There is considerable overlap between States Parties to the ATT and States that have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration, creating opportunities for greater policy coherence without imposing additional obligations or administrative burdens. Seventy-four States are both Parties to the ATT and have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration,¹¹ and seven Signatories of the ATT have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration.¹²

Even where States are Parties to the ATT but have not endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration or have endorsed the Declaration without being Parties to the ATT, aligning practice with the shared humanitarian objectives of both can contribute meaningfully to enhanced civilian protection outcomes.

SYNERGIES IN SCOPE

Explosive weapons are 'a broad category of weapons that use high explosives to create a zone of blast and fragmentation in the area around the point of a detonation'.¹³ Explosive weapons, or explosive weapon systems, include munitions with an explosive payload and their delivery systems.¹⁴

Heavy explosive weapons, also referred to as explosive weapons with 'wide area effects', are especially problematic when used in populated areas.¹⁵ Explosive weapons with wide area effects will affect an area significantly greater than that of the intended target. There are three characteristics of weapons that create wide area effects, either individually or in combination:

- A substantial blast and fragmentation radius resulting from a large explosive content;
- Inaccuracy of delivery, meaning that explosive munitions may land anywhere in a wider area; and
- The use of multiple warheads or multiple firings, sometimes designed to spread, affecting a wide area.¹⁶

The range of conventional arms in the scope of the ATT includes many explosive weapons. Those that are prone to wide area effects can be found in the ATT's major conventional arms categories (a)—(g) (see Table 1). Other explosive weapons can be found in the sub-categories of light weapons, including smaller munitions and hand-held or portable delivery systems.

9 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 'Arms Trade Treaty, 2 April 2013'. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Databases. tinyurl.com/vjpmenzn. See also: Arms Trade Treaty, Articles 6 and 7 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

10 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (adopted 18 November 2022). tinyurl.com/bdhdjbbd.

11 ATT States Parties that have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration, as of 31 May 2026, are Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

12 ATT Signatory States that have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration are Cambodia, Comoros, Kiribati, Malaysia, Thailand, Türkiye and the United States of America. The United States has signed the ATT but no longer intends to become a State Party.

13 Explosive Weapons Monitor (2023). '2021-2022: Two Years of Global Harm to Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons'. April 2023. tinyurl.com/yece52zp, p. 4.

14 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2022). 'Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas'. Geneva. January 2022. tinyurl.com/22eykpmn, p. 64.

15 See, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2022). 'Explosive Weapons: Civilians in Populated Areas Must Be Protected'. 26 January 2022. tinyurl.com/mvk4a6gs.

16 Article 36 and PAX (2020). 'Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects and Risk to Civilians'. Background Note. February 2020. tinyurl.com/45n5xhnp.

Table 1 – ATT conventional arms and explosive weapons

ATT conventional arms categories ¹⁷	Description including the munitions and delivery systems of explosive weapons ¹⁸
(a) Battle tanks	Armoured fighting vehicles equipped with a direct fire gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre. Tank gun projectiles, including high explosive munitions that fragment on impact and are used to target armoured and unarmoured vehicles, structures or personnel. ¹⁹
(b) Armoured combat vehicles	Vehicles with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either equipped to transport a squad of infantrymen, or armed with a missile launcher or a weapon of at least 12.5 millimetres calibre.
(c) Large-calibre artillery systems	Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars or multiple launch rocket systems, capable of engaging targets on the ground by indirect fire, with a calibre of 75 millimetres and above. Artillery gun projectiles and mortars are gun-launched, indirect-fire projectiles that are typically unguided, ²⁰ while ground-launched rocket artillery may be fired from a wide range of platforms and can be found in a variety of sizes and capabilities. ²¹
(d) Combat aircraft	Manned or unmanned fixed-wing aircraft equipped to employ guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons. This includes both guided and unguided air-dropped bombs, which compared with other categories of munitions are typically large (up to more than 2,000 kilograms). ²²
(e) Attack helicopters	Manned or unmanned rotary-wing aircraft equipped to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons.
(f) Warships	Vessels or submarines armed for military use and equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range. Naval artillery mounted on warships may be used to engage missiles and aircraft, attack other vessels or land-based targets. Most munitions fired by these artillery systems are unguided. ²³
(g) Missiles and missile launchers	Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres and means designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets.
(h) Light weapons	Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; and mortars of calibres less than 75mm.

17 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 2.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

18 Definitions of categories of major conventional arms are from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). 'Categories of Major Conventional Arms'. tinyurl.com/4xpxynkd. Examples of arms included in the ATT's light weapons sub-categories are from the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep. 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, p. 29.

19 Open Source Munitions Portal (n.d.). 'Tank Gun Projectiles'. tinyurl.com/ygmf696h.

20 Open Source Munitions Portal (n.d.). 'Artillery Gun Projectiles'. tinyurl.com/ynty5fdu; and Open Source Munitions Portal (n.d.). 'Mortar Projectiles'. tinyurl.com/bu4me8kf.

21 Open Source Munitions Portal (n.d.). 'Rockets and Missiles'. tinyurl.com/4aspstw8.

22 Open Source Munitions Portal (n.d.). 'Air-delivered Bombs'. tinyurl.com/fyy8ktmf.

23 Dullum, O. S., et al. (2017). 'Indirect Fire: A Technical Analysis of the Employment, Accuracy, and Effects of Indirect-fire Artillery Weapons'. Armament Research Services (ARES). January 2017. tinyurl.com/5n6hevsk, pp. 35-36.

Article 5.3 of the ATT encourages States Parties to go beyond the minimum categories listed in Article 2(1).²⁴ States Parties can include additional arms not explicitly listed in the ATT's scope in their national control lists and systems. These can include explosive weapons that are directly-emplaced (e.g., anti-vehicle and anti-personnel landmines) rather than fired, launched or delivered.

Though not explicitly mentioned in the scope of the ATT, Article 3 makes clear that States Parties must maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition and munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms in Article 2(1) and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 ('Prohibitions') and Article 7 ('Export and Export Assessment') prior to authorizing their export.²⁵ Article 4 establishes similar obligations in relation to parts and components.²⁶

EWIPA CONSIDERATIONS AND ATT RISK ASSESSMENT

In relation to the ATT, the EWIPA Declaration compliments the law on arms transfers by strengthening the normative framework for reducing civilian harm. All States are required, at a minimum, to respect and ensure respect for IHL, including when making decisions relating to the transfer of arms. Many States have also accepted more specific obligations through regional export control arrangements and the ATT. Under Article 7 of the ATT, States Parties must assess the potential that exported conventional arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL or IHRL and must not authorize an export where, after considering available mitigation measures, there remains an overriding risk of such consequences.²⁷ As such it is designed as a forward-looking instrument intended to prevent foreseeable harm by requiring prospective assessments of foreseeable risk before an export is authorized. The shared understanding reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, together with the substantial body of evidence concerning the foreseeable humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, is directly relevant to the evidence base upon which such prospective risk assessments should be conducted.

EVIDENCE OF PATTERNS OF HARM

For more than a decade, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and civil society have collected and analysed evidence on the civilian impact of explosive weapons in conflict. As a result, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been identified as a leading cause of civilian harm in contemporary armed conflicts, and the resulting patterns of harm to civilians are well-documented and recognized in the EWIPA Political Declaration.

Documented civilian impacts of explosive weapons include direct deaths and injuries, and the damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure. They also include reverberating effects, which cause harm to civilians beyond the time of an explosion and location of the immediate blast zone. These effects take numerous forms and can also stem from damaged infrastructure. They include disrupted access to essential services, such as healthcare, sanitation, water and electricity supply, and education. Such impacts also affect the environment, cause widespread displacement, and inflict disability and psycho-social trauma on individuals and communities.²⁸ The impacts of explosive weapons may also vary among women, men, girls and boys.²⁹

The frequency and consistency of these outcomes across different contexts indicate they should not be treated as incidental or context-specific, but as evidence of inherent and foreseeable risk in a number of active armed conflicts throughout the world. Whether through aerial bombardment in Gaza and Ukraine, shelling in Sudan and Myanmar, or the use of rockets and missiles in densely populated areas across the Middle East, the use of explosive weapons has humanitarian consequences and continues to disproportionately impact civilians.

24 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5(3) (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

25 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

26 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 4 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

27 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 7.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

28 Morais Figueiredo, B. and Young, K. (2024). 'Understanding Civilian Harm from the Indirect or Reverberating Effects of the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Strengthening Data Collection to Implement the Political Declaration'. Workshop Report. UNIDIR and Explosive Weapons Monitor. March 2024. tinyurl.com/tfyhpf7.

29 For more information on the gendered impacts of explosive weapons, see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (2024). 'Gendered Impacts of the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas'. tinyurl.com/mu2432bd.

CASE STUDIES – FORESEEABLE RISK TO CIVILIANS FROM EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS

These case studies illustrate situations of armed conflict in which harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons has been well-documented. They underscore the need for ATT States Parties, when assessing export applications, to proactively examine available information from multiple sources on a recipient's past and current use of explosive weapons. Additionally, States Parties should assess the broader context in relation to any ongoing or risk of armed conflict to determine whether there is a significant risk that exports of explosive weapons could be used in ways that cause serious civilian harm.

These case studies are illustrative rather than exhaustive. They are intended to demonstrate how documented patterns of harm can inform prospective risk assessments under Article 7.

Gaza

Israel's repeated use of explosive weapons in populated areas across successive military operations has generated extensive evidence regarding patterns of use and the resulting humanitarian consequences for civilians.³⁰ These patterns became particularly acute following the attacks of 7 October 2023, when Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups launched rockets and deployed fighters into southern Israel, killing around 1,200 people. Israeli armed forces responded with a military campaign marked by extensive aerial bombardment together with the use of artillery and other ground- and sea-launched explosive weapons during subsequent ground operations in Gaza.³¹

The impacts of the Israeli armed forces' aerial campaign have been particularly catastrophic for civilians. According to US intelligence, Israeli armed forces dropped at least 29,000

explosive munitions in Gaza during the first two months of the conflict alone, of which nearly half were unguided bombs.³² Munitions also included 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs, the latter of which has an estimated crater size of 14 meters.³³ A 2,000-pound bomb was used in an airstrike on the Jabalia refugee camp on 31 October 2023, killing at least 126 civilians, including 69 children.³⁴ Prior to the October 2025 ceasefire, government officials in Gaza estimated that Israeli armed forces dropped approximately 100,000 tonnes of explosives on the Gaza strip over the course of two years.³⁵ Fighter jets, such as F-35s, were utilized by Israeli armed forces to drop heavy explosive munitions.³⁶

As of October 2025, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported nearly 81 per cent of all structures in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed, including 89 per cent of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) assets, and 145 cultural and historical sites. It also reported food insecurity and malnutrition remain long-term issues for civilians on a large scale.³⁷

The use of explosive weapons by Israeli armed forces—and the resulting patterns of harm—was not limited to Gaza. In Lebanon, aerial and ground attacks by Israeli armed forces in densely populated areas, in response to rocket fire from Hezbollah after 7 October 2023, caused civilian casualties, damage and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, displacement and disruption of essential services. Israeli airstrikes during conflict escalation on 23 September 2024 were especially devastating for Lebanese civilians, on a scale akin to the first weeks of Israeli military action in Gaza in 2023.³⁸ During the 2026 war with Iran, similar attacks in South Lebanon have killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, caused a humanitarian crisis and damaged critical civilian infrastructure such as housing, farmland, transportation links and schools.³⁹

30 Young, K. (2023). 'Unprecedented Harm to Civilians in Gaza: Death and Injury from the Use of Air-Dropped Explosive Weapons in Densely-Populated Gaza'. *Fragments: Explosive Weapons Monitor Quarterly Series*, Vol. 1, Issue 2. December 2023. tinyurl.com/yef3gkxh.

31 For examples of incidents in which ground- or sea-launched explosive weapons were allegedly used by Israeli armed forces in Gaza, see: Airwars. 'Civilian Casualty Archive'. Accessed on 26 May 2026. [Archive. tinyurl.com/2tb638ys](https://archive.tinyurl.com/2tb638ys).

32 Betrand, N. and Bo Lillis, K. (2023). 'Exclusive: Nearly Half of the Israeli Munitions Dropped on Gaza Are Imprecise 'Dumb Bombs,' US Intelligence Assessment Finds'. *CNN Politics*. 14 December 2023. tinyurl.com/yc74znxa.

33 Pax and Article 36 (2016). 'Areas of Harm: Understanding Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects'. October 2016. tinyurl.com/495tefhp, p. 11.

34 Young, K. (2023). 'Unprecedented Harm to Civilians in Gaza: Death and Injury from the Use of Air-Dropped Explosive Weapons in Densely-Populated Gaza'. *Fragments: Explosive Weapons Monitor Quarterly Series*, Vol. 1, Issue 2. December 2023. tinyurl.com/yef3gkxh.

35 Aladam, M. (2025). 'Death Toll in Gaza Rises as Ceasefire Allows Rescuers to Search Rubble'. *Middle East Eye*. 22 January 2025. tinyurl.com/5n95ua55.

36 Amnesty International (2025). 'Over 230 Global Organizations Demand Governments Producing F-35 Jets to Stop Arming Israel'. 21 February 2025. tinyurl.com/mr35c45e.

37 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2026). 'Reported Impact Snapshot | Gaza Strip (8 April 2026)'. 10 April 2026. tinyurl.com/uf5wyuer.

38 Young, K. (2025). 'Escalation of Explosive Weapons Use in Lebanon: Humanitarian Consequences on Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure'. *Fragments: Explosive Weapons Monitor Quarterly Series*, Vol. 3, Issue 1. March 2025. tinyurl.com/5cdckuk8.

39 Christou, W. (2026). 'Vision of Destruction: Israel's Assault on Southern Lebanon in Video, Maps and Charts'. *The Guardian*. 11 May 2026. tinyurl.com/4bn7stw6; Saifi, Z. et al. (2026). 'The Gaza Playbook: Satellite Images Reveal Scale of Israeli Destruction in Lebanon'. *CNN*. 24 April 2026. tinyurl.com/mwet6hsk; and Ward, E. (2026). 'Nearly 700,000 Displaced by War in Lebanon, U.N. Says'. *The New York Times*. 10 March 2026. tinyurl.com/2y89tey.

Among the different transfers of arms to Israel, in March 2024, the United States authorized the transfer of 1,800 MK84 2,000-pound bombs, 500 MK82 500-pound bombs, and 25 F-35A fighter jets and engines fulfilling previously notified sales.⁴⁰ In addition, several ATT States Parties have indirectly provided parts and components of explosive weapons to the Israeli armed forces. For example, a consortium of countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States) participate in the production of parts and components for F-35 aircraft as part of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The components are ultimately exported to the United States for integration into the aircraft, of which dozens have been supplied to Israel.⁴¹ Transfers of parts and components are largely managed through general licences and final decisions on exports of complete F-35 aircraft, including to Israel, are taken by the United States.⁴²

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) can be traced back decades to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.⁴³ The Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23), which formed in 2012, has since clashed periodically with the armed forces of DRC in eastern DRC's towns and cities, most notably Goma. Extensive evidence of human rights violations emerged from these clashes.⁴⁴

At the beginning of 2024, increased use of explosive weapons in populated areas in North and South Kivu, in eastern DRC, exacerbated the humanitarian crisis that

developed over decades of conflict. Frequent use of heavy explosive weapons by both the Congolese armed forces and the Rwandan-backed M23 in eastern DRC's towns and cities, and the resulting surge in civilian casualties, marked a new phase of armed conflict in the country. The use of ground-launched unguided rockets, including 122mm Grad rockets, as well as mortars and artillery by both parties to the conflict, has had devastating consequences for civilians and generated evidence of serious human rights violations.⁴⁵

Amnesty International reported that between January and July 2024, explosive weapons were launched more than 150 times into densely populated areas, killing over 100 civilians and wounding hundreds more.⁴⁶ In one incident on 3 May 2024, a rocket killed at least 18 civilians, including 15 children, when it hit the 8ème CEPAC internally displaced persons (IDP) camp north-west of the city of Goma. The rocket was likely fired by M23 in response to additional rocket fire by Congolese armed forces that were positioned near the camp. Thirty civilians were also wounded, 28 of whom were women and children.⁴⁷

The ICRC also documented significant civilian harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in eastern DRC since mid-2024. In North Kivu, healthcare facilities reported that 40 per cent of injured civilians seeking care were victims of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, including shelling and use of other heavy weapons.⁴⁸ Hospitals, such as Ndosho hospital in Goma, became overwhelmed and were forced to operate beyond capacity.⁴⁹

40 Hudson, J. (2024). 'U.S. Signs Off on More Bombs, Warplanes for Israel'. Washington Post. 29 March 2024. tinyurl.com/2hh5caac. For a list of arms transfers to Israel, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 'SIPRI Arms Transfers Database'. Accessed on 26 March 2026. tinyurl.com/yc3bdttt.

41 Hudson, J. (2024). 'U.S. Signs Off on More Bombs, Warplanes for Israel'. Washington Post. 29 March 2024. tinyurl.com/2hh5caac.

42 See for instance: Control Arms Secretariat (2025). 'ATT Monitor Report 2025'. Geneva. 25 August 2025. tinyurl.com/yyhtbn2p, pp. 28-30; Gallagher, K. (2025). 'Global Production of the Israeli F-35 Joint Strike Fighter'. Project Ploughshares. January 2025. tinyurl.com/3sahay2e; and Hussain, Z. (2025). 'How Top Arms Exporters Have Responded to the War in Gaza: 2025 Update'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 3 October 2025. tinyurl.com/mrx2828v.

43 United Nations (2026). 'Use of Explosive Weapons 'Must Stop' in Eastern DR Congo: Türk'. 9 July 2026. tinyurl.com/ckjnumc2.

44 Human Rights Watch (2022). 'DR Congo: Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians'. 25 July 2022. tinyurl.com/zhcjwf3n.

45 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2026). 'Democratic Republic of Congo'. Populations at Risk. 16 March 2026. tinyurl.com/mry44s5a; and Amnesty International (2025). 'DR Congo: Rwandan-backed Armed Group and Congolese Army Must Stop Using Explosive Weapons in Densely Populated Areas'. 19 January 2025. tinyurl.com/mtvgdwad.

46 Amnesty International (2025). 'DR Congo: Rwandan-backed Armed Group and Congolese Army Must Stop Using Explosive Weapons in Densely Populated Areas'. 19 January 2025. tinyurl.com/mtvgdwad.

47 Ibid.

48 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 'DR Congo: Civilians in the Firing Line as Use of Heavy Weapons Signals Alarming New Phase of Armed Conflict in the East'. 6 March 2024. tinyurl.com/2yx5apx9.

49 Ibid.

In January 2025, M23 attacks intensified in both North and South Kivu, once again compounding the humanitarian crisis and displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians.⁵⁰ Physicians for Human Rights reported that M23's takeover of the city of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, resulted in the shelling of the Charité and Virunga hospitals.⁵¹ IDP camps were bombed and civilians were re-displaced, access to humanitarian aid was restricted by closed roads, and shelling forced temporary cessation of healthcare activities in parts of North Kivu.⁵²

Reported arms transfers to Rwanda in the last decade include, among others, large-calibre artillery systems, such as the export of RM-70 122mm multiple rocket launchers authorized by Slovakia in 2018 and delivered in 2019, as well as CS/SH-1 122mm truck-mounted self-propelled howitzers authorized by China in 2017 and delivered in 2018.⁵³ Reported past arms transfers to DRC also include large-calibre artillery systems, such as the export of D-20 152mm towed guns authorized by Bulgaria in 2013 and delivered in 2015, as well as 120mm mortars authorized and delivered by Serbia in 2012.⁵⁴ More recently, China authorized the export of nine CH-4B armed drones to the DRC, which were delivered in 2024.⁵⁵ These drones can be armed with AR-1 and AR-2 air-to-surface missiles, AKD-10 anti-tank missile, and FT- and GB-series guided bombs.⁵⁶

INCORPORATING EWIPA CONSIDERATIONS INTO ATT RISK ASSESSMENT

Incorporating analysis on an end user's past and current practices of explosive weapon use into ATT risk assessments can help identify foreseeable risks of civilian harm and strengthen the humanitarian goal of both instruments. Past practice is relevant not simply because it demonstrates previous harmful incidents, but because repeated patterns of use provide evidence of foreseeable future risk. The commitments reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration, together with the documentation of the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, provide an important body of evidence

that can inform the prospective assessments required under Article 7 of the ATT. This, in turn, assists exporting States Parties in determining whether there is an overriding risk that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL.

Incorporating these EWIPA-related considerations into ATT risk assessments offers a number of practical benefits. First, such analysis enhances the quality of risk analysis by grounding them in empirical evidence of humanitarian consequences concerning how particular weapons are used in populated areas, while ensuring that export decisions reflect up-to-date information about patterns of harm, operational practice and documented incidents, such as the examples above. Second, identifying these considerations as specific indicators within article 7 risk assessment can promote greater consistency in the application of the ATT by supporting more structured assessments of whether there is an 'overriding risk' that exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL. Third, it encourages greater coherence between implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration, enabling States that are Parties to the ATT and have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration to give practical effect to the shared humanitarian objectives of the two instruments through existing export control processes.

Explosive weapons are typically held by military or paramilitary forces for use in armed conflict, though they are also used in some contexts of conflict by non-state armed groups. Where a State uses such weapons within its own territory—particularly in populated areas—this should be understood as a warning signal of an escalating crisis. It may indicate a transition from policing to military force, limited State capacity to manage instances of insecurity through law-enforcement means or a breakdown in protection obligations toward civilians. While each situation requires an assessment of its own facts and circumstances, such patterns may provide an early indication of foreseeable risks of further escalation and increasing civilian harm and are therefore relevant considerations in prospective ATT risk assessments.

50 International Organization on Migration (IOM) (2025). 'Democratic Republic of the Congo'. Displacement Tracking Matrix. April 2025. tinyurl.com/4ydwazza.

51 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2026). 'War Watch: IHL in Focus Report – 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2025'. February 2026. tinyurl.com/47yw7hcz, p. 126.

52 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2025). 'UNHCR Gravely Concerned by Worsening Violence and Humanitarian Crisis in Eastern DR Congo'. Briefing notes. 24 January 2025. tinyurl.com/3snrxyp8.

53 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 'SIPRI Arms Transfers Database'. Accessed on 26 March 2026. tinyurl.com/yc3bdttt.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Army Recognition (2023). 'Congo Armed Forces Receive 9 Chinese CASC CH-4 Rainbow Combat Drones'. 4 July 2023. tinyurl.com/3mfvkyu3.

INDICATORS OF PATTERNS OF HARM ASSOCIATED WITH EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS

Indicators that reflect the real-world patterns of harm associated with explosive weapons in populated areas may include:⁵⁷

- The conduct of military operations involving explosive weapons in populated areas, particularly the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects including those with large blast and fragmentation radii, and/or those prone to inaccuracy or that fire multiple munitions across an area
- Credible reporting of civilian casualties or damage to essential civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, water systems or energy facilities
- Patterns of weapons use against civilians
- Spikes in displacement
- The absence of credible investigations into alleged violations
- Broader dynamics of escalating armed conflict and rising civilian harm, as indicators of possible future risks for civilians in populated areas.

LINKING EWIPA CONSIDERATIONS WITH ATT RISK ASSESSMENT: CURRENT PRACTICES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Some States and different stakeholders have already begun to incorporate considerations relevant to the EWIPA Political Declaration into arms transfer policy and practice. This section highlights examples of current practice and identifies opportunities for further strengthening coherence between implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration.

AREAS OF CURRENT STATE POLICY AND PRACTICE

State practice in linking civilian harm considerations to arms export decisions can be observed across several areas.

Formal export control policies

Several States have explicit references to IHL compliance and ongoing armed conflict as risk indicators in their export control frameworks.⁵⁸ These frameworks provide a logical entry point for developing more explicit policies. Specifically, they allow States to examine an end-user's past and present conduct, assess patterns of civilian harm, and incorporate EWIPA Political Declaration considerations, such as the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, strengthening export assessment criteria ensuring they reflect patterns of harm in current armed conflicts.



⁵⁷ See Moyes, R. (2012). 'State Use of Explosive Weapons: An Indicator of Crisis'. Article 36. January 2012. tinyurl.com/25cadrw5.

⁵⁸ Explosive Weapons Monitor (2025). 'An Assessment of Implementation of the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas'. Briefing Paper. November 2025. tinyurl.com/yy7mdagc.

NEW ZEALAND'S EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

New Zealand completed the review of its criteria for assessing proposed exports of 'military, dual use and catch-all goods' under its export controls regime in 2023. Under these criteria, the proposed export, its end-user and potential end use, will be assessed against both the legal obligations and non-legally binding commitments New Zealand has undertaken in respect of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. In guidance on its assessment criteria, the EWIPA Political Declaration is explicitly listed as an example of the non-legally binding commitments that will be taken into account in the assessment of a proposed export.⁵⁹

Decisions to suspend and deny arms exports

In a number of contexts, States have suspended, denied or revoked exports to parties in armed conflict, including Saudi Arabia in relation to the conflict in Yemen and Israel in relation to the conflict in Gaza.⁶⁰

In several instances, governments have referred to concerns regarding international humanitarian law, the humanitarian situation or the potential use of transferred weapons in military operations in populated areas. For example, in 2024 Canada suspended new arms export permits to Israel following parliamentary debate concerning the humanitarian situation in Gaza,⁶¹ while the United States temporarily paused the export of approximately 3,500 2,000 lb and 500 lb bombs in May 2024 over concerns they could be used during military operations in Rafah.⁶² The 500 lb bomb hold was reversed later in the Biden administration; the 2,000 lb hold remained in place until the administration's end and was then reversed. No further official suspensions have followed, though several legislative efforts to block specific transfers have failed to gain sufficient support, and the United States has continued transferring substantial arms to Israel since.⁶³

These decisions have not occurred in isolation: they have followed sustained public pressure, findings and recommendations from UN Commissions of Inquiry and Special Rapporteurs, litigation before domestic courts, and provisional measures proceedings before the International Court of Justice concerning Gaza—all of which have kept the question of continued arms transfers under active scrutiny. However, States rarely explain in detail how evidence of civilian harm, legal and political obligations are weighed in individual export decisions. Greater transparency about the reasoning behind a denial would allow States Parties to demonstrate compliance with their ATT obligations and commitment to the EWIPA Political Declaration. In practice, however, States often have limited incentive to do so, since detailed public reasoning can constrain their political flexibility to resume exports to the same recipient once circumstances change. This makes it difficult to assess precisely how documented patterns of civilian harm are incorporated into Article 7 risk assessments or whether the commitments reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration influence decision-making in practice. One example of good practice is the Netherlands, which reports annually on its strategic export control policy and provides information on export licence denials and the reasons underpinning those decisions.⁶⁴ Greater transparency along these lines could support more consistent, preventative application of Article 7, while reinforcing the preventive objectives of the EWIPA Political Declaration.

Risk assessments under Article 7 should be evidence-based, and an export recipient's past conduct legitimately forms part of that basis. However, current practices face critical issues regarding thresholds and timing. In practice, export denials are too often enacted only after sustained or large-scale civilian harm has accumulated in a specific conflict, rather than on the basis of foreseeable risk identifiable at an earlier stage. Documented patterns of harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas provide precisely the type of evidence that should inform prospective risk assessments, not only retrospective ones. Systematically integrating EWIPA-relevant evidence into export risk assessments could help shift these decisions toward a more consistent and preventative application of the ATT.

59 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.). 'Assessment Criterion 1' tinyurl.com/4uy3j548.

60 See, for example, Knolle, K. and Alkousaa, R. (2025). 'Germany Halts Arms Exports that Israel Can Use in Gaza'. Reuters. 8 August 2025. tinyurl.com/5ecc5rs3; and Muresan, R. (2021). 'Renewed Hope for Yemen as More Countries Halt Arms Transfers to Saudi-led Coalition'. Control Arms. 3 February 2021. tinyurl.com/2mh3vv8t.

61 Cecco, L. (2024). 'Canada to Halt Arms Sales to Israel after Non-Binding Vote in House of Commons'. The Guardian. 19 March 2024. tinyurl.com/zukbp965.

62 Flaherty, A. and Boccia, C. (2024). 'US Withheld Bomb Shipment to Israel Out of Fears It Could Be Used in Rafah'. ABC News. 8 May 2024. tinyurl.com/y3u7y3tz.

63 Forum on the Arms Trade (n.d.). 'Biden Administration Arms Sales and Transfers to Israel'. Last updated February 2025. tinyurl.com/jf64bkmh; and Forum on the Arms Trade (n.d.). 'Trump Administration Arms Transfers and Sales to Israel'. tinyurl.com/3rft4ksn.

64 Government of the Netherlands (n.d.). 'Reporting Practices with Regard to Military and Dual-use Goods'. tinyurl.com/y5h3yy5y; and Minister for Foreign Trade and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. (2025). 'Dutch Export Policy on Strategic Goods in 2024'. tinyurl.com/4uecf3f.

Oversight and review bodies

Parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review and litigation have become increasingly important mechanisms through which States' arms export decisions are examined. These processes have highlighted the importance of the humanitarian and civilian harm evidence underpinning export risk assessments, including documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. However, this trend is not uniform: in some jurisdictions, oversight of these processes has narrowed rather than

expanded.⁶⁵ While transparency surrounding export denials and risk assessments remains limited in many jurisdictions, in some cases these oversight mechanisms have helped clarify expectations regarding Article 7 risk assessments and the evidence on which they are based. They may also influence policy and legal developments beyond the jurisdictions in which they operate, contributing to the emergence of more consistent approaches to export risk assessment across States.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL
INSPECTING A FIGHTER
JET ON THE RUNWAY IN
RIONEGRO, COLOMBIA.**

CREDIT: © CAMILO OSPINA



⁶⁵ In the United Kingdom, the Committees on Arms Export Controls—the dedicated cross-committee body scrutinising strategic export licensing, drawing on the Defence, Foreign Affairs, Business and Trade, and International Development Committees—ceased to operate from January 2024, when responsibility was folded into the Business and Trade Committee's wider remit. Brooke-Holland, L. (2024). 'An Introduction to UK Arms Exports'. House of Commons Library (CBP-8312, 24 January 2024). tinyurl.com/mt3f5k9r; and Brooke-Holland, L. (2025). 'UK Arms Exports to Israel'. House of Commons Library (CBP-9964, 8 January 2025). tinyurl.com/3ujjhmxa. In the United States, annual public reporting on Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales has shifted to more aggregated figures in recent years, reducing visibility into those sales; a similar trend is documented in the Department of Defense's budget justifications for military aid programmes. Yousif, E. (2024). 'Diminishing Transparency in the US Arms Trade'. Stimson Center. 9 July 2024. tinyurl.com/ye8jrxta.

LITIGATION AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: THE UNITED KINGDOM, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS

Litigation under the ATT and related national export control frameworks has become an important mechanism for scrutinising government export decisions. Unlike other arms control and disarmament instruments, the ATT has generated sustained judicial review, placing governments on notice that export decisions may face legal challenges.

In the United Kingdom, litigation by the Campaign Against Arms Trade led to a 2019 Court of Appeal judgment on UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the Yemen conflict.⁶⁶ The court found the government had acted unlawfully in granting licences without properly considering potential IHL breaches, giving particular weight to evidence from UN bodies and non-governmental organizations. The ruling required suspension of new licences, but in July 2020 the UK resumed licensing, concluding the incidents were 'isolated' rather than a pattern.⁶⁷ More recently, a separate challenge over the UK's continued export of F-35 components to Israel via the global supply pool—despite a September 2024 partial suspension of other licences—was dismissed by the High Court in June 2025, which held the F-35 'carve-out' was non-justiciable; the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal in November 2025.⁶⁸ These cases show courts can find harm-evidence legally relevant, while still treating the ultimate decision as one for the executive, not the judiciary.

The Italian Parliament adopted a motion in June 2019—explicitly referencing the UK Court of Appeal judgment—calling for restrictions on arms transfers to members of the Saudi-led coalition. The government then suspended

the export of aircraft bombs, missiles and their components to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for 18 months.⁶⁹ In January 2021, those licences were permanently revoked, cancelling an export of more than 12,700 bombs—the first such decision in three decades under Italian Law 185 on Arms Exports.⁷⁰

In the Netherlands, the Court of Appeal of The Hague ordered the government in February 2024 to halt export of F-35 components to Israel, citing a clear risk they could be used in serious IHL violations in Gaza.⁷¹ The government appealed, and in October 2025 the Supreme Court overturned that order, ruling courts must exercise restraint in foreign and security policy and that the Minister has the authority, but is not obliged, to reassess a granted licence.⁷² It held, however, that once a government does reassess—as here, following 7 October 2023 and Israel's subsequent operations—it must apply the ATT's and the EU Common Position's mandatory criteria, including refusal where a clear IHL risk exists. The Minister was ordered to reassess within six weeks. In November 2025, the Dutch government wrote to the parliament that the suspension would continue, stating it would be unreasonable to resume the export of F-35 components at this time—meaning the practical effect of the 2024 Court of Appeal order has persisted, achieved through the government's own reassessment rather than a binding judicial prohibition.⁷³ In June 2026, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reassessed and confirmed this decision.⁷⁴

66 Courts and Tribunal Judiciary (2019). 'Campaign Against Arms Trade v Secretary of State for International Trade'. [2019] EWCA Civ 1020. 20 June 2019. tinyurl.com/sez4pcsp. See also Campaign Against Arms Trade (2025). 'CAAT's Legal Challenge'. 8 September 2025. tinyurl.com/3kwye49.

67 UK Secretary of State for International Trade (2020). 'Trade Update'. Statement UIN HCWS339. 7 July 2020. tinyurl.com/32vvj56x.

68 Courts and Tribunal Judiciary (2025). 'Al-Haq v Secretary of State for Business and Trade'. [2025] EWHC 1615 (Admin). 30 June 2025. tinyurl.com/2kbt8sdt; and Courts and Tribunal Judiciary (2025). 'Al-Haq -v- Secretary of State for Business and Trade'. [2025] EWCA Civ 1433. 12 November 2025. tinyurl.com/466dae52.

69 Camera dei Deputati [Chamber of Deputies - Italy] (2019). Mozione 1/00204 [Motion 1/00204]. 24 June 2019. tinyurl.com/dpkzfuhk.

70 See: European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) (2021). 'The Italian Government Revokes Bomb Export Licenses to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Civil Society Organizations Welcome the Decision'. 29 January 2021. tinyurl.com/ydp6u9vu.

71 Court of Appeal of The Hague, State of the Netherlands v. Oxfam Novib et al., judgment of 12 February 2024, ordering the Netherlands to cease the export and transit of F-35 parts destined for Israel because of a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. See: Court of Appeal in The Hague (2024). 'ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:191' (Unofficial translation). 12 February 2024. tinyurl.com/27s2hdyg.

72 Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), case no. 24/01340, judgment of 3 October 2025, ECLI:NL:HR:2025:1435 tinyurl.com/4mhvwt7h, overturning the Court of Appeal's order and ruling that the Minister must perform the reassessment of the F-35 export licence again, applying the criterion of whether granting the licence poses a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law. See: Hoge Raad Der Nederlanden (2025). 'Supreme Court: Minister Must Perform Reassessment of Licence to Export F-35 Parts to Israel Again'. 3 October 2025. tinyurl.com/2k2ysg22.

73 PAX (2025). 'Crucial Victory: Export of F-35 Parts to Israel Remains Prohibited'. 14 November 2025. tinyurl.com/5agbh57h.

74 PAX (n.d.). 'Rechtszaak Tegen Nederlandse Staat: Stop Levering Voor F-35's' [Lawsuit Against Dutch State: Halt Delivery of F-35s]. tinyurl.com/452wtcc.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Building on current practice, several practical opportunities exist for States to strengthen coherence between implementation of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration. None of these measures would create new legal obligations or additional export criteria. Rather, they would strengthen the evidence base upon which existing Article 7 risk assessments are conducted by drawing more systematically on documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

Opportunities for strengthening risk analysis

Eighty-one States that are States Parties or Signatories of the ATT have also endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration. This overlap creates an opportunity for more coherent implementation. Exporting States could strengthen prospective risk assessments by drawing more systematically on a recipient's past and current use of explosive weapons in populated areas, patterns of damage to civilian infrastructure, foreseeable reverberating effects, military doctrine and operational practice including those reflected in the EWIPA Political Declaration. Such information provides a stronger evidential basis for assessing foreseeable risk under Article 7.

Strengthening the evidence available to support these assessments is equally important. Integrating specific EWIPA-related considerations into ATT decision-making supports the Treaty's purpose of reducing human suffering, improves legal risk management and reinforces the EWIPA Political Declaration's objective of protecting civilians from the harmful effects of explosive weapons in populated areas. Continued development of civilian harm tracking, investigation mechanisms, lessons-learned processes and public reporting can improve understanding of the humanitarian consequences associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. These mechanisms not only support implementation of the EWIPA Political Declaration by informing military policy and practice but can also improve the quality of ATT risk assessments by generating more systematic evidence concerning patterns of weapons use, civilian harm and the effectiveness of mitigation measures.

Other opportunities for synergies in States' implementation and engagement

Additional opportunities exist to strengthen coherence in implementation at both the national and multilateral levels. At the national level, States that are Parties to the ATT and have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration could review export control policies, military doctrine and civilian protection policies together, ensuring that implementation of one instrument informs implementation of the other.

At the multilateral level, States could draw more explicitly on the relationship between these instruments during Conferences of States Parties and Working Group meetings under the ATT, as well as during international conferences and intersessional meetings held under the EWIPA Political Declaration. ATT discussions could examine how documented patterns of civilian harm associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas are incorporated into Article 7 risk assessments. Conversely, discussions under the EWIPA Political Declaration could consider responsible arms transfer policy as one practical means through which endorsing States may seek adherence to the Declaration's commitments by all parties to armed conflict, consistent with commitment 4.8. While the EWIPA Political Declaration does not explicitly refer to the transfer of explosive weapons, this commitment and commitment 3.1 to implement, review, develop or improve, national policy and practice on the protection of civilians during armed conflict, can support States in adopting arms transfer policies aimed at avoiding the civilian harm associated with use of explosive weapons in populated areas. In practice, States considering the export of explosive weapons—particularly those with wide-area effects—should assess whether a proposed recipient may reasonably be expected to use them in densely populated areas, including on the basis of the recipient's past conduct. Greater exchange of good practice across these forums would support more coherent implementation of both instruments.

Better coordination between these processes would reinforce the complementary objectives of the ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration. By ensuring that documented patterns of civilian harm and the evidence generated through EWIPA implementation are more systematically reflected in export risk assessments, States Parties can strengthen both the preventative application of Article 7 and broader efforts to protect civilians from the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

CONCLUSION

The ATT and the EWIPA Political Declaration have largely developed through separate legal and political processes. Yet they are complementary instruments that seek, through different means, to reduce human suffering and strengthen the protection of civilians. The ATT regulates the transfer of conventional arms, while the EWIPA Political Declaration establishes political commitments regarding their use. Read together, they provide mutually reinforcing frameworks through which States can strengthen the protection of civilians before harm occurs.

The EWIPA Political Declaration does not create new legal obligations governing arms transfers, nor does it alter the legal standard established by Article 7 of the ATT. Rather, it strengthens the evidence base available for prospective risk assessments by reflecting States' shared recognition of the foreseeable humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and by promoting policies and practices that improve understanding of civilian harm. That evidence is directly relevant to the prospective assessment of foreseeable risk required under Article 7.

The relationship between the two instruments is also reciprocal. The ATT provides one practical means through which endorsing States can give effect to their commitments

under the EWIPA Political Declaration. Where States have recognised, through the Declaration, the foreseeable humanitarian consequences associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and have committed to restrict or refrain from such use, to strengthen national civilian protection policies and to seek adherence to those commitments by all parties to armed conflict, those commitments should inform how they assess the export of explosive weapons under Article 7 of the ATT.

Accordingly, where States that have endorsed the EWIPA Political Declaration fail to take account of the evidence and commitments reflected in the Declaration when conducting ATT risk assessments, questions arise not only as to whether Article 7 assessments have fully reflected foreseeable risk, but also as to whether those States are giving practical effect to the commitments they have undertaken under the EWIPA Political Declaration. Conversely, by systematically incorporating this evidence into export risk assessments, strengthening transparency surrounding export decisions and continuing to improve civilian harm tracking and analysis, States can reinforce implementation of both instruments in a mutually reinforcing manner and strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict.



**CH-53 HELICOPTER
AIRLIFTING A HOWITZER.**

CREDIT: © SOLY MOSES



**STUDENTS IN THE RECONNAISSANCE
AND SURVEILLANCE LEADERS
COURSE CONDUCT A PARADROP FROM
AN UH-60 BLACKHAWK HELICOPTER.**

CREDIT: © CAPT. STEPHANIE SNYDER,
U.S. ARMY

CHAPTER 2 – ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 2024 ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS¹

Achieving transparency in the international trade in conventional arms is a stated purpose of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and is fundamental to realizing its object and purpose.² Transparency among States Parties engaged in the arms trade is essential to fulfilling these goals and to the effective implementation of the Treaty. It also serves as an indicator of States Parties' commitment to monitoring, oversight and accountability under the ATT.

As per Article 13.3, ATT States Parties are obligated to submit an annual report detailing their authorized or actual arms exports or imports by 31 May each year.³ These reports are critical for enabling States Parties and other stakeholders to assess whether Treaty commitments are being fulfilled. Timely and transparent reporting of arms exports and imports is not only an obligation under the ATT, but is also foundational to building trust among States Parties and ensuring cooperation and accountability among arms-trading States. When governments report accurately and openly, they contribute to global security and demonstrate their commitment to the responsible trade in conventional arms.

Conversely, delays, omissions or vague reports weaken the ATT's credibility and make it difficult to assess whether obligations are being met. Submitting detailed, disaggregated and public reports ensures meaningful oversight and helps identify risks or patterns in arms transfers. For these reasons, compliance with Article 13.3 is a practical necessity for the ATT to work effectively.

The analysis of 2024 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and lists States Parties that have met meaningful and higher standards of transparency in their reports. The methodology by which each category is assessed is explained below.

The 2024 reporting year saw an increase in States Parties that submitted annual reports by the 1 February cut-off date, marking a positive development in annual reporting rates. Despite this improvement, analysis of 2024 annual reports reveals persistent challenges in achieving accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. Several States Parties submitted overdue reports for previous years. When overdue reports are taken into account, both the overall submission rate and the proportion of annual reports considered meaningfully transparent for 2024 were the lowest recorded since the Treaty entered into force. This underscores the continued insufficiency of progress on both indicators.

KEY FINDINGS

- For the 2024 reporting year, only 77 States Parties (68 per cent) required to submit an annual report did so. This is the lowest reporting rate since the process began in 2015, but the number and percentage are higher compared to last year's percentage as of 1 February. Among these, 50 States Parties (44 per cent) submitted their reports on time, a proportion in line with 2023.
- Twenty-four States Parties (31 per cent of submitted reports) submitted a confidential annual report for 2024. The number and share of confidential reports rose from three (6 per cent) in 2015 to a peak of 26 (34 per cent) in 2020, before beginning to decline. While 2024 marks an increase from 2023, which saw the submission of 21 (27 per cent) confidential reports, it remains below the peak levels observed between 2020 and 2022.
- Only 26 States Parties (23 per cent) required to submit an annual report submitted one that was meaningfully transparent. This proportion is the lowest recorded since the Treaty's entry into force. In particular, the percentage of annual reports that disaggregated data by trading partners has dropped to 59 per cent, the lowest rate on record.
- Thirty-eight States Parties (34 per cent) provided descriptions for some or all transfers reported, while 30 of the reports (27 per cent) contained comments covering some or all transfers.
- Sixteen States Parties (14 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2024 complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.

1 For a country-by-country assessment of the 2024 annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat, see the Country Profiles in the Annex.

2 One of the purposes of the ATT is 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'. Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

3 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu. Article 13.1 of the Treaty asks each State Party to provide within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty 'an initial report to the Secretariat of measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures'.

METHODOLOGY

Annual reports were downloaded from the ATT Secretariat website for analysis on 1 February 2026. Reports later submitted by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. Each year the ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the deadline for annual reports to be included in this chapter to ensure adequate time for an in-depth analysis as well as the possibility to compare findings and trends across years.

This chapter examines annual reporting trends that indicate whether States Parties' reporting practices are becoming more or less transparent. It examines ATT annual reporting on three levels to evaluate whether (and to what degree) the reporting obligations and transparency objectives of the ATT have been fulfilled. ATT Monitor analysis considers whether annual reports:

1. Are compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations.
2. Are meaningfully transparent, contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty.
3. Contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

For each level, the ATT Monitor established specific criteria upon which annual reports are evaluated. These criteria are provided below.

Distinct evaluation exercises were undertaken for each level of reporting to distinguish between (1) Treaty obligations (Article 13.3 reporting requirements), (2) the minimum amount of information the ATT Monitor has determined is needed for reports to be meaningfully transparent and to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty, and (3) additional information that, when provided, contributes to a higher standard of transparency (for example, comments on the nature of reported transfers). The analysis of each category separately allows the examination of different levels of commitment to transparency.

Using all of these criteria in one exercise to evaluate annual reports would not have produced an easily understood analysis regarding transparency. For example, even though an annual report submitted after the reporting deadline does not meet Article 13.3 obligations, it may still include information that is meaningfully transparent and contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

The submission of 'nil' reports for exports and/or imports may also fulfil Article 13.3 reporting obligations and the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Even without transfer data, the affirmative act of reporting 'nil'—indicating there were no exports

or imports in a given year—still provides transparency on States Parties' transfer activities. By providing such a window, those who submit 'nil' reports may still have an equivalent commitment to transparency.

The analysis considers annual reports for all years, including those submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, the numbers presented in this report concerning annual reports covering the years 2015 to 2023 differ slightly from those presented in previous ATT Monitor Reports.

This analysis only evaluates information provided by States Parties in annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat. It does not seek to determine whether all transfers are reported or to independently verify the accuracy of that information. As such, this analysis is not a general measure of transparency for all arms transfers.

STATES PARTIES' COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Article 13.3 of the Treaty requires States Parties to submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports during the previous calendar year by 31 May of each year. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if:

1. It is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
2. It is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).⁴
3. Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or relevant 'nil' reports indicating that no arms were transferred.

ARTICLE 13.3

Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1). Reports shall be made available and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

4 ATT annual reports are due by 31 May each year. However, States Parties are granted a seven-day grace period by the ATT Secretariat, translating into a de facto deadline of 7 June.

In total, 113 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on exports and imports for 2024 by 31 May 2025. Only 77 (68 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2026 cut-off date for analysis.⁵


SUBMITTING REPORTS TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT

The number of annual reports submitted for 2024 represents a slight decrease compared to prior years. The number of annual reports submitted for 2024 totalled 77, compared to 78 submitted for 2023 and 79 for both 2022 and 2021, when considering late reports submitted for these years. As the number of States Parties has increased, the reporting rate has declined—from 87 per cent in 2015 to 68 per cent for 2024 (see Figure 2.1). This marks the lowest percentage of due

annual reports submitted since the ATT came into force. Both the number and percentage of submitted reports are higher compared to 2023 annual reports at last year's ATT Monitor cut-off date of 1 February 2025, which was respectively 69 and 62 per cent.

The number of annual reports due for 2024 (113) is higher than that for 2023 (112). Andorra was due to report for the first time on 31 May 2025, but did not do so. The Bahamas and Guyana submitted a report for the first time, after not having done so in previous years. Thirteen States Parties did not submit a 2024 annual report by 1 February 2026, even though they had submitted an annual report in one or more previous years.⁶ An additional 23 States Parties have never submitted an annual report.⁷

FIGURE 2.1 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



- 5 The following States Parties have submitted an annual report for 2024 by 1 February 2026: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay. Samoa submitted an annual report for 2024 after the 1 February cut-off date and as of 7 June 2026; therefore, its report is not included in the count of submitted reports. The analysis presented in this chapter also considers reports from previous years that have been submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, numbers presented here for reports covering the years 2015 to 2023 may differ from those presented in previous ATT Monitor reports.
- 6 Austria, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Zambia. Of these, four States Parties (Austria, Kazakhstan, Republic of Moldova and Suriname) did not submit a 2024 annual report by 1 February 2026, after having submitted one for 2023.
- 7 Afghanistan, Andorra, Belize, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo.

Four States Parties have a mixed record of reporting and submitted a 2024 annual report.⁸ Seventy-one States Parties have submitted an annual report for every year that one was due.⁹

Between 1 February 2025 and 1 February 2026, the following States Parties submitted previously overdue annual reports: Antigua and Barbuda (2022 and 2023), Austria (2023), Botswana (2020), Brazil (2019), Cameroon (2021, 2022 and 2023), Greece (2023), Guatemala (2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022 and 2023), Iceland (2022 and 2023), Malta (2023), Panama (2021 and 2022), Paraguay (2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023), Philippines (2023). The ATT Monitor commends these States Parties for fulfilling their reporting obligations, particularly those that were able to clear their entire backlog.¹⁰ Late reporting remains valuable and contributes to the goals of transparency and accountability under the Treaty.

SUBMITTING ANNUAL REPORTS ON TIME

Fifty States Parties (44 per cent of due reports) complied with the Treaty obligation to submit an annual report by the 31 May deadline.¹¹ The remaining 27 States Parties (24 per cent of due reports) submitted their report between the reporting deadline and the ATT Monitor's cut-off date for analysis.¹² It is worth noting that the ATT Monitor bases its calculation of on-time reporting on the information posted by the ATT Secretariat on its website by the de facto deadline of 7 June,

operating under the assumption that reports were posted promptly on the ATT Secretariat's website. The percentage of annual reports submitted on time for 2024 is the same as in 2023. The rate of on-time reporting has plateaued at 44 per cent after dipping to 35 per cent in 2022.¹³

REPORTING BOTH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS COVERED BY ARTICLE 2.1

All States Parties that submitted a public annual report complied with the Article 13 obligation to report on arms exports and imports. Costa Rica submitted a 'nil' report for exports but did not tick the relevant box on the first page of the reporting template to make such an indication. Panama submitted a 'nil report' for exports, but also retained the export section of the reporting template and inserted the word 'zero' in the relevant fields. Ten States Parties submitted 'nil' reports only for exports and recorded this information accordingly in the front-page box related to the contents of the report.¹⁴

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2024, which is equivalent to the number and share of States Parties having done so for 2023 (Figure 2.2).¹⁵ These States Parties submitted public annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline, which included data on arms exports and imports or 'nil' reports.

8 Burkina Faso, Iceland, Paraguay and Seychelles.

9 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

10 Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Greece, Guatemala, Malta, Panama and the Philippines.


11 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

12 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Nigeria, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

13 Control Arms Secretariat (2025). ATT Monitor Report 2025. Geneva. 25 August 2025. tinyurl.com/yyhtbn2p, p. 55.

14 Benin, Botswana, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Lesotho, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Information on States Parties that submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports is provided later in the chapter.

15 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

FIGURE 2.2 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS FULLY COMPLIANT WITH ARTICLE 13.3**MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS**

The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent and to contribute to the object and purpose of the ATT, an annual report should, at a minimum:¹⁶

1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.
2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
3. Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/exporter.
4. Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).¹⁷
5. Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

States Parties can submit 'nil' reports indicating they did not export or import any arms, while still contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Therefore, the ATT Monitor also considers that an annual report can be meaningfully transparent if the State Party has clearly submitted a 'nil' report for exports or imports (or both).


IDENTIFYING MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

Based on the ATT Monitor's methodology, only 26 annual reports for 2024 (23 per cent of all reports due) met the above criteria and were therefore considered meaningfully transparent.¹⁸ Figure 2.3 shows the number and percentage of meaningfully transparent annual reports by year. The highest percentage of annual reports deemed meaningfully transparent was in 2015 (46 per cent), the first year that States Parties were obligated to submit annual reports detailing arms transfers.

¹⁶ These criteria were earlier presented in: Control Arms Secretariat (2021). 'ATT Monitor 2021'. New York. 30 August 2021. tinyurl.com/4765rd3u.

¹⁷ An authorized export or import has been approved by national authorities, while an actual export or import concerns the physical movement of weapons across a national border or a change in ownership. Authorizations are generally granted before the actual export takes place, sometimes years in advance. For more information, see Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep. 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, pp. 11-13.

¹⁸ Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

FIGURE 2.3 – NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF DUE ANNUAL REPORTS THAT WERE MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT

Meaningful transparency in reporting has generally declined as the number of States Parties required to submit annual reports has increased, due to the accession of new States Parties to the Treaty. In the last five years, the number of meaningfully transparent reports has remained consistently around 30. Importantly, as of the annual ATT Monitor 1 February cut-off date over the last five years, only 10 States Parties have consistently submitted meaningfully transparent reports,¹⁹ while a further 35 have done so for at least one (but not all) of these years.²⁰ This illustrates that a large number of States Parties that have reported publicly in the last five years have the capacity to submit meaningfully transparent reports, and have done so—although not consistently—in the past.

However, 2024 saw the lowest percentage of annual reports deemed meaningfully transparent by the ATT Monitor since annual reporting began. This percentage highlights persistent gaps in accurate and comprehensive reporting by States Parties.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

For the 2024 reporting period, a driver in the decrease of meaningfully transparent annual reports was an increase in confidential reporting.

Whereas ATT States Parties are obligated to submit annual reports to the ATT Secretariat, they may choose to submit annual reports confidentially, meaning that reports are only available to the Secretariat and other States Parties. Article 13 of the Treaty does not specify that reports should be made public, but that they 'shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat',²¹ without clarifying to whom they shall be made available.²² Public reporting is critical to enhancing transparency and provides a public record of annual arms transfers available to civil society, media, academia and the broader international community.²³

19 Canada, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru and Sierra Leone.


20 Albania, Argentina, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

21 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

22 For further discussion, see Marsh, N. and Karim, A. (2015). 'Article 13: Reporting'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds). 'Weapons and International Law: The Arms Trade Treaty'. Brussels: Larcier, pp. 213-231; and Casey-Maslin, S. et al. (2016). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 386-387.

23 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024). 'Impact of Arms Transfers on Human Rights: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'. A/HRC/56/42. tinyurl.com/y5aw37y8.

FIGURE 2.4 - NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CONFIDENTIAL ANNUAL REPORTS SUBMITTED



As reflected in Figure 2.4, 24 States Parties submitted a confidential report for 2024, representing 31 per cent, or nearly one-third, of all annual reports submitted.²⁴ While this is higher than the 21 (27 per cent) confidential reports submitted last year, it remains lower than the three preceding years, which saw 25 (32 per cent), 26 (33 per cent) and 26 (34 per cent) confidential reports submitted in 2022, 2021 and 2020, respectively.

Two States Parties (Burkina Faso and Slovakia) submitted confidential reports in 2024 after submitting public reports for 2023. The Seychelles submitted a confidential report after failing to submit a report the prior year. The Bahamas submitted a confidential report for 2024 after not submitting either public or private annual reports in any years since it joined the Treaty in 2014.

Finland submitted a public annual report covering its arms transfers in 2024. This follows Finland reporting its arms exports publicly and its imports confidentially for 2023, marking the first time a hybrid report was submitted to the ATT Secretariat. The ATT Monitor commends Finland for submitting a public report covering all transfers in 2024.

Among the States Parties that submitted an annual report for 2024, ten States Parties have consistently submitted confidential annual reports for all years when these were due.²⁵

Four States Parties submitted 'nil' annual reports, clearly indicating that they had neither exported nor imported any arms in 2024.²⁶ The remaining 49 annual reports, which contain data on arms transfers for 2024, are assessed in the remainder of this section.²⁷

DISAGGREGATING BY WEAPON TYPES AND BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER

Aggregating arms transfers by trading partner or weapon types prevents case-by-case analysis of exports and imports, thereby weakening the utility of the data presented and ultimately undermining transparency. As such, for annual reports to be considered meaningfully transparent, States Parties must clearly provide information disaggregated by the type of arms transferred and by importing and exporting States.

²⁴ Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia and State of Palestine.

²⁵ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte D'Ivoire, Guatemala, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Philippines and State of Palestine.

²⁶ Madagascar, Monaco, Palau and Sierra Leone.

²⁷ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

Disaggregating transfers by category of arms

For 2024, 46 States Parties (94 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) submitted annual reports that provided information that was adequately disaggregated by categories of arms.²⁸ Three States Parties (Australia, Belgium and Norway) aggregated some of their reported arms transfers and not others. Belgium reported some exports and imports under national categories, aggregating transfers of arms corresponding to category ML1 of the European Common Military List, which includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (0.50 inches) or less.

Disaggregating transfers by importer/exporter

Twenty-nine States Parties (59 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) provided fully disaggregated information by importer/exporter.²⁹ An additional 14 States Parties included adequate disaggregation by importer/exporter for some but not all categories of arms.³⁰ For example, Germany aggregated the temporary import of portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems from 'EU Member States', and Hungary reported the import of six manned attack helicopters from 'Germany/France'.

The annual reports of six States Parties did not provide any meaningful disaggregation by trading partner (Botswana, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Iceland, Ireland and Panama). In its annual report, Botswana reported the import of 815 rifles and carbines and 467 shotguns, but listed the exporters simply as 'Various States'. Both Iceland and Panama did not identify any trading partners. Costa Rica and El Salvador provided the total number of items imported in different categories of arms and an aggregated list of small arms exporters, with Costa Rica appearing to have made an error by listing these in the 'State of origin' column. Ireland reported both arms exports and imports but, for each category of exported or imported arms, it provided only total numbers and an aggregated list of importing/exporting States.

SPECIFYING WHETHER TRANSFERS CONCERN AUTHORIZATIONS OR ACTUAL TRANSFERS (OR BOTH)

Annual reports should also indicate whether transfers are actual or authorized, meaning whether reported transfers refer to the actual physical movement of goods or an authorization that an export or import may take place. States Parties typically base their annual reports on one or other types of data—for example, on authorizations (licenses or permits) issued by relevant officials, or on data on the physical movement of goods occurring in the reporting year that are collected by custom authorities. It is important for an annual report to indicate the type of data because there are important differences between the two. An authorized export may never take place if the order is cancelled or reduced, or the authorization is later revoked. Similarly, when authorized arms are actually transferred, they may cross national borders during a different reporting period than when the authorization was granted, even perhaps several years later. In addition, knowing whether arms transfers are authorized or actual is vital to understanding apparent discrepancies between reports produced by different States Parties.³¹ States Parties can decide to use different approaches in reporting authorized or actual transfers. However, the ATT Secretariat advises for the sake of consistency and continuity, States Parties should maintain their chosen reporting approach over time.³²

In 2024, thirty-seven annual reports (76 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) adequately indicated whether the data reported concerns authorized or actual transfers.³³ Nine annual reports provided an indication for some or most of the reported transfers,³⁴ with three annual reports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Finland) not providing information for any reported transfers.

28 Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

29 Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

30 Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

31 Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. New York. 11 September 2017. tinyurl.com/b9xrcr8p, pp.45-51.

32 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep. 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, p. 13.

33 Australia, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

34 Argentina, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia and Spain.

Four States Parties (Dominican Republic, Mexico, Montenegro and Peru) included some transfers that were categorized as both 'actual' and 'authorized' transfers. For example, apart from certain small arms imports (which were not specified), Mexico reported all its transfers were both authorized and actual. Three other States Parties also included some transfers that were categorized as both authorizations and actual transfers (Dominican Republic, Montenegro and Peru). The ATT reporting template allows for this approach, which may accurately reflect the situation if reports are based on two different data sources, one for authorizations and another for actual movements of arms, without discrepancies between the two. However, categorizing transfers as both limits the ability to obtain information about arms exports and imports from an annual report. To prevent potential misunderstandings, States Parties could clarify the data source through additional comments or, as suggested by the ATT Secretariat, submit two separate tables—one for authorizations and another for actual transfers.³⁵ In this regard, for cases when it ticked both boxes, Denmark explicitly specified the number of authorized and the number of actual transfers in the 'number of items' column of the ATT reporting template.

INDICATING THE NUMBER OF ARMS OR THEIR FINANCIAL VALUE

The ATT reporting template includes columns for States Parties to record the number of arms transferred or their financial value. This information is crucial to understand the magnitude of an arms transfer. All 49 of the annual reports containing data on transfers included the number of units or their financial value, although seven reports excluded data for specific transfers.³⁶ Of these, three States Parties (Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden) explicitly stated that information had been withheld for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security. For instance, the Netherlands clearly classified the quantities of F-16 manned combat aircraft, air defense systems, and .50 calibre heavy machine gun exports to Ukraine, indicating in two cases in the comments column that the information was being withheld due to national security regulations. Similarly, Sweden classified the quantities of exports of RBS 70 MANPADS to Latvia, as well as 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless multi-role weapon systems and AT4 anti-armour weapons to an aggregate number of recipients. This practice conforms to Article 13.3 of the Treaty, stating that annual reports 'may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information'.³⁷

REPORTING BOTH NUMBERS AND VALUES OF ITEMS

As per a guidance document issued by the ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting, States Parties must—at a minimum—report 'the number of items or the financial value of the exported and imported conventional arms' in their annual national reports.³⁸ The standardized ATT reporting template, which was most recently revised in 2021, includes two columns—one each for reporting the number of items transferred and for the financial value thereof.

Most States Parties that submit public annual reports choose to complete one of the columns, but not both. This is likely a result of whether their national control systems capture the number of units per transfer or the value of each transfer. In 2024, of the States Parties that submitted non-nil public

reports, ten (20 per cent) provided both numbers and values for at least some of their reported transfers.³⁹ However, only four of these States Parties (8 per cent) did so consistently for each transfer: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Peru and Uruguay.

Providing both the numbers of items transferred and their declared value is not required but constitutes good practice and contributes to a higher standard of transparency. This approach can also offer insight into the monetary value of certain major conventional arms, small arms and light weapons, and in other cases, ammunition and parts and components. This can inform a broader understanding of arms flows among arms trade monitors and civil society.

35 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhj3e, p. 13.

36 Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

37 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

38 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhj3e, p. 17.

39 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Japan, Malta, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia and Uruguay. Belgium reported numbers of units for transfers of the eight categories of arms of the ATT, and value for transfers of items covered in national categories.

CHANGES IN COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY

Table 1 shows the share of public annual reports since 2015 that meet the ATT Monitor’s criteria for meaningful transparency. The data highlights mixed trends in transparency of arms trade reporting.

- The number of reports disaggregated by category of arms has fluctuated over the years. In 2024, the percentage reached 94 per cent, which is the highest level since reporting began.
- The proportion of States Parties that disaggregated data by trading partners has sharply dropped since the peak of 83 per cent in 2020. In 2024, both the total number and overall share of States Parties doing so, just 29 (59 per cent), hit the lowest figure on record.
- There has been a decrease in the number of reports specifying whether data represents authorizations or actual transfers, declining from 96 per cent in 2015 to 76 per cent in 2024. The rate rebounded from 70 per cent in 2023, which was the lowest figure on record.
- The share of reports that include the number of units or financial value of transfers remained consistently high across the years. However, in 2024, the figure modestly dipped to an all-time low of 92 per cent, compared to 94 per cent in 2023.
- Overall, while improvements are evident in areas such as disaggregation by category of arms, the limited information on authorized versus actual transfers and, particularly, the decline in disaggregation by trading partners reflect significant challenges in maintaining transparency standards.

Table 1: Percentage of public annual reports (excluding ‘nil’ and early submissions) that meet the criteria for meaningful transparency

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Provided information disaggregated by weapon type	90%	86%	87%	85%	88%	93%	83%	82%	90%	94%
Provided information disaggregated by trading partner	65%	65%	64%	71%	76%	83%	79%	69%	70%	59%
Indicated whether transfer data reflects authorized or actual transfers (or both)	96%	94%	91%	92%	84%	87%	74%	86%	70%	76%
Provided the number of units or financial value (or both) for each transfer	96%	96%	98%	94%	98%	98%	98%	100%	94%	92%



OVERALL, WHILE IMPROVEMENTS ARE EVIDENT IN AREAS SUCH AS DISAGGREGATION BY CATEGORY OF ARMS, THE LIMITED INFORMATION ON AUTHORIZED VERSUS ACTUAL TRANSFERS AND, PARTICULARLY, THE DECLINE IN DISAGGREGATION BY TRADING PARTNERS REFLECT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE ATT MONITOR MEANINGFUL TRANSPARENCY CRITERIA

Twenty States Parties (18 per cent of all reports due) required to submit an annual report for 2024 submitted a meaningfully transparent report on time.⁴⁰ This rate is slightly lower than in the previous year, when 19 per cent of States Parties required to submit a report met these criteria.

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

The previous sections outlined the minimum reporting requirements for compliance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty and the criteria for meaningfully transparent annual reports as defined by the ATT Monitor. However, the Treaty encourages States Parties to provide additional information, thereby contributing to a higher standard of transparency. For example, Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including those on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms.⁴¹ The FAQ-type guidance document on annual reporting obligations, endorsed by the ATT Conference of States Parties, outlines possible ways for States Parties to include information on a wider range of items in their annual reports than those set out in the eight categories in Article 2.1.⁴²

Similarly, the reporting template provides the possibility for States Parties to include comments on each transfer and descriptions of the arms being exported or imported. In doing so, a report can provide additional context which can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, when reporting the import of 42 rifles and carbines from Germany, Serbia commented that these were defective goods which were being returned.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if States Parties do at least one of the following:

1. Include descriptions of reported transfers that provide details on the make, model and/or calibre of transferred conventional arms.
2. Include comments on reported transfers that provide details on the nature of the transfer, including information on end-use/end-user.
3. Include 'o', 'nil', '/' or any other indication that no transfers in relevant categories and sub-categories of arms were made.
4. Clearly indicate whether commercially sensitive or national security information was withheld, and if so, what information was withheld.
5. Report information via voluntary national categories that includes arms categories covered by Article 2.1, but not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (shotguns, etc.).
6. Report information via voluntary national categories that includes categories not covered by Article 2.1 (ammunition, parts and components, gas-powered firearms, etc.).
7. Include any other type of additional information, including national reports, detailed tables or annexes with information on categories of arms not covered by Article 2.1 (other types of aircraft, vessels and vehicles that fall outside the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) categories, or imaging, communications and radar items).
8. Include national definitions of reported categories of conventional arms.



TWENTY STATES PARTIES (18 PER CENT OF ALL REPORTS DUE) REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2024 SUBMITTED A MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT REPORT ON TIME. THIS RATE IS SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR, WHEN 19 PER CENT OF STATES PARTIES REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A REPORT MET THESE CRITERIA.

⁴⁰ Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uruguay.

⁴¹ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

⁴² Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, pp. 14-15.

DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTS

The ATT reporting template includes a column in which States Parties can provide a more detailed description of the item(s) transferred. Fifteen States Parties included descriptions for all the transfers they reported,⁴³ while an additional 23 States Parties included descriptions for at least some transfers.⁴⁴ This combined total (38 annual reports) is slightly lower than last year's figure (39 annual reports). Descriptions provide important contextual information that can help clarify the nature of a transfer. Panama, for example, used the column for 'descriptions' to indicate the calibres of its small arms imports.

The ATT reporting template also includes a column for States Parties to provide comments on the transfer. Ten States Parties provided comments on every transfer.⁴⁵ An additional 20 States Parties included comments on some transfers.⁴⁶ The combined figure of 30 annual reports that included comments on transfers is slightly higher than the number of annual reports from the previous year (28 reports). Comments can provide important information that further contextualizes a transfer. Hungary, for example, added comments to specify the end-users and end-use of its transferred arms. It also declared when arms were being transferred for the purposes of testing, demonstration or re-sale.

FILLING IN BLANK SPACES

While Article 13.3 of the Treaty allows States Parties to 'exclude commercially sensitive or national security information' (see next sub-section), leaving sections blank creates ambiguity. If a State Party leaves parts of its report blank, it is not possible to discern whether there were no transfers or if information has been withheld. Seventeen States Parties used symbols such

as 'o', '/' or '-' to indicate that no transfers of specific categories and/or sub-categories of arms had taken place during 2024.⁴⁷

In addition, Canada, Greece, Netherlands and the United Kingdom used the UNROCA template for their reports, which does not include rows for categories of arms for which no transfers are reported. This figure is lower than in 2023, when 23 States Parties (including those that used the UNROCA reporting template) made such indications.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

The ATT reporting template provides a checkbox for States Parties to indicate whether information has been withheld for commercially sensitive and/or national security-related reasons in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty. Forty-eight States Parties either checked 'yes', 'no' or used other means to indicate whether information was withheld in their 2024 annual reports.⁴⁸ This number is lower than in the previous year, when 52 States Parties provided this information. In contrast, five States Parties did not provide any such indication in their 2024 annual report, making it unclear whether information was withheld.⁴⁹ This is in line with the previous year, when five States Parties did not provide this clarification.

Seventeen States Parties indicated that information had been withheld for commercial or security reasons.⁵⁰ Among these, three explicitly specified the type of information being withheld by marking it as 'classified' or adding explanatory notes to the comments, either in relation to the specific number of units transferred or to the value thereof.⁵¹ For example, Belgium withheld the number of AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles exported to Ukraine and declared that the 'number [was] withheld for security reasons' in the column for comments.

43 Benin, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa and Uruguay.

44 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

45 Botswana, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Panama, Peru and Romania.

46 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

47 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Estonia, France, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Jamaica, Japan, Malta, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Sweden.

48 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. The Netherlands used the UNROCA reporting template, which does not provide a dedicated box to indicate whether information has been withheld, but clarified where information was withheld for security reasons using the column for comments.

49 South Africa. In addition, Canada, France, Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland used either a national template or the UNROCA template which does not provide a box to indicate whether information has been withheld. Since these States Parties did not specify whether information was being withheld through other means, the ATT Monitor includes them in this figure.

50 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania and Sweden.

51 Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden.

VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Some annual reports contain information on a wider range of conventional arms than those explicitly defined in the ATT reporting template. This information is provided under the sub-categories for 'other' small arms and 'other' light weapons, in a section for voluntary national categories, or in additional supplementary tables of data.

- Twenty-nine States Parties included information on arms that fall within the scope of Article 2 of the Treaty but are not explicitly specified in the reporting template.⁵² This is in line with 2023, when 29 annual reports contained such information. Estonia, for example, reported the export of 67 smooth-bore guns to Finland, Italy, and Latvia under 'other small arms'. New Zealand reported exports and imports of shotguns using voluntary national categories.
- Nine States Parties reported on a wider range of military equipment.⁵³ Such equipment is not directly covered in Article 2.1 of the ATT, which delineates the scope of the Treaty. However, Article 5(3) states that each State Party 'is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms'.⁵⁴ The Dominican Republic, for example, reported the import of armoured windows from Colombia, tear gas from the United States, and ammunition from Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United States. South Africa authorized the

import of 2,061 barrels. While these items are related to small arms, they are parts and components and not complete arms, and thus not covered under Article 2.1 of the ATT. The number of States Parties reporting such information is slightly higher than the previous year, when eight States Parties reported this information.

- Five States Parties included supplementary tables, which contained additional data.⁵⁵ Three of these States (Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom) included data on military holdings, which constitutes a dedicated section in the UNROCA reporting template.⁵⁶ Japan provided additional information on transfers of SALW using Harmonized System (HS) codes. Australia included a table on SALW export permits approved during 2024. This figure is slightly lower than the previous year, when six States Parties provided supplementary information through annexes.
- Thirteen States Parties included definitions of national categories of arms and/or definitions of the terms 'exports' and 'imports' in their annual reports.⁵⁷ For example, New Zealand outlined some of its national regulations pertaining to small arms and light weapons and provided a disclaimer that reporting on shotguns 'serves to advance the object and purpose of the Arms Trade Treaty.' Germany further elaborated on the nature of its export licenses.



TWENTY-NINE STATES PARTIES INCLUDED INFORMATION ON ARMS THAT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY BUT ARE NOT EXPLICITLY SPECIFIED IN THE REPORTING TEMPLATE. THIS IS IN LINE WITH 2023, WHEN 29 ANNUAL REPORTS CONTAINED SUCH INFORMATION. ESTONIA, FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTED THE EXPORT OF 67 SMOOTH-BORE GUNS TO FINLAND, ITALY, AND LATVIA UNDER 'OTHER SMALL ARMS'. NEW ZEALAND REPORTED EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SHOTGUNS USING VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES.

52 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

53 Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa.

54 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

55 Australia, Canada, Japan, Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

56 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland also provided information on national procurement, which constitutes a section of the UNROCA reporting template.

57 Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama and the Republic of Korea.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TRENDS

The following findings summarize major trends in arms transfers reported by ATT States Parties that submitted a public annual report for 2024 containing data on exports and/or imports.

Exports of major conventional arms: 476,825 major conventional arms exports were reported in 2024.⁵⁸ Of these, 89,172 were actual transfers and 113,012 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The category which saw the most exports was large-calibre artillery systems (68.5 per cent), followed by missiles and missile launchers (24.3 per cent) and combat aircraft (6.4 per cent).

Exports of SALW: in 2024, a total of 1,809,668 SALW exports were reported. Of these, 1,471,254 were actual transfers and 251,199 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The sub-category which saw the highest number of exports was hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (45.0 per cent), followed by rifles and carbines (15.1 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (11.4 per cent).

Imports of major conventional arms: 27,103 major conventional arms imports were reported in 2024.⁵⁹ Of these, 25,966 were actual transfers and 1,103 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The category with the most imports was missiles and missile launchers (95.4 per cent), followed by large-calibre artillery systems (1.9 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (1.7 per cent).

Imports of SALW: in 2024, 629,991 SALW imports were reported. Of these, 318,766 were actual transfers and 209,405 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick either cell or ticked both cells indicating whether transfers were actual or authorized. The sub-category with the most imports was revolvers and self-loading pistols (40.2 per cent), followed by rifles and carbines (33.4 per cent) and other small arms (7.3 per cent).

For information disaggregated by State Party, please refer to the Annex: Country Profiles. Since 2024, the ATT Monitor is providing a graphical and interactive representation of the reported arms trade via its ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard. Please consult the Dashboard at: attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard. Data on transfers reported in 2024 annual reports will be included in the Dashboard by 31 December 2026.

CF-18 HORNETS TAKE OFF FROM MIHAIL KOGALNICEANU (MK) AIR BASE IN ROMANIA, TO RETURN TO CANADA DURING OPERATION REASSURANCE.

CREDIT: © CORPORAL ERIC CHAPUT, CANADIAN ARMED FORCES



⁵⁸ Approximately half of this figure (240,750 or 50.5 per cent) is made up of large-calibre artillery systems exported from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United States. However, based on the large quantity of units reported and the accompanying descriptions, the ATT Monitor believes these transfers may include projectiles in addition to the artillery systems themselves.


⁵⁹ One of the main reasons for the difference between reported exports and imports is the fact that some major importers are not States Parties to the ATT.

MOST TRANSPARENT REPORTS

Like previous years, no State Party submitting a 2024 annual report used all transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Sixteen States Parties complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.⁶⁰

Of these, one State Party, Peru, provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency. Peru provided all required information in its annual report, included comments and descriptions for all its transfers and clearly stated that it had not withheld any data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security.

GOOD TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES IN STATES PARTIES' 2024 ANNUAL REPORT SUBMISSIONS



60 Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa and Uruguay. The list excludes States Parties that have submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports, as well as States Parties that met only one of the criteria for contributing to a higher standard of transparency.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of 2024 annual reports underscores the continued challenges facing the ATT in achieving its core transparency objectives. While a majority of States Parties submitted annual reports covering 2024, the overall reporting rate is below 70 per cent, continuing a long-term downward trend as the ATT community grows with new States Parties joining the Treaty.

Levels of full compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations remain low, with approximately only one-third of States Parties meeting all requirements. While on-time reporting has remained stable, with 44 per cent of States Parties submitting reports on-time, the share of confidential reporting increased to nearly one-third of all submitted reports, reversing the decreasing trend recorded in recent years. The growing reliance on confidential reporting limits the ability of civil society, media, academia and international institutions to assess arms transfers and determine compliance with Article 13, all while undermining the broader transparency purpose of the Treaty.

At the same time, the quality of transfer data reported also faces significant challenges. Only 26 States Parties submitted reports that meet the ATT Monitor's criteria for meaningful transparency, representing the lowest proportion recorded

since the Treaty's entry into force and since data collection began, with a sharp decrease in reports that disaggregate data by trading partners. This shows how comprehensive, detailed and openly accessible reporting remains difficult to achieve by ATT States Parties.

Taken together, these trends mark persistent challenges toward achieving meaningful transparency that is necessary to realizing the Treaty's objectives. Without accurate, comprehensive and publicly accessible reporting, it becomes increasingly difficult to assess compliance with the Treaty and ensure accountability in the global arms trade.

In contrast, the first annual report submissions by the Bahamas and Guyana, the fact that some States Parties submitted their past due reports and cleared their backlog, an increased number of reports submitted by the 1 February cut-off date compared to 2023 reports and examples of stronger reporting practice by some States Parties demonstrate that progress remains possible. Strengthening both the quantity and quality of reporting should therefore remain a priority for States Parties, the Secretariat and the wider ATT community. Ensuring that annual reports are timely, detailed, disaggregated and public is essential to reinforcing confidence amongst States Parties and maintaining credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty.



**CAPTAIN STEVEN MORRIS STANDS
AT THE DOOR OF A CH-148 CYCLONE
HELICOPTER FLYING OVER JUNO BEACH
IN FRANCE DURING A TRAINING FLIGHT
AS PART OF OPERATION REASSURANCE.**

CREDIT: © CPL LAURA LANDRY,
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES



CLOSE-UP OF INDIAN SOLDIERS
IN UNIFORM HOLDING RIFLES,
STANDING IN FORMATION.

CREDIT: © DEVANSH BOSE

CHAPTER 3 – PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2025 ATT ANNUAL REPORTS AND NEW INITIAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

States Parties are required by Article 13 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to submit two types of reports to the ATT Secretariat. Article 13.1 obligates each State Party to submit an initial report on national control systems and implementation measures within one year of the Treaty entering into force for that State. States Parties are further required to update this initial report as needed. Article 13.3 obligates States Parties to submit, beginning the first full calendar year after acceding to the Treaty, an annual report on authorized or actual conventional arms exports and imports that occurred in the preceding calendar year. The ATT requires annual reports to be submitted by 31 May each year, but the ATT Secretariat provides a seven-day grace period, resulting in a 7 June de-facto deadline.

Both initial and annual reporting are essential in achieving the ATT's object of 'establish[ing] the highest common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms' and purpose of 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'.¹ Initial reports provide one of the few mechanisms for: examining how States Parties interpret and implement their ATT obligations (allowing for inter-State sharing of good practice); offering an instrument for States Parties to assess their own existing transfer-control frameworks; and identifying regulatory, legal, or institutional gaps and related assistance needs. ATT annual reports deliver invaluable information on global weapon flows, serving as a transparency check on State decision-making while building confidence between States Parties. Both types of reports also play a critical role in monitoring and evaluating ATT implementation. More than ten years after the ATT entered into force, and in an environment impacted by global conflict and increasing military spending, the data in these reports can support assessments of the Treaty's effectiveness and accountability in arms transfer decisions.

Recognizing the importance of ATT reporting, this chapter delivers an assessment of the current state of initial and annual reporting, overarching reporting trends and States Parties' compliance with reporting obligations. The first section provides a preliminary analysis of the calendar year 2025 annual reports, as well as the overdue annual reports submitted since last year's reporting deadline of 7 June 2025. The second section evaluates this year's new initial report submissions.

ANNUAL REPORTS

PREVIEW OF 2025 ANNUAL REPORTS

One hundred and fifteen of the 118 States Parties to the ATT were required to report to the ATT Secretariat on their 2025 arms exports and imports by 31 May 2026 (the newest States Parties—Colombia, Vanuatu and Ecuador—were not required to submit a 2025 annual report).² As of 7 June 2026, 46 States Parties had submitted annual reports for 2025:³

- Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Guatemala, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

For 2025 reports, there was an on-time reporting rate of 40 per cent—a decrease from the 44 per cent on-time reporting rate for both the 2023 and 2024 reports. Time will tell if this decreased on-time reporting rate is indicative of a larger trend.

Looking at the composition of these on-time reporters, eight (17 per cent) are considered either Least Developed Countries (Central African Republic, Lesotho, Senegal and Sierra Leone) or Small Island Developing States (Jamaica, Palau, Samoa and Seychelles) by the United Nations (UN).⁴ Eight (17 per cent) of the on-time reporters are located in Africa, ten (22 per cent) are located in the Americas, five (11 per cent) are located in Asia, 19 (41 per cent) are located in Europe and four (9 per cent) are located in Oceania.

1 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

2 Colombia and Vanuatu are required to submit their first annual reports in 2027 (on transfers made in 2026), and Ecuador's first annual report is due in 2028 (on transfers made in 2027).

3 For methodological rigor and consistency, for the 2016–2024 ATT Monitor Reports the Monitor limited its analysis of annual report compliance to the reports available on the Secretariat's website as of 7 June (though it was possible that reports submitted on time may not have been accurately reflected on the ATT Secretariat's website). However, beginning with last year's 2025 ATT Monitor Report, the Monitor has been able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the ATT Secretariat.

4 United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (n.d.). 'List of LDCs'. tinyurl.com/mryfk636; United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (n.d.). 'List of SIDS'. tinyurl.com/mr2rzf25.

The Central African Republic submitted an on-time 2025 report, marking its first-ever annual report submission. The ATT entered into force for the Central African Republic in January 2016, and its first annual report was due in 2018 (on 2017 transfers).⁵

The two new States Parties required to submit their initial annual reports this year—The Gambia and Malawi—did not do so by the 7 June deadline. These outstanding reports are consistent with a broader pattern in which newly acceded ATT States Parties face challenges in meeting reporting requirements.

Of the 46 States Parties that submitted on-time 2025 annual reports, 13 (28 per cent) chose to report privately (keeping reports available only to the ATT Secretariat and other States Parties).⁶ The percentage is in line with recent years—on-time

private annual reporting has hovered in the high 20 to low 30 per cent range since submission of 2020 reports in 2021 (except for the on-time private reporting rate of 2023 reports at 22 per cent).

Of the 2025 on-time reporters that submitted private reports, almost all have a history of private reporting. Brazil, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guatemala, People's Republic of China, Seychelles and the State of Palestine have only ever submitted private reports. Albania, Georgia, Latvia, Paraguay and Senegal each submitted public reports in the early years following their accessions to the ATT (each State Party submitting between one and six public reports) but have since switched to consistent private annual reporting. Lesotho changed its reporting practice this year, submitting a private 2025 report after submitting its 2015–2024 reports publicly.

Table 1 - ATT Annual Reports on-time reporting rates

Reporting year	Number of on-time reports (using de facto 7 June deadline)	On-time compliance rate (as percentage of reports due)
2015	30	49%
2016	31	41%
2017	37	42%
2018	46	50%
2019	37	38%
2020	46	44%
2021	48	44%
2022	38	35%
2023	49	44%
2024	50	44%
2025	46	40%



THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SUBMITTED AN ON-TIME 2025 REPORT, MARKING ITS FIRST-EVER ANNUAL REPORT SUBMISSION.

5 ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'States Parties to the ATT (in Order of Deposit of Instrument of Ratification, Approval, Acceptance, or Accession)'. 26 February 2026. tinyurl.com/k2rj4rz8.

6 Albania, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lesotho, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Senegal, Seychelles and State of Palestine.

REPORTING UPDATES

Since the submission deadline for the 2024 reporting period (7 June 2025), a total of 30 States Parties have submitted overdue annual reports.⁷ Twenty-eight States Parties submitted overdue 2024 annual reports (covering 2024 transfers).⁸ Of note, Guyana submitted its first-ever annual report on 2024 transfers. Guyana was an early acceder to the ATT and has been obligated to report since 2016 (on 2015 transfers).⁹

Nine States Parties submitted a total of 19 annual reports covering transfers made from 2017 to 2023: the Seychelles submitted reports for 2017–2020 and 2023; Cameroon submitted reports for 2021–2023; Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas and Iceland each submitted two past-due reports for 2022–2023; Panama submitted reports for 2021 and 2022; Malta and Samoa each submitted reports for 2023; and Botswana submitted a 2020 report. With these new submissions, Cameroon, Panama and the Seychelles are now in full compliance with their annual report obligations.

Looking at compliance overall, 42 of the 115 ATT States Parties due to have submitted at least one report (37 per cent) have submitted each of their required reports.¹⁰ This marks a decline from last year, when as of 7 June the overall compliance rate was 48 out of 113 (42 per cent). However, this figure will improve as more States Parties submit 2025 annual reports in the coming months.

As of 7 June 2026, 24 States Parties (21 per cent of those required to have submitted at least one report) have never submitted an annual report.¹¹ This marks a slight decrease from the past two years—the total number of States never having submitted an annual report remained at 25 (22 per cent) in both the 2025 and 2024 ATT Monitor Reports. Of the 24 non-reporters as of 7 June

2026: five States Parties have been obligated to report since 2016 (on 2015 transfers);¹² five have been obligated to report since 2017 (on 2016 transfers);¹³ three since 2018 (on 2017 transfers);¹⁴ three since 2021 (on 2020 transfers);¹⁵ four since 2022 (on 2021 transfers);¹⁶ one (Gabon) since 2024 (on 2023 transfers); one (Andorra) since 2025 (on 2024 transfers); and The Gambia and Malawi as of this year. The Central African Republic and Guyana should be noted for submitting their first annual reports (on 2025 and 2024 transfers, respectively), but the list of States Parties that have never submitted a required annual report has remained relatively stagnant, with 13 States Parties—representing more than half of all non-reporters—having accumulated between nine and 11 overdue reports.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Although States Parties will continue to submit 2025 annual reports in the coming months, several observations can be made based on an initial review of the contents of the 33 public, on-time 2025 reports.

Reporting templates

The Treaty text does not prescribe a singular format by which States Parties must submit their annual reports. The Second Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in 2016 recommended a standard template for use, which was updated by CSP7 in 2021. States Parties may also use the ATT Secretariat's online reporting tool, which mirrors the CSP-recommended reporting template and has been available since CSP4 in 2018.¹⁷ To promote synergies between international conventional arms control instruments, States Parties are further permitted to submit their UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) reports to fulfil their ATT annual reporting obligations.

7 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Nigeria, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Seychelles and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

8 Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Nigeria, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Samoa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

9 ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'States Parties to the ATT (in Order of Deposit of Instrument of Ratification, Approval, Acceptance, or Accession)'. 26 February 2026. tinyurl.com/k2rj4rz8.

10 Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Guatemala, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

11 Afghanistan, Andorra, Belize, Cabo Verde, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo.

12 Grenada, Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

13 Belize, Chad, Dominica, Mauritania and San Marino.

14 Cabo Verde, Ghana and Togo.

15 Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon and Mozambique.

16 Afghanistan, Namibia, Niue and São Tomé and Príncipe.

17 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2026). 'Draft Annotated Agenda for Meeting of 19 March 2026'. 17 February 2026. ATT/CSP12CSP12.WGTR/20262026/CHAIR/836/DrAnnAgenda. tinyurl.com/bdeyd5a6, p. 4.

Most on-time, public reporting States Parties continue to prefer to report using a version of the recommended annual reporting template. Of the 33 public 2025 reports submitted by 7 June 2026, 29 States Parties (88 per cent) used a version of the recommended template. Twenty-four of these (73 per cent of the 33 public 2025 reports) used the CSP7 2021 template,¹⁸ which has been the most popular reporting format since its first year of use in 2022 (with the submission of 2021 reports). Four States Parties (Finland, Iceland, Poland and Slovenia), reflecting 12 per cent of the 33 public 2025 reports, submitted with the online reporting tool. One State Party (South Africa) submitted its report using a modified version of the CSP2 2016 template.¹⁹ The remaining three on-time public 2025 annual reports (Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom), making up nine per cent of the total public 2025 reports, reported using their UNROCA reports. The final on-time publicly reporting State Party (Central African Republic), submitted its report using a national format that closely mirrored the contents of the CSP7 2021 template. Four States Parties (Australia, Finland, Jamaica and Japan) provided additional tables of imports and exports in national formats.

Use of the online reporting tool has diminished since it was first made available. Looking at the total 2015–2024 reports submitted as of 7 June 2026, use of the online tool hovered at an average of 20 per cent of public reports for the 2018–2021 report years (ranging between 10 and 11 reports in absolute numbers), falling to 15 per cent (eight) of the currently submitted public 2022 reports, 10 per cent (six) of the currently submitted public 2023 reports,²⁰ and 9 per cent (five) of the currently submitted public 2024 reports. The Working Group on Transparency and

Reporting (WGTR) is currently assessing the online reporting tool and will 'prepare recommendations on the continuation of these functionalities' during the CSP12 cycle.²¹ Understanding why States Parties choose to use one template, the challenges of using the template and the contribution of the template to transparency should be further examined before a new version of the reporting template is considered. In addition, the use of a common template increases reporting compatibility and analysis, so standardizing reporting template usage can be useful in ensuring consistent and useful comparisons.

Nil reports

Of the 33 public 2025 annual reports submitted by 7 June 2026, three States Parties (Palau, Samoa and Sierra Leone) submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, and five States Parties (Central African Republic, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) only submitted 'nil' reports for exports. Almost all of these States Parties used the CSP7 recommended template to submit their reports (noting that the Central African Republic used a national format that closely mirrored the CSP7 template), which features a 'Contents of report' section allowing States Parties to indicate whether they had submitted reports (or 'nil' reports) on arms exports and imports (see Figure 3.1). Each State Party positively indicated they had submitted a 'nil' report on either exports or imports in the relevant checkboxes in the recommended report template ('i) Nil report on exports of conventional arms' and 'ii) Nil report on imports of conventional arms'), as well as submitted the correct 'nil' report using Annex 3A or 3B.²²

Figure 3.1: The 'nil' reporting checkboxes on the second page of the CSP7-recommended reporting template

Contents of report (check as appropriate)		Yes	No
i)	Nil report on exports of conventional arms	☐	☐
ii)	Nil report on imports of conventional arms	☐	☐
iii)	Annual report on exports of conventional arms	☐	☐
iv)	Annual report on imports of conventional arms	☐	☐
vi)	National definitions of categories of conventional arms reported	☐	☐

18 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Estonia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

19 South Africa edited and added some categories to the standard UN Register Categories within the CSP2 2016 template.

20 Including Finland's submission of a 'hybrid' 2023 report, making the exports section of its report public and the imports section private.

21 ATT WGTR (2026). 'Draft Annotated Agenda for Meeting of 19 March 2026': 17 February 2026. ATT/CSP12CSP12/WGTR/20262026/CHAIR/836/DrAnnAgenda. tinyurl.com/bdeyds5a6, p. 1.

22 For Annexes 3A and 3B see the CSP7-recommended annual reporting template, pages 15–16: ATT Secretariat (2021). 'Annual Reporting Template'. 16 July 2021. tinyurl.com/fwvddzvr.

Information withholding

Per ATT Article 13.3, States Parties are permitted to withhold commercially sensitive or national security information.²³ Of the on-time public reporters, 11 States Parties (33 per cent) indicated they had withheld information.²⁴ Ten of these States indicated they had withheld information by utilizing relevant checkbox in the online tool or the CSP7 2021 template.²⁵ One State Party (Canada), which used the UNROCA template, indicated withholding information through comments in the body of its report (the UNROCA template does not provide a specific place to indicate information withholding). Nineteen States Parties used the online tool or the CSP7 2021 template checkbox to indicate they had not withheld information.²⁶ Three States Parties (Netherlands, South Africa and the United Kingdom) did not indicate whether information was withheld: the Netherlands and the United Kingdom each submitted UNROCA templates and did not provide specific comments on withheld information from their sections on exports or imports; South Africa used the CSP2 2016 template and left the relevant checkbox blank.

Several States Parties made efforts to specify the nature of their information withholdings. Canada, for instance, withheld the number of Category VII(a) missiles and missile launchers it imported from Sweden and the United States, noting in a comment that 'Missile numbers are classified'. In another example, the Central African Republic indicated the numbers and values of ammunition imported from the Russian Federation were confidential and explained that, per Article 13.3, 'specific data regarding the volumes and values of ammunition imports destined for the defense and security forces of the Central African Republic are classified as matters of national security and are therefore excluded from this public report. However, this information is provided to the United Nations Security Council Committee 2127 and its Panel of Experts within the framework of embargo exemption procedures.'²⁷

The number of on-time public annual reports indicating the withholding of information has slightly risen in the past several years: 11 States Parties (30 per cent) indicated they had withheld information in their 2024 on-time public annual reports, and ten States Parties indicated withholding information in their 2023 (26 per cent) and 2022 (38 per cent) on-time annual public reports.

National definitions and categories

Eight on-time publicly reporting States Parties (Belgium, Central African Republic, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa and Switzerland) reported 2025 transfers under national categories or indicated that they had reported on national definitions. The Central African Republic provided information on the definitions of conventional arms it used within its report, specifying that: 'It[he Central African Republic] strictly applies the UNROCA definitions reproduced in Annex 1, supplemented by Law No. 20.021 of 7 August 2020 and the Kinshasa Convention of 30 April 2010'.²⁸ Belgium, Finland and Japan utilized regional or international categorization systems in their reports: Belgium reported under European Common Military List 'ML1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less'; Finland reported 'Approved licenses of defence materiel' and 'Actual Export of Defence materiel' under European Common Military List categories in separate tables; and Japan reported its small arms exports and imports in separate tables under the International Trade Administration's harmonized system (HS) codes. New Zealand reported on its exports and imports of shotguns as an additional national category, and, within the recommended template Annex 2, provided information on its national definitions of UNROCA Category VIII (small arms and light weapons) and the reasoning for its inclusion of shotguns in its annual report. Panama reported all imports under the 'National Categories' section of its report without providing definitions of the categories it reported.²⁹ While using the CSP2 2016 template as

23 'Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information'. Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

24 Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Estonia, Finland, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea and Sweden.

25 The two recommended versions of the annual reporting template (and the online tool) include a question asking States Parties to indicate whether, 'In the submitted report, some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related data has been withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty' and if yes, to 'please consider providing more information on a voluntary basis'. ATT Secretariat (2021). 'Annual Reporting Template'. 16 July 2021. tinyurl.com/fwvddzvr.

26 Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Uruguay.

27 Translated from the original French: 'Conformément à l'Article 13(3) du Traité sur le commerce des armes, les données précises sur les volumes et valeurs des importations de munitions destinées aux Forces de défense et de sécurité de la République Centrafricaine sont classifiées comme relevant de la sécurité nationale et sont donc exclues du présent rapport public. Ces informations sont toutefois communiquées dans le cadre des procédures d'exemption d'embargo au Comité 2127 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et à son Groupe d'experts'.

28 Translated from the original French: 'La République Centrafricaine applique strictement les définitions de l'UNROCA reproduites à l'Annexe 1, complétées par la Loi n° 20.021 du 7 août 2020 et la Convention de Kinshasa du 30 avril 2010'.

29 Panama reported three general categories of imports under the 'National Category' section of its report: 'Armas de fuego' (under which it reported 'Revólver', 'Pistolas semiautomáticas', 'Escopetas' and 'Rifle semiautomático'), 'Municiones' (under which it reported 'Munición' and 'Munición traumática') and 'Materiales Relacionados' (under which it reported 'Componente').

a base, South Africa modified some of the category titles—while most aligned with the original UN Register Categories with only small changes (for example, some of the category numbers were altered), South Africa added and then reported under a category it labelled '8. Barrels'. As in prior years, Switzerland indicated it had used national definitions in its 2025 annual report but did not provide further information on those national definitions.

Information sharing with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

To leverage synergies with the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the CSP7 annual report template added a question asking whether States Parties would allow the sharing of their ATT reports with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) for UNROCA reporting. Ninety per cent (26 out of 29 reports) of the States Parties that submitted on-time 2025 public reports using the recommended CSP7 2021 template or the online reporting tool (or a national format that closely mirrored the recommended template, in the case of the Central African Republic) indicated that their 2025 annual report submissions could be shared with UNODA.³⁰ Only three States Parties (Belgium, Japan and Poland) that used the recommended CSP7 template/online reporting tool left the section blank (indicating 'no').³¹ This shows a slight increase in information sharing with UNODA when compared to last year's ATT Monitor Report.³² Efforts to leverage synergies between UNROCA and the ATT appear to be facilitating increased UNROCA report submissions. The Group of Governmental Experts on UNROCA's 2025 report found that 'a sizeable proportion of the submissions to the Register for the calendar years 2021–2023 had been provided through the Arms

Trade Treaty secretariat', and the 'provision of Arms Trade Treaty annual reports to the Register has had an impact on the level of reporting from regions that had low numbers of submissions' in the 2010s, particularly African and Latin American and Caribbean UN Member States.³³

EXPORTS

- Twenty-five of the 33 States Parties that submitted on-time, public 2025 annual reports reported conventional arms exports.³⁴ Seventeen of these States Parties reported both major arms and small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports,³⁵ and eight only reported SALW exports.³⁶
- Of the 17 States Parties that reported major conventional arms exports, four reported these transfers as authorized exports (Australia, Italy, Republic of Korea and South Africa), nine States Parties reported actual major arms exports,³⁷ and two (Belgium and the United Kingdom) reported a combination of authorized and actual major arms exports. Two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Finland) did not indicate authorized or actual for any of their major arms exports reported under UN Register Categories.³⁸
- Twenty-five States Parties reported SALW exports. Of these, seven reported authorized SALW exports,³⁹ 13 reported actual SALW exports⁴⁰ and three (Belgium, Estonia and the United Kingdom) reported a combination of authorized and actual SALW exports. Two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iceland) did not indicate authorized or actual for any of their SALW exports.

30 Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

31 The remaining four public on-time reporters (Canada, Netherlands, South Africa and the United Kingdom) submitted their ATT reports using the UNROCA template or the CSP2 2016 recommended template.

32 As of 7 June 2025, 25 States (76 per cent of the 33 public on-time reporters submitting with the 2021 template/online reporting tool) had allowed their ATT reports to be shared. The significant percentage difference of UNODA information sharing between the on-time 2024 and 2025 report submissions might be accounted for by the lower number of total on-time reports submitted as of 7 June this year.

33 United Nations, General Assembly (2025). 'Continuing Operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its Further Development'. A/80/121. 9 July 2025. tinyurl.com/2h4uuakz, pp. 22–23.

34 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

35 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

36 Estonia, Iceland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand and Slovenia.

37 Bulgaria, Canada, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

38 Finland did not indicate whether the major arms exports it reported in UN Register Categories in the body of its report were authorized or actual transfers. However, it did report 'Approved licenses of defence materiel' and 'Actual Export of Defence materiel' in European Common Military List categories in separate tables.

39 Australia, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Switzerland.

40 Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

- Two States Parties (Finland and Switzerland) reported major arms and SALW exports differently. Finland reported actual SALW exports but did not indicate whether the major arms exports it reported under UN Register Categories represented authorized or actual transfers.⁴¹ Switzerland reported actual major arms exports and authorized SALW exports.
- Of the 25 States Parties that reported arms exports, 18 only provided the number of items transferred⁴² and seven provided a combination of numbers and values.⁴³ Practices varied amongst those who reported a combination of numbers and values. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina provided the quantity and a total value (disaggregated by trading partner) of each major arms and SALW export, while Belgium reported quantity for the exports it reported under major arms categories and SALW, and value for the items it reported in national categories under 'European Common Military List ML1.'
- Twenty of the 25 States Parties that reported arms exports provided information on the final importing State of each of their exports. Iceland did not provide any information on the final importing State of its exports, while four States Parties (Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland) noted the final importing State for some but not all of their exports.⁴⁴ Only three States Parties (Belgium, Serbia and South Africa) provided State names in the 'States of origin (if not exporter)' column of their reports. Belgium and Serbia provided a State of origin for some of their exports—though on multiple occasions Serbia only wrote 'more' in the State of origin column without further explanation. South Africa noted itself as the State of origin of each of its exports.

IMPORTS

- Thirty of the 33 States Parties that submitted on-time, public 2025 annual reports reported conventional arms imports.⁴⁵ Eighteen of these States Parties reported both major arms and SALW imports,⁴⁶ one State (the United Kingdom) only reported major arms imports and 11 only reported SALW imports.⁴⁷
- Nineteen States Parties reported major arms imports.⁴⁸ Of these, two (Italy and Republic of Korea) reported their transfers as authorized imports, 12 reported actual imports⁴⁹ and three (Australia, Peru and the United Kingdom) reported a combination of authorized and actual major arms imports. Two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Portugal) did not indicate authorized or actual for any of their major arms imports.
- Twenty-nine States Parties reported SALW imports.⁵⁰ Of these, four (Italy, Jamaica, Republic of Korea and South Africa) reported authorized SALW imports, 19 reported actual SALW imports⁵¹ and three (Belgium, Estonia and Peru) reported a combination of authorized and actual SALW imports. Three States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Iceland) did not indicate whether their SALW imports represented actual or authorized transfers.

41 Finland did not indicate whether the major arms exports it reported in UN Register Categories in the body of its report were authorized or actual transfers. However, it did report 'Approved licenses of defence materiel' and 'Actual Export of Defence materiel' in European Common Military List categories in separate tables.

42 Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

43 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Japan, Portugal and Slovenia.

44 Italy reported the final importing State of all its major arms exports, but for its SALW exports placed the State names in the 'Value' column such that it is unclear if the State referenced is the final importing State, the State of origin, or simply a trading partner. Portugal left the 'Final importing State' column of its major arms exports blank—specifying in the 'Comments' column that the exports were '[d]onation[s] to Ukraine'—but reported the final importing State of each of its SALW exports. Sweden classified the final exporting State(s) of its Category VII(a) 'Missiles etc' exports. Switzerland neglected to identify the final importing State of its export of 14 Category II 'Piranha' armoured combat vehicles.

45 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

46 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

47 Central African Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Iceland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Poland and South Africa.

48 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

49 Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

50 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

51 Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Finland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

- Several States Parties that reported both major arms and SALW imports reported them differently in their submissions. Australia reported a combination of authorized and actual major arms imports and only actual SALW imports. Belgium designated all major arms and small arms imports it reported under UN Register Categories as actual, while imports recorded under the national category 'European Common Military List ML1' were marked as authorized. While Portugal did not indicate whether its major arms imports were actual or authorized transfers, it marked its SALW imports as actual.
- Of the 30 States Parties that reported arms imports in their public, on-time 2025 submissions, 23 provided the number of items transferred⁵² and six provided a combination of numbers and values.⁵³ Practices varied amongst those who reported a combination of numbers and values. For example, Japan reported the numbers of its major arms and light weapons imports and both the numbers and values of its small arms imports, while Peru reported the quantity and total value of each of its imports. Only one State Party (Central African Republic) did not provide information on either the number or value of its imports.
- Except for Iceland, each of the 30 States Parties that reported arms imports in their public, on-time 2025 submissions provided information on the exporting State of their imports. Twenty-six of these States did so for each transfer listed, while one State Party (Australia) wrote 'Other' or 'Unspecified' on several SALW imports and one State Party (Sweden) classified all or some exporting State(s) of its Category IV b) unmanned combat aircraft, Category VII a) Missiles etc. and Category VII b) MANPADS imports. As Italy did for its SALW exports, for its SALW imports El Salvador placed State names in the 'Value' column such that it is unclear if the State referenced is the final importing State, the State of origin, or simply a trading partner. Eight States Parties provided names in

the ATT recommended template 'States of origin (if not exporter)' column for some or all of their imports.⁵⁴ South Africa modified its CSP2 2016 template, replacing the 'Exporting State' column with 'Final importing State'—the country noted itself as the final importing State of most of its imports and gave the State of origin for each import.

UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS

RECENT INITIAL REPORTS

Three new States Parties were required to submit initial reports since last year's ATT Monitor Report (between 8 June 2025 and 7 June 2026). The Gambia's initial report was due 10 September 2025, Malawi's initial report was due 8 October 2025 and Colombia's was due 12 January 2026.⁵⁵ Of the three, only Colombia has submitted its initial report as of 7 June 2026.⁵⁶

The Gambia and Malawi's lack of submission points to a longstanding challenge in ATT reporting: initial reporting compliance continues to remain low for the Treaty's newest members. Of the 11 States Parties that have been required to submit an initial report since January 2021, more than half (six States Parties, or 55 per cent) have yet to do so.⁵⁷ Furthermore, no States Parties submitted overdue initial reports in the year since publication of the 2025 ATT Monitor Report.⁵⁸

INITIAL REPORT COMPLIANCE

One-hundred sixteen of the current 118 States Parties to the ATT were required to submit initial reports as of 31 May 2026.⁵⁹ According to the ATT Secretariat's website, as of 7 June 2026, 94 States Parties have done so, reflecting a compliance rate of 81 per cent. As marked annually by the ATT Monitor Report, this year represents a new plateau in initial reporting compliance rates following an eight-year period of small but steady gains (see Figure 3.2).

52 Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

53 Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Peru, Portugal and Slovenia.

54 Australia, Central African Republic, Peru, Republic of Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden and Uruguay.

55 ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'States Parties to the ATT (in Order of Deposit of Instrument of Ratification, Approval, Acceptance, or Accession)'. 26 February 2026. tinyurl.com/k2rj4rz8.


56 Colombia's report was due 12 January 2026 but not published on the ATT Secretariat website until February 2026.

57 Eleven States Parties have been required to submit their initial reports since 2021: Afghanistan, Andorra, Colombia, Gabon, Gambia, Malawi, Namibia, Niue, People's Republic of China, Philippines and São Tomé and Príncipe. Just over half of these (Afghanistan, Gabon, Gambia, Malawi, Niue and São Tomé and Príncipe) have yet to submit reports.

58 Two States Parties submitted overdue reports during the reporting period of the 2025 ATT Monitor (8 June 2024 to 7 June 2025), three States Parties submitted overdue reports during the 2024 Monitor reporting period (8 June 2023 to 7 June 2024) and two States Parties submitted overdue reports during the 2023 Monitor reporting period (8 June 2022 to 7 June 2023).

59 The two States Parties not yet required to submit initial reports are Vanuatu and Ecuador. Vanuatu is required to submit an initial report by 3 December 2026 and Ecuador by 25 May 2027. ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'States Parties to the ATT (in Order of Deposit of Instrument of Ratification, Approval, Acceptance, or Accession)'. 26 February 2026. tinyurl.com/k2rj4rz8.

FIGURE 3.2: INITIAL REPORT COMPLIANCE, 2016 – 2026



* Data calculated annually on 7 June.

Twenty-two States Parties have yet to fulfil their initial reporting obligation, with most several years past their due dates.⁶⁰ Thirteen States Parties (59 per cent of the States that have not yet submitted an initial report) are eight to ten years past their initial report deadline,⁶¹ six (27 per cent) are between four and six years past their deadline,⁶² one (Gabon) is two years past and the final two (Gambia and Malawi) were required to submit their reports in the past year.

Many of these non-reporting ATT States Parties, despite having a legal obligation to report, have nevertheless done so under other relevant voluntary instruments. For example, of the 22 States Parties that have yet to submit required initial reports, 17 (77 per cent)⁶³ have reported at least once to the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA)—under which States Parties are encouraged to submit voluntary reports every two years.⁶⁴ This includes 13 (59 per cent)⁶⁵ which have submitted a report to the PoA since 2015 (the first year of ATT reporting) and eight (36 per cent)⁶⁶ which have reported to the PoA since their ATT initial reporting obligation took effect.

60 Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles.

61 Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Mali, Mauritania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino and Seychelles.

62 Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mozambique, Niue and São Tomé and Príncipe.

63 Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, San Marino and São Tomé and Príncipe.

64 UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons. tinyurl.com/4gr4kta7.

65 Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique and San Marino.

66 Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and San Marino.

Table 2 – States Parties with overdue ATT initial reports

State Party	Initial report deadline
Guyana	23 December 2015
Mali	23 December 2015
Saint Lucia	23 December 2015
Guinea	18 January 2016
Saint Kitts and Nevis	14 March 2016
Chad	22 June 2016
Dominica	18 August 2016
San Marino	26 October 2016
Mauritania	21 December 2016
Central African Republic	4 January 2017
Seychelles	30 January 2017
Ghana	20 March 2017
Cabo Verde	21 December 2017
Guinea-Bissau	19 January 2020
Mozambique	13 March 2020
Lebanon	6 August 2020
São Tomé and Príncipe	25 October 2021
Afghanistan	26 October 2021
Niue	3 November 2021
Gabon	19 December 2023
Gambia	10 September 2025
Malawi	8 October 2025

States Parties are additionally required under Article 13.1 to 'report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate'.⁶⁷ While the Treaty text does not specify the method by which States Parties should implement the obligation, the accepted practice is to submit an updated report.⁶⁸ This year, only the United Kingdom submitted an updated initial report (see box on page 63). The United Kingdom originally submitted its initial report in December 2015, after ratifying the Treaty in April 2014.

Although many States Parties have indicated at formal and informal ATT meetings that they have made changes to their national control systems since submitting their initial reports—and despite the fact that at least 53 per cent of current reports (50 of the total 94) were submitted between nine and 11 years ago⁶⁹—to date, only seven States Parties (Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have submitted updated reports. The lack of updated initial reports raises practical concerns that go beyond compliance with States Parties' international legal obligations. Because many of the older initial reports likely contain outdated information, the Treaty's repository of annual reports is less reliable as a tool for identifying implementation challenges, highlighting good practices, assessing the ATT's long-term impact on strengthening national control systems, or evaluating progress made and impact of the ATT.



TO DATE, ONLY SEVEN STATES PARTIES (HUNGARY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, ROMANIA, SLOVENIA, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM) HAVE SUBMITTED UPDATED REPORTS.

⁶⁷ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). tinyurl.com/23vvaafu.

⁶⁸ The initial report template recommended at CSP7 notes: 'This template may be used to supply such updates as well. Only changes need then be indicated either by highlighting, tracking or marking up changes made in each section OR providing a summary description of the updates made in Annex A.' ATT Secretariat (2021). 'Initial Reporting Template'. 16 July 2021. tinyurl.com/3rp24wf6.

⁶⁹ This datapoint is based primarily upon records of when initial reports first appeared on the ATT Secretariat website. The Secretariat does not publicly disclose the dates on which States Parties submitted their initial reports.

UPDATING INITIAL ATT REPORTS: THE UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE

In August 2025, the United Kingdom submitted an updated initial annual report to the ATT Secretariat, becoming one of only seven States Parties that have provided updated reports since their original submissions.⁷⁰ Lessons from the UK experience can provide good practice for States Parties planning to update their initial reports.⁷¹

The United Kingdom's initial report had not been updated since its original submission in December 2015. Since then, legislative changes following the country's withdrawal from the European Union, alongside other institutional changes, prompted the department responsible for the ATT portfolio (the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, or FCDO) to provide an updated report, to both reflect these developments and ensure that the information remains current and accurate.

The update to the United Kingdom's initial report was an inter-agency effort. Once the decision was made to submit an update, the FCDO undertook a preliminary review and noted which sections needed to be updated. This process also helped new staff familiarize themselves with UK arms export policies. The initial report was circulated among offices responsible for import, export and border/trade controls, with each office given the responsibility to review and update the specific sections relevant to its work. Those updates were returned to the FCDO office that submits the report to the ATT Secretariat.

The FCDO was well placed to coordinate the exercise. Assigning one department to consult other offices proved the most efficient approach. The coordinating department does not hold expertise on all aspects of ATT implementation and experiences regular employee turnover, which can limit institutional memory. The process relied heavily on the consulting offices staffed by long-term employees with extensive subject-matter expertise.

The United Kingdom also took advantage of synergies with other multilateral reports. The UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report and the UK's reports to the UN PoA and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Information Exchange on Conventional Arms Transfer were valuable sources of information. Other useful resources included the UK online public record of government legislation (legislation.gov.uk) and the recommended ATT initial report template, whose questions provided a helpful guide.

Ultimately, the United Kingdom's experience in updating its initial report demonstrates that, when supported by strong institutional systems, the reporting process does not have to be burdensome. While the approach to updating initial reports will differ across countries, several valuable lessons can be drawn.

- States Parties should perform regular reviews of their initial report to make sure it remains up to date. This helps decrease the amount of work required to update the report, both substantively and procedurally, since contributors are accustomed to the process and inter-agency procedures do not need to be (re)established.
- States Parties should adopt clear processes and procedures that are based on an interagency framework to allow for regular updating of the initial report. Involving multiple relevant agencies helps distribute the workload and can also serve as a form of peer review, thereby improving overall quality control. In such a review process, the coordinating department should engage consultees early and ensure that participating departments understand the importance of ATT reporting. Responsibilities assigned to consulted departments should be limited and manageable. Each consultee should clearly understand what they are responsible for and the timeline for completing their assigned sections, and the coordinating office should allow sufficient time for departments to conduct a thorough review.
- States Parties should leverage synergies as much as possible. The recommended initial report template provides guidance on the types of information needed to complete a report.⁷² Other conventional arms control mechanisms, such as recent reports to other multilateral instruments or to national parliaments, can be of use in identifying domestic legislative changes and ensuring consistency.
- In the updated report, the coordinating office should clearly identify what has been revised to increase readability and facilitate future updates.⁷³
- Once the updated report has been completed and sent to the ATT Secretariat, the State Party should inform stakeholders that the report has been updated.

70 The seven States Parties that have submitted an updated initial report are: Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

71 Information about the UK experience updating its initial report was obtained during an interview with a UK official on 2 March 2026. It was also presented during a side event at the ATT Working Groups meetings in March 2026.

72 PDF and Word document versions of the recommended initial template may be found on the right-hand side of the ATT Secretariat's 'How To Submit a Report' webpage. ATT Secretariat (n.d.). 'How To Submit a Report'. tinyurl.com/ytcetpsw.


73 The recommended initial report template includes a section for this purpose in the back of the report, titled 'ANNEX A. Summary of updates to the previous Initial Report'.

PRIVATE REPORTING IN INITIAL REPORTS

As of 7 June 2026, 24 of the 94 current initial reports (26 per cent) available on the ATT Secretariat's website are private.⁷⁴ All three initial reports submitted in the past two years (Colombia, Bahamas and Andorra) were submitted privately—in contrast to the 2024 ATT Monitor reporting period of 8 June 2023 to 7 June 2024, when the three initial reports submitted were public. Private initial reporting rates have slowly but steadily risen over the past decade, from 6 per cent of the initial reports submitted as of June 2016, to 18 per cent of the reports submitted in June 2020, to the current 26 per cent of total reports (see Figure 3.3).

With private reporting rates accounting for a quarter of all initial reports, ATT stakeholders other than the ATT Secretariat and States Parties face significant limitations in their ability to evaluate national control systems, tailor support and assistance initiatives, and assess the status and impact of Treaty implementation.

FIGURE 3.3: PRIVATE INITIAL REPORTING, 2016 – 2026



* Data calculated annually on 7 June.

74 Andorra, Bahamas, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, State of Palestine and Tuvalu.

CONCLUSION

Early analysis of the 2025 ATT annual reports delivers some positive trends in reporting. Many States Parties submitted overdue reports, including some States which submitted backlogs of overdue reports and are now in full compliance with their annual reporting obligations, and two States Parties (the Central African Republic and Guyana) which have been removed from the list of annual non-reporters after submitting their first annual reports. Following a steady rise in private annual reporting from 2015 to 2020, private reporting rates have solidified. An increasing number of States Parties are utilizing the newest version of the recommended annual template, supporting a more comprehensive and comparable understanding of arms transfer trends across States. Perhaps most encouragingly, efforts to improve information sharing with UNROCA has begun to show results, with UNROCA reporting rates strengthening since introduction of the information sharing mechanism in the ATT recommended annual reporting template.⁷⁵ However, ATT annual reporting also continues to face recurring challenges: new States Parties continue to struggle to submit annual reports, while a core group of early-acceding States has yet to report.

With respect to initial reporting, maintaining such a high compliance rate (81 per cent) despite the growth in the number of ATT States Parties is an achievement. However, as with annual reporting, the core list of non-reporters has stagnated,

and new States Parties often take more than one year after the Treaty enters into force for their own State to submit their initial reports. The utility of the information available within the reports is declining—with only a handful of States Parties having updated their reports, the current reports are growing increasingly outdated. Private initial reporting rates have steadily grown over the past decade, now accounting for a quarter of all submitted reports. A possible new stagnation in initial reporting compliance rates, following an eight-year period of gains, may require attention in the coming years.

The ATT community should be commended for maintaining high levels of engagement and compliance with ATT transparency and reporting obligations in the context of an increasingly challenging international environment. However, there is still much work to be done to meet the standards set by the Treaty's object and purpose. Whether through targeted outreach to non-reporting and new States Parties, efforts to leverage synergies with fellow conventional arms transfer reporting mechanisms or initiatives to raise awareness of the need to update initial reports, sustained action to improve initial and annual reporting trends will be essential to strengthening transparency, building confidence among States Parties and advancing effective implementation of the Treaty in the years ahead.



**IMAGE OF A SUBMACHINE GUN
ON DISPLAY.**

CREDIT: © VALENTIN ANGEL
FERNANDEZ

75 Bramlett, N. and Stohl, R. (2025). 'Ten Years of ATT Reporting: Placing the 2024 Reports in Context'. Stimson Center. November 2025. tinyurl.com/ym26ff46, p. 30.



DETAILED SHOT OF A US MILITARY
AMMO BELT DRAPED OVER A
MACHINE GUN, SHOWCASING
BULLETS AND MILITARY GEAR.

CREDIT: © MICHAEL VILLANUEVA

ANNEX: COUNTRY PROFILES

This Annex examines the annual reports submitted by States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Secretariat reflecting their transfer of conventional arms in 2024. An analysis is provided in the form of country profiles covering all States Parties that submitted publicly available reports for 2024. By disaggregating the analysis by country, the ATT Monitor intends to provide easy, comparable and nationally relevant findings to help inform future practice.

One hundred and thirteen States Parties were due to submit an annual report for 2024 to the ATT Secretariat within one week following 31 May 2025.¹ As of 1 February 2026, 77 had submitted reports, of which 53 were made public. These reports form the basis of the analysis presented in this annex.

Annual reports are one of the primary tools for transparency available to States Parties. They help build confidence between countries and enable States Parties to demonstrate their arms control regimes are consistent with their obligations under the ATT. For annual reports to fulfill this pivotal role, it is necessary that States Parties complete them in a comprehensive, accurate and public manner.

The ATT Monitor continuously builds on findings from annual reporting to the ATT Secretariat. This analysis expands on the baseline work completed by the ATT Monitor in previous reports, including assessments of reporting, examples of good national practices, and the interpretative and practical challenges that are common among States Parties.

METHODOLOGY

All annual reports were downloaded for analysis on 1 February 2026. Unless otherwise stated, reports received by the ATT Secretariat after this date or later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in its report each year to ensure adequate time to conduct an in-depth analysis.

Each profile assesses a State Party's compliance with the reporting obligations set out in ATT Article 13.3.

Where applicable, annual reports for 2024 were compared to 2023 submissions to evaluate how national reporting changed under the ATT and to assess if the common challenges identified remained the same or if reporting practice had improved. Reporting practices were assessed for each State Party according to key criteria identified in previous ATT Monitor reports. These criteria are:

- Submitting a report as per each State Party's legal obligation under Article 13.3
- Compliance with Article 13.3's on-time reporting obligation (within one week of the 31 May 2025 reporting deadline)
- Providing data on both exports and imports, or submitting 'nil' reports
- Making a report publicly available (including withholding data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security and indicating where or what information was withheld)
- Providing data that is clearly disaggregated by category of arms, importer and/or exporter, and number of items and/or financial value; specifying whether transfers are actual or authorized²
- Providing information that goes beyond the minimum requirements specified in Article 13.3 (for example, reporting on exports/imports of ammunition, national categories, etc.)

Changes in reporting practices, such as States Parties switching from reporting authorized to actual transfers or utilizing a new reporting format, are highlighted in the country profiles.

Reports from each State Party are assessed based on their contributions to the ATT's core objective of increasing transparency in the global arms trade. The analysis is not intended as a 'name and shame' exercise, but to present comparable information that is country-specific to inform policymakers and civil society, and to help build knowledge and capacity—particularly by highlighting good practices and room for improvement—among officials responsible for producing ATT annual reports.

¹ The ATT Secretariat grants States Parties a seven-day grace period beyond the Article 13 deadline to submit their annual reports, creating a de facto annual deadline of 7 June.

² To be classified as providing clear, disaggregated data, a State Party must clarify if reported exports and imports were authorized or actual (or both), provide a number or value for each item and clearly name the final importing/exporting country.

Each country profile addresses the timeliness of reporting and compliance with established deadlines. The ATT Monitor considers reports to be on time if they are received by the ATT Secretariat and posted on its website within one week following the 31 May reporting deadline.³ Dates of submission provided by States Parties in their annual reports and the dates which they were received by the ATT Secretariat sometimes differ. The reason for the gaps between the stated and actual dates of submission is not always clear.

States Parties can submit their annual reports by using the ATT annual reporting template, the online reporting tool, their report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), a custom national report, or a report on conventional arms exports and imports submitted to a regional organization (provided that the content of these reports comply with the annual reporting obligations of the Treaty).⁴ The ATT Secretariat and the ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) work to make improvements to the ways in which States Parties can submit annual reports, including through amendments to reporting templates and the introduction of the online reporting tool in 2018.⁵

It should be noted that, under the ATT, States Parties can submit the same report they provide to UNROCA as their ATT annual report.⁶ However, there are key differences between these reports. For example, the UNROCA template does not allow countries to specify whether they are withholding data for commercial sensitivity or national security-related reasons, whereas the ATT reporting template explicitly does. Therefore, in the ensuing analysis, the ATT Monitor considers this confidentiality criterion as 'Unspecified' for countries that submit UNROCA reports, unless otherwise indicated.⁷

Where States Parties reported the value of transfers in their annual reports, the transfer summaries include the monetary value of the corresponding exports or imports. When national or supranational currencies were used, values have been converted to US dollars using the International Monetary Fund's annual conversion rate for each currency for the 2024 calendar year, unless otherwise indicated.⁸ In some cases, the currency reported by States Parties was not specified and this is noted in the concerned profiles.

In some instances, States Parties used country codes to indicate the final exporting and importing countries. The ATT Monitor determined which countries such codes referenced by using online sources, such as the United Nations country code list, though it did not verify with each State Party whether such determinations are accurate.

In addition to assessing reporting practices, each country's profile includes key baseline data relating to the transfers described by States Parties in their annual reports. This data includes:

- Total number of export/import partners and their Treaty status, based on the partner's status at the beginning of the reporting year (for this year, as of 1 January 2024)⁹
- The number and categories of major conventional arms reported, if available¹⁰
- The number and sub-categories of small arms and light weapons (SALW) reported¹¹
- The principal trade relationships reported by the State Party.¹²

3 A complete list of States Parties that submitted timely 2024 annual reports can be found in the ATT Monitor's preliminary analysis in the 2025 ATT Monitor Report. See Control Arms Secretariat (2025). 'ATT Monitor Report 2025'. Geneva. 25 August 2025. tinyurl.com/mwcvxcbu, p. 54. In 2025, the ATT Monitor was able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the ATT Secretariat.

4 Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep. 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, p. 9.

5 ATT Secretariat (2021). 'ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Co-chairs' draft report to CSP7'. Geneva. 22 July 2021. tinyurl.com/kjzv2stj.

6 States Parties can also submit information from their ATT Annual Report to UNROCA by ticking the box: 'The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) may use the relevant information in this Annual Report as a basis for the reporting State's report to the United Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA)'.

7 When it can be inferred from the reported data that some information was withheld for commercial sensitivity/national security-related reasons, the ATT Monitor includes this in the Good Practices section.

8 International Monetary Fund (2025). 'Data Explorer: Exchange Rates'. tinyurl.com/y5u6fphw.

9 Determining ATT membership status at the start of the reporting year allows the ATT Monitor to calculate reported transfers among States Parties. The United States is included as a Signatory State, as it has signed the Treaty but no longer intends to become a State Party. Where applicable, analysis includes the names of non-States Parties (and non-UN members) to highlight trade relationships that extend beyond the ATT.

10 Categories of major conventional arms include: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile launchers.

11 Sub-categories of small arms include: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns and others. Sub-categories of light weapons include: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, mortars of calibres less than 75mm and others.

12 Principal trade relationships are determined by totaling either the numbers or values of transfers reported by each State Party, depending on data provided. When both numbers and values are reported, the ATT Monitor specifies which was used in determining these relationships.

Each profile indicates whether an ATT annual report was submitted for the previous five reporting years in which reports were due.¹³ Annual reports voluntarily submitted before a State Party's first report was due are also noted (*). Each profile indicates whether reports were made publicly available (✓) or kept private (✗) for each year a report was submitted over the last five years.

This annex solely concerns transfer data as reported by each State Party in its ATT annual report.¹⁴ It does not compare the data with other relevant reporting mechanisms or findings by independent experts, media sources, national reports to parliamentary authorities, or think tanks and institutes such as

the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.¹⁵ Integrating information from such external sources would likely paint a different picture of the global arms trade compared to data reported to the ATT Secretariat, particularly with respect to the volume of transfers between States. For the analysis conducted by the ATT Monitor and others to be as accurate as possible, it is critical that States Parties submit public, clear and comprehensive annual reports and consider the fulfillment of their reporting obligations as an opportunity to support the ATT's goal of greater transparency in the global arms trade. States Parties or other ATT stakeholders are encouraged to reach out to the ATT Monitor to clarify any information presented in the following profiles.



¹³ Only years with reporting obligations are listed in each State's profile.

¹⁴ In certain cases, percentages in country profile transfer summaries may not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding of individual values.

¹⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (n.d.). 'SIPRI Arms Transfers Database'. tinyurl.com/26utypps.

AFGHANISTAN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No			
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2021 X	2022 X	2023 X	2024 X
Were submitted reports made publicly available?				

ALBANIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?				No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 X	2021 ✓	2022 X	2023 X	2024 X	

ANDORRA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No			
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2024 X			
Were submitted reports made publicly available?				

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?				No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 X	2021 X	2022 X	2023 X	2024 X	

ARGENTINA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT online reporting tool		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Argentina continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports.

Argentina continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Argentina disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Argentina provided descriptions for all reported small arms exports and imports of major conventional arms, as well as for some SALW imports.

Argentina provided comments for some reported imports.

Argentina clarified that reported imports of 'other small arms' referred to shotguns.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Argentina did not indicate whether reported imports of rifles and carbines and heavy machine guns were authorized or actual.

Argentina excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Argentina could indicate clearly there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Argentina could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Argentina reported exports to eight countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-State Party (Ecuador) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.¹⁶
- Argentina did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Argentina reported the export of 14,031 small arms, all of which were revolvers and self-loading pistols.
- The main importers of small arms exported by Argentina were the United States (80.1 per cent), Ecuador (6.4 per cent) and Guatemala (6.4 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Argentina reported imports from nine countries. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Argentina reported the import of one manned combat aircraft from the United States.
- Argentina reported the import of 21,844 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The vast majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (42.5 per cent), rifles and carbines (37.3 per cent) and shotguns reported as 'other small arms' (20.2 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Argentina were the United States (25.7 per cent), Brazil (21.9 per cent) and Türkiye (20.6 per cent).

¹⁶ Ecuador is listed as a non-State Party because it became an ATT State Party on 26 May 2026.

AUSTRALIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Australia's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024.

Australia continued to report **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** for most exports of major conventional arms. It also continued to report **Aggregated Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of small arms and light weapons exports in an additional annex.

Australia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of imports of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons. It began reporting **Values** for some imports of major conventional arms, after not having done so in the previous year.

GOOD PRACTICES

Australia reported exports and imports of major conventional arms disaggregated by weapon category and trading partner.

Australia integrated reported imports of firearms into the relevant section of the ATT reporting template, instead of reporting these in a separate annex. This allowed Australia to disaggregate its firearms imports by exporting State and number of units.

Australia provided values for most exports of both major conventional arms and aggregated small arms and light weapons, as well as some imports of major conventional arms.

Australia provided descriptions of items for all transfers of major conventional arms and some imports of small arms and light weapons.

Australia provided comments for some major conventional arms exports, as well as some SALW and all its major conventional arms imports.

Australia provided an explanation for its table on SALW exports, further expanding on the conditions of permits issued.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Australia continued to provide aggregated numbers and values of SALW exports, making it impossible to determine which SALW sub-categories were exported to each importing State.

Australia did not identify the exporting States for around 5,000 small arms imports, instead listing them as 'unspecified'. This makes it impossible to determine exactly how many items were imported from which country.

Australia excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Australia could indicate clearly there were no transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

In some cases, Australia could indicate which of the descriptions for major conventional arms correspond to which specific export, instead of aggregating them.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Australia reported exports to a total of 37 countries and non-UN members in 2024. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and seven were non-States Parties (Bolivia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka).¹⁷
- Australia reported the export of 112,280 units of major conventional arms across all seven categories with a total value of approximately A\$735m (US\$485m). In terms of numbers, most exports were missiles (72.6 per cent), unmanned combat aircraft (27.1 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (0.3 per cent).
- In terms of value, manned (79.2 per cent) and unmanned combat aircraft (13.0 per cent) accounted for the majority of the total sum, followed by missiles (5.2 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Australia in 2024 were Canada (72.6 per cent), the United Kingdom (13.6 per cent) and the United States (13.4 per cent). In terms of value, the main importers of major conventional arms from Australia were France (77.0 per cent), Indonesia (8.8 per cent) and the United States (6.8 per cent).

¹⁷ Australia specified reported exports to France included exports to New Caledonia. Australia reported exports to one non-UN member ('Other (Taiwan)').

- Australia reported the export of 11,526 small arms and light weapons with a total value of approximately A\$5.06m (US\$3.34m).
 - In terms of units, the main importers of small arms and light weapons from Australia in 2024 were Canada (43.6 per cent), France (43.4 per cent) and the United States (5.6 per cent). In terms of value, the main importers of small arms and light weapons from Australia were the People's Republic of China (39.2 per cent), Canada (20.6 per cent) and the United States (11.6 per cent).
- TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA**
- Australia reported imports from a total of 49 countries and non-UN members in 2024. Of these, 34 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and seven were non-States Parties (Azerbaijan, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar and Sri Lanka).¹⁸
 - Australia reported the import of 58 major conventional arms, covering four categories. The majority of imports were battle tanks (79.3 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (15.5 per cent), followed by large-calibre artillery systems (3.4 per cent). The only exporters of major conventional arms to Australia in 2024 were the United States (96.6 per cent) and the Republic of Korea (3.4 per cent).
 - In 2024, Australia reported the import of 91,548 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. The majority of imports were rifles and carbines (54.8 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (26.4 per cent) and 'other small arms' (18.5 per cent). The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Australia in 2024 were the United States (20.8 per cent), Austria (14.0 per cent) and Türkiye (12.2 per cent).



¹⁸ Australia reported imports from one non-UN member ('Other', specifying in comments it is Taiwan) as well as from 'unspecified' exporters.

AUSTRIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✗
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	

BAHAMAS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✗	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✗	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2024 ✗				

BARBADOS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✗	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✗	2024 ✗

BELGIUM

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Belgium continued to report a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports. It continued reporting **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports, as well as **Authorized Values** of exports under voluntary national categories.¹⁹

Belgium reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports, as opposed to 2023 when it solely reported **Actual Numbers**. Belgium continued to report **Authorized Values** of arms imports under voluntary national categories.

GOOD PRACTICES

Belgium reported exports and imports of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons, and disaggregated transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Belgium provided the values of transfers it reported under a national category.

Belgium specified where information was being 'withheld for security reasons', for which arms category and transfer (export of AIM9M Sidewinder missiles to Ukraine), and also disclosed what type of information was being withheld (number).

Belgium provided a description for all transfers of major conventional arms, as well as for exports of small arms and light weapons.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Belgium could identify the importing States for exports of small arms and light weapons.

Belgium could indicate clearly that there were no transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Belgium could provide descriptions of items for transfers reported under a national category, as well as comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Belgium reported exports to a total of 53 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and nine were non-States Parties (Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Somalia and Tunisia).²⁰
- Belgium reported the export of 299 major conventional arms. These were missiles (56.5 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (43.5 per cent).
- The main importers of Belgian exports of major conventional arms were Denmark (48.5 per cent), the Czech Republic (33.4 per cent) and Ukraine (10.0 per cent).
- Belgium reported the export of 5,627 small arms and light weapons, covering five sub-categories. The majority were assault rifles (71.5 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (17.8 per cent) and 'other small arms' (8.9 per cent).
- Under national categories, Belgium reported ML1 exports valued at €216m (US\$224m). By value, the main importers of ML1 from Belgium were the United States (14.0 per cent), the United Kingdom (13.2 per cent) and France (13.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Belgium reported imports from 28 countries. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (India and Saudi Arabia).
- Belgium reported the import of 24 major conventional arms, being missiles (83.3 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (16.7 per cent) from the United States.
- Belgium did not report any imports of small arms and light weapons.
- Under national categories, Belgium reported ML1 imports valued at €72.8m (US\$75.3m). By value, the main exporters of ML1 to Belgium were Japan (26.5 per cent), the United States (21.1 per cent) and the United Kingdom (18.8 per cent).

¹⁹ Belgium reported the export and import of items under the European Common Military List ML1 (smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less).

²⁰ Belgium reported exports to two non-UN members ('Greenland (Denmark)' and Taiwan).

BELIZE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒ 2021 ☒ 2022 ☒ 2023 ☒ 2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	

BENIN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒ 2021 ☒ 2022 ☒ 2023 ☒ 2024 ☒		
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒ 2021 ☒ 2022 ☒ 2023 ☒ 2024 ☒		

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Benin continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports. Benin continued to report **Actual Numbers** of imports of small arms and light weapons.

GOOD PRACTICES

Benin disaggregated SALW imports by weapon sub-category and exporting State.

Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly that it had no transfers to report.

Benin provided descriptions for all its imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Benin could indicate clearly that there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Benin could provide comments describing the nature of its reported imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Benin reported imports from one ATT State Party in 2024 (Serbia).
- Benin did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Benin reported the import of 70 small arms and light weapons. These were assault rifles (85.7 per cent), heavy machine guns (8.6 per cent), light machine guns (2.9 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (2.9 per cent).

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to provide **Numbers** and **Values** for major conventional arms and SALW exports, as well as **Numbers** and **Values** for SALW imports.

It did not specify whether these transfers were **Authorized** or **Actual**.

GOOD PRACTICES

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided numbers, values, and trading partners for all reported transfers.

In most cases, Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly indicated that there were no reported transfers in specific sub-categories of arms by inserting a '/' in the relevant fields.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided descriptions for most of its transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual transfers.

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (Indonesia and Iraq).
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 271,493 major conventional arms, all of them being large-calibre artillery systems with a total value of €259m (US\$280m).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Bosnia and Herzegovina were the United States (88.7 per cent), the Czech Republic (11.2 per cent) and Indonesia (0.1 per cent). In terms of value, the main importers were the United States (93.1 per cent), the Czech Republic (3.5 per cent) and Mongolia (1.5 per cent).

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 7,576 small arms and light weapons valued at €3.38m (US\$3.65m), covering five sub-categories. In terms of numbers, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (79.3 per cent), light machine guns (13.2 per cent) and rifles and carbines (4.2 per cent). In terms of value, most exports were revolvers and self-loading pistols (50.4 per cent), light machine guns (19.2 per cent) and mortars of calibres less than 75mm (12.6 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of small arms and light weapons were the United States (66.0 per cent), Iraq (13.2 per cent) and Serbia (13.2 per cent). In terms of value, the main importers were the United States (36.9 per cent), Mongolia (24.6 per cent) and Iraq (19.2 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported imports from 12 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of 9,983 small arms and light weapons valued at €5.53m (US\$5.99m), covering four sub-categories. In terms of numbers, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (92.0 per cent), rifles and carbines (7.8 per cent) and sub-machine guns (0.2 per cent). In terms of value, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (81.2 per cent), rifles and carbines (15.7 per cent) and sub-machine guns (3.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Czech Republic (41.1 per cent), Türkiye (28.4 per cent) and the United States (15.1 per cent). In terms of value, the main exporters were the Czech Republic (61.9 per cent), the United States (12.2 per cent) and Türkiye (11.7 per cent).

BOTSWANA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

As in its 2023 annual report, Botswana submitted a 'nil report' for exports.

Botswana reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Botswana disaggregated imports of small arms by weapon sub-category.

Botswana submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly that it had no transfers to report.

Botswana provided values, descriptions and comments for all its imports of small arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Botswana aggregated countries from which it imported small arms as 'various States', making it impossible to determine from where each transfer was exported.

Botswana could clearly indicate that there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Botswana submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Botswana did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Botswana reported the import of 1,282 small arms valued at US\$908,000.
- In terms of numbers, most were rifles and carbines (63.6 per cent), with the remainder being shotguns (36.4 per cent). In terms of value, the vast majority were rifles and carbines (89.7 per cent) and shotguns made up the remainder (10.3 per cent).

BRAZIL

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

BULGARIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time ²¹	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Bulgaria continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Bulgaria continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Bulgaria disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Bulgaria provided descriptions for all transfers of major conventional arms and light weapons, as well as most transfers of small arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Bulgaria excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Bulgaria could indicate clearly that there were no transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Bulgaria could provide descriptions for all its small arms transfers, as well as comments for all transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Bulgaria reported exports to 25 countries. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and five were non-States Parties (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan).
- Bulgaria reported the export of 492 major conventional arms. These were large-calibre artillery systems (89.4 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (10.6 per cent).

- The main importers of Bulgarian exports of major conventional arms were the Czech Republic (31.5 per cent), Poland (24.6 per cent) and Albania (17.3 per cent).
- Bulgaria reported the export of 141,480 small arms and light weapons covering 11 sub-categories. The majority were portable anti-tank guns (63.7 per cent), assault rifles (22.7 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (5.9 per cent).
- In 2024, the main importers of small arms and light weapons from Bulgaria were Romania (35.3 per cent), Poland (27.2 per cent) and the United States (10.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Bulgaria reported imports from 21 countries. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (Azerbaijan and Egypt).
- Bulgaria reported the import of 298 major conventional arms, being large-calibre artillery systems (97.0 per cent), manned combat aircraft (1.3 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (1.3 per cent) and battle tanks (0.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional arms to Bulgaria were Egypt (47.7 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (44.3 per cent) and Croatia (2.7 per cent).
- Bulgaria reported the import of 9,795 small arms and light weapons covering six sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (53.9 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (38.0 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (5.6 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Bulgaria were Austria (25.6 per cent), Italy (9.8 per cent) and Finland (9.1 per cent).

²¹ Bulgaria submitted its 2024 annual report before the deadline of 7 June 2025. However, the version of the report originally published on the ATT Secretariat website contained a clerical error, with one missing 'category of arms' and some arms mislabelled in a different 'category of arms'. The correct version was uploaded to the ATT website in spring 2026. The ATT Monitor's analysis of Bulgaria's annual report is based on the amended version.

BURKINA FASO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?					No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?		2021	2022	2023	2024		

CABO VERDE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No					
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Were submitted reports made publicly available?						

CAMEROON

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?					No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	

CANADA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons?	Unspecified – UNROCA template	What reporting template was used?	UNROCA template		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Canada continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons exports.

Canada continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms and light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Canada disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Canada provided comments for all its reported transfers, as well as descriptions for some of its exports of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Canada could provide descriptions for all transfers of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Canada reported exports to 13 countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Saudi Arabia).
- Canada reported the export of 452 major conventional arms. These were armoured combat vehicles (99.1 per cent), battle tanks (0.7 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (0.2 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Canada were Ukraine (77.4 per cent), Saudi Arabia (13.9 per cent) and the United States (2.4 per cent).
- Canada reported the export of 8,056 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The vast majority were assault rifles (93.4 per cent), light machine guns (4.5 per cent) and rifles and carbines (1.6 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons from Canada were Ukraine (45.5 per cent), the Netherlands (44.6 per cent) and Denmark (9.0 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Canada reported imports from ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Canada did not report any imports of major conventional arms.
- Canada reported the import of 282 units of small arms and light weapons covering six sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (81.9 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (7.4 per cent) and rifles and carbines (6.0 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Canada were the United States (49.6 per cent), Austria (34.0 per cent) and the Czech Republic (5.3 per cent).

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

CHAD

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?



CHILE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Chile's reporting practice changed in 2024.

In 2024, Chile switched from using a national reporting template to using the standardized ATT reporting template. Chile submitted a 'nil' report for exports and reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Chile disaggregated its imports of major conventional arms by weapon category and exporting State.

Chile submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly that it had no transfers to report.

Chile provided a description for its import of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Chile could indicate clearly that there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Chile did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Chile submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Chile reported the import of 21 armoured combat vehicles from the United States, which is an ATT Signatory.
- Chile did not report the import of any small arms and light weapons in 2024.

COSTA RICA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Costa Rica's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024.

Costa Rica submitted a 'nil' report for exports, as opposed to 2023, when it reported **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of temporary exports of small arms and of temporary exports under national categories.

Costa Rica reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports, as well as weapons categorized under voluntary national categories. In 2023, Costa Rica reported both **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers**.

GOOD PRACTICES

Costa Rica submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly that it had no transfers to report.

Costa Rica provided descriptions and comments for all small arms imports, as well as weapons categorized under voluntary national categories.

Costa Rica provided additional information, including imports of ammunition, under voluntary national categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Costa Rica continued to aggregate States for all reported transfers, thereby making it impossible to determine from and to where items were imported or exported.

Costa Rica could indicate clearly that there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Costa Rica did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Costa Rica submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Costa Rica reported imports from seven countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.²²
- Costa Rica did not report any imports of major conventional arms.
- Costa Rica reported the import of 8,530 small arms, with the majority being pistols and revolvers (80.7 per cent) reported under a voluntary national category and the remainder being rifles and carbines (19.3 per cent).
- Costa Rica also reported the import of 13,503,350 units of ammunition under a voluntary national category, further disaggregating them by different calibres.

²² The ATT Monitor interpreted the States listed under 'State of origin' as exporting States.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time		Was the 2024 annual report made public?		No	
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✗	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✗	2024 ✗	

CROATIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline					Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020	✓	2021	✓	2022	✓	2023	✓	2024	✓	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020	✓	2021	✗	2022	✗	2023	✗	2024	✗	

CYPRUS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline					Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No																		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓					2021 ✓					2022 ✓					2023 ✓					2024 ✓				
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✗					2021 ✗					2022 ✓					2023 ✗					2024 ✗				

CZECH REPUBLIC

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT online reporting tool		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

The Czech Republic continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

The Czech Republic continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Czech Republic provided disaggregated numbers for all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

The Czech Republic provided comments for some exports and imports of major conventional arms and light weapons.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Czech Republic could indicate clearly that there were no transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

The Czech Republic could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- The Czech Republic reported exports to a total of 60 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, nine were Signatories and 12 were non-States Parties (Armenia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Uganda).²³
- The Czech Republic reported the export of 791 major conventional arms covering four categories. The vast majority were large-calibre artillery systems (71.6 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (14.8 per cent) and battle tanks (10.1 per cent).

- The main importers of major conventional arms from the Czech Republic were Ukraine (79.5 per cent), Uganda (7.8 per cent) and the Netherlands (7.1 per cent).
- In 2024, the Czech Republic reported the export of 38,918 small arms and light weapons covering nine sub-categories. These included revolvers and self-loading pistols (46.9 per cent), sub-machine guns (24.7 per cent) and assault rifles (20.9 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons from the Czech Republic were Spain (21.7 per cent), Poland (16.0 per cent) and Lebanon (10.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- The Czech Republic reported imports from 11 countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (Jordan and Pakistan).²⁴
- The Czech Republic reported the import of 344 major conventional arms covering four categories. The vast majority were large-calibre artillery systems (95.9 per cent), unmanned combat aircraft (1.7 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (1.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional arms to the Czech Republic were Bulgaria (87.2 per cent), Serbia (5.2 per cent) and the United States (3.5 per cent).
- In 2024, the Czech Republic reported the import of 4,508 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. These included rifles and carbines (41.3 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (23.4 per cent) and light machine guns (22.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to the Czech Republic were Pakistan (50.3 per cent), Türkiye (34.3 per cent) and Switzerland (9.2 per cent).

²³ The Czech Republic reported exports to two non-UN members (Kosovo and Taiwan).

²⁴ The Czech Republic indicated that, by implementing the Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and Council, it 'is not granting any licenses for transfers from other EU member states into its territory'; consequently, reported data likely does not include all Czech imports from other EU Member States.

DENMARK

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Denmark reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of its exports of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons, after reporting only **Authorized Numbers** in 2023.

Denmark continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports. It also continued to report a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Denmark provided disaggregated transfers by weapon category and sub-category.

Denmark indicated clearly that there were no reported transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Denmark provided descriptions for all transfers of major conventional arms, as well as for most SALW transfers.

Denmark provided comments for some small arms transfers.

When Denmark indicated that the transfers in a weapon category or sub-category were both authorized and actual, it specified explicitly the number of transfers that were authorized and the ones that were actual.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

In some cases, Denmark aggregated trading partners for imports and exports of small arms and exports of major conventional weapons, making it impossible to determine from where these items were imported or to where they were exported.

Denmark did not provide the number of units for several transfers of major conventional arms, as well as exports of one category of light weapons.

Denmark could clearly indicate what information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Denmark could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Denmark reported exports to at least five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one a Signatory.²⁵
- Denmark reported the export of 109 major conventional arms. These were armoured combat vehicles (82.6 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (17.4 per cent).
- Denmark reported the export of 3,591 small arms and light weapons covering eight sub-categories. The vast majority were rifles and carbines (67.8 per cent), 'other small arms' (27.7 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (2.5 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Denmark reported imports from at least four countries. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.²⁶
- Denmark reported the import of 48 major conventional arms covering four categories. The majority were missiles (75.0 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (10.4 per cent), and manned combat aircraft (8.3 per cent).
- Denmark reported the import of 9,917 small arms covering five sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (49.1 per cent), 'other small arms' (40.4 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (10.1 per cent).

²⁵ Denmark reported some exports to 'multiple States', making it impossible to determine if these 'multiple States' refer only to the five States explicitly reported.

²⁶ Denmark reported some imports from 'multiple States', making it impossible to determine if these 'multiple States' refer only to the four States explicitly reported.

DOMINICA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

The Dominican Republic continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

The Dominican Republic reported **Numbers** of small arms imports but did not specify whether these were **Authorized** or **Actual**.

The Dominican Republic reported both **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of imports under three voluntary national categories.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Dominican Republic disaggregated reported imports by weapon category and sub-category.

The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

The Dominican Republic provided descriptions for all reported imports.

The Dominican Republic provided definitions of national categories, which it used to report additional imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Dominican Republic did not indicate whether imports of small arms were authorized or actual.

The Dominican Republic aggregated exporters of small arms and munitions, making it impossible to determine how many items were exported from which country.

The Dominican Republic could indicate clearly that there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- The Dominican Republic reported imports from seven countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.²⁷
- The Dominican Republic did not report any imports of major conventional arms.
- The Dominican Republic reported the import of 1,290 shotguns from Belgium, Italy, Türkiye and the United States.
- Under voluntary national categories, the Dominican Republic reported the import of 5.82 million units of ammunition from Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United States. It also imported 12 sets of armoured windows for armoured vehicles from Colombia, as well as ten units of tear gas from the United States.

²⁷ Colombia is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 13 January 2025.

EL SALVADOR

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

El Salvador's reporting practice changed in 2024.

El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

El Salvador reported **Numbers** of small arms imports but did not specify whether these were **Authorized** or **Actual** transfers. In 2023, El Salvador reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

El Salvador disaggregated reported imports by weapon category and sub-category.

El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

El Salvador did not indicate whether imports of small arms were authorized or actual.

El Salvador aggregated small arms exporters by sub-category, making it impossible to determine the number of small arms imported from each trading partner.

El Salvador could indicate clearly that there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

El Salvador could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of reported imports of small arms.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- El Salvador reported imports from seven countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- El Salvador did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- El Salvador reported the import of 2,193 small arms. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (82.4 per cent) and rifles and carbines (17.6 per cent).

ESTONIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

In 2024, Estonia's reporting practice changed slightly.

Estonia reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports, as opposed to the previous year, when it reported **Authorized Numbers**.

Estonia reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports. In 2023, Estonia reported a mix of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers**.

GOOD PRACTICES

Estonia clearly disaggregated transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Estonia clearly indicated there were no reported transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Estonia clarified transfers it reported under 'other small arms' referred to smooth-bore guns.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Estonia could clearly indicate what information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Estonia could provide descriptions and comments for reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Estonia reported exports to six countries. Of these, five were States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Estonia did not report any exports of major conventional arms.
- Estonia reported the export of 347 small arms and light weapons covering six sub-categories. The majority were light machine guns (34.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (27.1 per cent) and 'other small arms' (19.3 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons exported by Estonia were Latvia (36.9 per cent), Ukraine (36.6 per cent) and Finland (17.6 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Estonia reported imports from ten countries. Of these, eight were States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Estonia did not report any imports of major conventional arms.
- Estonia reported the import of 1,019 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (58.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (21.2 per cent) and 'other small arms' (20.1 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Estonia were Austria (33.7 per cent), Italy (18.0 per cent) and Germany (15.2 per cent).

FINLAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT online reporting tool		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✗	2023 ✓/✗	2024 ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Finland submitted a public report on exports and imports, after submitting a hybrid report in 2023.²⁸

Finland reported **Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms exports, as well as imports of major conventional arms.

GOOD PRACTICES

Finland disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Finland provided descriptions for all reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Finland did not indicate whether reported transfers were authorized or actual.

Finland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Finland could indicate clearly there were no exports and imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Finland could provide comments for reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Finland reported exports to a total of 33 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 29 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Jordan).²⁹
- Finland reported the export of 109 major conventional arms, all of which were armoured combat vehicles.
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Finland were Sweden (57.8 per cent), Latvia (40.4 per cent), and Germany and Slovakia (0.9 per cent each).
- Finland reported the export of 6,588 small arms. These were assault rifles (82.4 per cent) and rifles and carbines (17.6 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Finland were Sweden (85.7 per cent), the United States (3.4 per cent) and Estonia (1.5 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Finland reported imports from one country, which was an ATT State Party.
- Finland reported the import of 12 large-calibre artillery systems from the Republic of Korea.
- Finland did not report the import of any small arms and light weapons.

28 In 2023, Finland reported exports publicly and imports confidentially.

29 Finland reported exports to one non-UN member (Greenland).

FRANCE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Unspecified – Not indicated	What reporting template was used?	National template		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

France continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons exports.

France continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

France disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

France indicated clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

France provided descriptions for most reported transfers. It also provided comments for some transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

France did not specify whether reported exports of combat aircraft and attack helicopters were manned or unmanned, as per UN Registry Definitions of Categories as outlined in Article 2 of the ATT.³⁰

France did not specify whether any information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

France could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- France reported exports to 30 countries. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and five were non-States Parties (Armenia, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Qatar).
- France reported the export of 567 major conventional arms covering seven categories. The majority were missiles (42.9 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (34.7 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (10.9 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from France were Ukraine (46.2 per cent), Qatar (15.9 per cent) and the United Arab Emirates (12.9 per cent).
- France reported the export of 5,793 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (76.3 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (6.3 per cent) and light machine guns (5.9 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from France were Ukraine (87.7 per cent), the United States (4.7 per cent) and Cameroon (1.7 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- France reported imports from nine countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- France did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- France reported the import of 938 small arms covering four sub-categories. The vast majority were assault rifles (49.4 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (29.3 per cent), and rifles and carbines (20.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to France were Germany (24.2 per cent), Austria (21.3 per cent) and Italy (14.4 per cent).

³⁰ For descriptions of UN Register of Conventional Arms categories, see: Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. tinyurl.com/8zwhyj3e, pp. 26-27.

GABON

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GEORGIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

Yes – On time

Was the 2024 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

✓

2021

✓

2022

✓

2023

✓

2024

✓

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X



GERMANY

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Germany continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and **Authorized Numbers** of small arms and light weapons exports.

Germany continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Germany disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Germany provided descriptions for most transfers of major conventional arms.

Germany provided comments for most SALW imports.

Germany filled in the column labelled 'State of origin', thereby providing additional information.

Germany provided a disclaimer at the beginning of the report, further expanding on the conditions of licenses issued by the German government.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Germany aggregated the exporting States of an unspecified number of portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems as 'EU Member States', making it impossible to determine exactly how many items were imported from which country.

Germany could indicate clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, instead of leaving those fields blank.

Germany could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Germany reported exports to a total of 38 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 32 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (Egypt and Qatar).³¹
- Germany reported the export of 903 major conventional arms covering seven categories. The majority were armoured combat vehicles (41.7 per cent), missiles (35.9 per cent) and battle tanks (16.1 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Germany were Ukraine (78.7 per cent), Hungary (5.4 per cent) and Singapore (3.8 per cent).
- Germany reported the export of 59,755 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. The majority were assault rifles (83.4 per cent), recoilless rifles (6.8 per cent), and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (4.0 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Germany reported imports from at least 18 countries. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.³²
- Germany reported the import of 178 major conventional arms covering four categories. The majority were MANPADS (77.0 per cent), battle tanks (14.0 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (8.4 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional arms to Germany were Israel (74.7 per cent), Switzerland (14.0 per cent) and Italy (8.4 per cent).
- Germany reported the import of 1,389 small arms and light weapons covering ten sub-categories. The majority were light machine guns (40.9 per cent), heavy machine guns (25.6 per cent), and rifles and carbines (10.5 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Germany were Belgium (62.3 per cent), Switzerland (14.5 per cent) and Italy (7.3 per cent).

³¹ Germany reported exports to one non-UN member (Kosovo).

³² Germany reported an unspecified number of imports from 'EU Member States', making it impossible to determine if these 'EU Member States' refer only to the ten previously named States or include others. The total number of additional units imported from these countries also remains unclear.

GHANA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?



GREECE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons?	Unspecified – UNROCA template	What reporting template was used?	UNROCA template		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Greece continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms exports.

Greece continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Greece disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Greece provided descriptions for all reported transfers of major conventional arms, as well as for one reported import of small arms.

Greece provided comments for some transfers of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Greece could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Greece reported exports to 14 countries, all of which were ATT States Parties.
- Greece reported the export of 121 major conventional arms. These were large-calibre artillery systems (85.1 per cent) and missiles (14.9 per cent).
- The importers of major conventional arms exported by Greece were the Czech Republic (85.1 per cent) and France (14.9 per cent).
- Greece reported the export of 2,511 small arms. These were rifles and carbines (91.2 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (8.8 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms exported by Greece were Albania (32.1 per cent), Cyprus (21.5 per cent) and the Republic of North Macedonia (17.8 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Greece reported imports from 20 countries. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Kuwait).
- Greece reported the import of 59 major conventional arms. These were missiles (89.8 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (10.2 per cent), all of which came from France.
- Greece reported the import of 58,623 small arms. These were rifles and carbines (83.5 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (16.5 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Greece were Italy (46.3 per cent), Belgium (15.4 per cent) and Türkiye (14.3 per cent).

GRENADA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GUATEMALA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

Yes – On time

Was the 2024 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

✓

2021

✓

2022

✓

2023

✓

2024

✓

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

GUINEA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GUINEA-BISSAU

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GUYANA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2024 ☒		

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Guyana submitted an annual report for the first time in 2024.

Guyana submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

Guyana reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Guyana clearly indicated there were no reported imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Guyana submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

Guyana provided descriptions for most reported small arms imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Guyana aggregated the exporters of small arms imports, making it impossible to determine how many items came from each country.

Guyana could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

Guyana may consider listing imports of shotguns under 'other small arms', instead of creating a new sub-category in the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Guyana submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Guyana reported imports from seven countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Guyana did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Guyana reported the import of 3,288 small arms covering four sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68.0 per cent), assault rifles (15.2 per cent) and shotguns (13.2 per cent).

HONDURAS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒
	2021 ☒
	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒
	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒

HUNGARY

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2016		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Hungary continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms exports.

Hungary continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Hungary disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

In some instances, Hungary indicated clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Hungary provided descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

In some instances, Hungary filled in the column labelled 'State of origin', thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Hungary aggregated the exporting States for import of six manned attack helicopters, making it impossible to determine how many items came from each country.

Hungary excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Hungary could consistently indicate there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, instead of leaving those fields blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Hungary reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-State Party (Uzbekistan).
- Hungary reported the export of 68 major conventional arms. These were armoured combat vehicles (98.5 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (1.5 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms exported by Hungary were Serbia (98.5 per cent) and the Czech Republic (1.5 per cent).
- Hungary reported the export of 3,793 small arms covering four sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (87.3 per cent), rifles and carbines (12.4 per cent), and assault rifles (0.2 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms exported by Hungary were the Czech Republic (87.0 per cent), Germany (8.9 per cent) and Romania (1.4 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Hungary reported imports from 18 countries. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Hungary reported the import of 48 major conventional arms covering four categories. The majority were battle tanks (45.8 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (35.4 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (12.5 per cent).
- The main exporter of major conventional arms to Hungary was Germany (81.3 per cent).
- Hungary reported the import of 4,113 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (78.9 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (20.7 per cent) and assault rifles (0.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Hungary were Germany (31.3 per cent), Austria (13.1 per cent) and Finland (9.7 per cent).

ICELAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Iceland continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports.

Iceland continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports

GOOD PRACTICES

Iceland disaggregated reported imports by weapon category and sub-category.

Iceland indicated clearly there were no transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Iceland clarified reported transfers of 'other small arms' referred to shotguns.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Iceland did not list trading partners, making it impossible to determine where items were exported to or imported from.

Iceland could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Iceland did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Iceland reported the export of 34 small arms. These were rifles and carbines (94.1 per cent) and shotguns reported under 'other small arms' (5.9 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Iceland did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Iceland reported the import of 1,212 small arms. These were rifles and carbines (49.0 per cent), shotguns reported under 'other small arms' (38.5 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (12.5 per cent).

IRELAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Ireland continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports.

Ireland continued to report **Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Ireland disaggregated reported exports and imports by weapon category and sub-category.

Ireland provided descriptions for all reported small arms exports.

Ireland clarified reported exports of 'other small arms' referred to shotguns, air rifles, air pistols and scopes.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Ireland did not indicate whether imports of small arms were authorized or actual.

Ireland aggregated trading partners, making it impossible to determine how many items were exported to or imported from each country.

Ireland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Ireland could clearly indicate there were no transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Ireland could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Ireland reported exports to 18 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.³³
- Ireland did not report any exports of major conventional arms.
- Ireland reported the export of 270 small arms. These were 'other small arms' (70.0 per cent), rifles and carbines (25.9 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Ireland reported imports from a total of 18 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Kyrgyzstan) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.³⁴
- Ireland did not report any imports of major conventional arms.
- Ireland reported the import of 7,163 small arms. These were 'other small arms' (73.1 per cent), rifles and carbines (22.4 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.5 per cent).

33 Ireland listed both 'United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)' and 'UK' as importing States.

34 Ireland also reported imports from one non-UN member (Jersey). Vanuatu is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 4 December 2025.

ITALY

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Italy's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024, when it shifted from using the ATT online reporting tool in 2023 to the ATT reporting template.

Italy continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Italy continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

Italy specified it defines the terms 'exports' and 'imports' as 'licenses authorized in 2024'. It also clarified that, since intra-EU transfers do not require import licenses, these 'are not available'.

GOOD PRACTICES

Italy disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Italy could indicate clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, instead of leaving those fields blank.

Italy could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Italy reported exports to a total of 46 countries and non-UN members. Of these, 25 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and 14 were non-States Parties (Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda and Uzbekistan).³⁵
- Italy reported the export of 209 major conventional arms covering six categories. The majority were manned attack helicopters (34.0 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (21.5 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (20.6 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Italy were the Republic of North Macedonia (23.9 per cent), Ukraine (21.1 per cent) and the United Kingdom (19.6 per cent).
- Italy reported the export of 116,202 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. The majority were assault rifles (51.8 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (39.5 per cent), and rifles and carbines (3.6 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons exported by Italy were Qatar (35.3 per cent), Saudi Arabia (26.3 per cent) and Guatemala (8.6 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Italy reported imports from five countries. Of these, three were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.³⁶
- Italy reported the import of 29 large-calibre artillery systems from the United Kingdom.
- Italy reported the import of 5,167 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. The majority were assault rifles (97.7 per cent), rifles and carbines (1.4 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (0.5 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Italy were Switzerland (98.0 per cent), the United States (1.9 per cent) and Türkiye (0.04 per cent).

³⁵ Italy reported exports to two non-UN members (Holy See and Taiwan).

³⁶ Italy indicated that 'intra UE transfer do not require import license and therefore are not available'; consequently, reported import data likely does not include all Italian imports from other EU Member States.

JAMAICA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Jamaica continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Jamaica disaggregated reported transfers by weapon category and sub-category.

In some instances, Jamaica indicated clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Jamaica clarified reported transfers of 'other small arms' referred to shotguns and grenade launchers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

In all sub-categories with more than one trading partner, Jamaica aggregated its transfers, making it impossible to determine how many items were exported to / imported from which country.

Jamaica could consistently indicate there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, instead of leaving those fields blank.

Jamaica could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Jamaica reported exports to ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Jamaica reported the export of 689 small arms covering four sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (48.5 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (42.4 per cent), and light machine guns (5.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Jamaica reported imports from 11 countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Jamaica reported the import of 4,717 small arms covering five sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (72.5 per cent), shotguns reported under 'other small arms' (18.9 per cent), and rifles and carbines (7.6 per cent).

JAPAN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time ³⁷	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Japan reported **Actual Numbers** of light weapons exports. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports.

Japan continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and light weapons imports, and **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms imports.

Japan continued to provide additional information on small arms transfers, in two separate tables, using the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Codes) of the World Customs Organization.

GOOD PRACTICES

Japan clearly disaggregated transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Japan provided numbers and values for all transfers of small arms.

Japan indicated there were no reported transfers of specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Japan provided descriptions for all transfers of light weapons and imports of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Japan could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

Japan's use of HS Codes to report transfers of small arms meant the data provided did not correspond directly to the categorization within the ATT reporting template, making it difficult to comparatively analyze transfer data.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Japan reported exports to 15 countries. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Japan did not report any exports of major conventional arms.
- Japan reported the export of 116,682 small arms and light weapons with a total value of ¥6.37b (US\$42.1m). The vast majority were small arms reported using HS codes (99.7 per cent), particularly 'other sporting, hunting, or target-shooting rifles' (86.4 per cent) and 'other sporting, hunting, or target-shooting shotguns, including combination shotgun-rifles' (13.3 per cent). The rest were recoilless rifles (0.3 per cent) and mortars of calibres less than 75mm (0.02 per cent).
- In terms of units, the main importers of small arms and light weapons from Japan were the United States (78.0 per cent), Belgium (15.5 per cent) and Australia (3.6 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Japan reported imports from 14 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- In terms of major conventional arms, Japan reported the import of one manned combat aircraft from the United States.
- Japan reported the import of 7,707 small arms and light weapons with a total value of ¥8.95b (US\$59.1m). The vast majority were small arms reported using HS codes (99.7 per cent). The rest were mortars of calibres less than 75mm (0.2 per cent) and recoilless rifles (0.1 per cent).
- In terms of units, the main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Japan were Germany (35.1 per cent), Italy (30.4 per cent) and the United States (8.8 per cent).

³⁷ Japan submitted its 2024 annual report before the deadline of 7 June 2025 and updated its report after the ATT Monitor cut-off date of 1 February 2026. The ATT Monitor's analysis of Japan's annual report is based on the version of the report that was published on the ATT Secretariat website as of 1 February 2026.

KAZAKHSTAN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	

LATVIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?				No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

LEBANON

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?					

LESOTHO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Lesotho continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Lesotho continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Lesotho disaggregated reported imports by weapon category, sub-category and exporting State.

Lesotho submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

Lesotho provided comments for small arms imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Lesotho could indicate clearly there were no imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Lesotho could provide descriptions of reported imports of small arms.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Lesotho submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Lesotho reported imports from four countries. Of these, two were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory and one was a non-State Party (Pakistan).
- Lesotho did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Lesotho reported the import of 550 small arms, all of which were revolvers and self-loading pistols. The main exporters of small arms to Lesotho were Pakistan (52.5 per cent), the Czech Republic (18.2 per cent) and Türkiye (18.2 per cent).

LIBERIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?					

LIECHTENSTEIN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓ 2021 ✓ 2022 ✓ 2023 ✓ 2024 ✓		
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✓ 2021 ✓ 2022 ✓ 2023 ✓ 2024 ✓		

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Liechtenstein continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Liechtenstein disaggregated reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.
Liechtenstein provided comments for all reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Liechtenstein could indicate clearly there were no exports and imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.
Liechtenstein could provide descriptions for reported transfers of small arms.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Liechtenstein reported exports to two countries, both of which were ATT States Parties.
- Liechtenstein did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Liechtenstein reported the export of three small arms, all of which were rifles and carbines. Two units were exported to Austria and one unit was exported to Germany.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Liechtenstein reported imports from one country, which was an ATT State Party.
- Liechtenstein did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Liechtenstein reported the import of six units of small arms. Of these, five (83.3 per cent) were rifles and carbines and one was a revolver and self-loading pistol (16.7 per cent). All arms were imported from Austria.

LITHUANIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓ 2021 ✓ 2022 ✓ 2023 ✓ 2024 ✓		
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✗ 2021 ✗ 2022 ✗ 2023 ✗ 2024 ✗		

LUXEMBOURG

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Luxembourg's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024.

Luxembourg reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and imports, as well as light weapons imports, after reporting both **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** in 2023.

GOOD PRACTICES

Luxembourg disaggregated reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and exporting State.

Luxembourg provided descriptions for all reported transfers.

Luxembourg provided comments for most reported imports of small arms and light weapons.

Luxembourg identified the States of origin for exports of small arms, thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Luxembourg could indicate clearly there were no exports and imports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Luxembourg could provide comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Luxembourg reported exports to two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and the other a Signatory.
- Luxembourg did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Luxembourg reported the export of seven small arms. Of these, five were rifles and carbines (71.4 per cent) exported to Switzerland and two (28.6 per cent) were revolvers and self-loading pistols exported to Türkiye.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Luxembourg reported imports from three ATT States Parties.
- Luxembourg did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Luxembourg reported the import of 1,707 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. The majority were assault rifles (73.2 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (11.7 per cent) and sub-machine guns (8.8 per cent).
- The exporters of small arms and light weapons to Luxembourg were Germany (92.6 per cent), Austria (5.9 per cent) and Belgium (1.6 per cent).

MADAGASCAR

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Madagascar continued to submit 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Madagascar submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Madagascar did not tick all the necessary boxes in the 'Contents of report' section on the first page of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Madagascar submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Madagascar submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

MALDIVES

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

MALI

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒
	2021 ☒
	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒
	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	

MALTA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Malta continued to report **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports.

Malta continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Malta disaggregated transfers by weapon category and sub-category.

Malta provided numbers and values of small arms exports.

In some cases, Malta indicated there were no reported exports or imports of some specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Malta identified the States of origin for small arms exports and SALW imports, thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Malta aggregated the exporting and importing countries for small arms transfers, making it impossible to determine where small arms were imported from or exported to.

Malta could consistently indicate there were no transfers of specific sub-categories of small arms and light weapons, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Malta could provide descriptions and comments for reported transfers.

Malta did not specify the currency used for exports of small arms.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Malta reported exports to four countries. Of these, three were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Malta did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Malta reported the export of 53 small arms with a total value of €68,500 (US\$74,100).³⁸
- In terms of numbers, these were rifles and carbines (94.3 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (5.7 per cent). In terms of value, these were rifles and carbines (95.6 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.4 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Malta reported imports from six countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Malta did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Malta reported the import of 12,516 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (48.8 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (40.6 per cent) and 'other small arms' (10.5 per cent).

³⁸ As Malta did not provide the currency for its reported values, the ATT Monitor assumed the values are in euros, Malta's official currency.

MAURITANIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

MAURITIUS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

Yes – Missed deadline

Was the 2024 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

✓

2021

✓

2022

✓

2023

✓

2024

✓

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X



A SAUDI JET ON A RUNWAY.

CREDIT: © KHALID ALJMMAN

MEXICO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Mexico continued to report **Numbers** of small arms exports. It ticked both boxes for **Authorized** and **Actual** transfers. In its 2023 report, it had not ticked either box.

Mexico continued to report **Numbers** of small arms imports. In most cases, it ticked both boxes for **Authorized** and **Actual** transfers. In its 2023 report, Mexico reported a mix of **Actual**, **Authorized** and **Actual**, and unspecified **Numbers**.

GOOD PRACTICES

In most cases, Mexico disaggregated transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.³⁹

Mexico provided detailed descriptions for all reported transfers, including information on the manufacturer and weapon model.

Mexico provided comments for most of reported transfers.

Mexico clarified that transfers reported under 'other small arms' referred to shotguns and rifles.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Mexico could clearly indicate whether reported exports and imports referred to authorized or actual transfers.

For its import of 200 Grand Power revolvers and self-loading pistols, Mexico did not indicate the exporting State.

Mexico could indicate clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Mexico could provide comments on the nature of all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Mexico reported exports to four countries. Of these, three were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Mexico did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Mexico reported the export of 13,252 small arms. The majority was made up of rifles and carbines (99.2 per cent). The remainder consisted of revolvers and self-loading pistols (0.8 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Mexico were the United States (86.8 per cent), Guatemala (10.2 per cent) and Panama (2.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Mexico reported imports from eight countries. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Mexico did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Mexico reported the import of 46,179 small arms covering five sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (58.2 per cent), rifles and carbines (22.0 per cent) and 'other small arms', specifically shotguns and rifles (10.2 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Mexico were the United States (27.7 per cent), the Czech Republic (20.7 per cent) and Austria (15.2 per cent).

³⁹ In its annual report imports section, Mexico listed names of States under 'State of origin' while leaving 'Exporting State' blank; the ATT Monitor interpreted these as the exporting States.

MONACO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity'/ national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Monaco continued to submit 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Monaco submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for imports.



MONTENEGRO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Montenegro continued to report a combination of **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports.

Montenegro continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Montenegro disaggregated most transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Montenegro indicated there were no reported exports or imports of some specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Montenegro provided descriptions for most reported transfers, including models and calibres. It also included comments for some reported transfers.

Montenegro identified the States of origin for most reported transfers, thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Montenegro could indicate how many exports of revolvers and self-loading pistols were authorized and how many were actual transfers.

Montenegro listed the exporting States of some imports of revolvers and self-loading pistols as being of 'various origin', making it impossible to determine the exporting States of these items.

Montenegro excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Montenegro could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

Montenegro did not complete the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Montenegro reported exports to three countries. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Montenegro did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Montenegro reported the export of 6,080 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. The vast majority were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (98.1 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (1.4 per cent) and 'other light weapons' (0.3 per cent).
- The importers of SALW from Montenegro were Mexico (98.1 per cent), Serbia (1.7 per cent) and Malaysia (0.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Montenegro reported imports from at least 12 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.⁴⁰
- Montenegro did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Montenegro reported the import of 7,013 small arms, being revolvers and self-loading pistols (57.5 per cent), rifles and carbines (38.4 per cent) and assault rifles (4.0 per cent).⁴¹
- The main exporters of small arms to Montenegro were Italy (20.0 per cent), the Czech Republic (17.9 per cent) and the United States (9.9 per cent).

⁴⁰ Montenegro reported some imports from 'various origin', making it impossible to determine if this 'various origin' refers only to the 12 States explicitly reported.

⁴¹ The pages of Montenegro's original submission appeared to be misordered. Consequently, the report did not clearly indicate the sub-category of arms to which certain transfers corresponded. Based on the descriptions provided, the ATT Monitor determined the listed transfers were most likely rifles and carbines.

MOZAMBIQUE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

NAMIBIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?



A LARGE NAVAL SHIP
DOCKED IN ODESSA HARBOR
UNDER A CLOUDY SKY.

CREDIT: © YEVGEN BUZUK

NETHERLANDS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons?	Unspecified – UNROCA template ⁴²	What reporting template was used?	UNROCA template		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

The Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

The Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Netherlands disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

The Netherlands specified where and what type of information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

The Netherlands provided descriptions and comments for some reported transfers.

The Netherlands identified the States of origin for some SALW exports, thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Netherlands could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- The Netherlands reported exports to 25 countries. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- The Netherlands reported the export of 460 major conventional arms. These were missiles (56.3 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (40.9 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (2.8 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from the Netherlands were Ukraine (29.8 per cent), Germany (28.0 per cent) and Norway (18.0 per cent).
- The Netherlands reported the export of 10,946 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. The majority were sub-machine guns (34.6 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (24.4 per cent) and rifles and carbines (19.0 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons from the Netherlands were the United States (45.1 per cent), Ukraine (25.9 per cent) and Sweden (11.4 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- The Netherlands reported imports from 22 countries. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Ecuador) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.⁴³
- The Netherlands did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- The Netherlands reported the import of 19,685 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. The vast majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (43.3 per cent), assault rifles (28.2 per cent) and rifles and carbines (13.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to the Netherlands were Germany (45.0 per cent), Canada (21.6 per cent) and Austria (12.6 per cent).

⁴² The Netherlands used a UNROCA template that does not allow States to specify whether they are withholding data for commercial or national security-related reasons. However, it indicated in the text of the report that it did not declare some information 'Due to NLD security regulations'.

⁴³ Ecuador is listed as a non-State Party because it became an ATT State Party on 26 May 2026.

NEW ZEALAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

New Zealand continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports, as well as exports of shotguns under a voluntary national category.

New Zealand continued to report **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports and imports of shotguns under a voluntary national category.

New Zealand specified it defined the terms 'exports' and 'imports' as the 'issuing of an export/import permit'.

GOOD PRACTICES

New Zealand disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

New Zealand clearly indicated there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

New Zealand provided comments for some SALW transfers and shotguns.

New Zealand reported exports and imports under a voluntary national category and provided extensive information in Annex 2 on national definitions of Category VIII weapons (SALW) and its voluntary national categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

New Zealand could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- New Zealand reported exports to 25 countries in 2024. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and six were non-States Parties (Fiji, India, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Tonga) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.⁴⁴
- New Zealand did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- New Zealand reported the export of 1,660 small arms and light weapons. These were rifles and carbines (80.8 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (18.6 per cent), and assault rifles (0.6 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons from New Zealand were Australia (52.1 per cent), Papua New Guinea (15.6 per cent) and Vanuatu (8.8 per cent).
- New Zealand reported the export of 363 shotguns under a voluntary national category. The main importers of these items were New Caledonia (38.3 per cent), Australia (27.3 per cent) and Samoa (14.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- New Zealand reported imports from 42 countries in 2024. Of these, 29 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and seven were non-States Parties (India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, the Russian Federation and Tonga).⁴⁵
- New Zealand did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- New Zealand reported the import of 16,566 small arms and light weapons covering nine categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (72.6 per cent), 'other small arms' (20.1 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (5.9 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to New Zealand were Australia (22.7 per cent), Finland (20.4 per cent) and the United States (16.1 per cent).
- New Zealand reported the import of 1,981 shotguns under a voluntary national category. The main exporters of these items were Italy (37.4 per cent), the United States (29.5 per cent) and Türkiye (11.8 per cent).

⁴⁴ Vanuatu is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 4 December 2025. New Zealand specified reported exports to France were destined for French Polynesia and New Caledonia.

⁴⁵ New Zealand specified reported imports from Australia, France, the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom included imports from Norfolk Island, French Polynesia and New Caledonia, Taiwan and Pitcairn Islands.

NIGER

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

✓

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2021

X

NIGERIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

Yes – Missed deadline

Was the 2024 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

✓

2021

✓

2022

✓

2023

✓

2024

✓

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

NIUE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

NORWAY

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Norway's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024.

Norway reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Norway reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional arms and small arms imports. In 2023, Norway reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Norway provided both numbers and values for its reported imports.

In some cases, Norway clearly indicated there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Norway provided descriptions for most transfers of major conventional arms. It also provided an aggregate description for small arms exports and comments for most exports.

Norway listed the 'State of origin' for most exports, thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Norway did not identify the importing States of many exports, instead listing them as 'multiple States', and aggregated the exporting States for some imports, thereby making it impossible to determine where items were exported to or imported from.

Norway provided neither numbers nor values for some of its exports, making it impossible to determine how many units were transferred or their values.

Norway excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Norway could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Norway reported the export of armoured combat vehicles, manned combat aircraft and missiles. Specifically, Norway reported the export of 23 armoured combat vehicles to Ukraine. It did not specify the number of other exports and aggregated recipients as 'multiple States'.
- Norway reported the export of 825 small arms, including rifles and carbines and sub-machine guns. Specifically, Norway reported the export of 50 rifles and carbines and 55 sub-machine guns to Ukraine. For the rest of its SALW exports, Norway neither disaggregated the transfers by trading partner nor by weapon sub-category, and aggregated recipients as 'multiple States'.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Norway reported imports from five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Norway reported the import of 47 major conventional arms valued at NOK5.89b (US\$549m). By numbers, these were missiles (51.1 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (36.2 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (12.8 per cent). By value, these imports were manned combat aircraft (95.0 per cent), missiles (4.5 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (0.5 per cent).
- In terms of value, the United States was the largest exporter of major conventional arms to Norway.
- Norway reported the import of 1,077 small arms valued at NOK104m (US\$9.71m). By numbers, these were light machine guns (92.3 per cent), rifles and carbines (4.4 per cent) and assault rifles (3.3 per cent). By value, in the same order, these imports were light machine guns (90.8 per cent), rifles and carbines (6.9 per cent) and assault rifles (2.2 per cent).
- In terms of value, Belgium was the largest exporter of small arms to Norway.

PALAU

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒
	2023 ☒	2024 ☒	

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Palau continued to submit 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Palau submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Palau did not tick all the necessary boxes in the 'Contents of report' section on the first page of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Palau submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Palau submitted a 'nil' report for imports.



NAVY WARSHIPS NAVIGATING
TURBULENT OCEAN WATERS.

CREDIT: © GERMAN NAVY

PANAMA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Panama continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.
Panama reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Panama indicated clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.
Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.
Panama provided detailed descriptions, including weapon calibre, and comments for all small arms imports.
Panama provided extensive information in Annex 2 to clarify specific national definitions of firearms, ammunition and related materials.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Panama did not identify the exporting States of small arms imports, making it impossible to determine where they were imported from. Instead, it marked the relevant columns with asterisks, but it is unclear whether this indicates that this information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons.
Panama excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Panama reported the import of 12,131 small arms. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (82.7 per cent), shotguns reported under 'other small arms' (10.6 per cent), and rifles and carbines (6.8 per cent).

PARAGUAY

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✗	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✗	2024 ✗

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No	
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✗	2024 ✗



PERU

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Peru continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Peru reported **Authorized Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional arms imports. It continued to report both **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers**, as well as **Values**, of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Peru disaggregated reported imports by weapon category, sub-category and exporting State.

Peru provided both numbers and values for all reported imports.

Peru submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

Peru provided descriptions and comments for all imports, thereby adding detail on the nature of the transfers and the model of the weapons.

Peru filled in the column labelled 'State of origin', providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

For its SALW imports, Peru ticked both boxes for authorized and actual transfers. Peru could indicate which transfers were authorized and which were actual instead of ticking both cells.

Peru could indicate clearly there were no reported imports in specific arms categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Peru submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Peru reported imports from ten countries. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Peru reported the import of 1,049 major conventional arms valued at US\$63.8m. By numbers, these were missiles (97.1 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (2.9 per cent). By value, in reverse order, these were armoured combat vehicles (94.1 per cent) and missiles (5.9 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional arms to Peru were Bulgaria (73.4 per cent), Brazil (23.7 per cent) and the Republic of Korea (2.9 per cent). In terms of value, the exporters were the Republic of Korea (94.1 per cent), Brazil (3.9 per cent) and Bulgaria (2.1 per cent).
- Peru reported the import of 25,003 small arms and light weapons valued at US\$35m. In terms of numbers, the majority were semi-automatic pistols (44.5 per cent), assault rifles (44.2 per cent) and shotguns (4.9 per cent).⁴⁶ By value, these were assault rifles (88.9 per cent), semi-automatic pistols (8.9 per cent) and rifles and carbines (1.0 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of SALW to Peru were Israel (40.9 per cent), Türkiye (20.7 per cent) and Brazil (20.5 per cent). By value, the main exporters were Israel (77.7 per cent), Belgium (11.5 per cent) and Panama (3.4 per cent).

⁴⁶ A misordered page in Peru's original submission did not clearly indicate the sub-category of arms to which the transfers on the page corresponded. Based on descriptions provided, the ATT Monitor determined the listed transfers were likely rifles and carbines.

PHILIPPINES

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?		2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?		2023 ☒	2024 ☒



POLAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT online reporting tool		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Poland's reporting changed slightly in 2024.

Poland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports, unlike 2023, when it reported **Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Poland reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports, as opposed to 2023, when it reported **Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Poland disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Poland specified what information was withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty.⁴⁷

Poland provided descriptions for all exports of major conventional arms.

Poland clearly indicated that all reported transfers were actual, after not specifying if transfers were actual or authorized in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Poland could indicate clearly there were no imports or exports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Poland could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Poland reported exports to 15 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (Jordan and Saudi Arabia).
- Poland reported the export of 577 major conventional arms covering four categories. The majority were armoured combat vehicles (51.1 per cent), MANPADS (28.2 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (18.4 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Poland were Ukraine (69.5 per cent), Estonia (11.6 per cent) and the Republic of Moldova (7.6 per cent).
- Poland reported the export of 62,270 small arms and light weapons covering 12 sub-categories. The majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (45.8 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (26.1 per cent) and rifles and carbines (19.2 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons from Poland were Ukraine (82.1 per cent), the Czech Republic (12.8 per cent) and Rwanda (2.9 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Poland reported imports from 18 countries. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Poland did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- Poland reported the import of 15,897 small arms and light weapons covering eight sub-categories. The vast majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (60.7 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (22.0 per cent) and rifles and carbines (11.6 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Poland were the United States (43.9 per cent), Norway (22.1 per cent) and Türkiye (11.6 per cent).

⁴⁷ Poland noted that '[t]he data included in the annual report do not include donations to Ukraine and imports to Poland of certain categories of conventional weapons (I-VII) - in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty'.

PORTUGAL

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Portugal's reporting practice changed in 2024.

Portugal reported **Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional arms and light weapons exports but did not specify if they were **Actual** or **Authorized**, as opposed to 2023, when it reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** for these categories. In 2024, Portugal reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports, unlike the previous year, when it reported **Actual Numbers** and some **Values** of small arms exports.

Portugal reported **Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional arms and light weapons imports but did not specify if they were **Actual** or **Authorized**. Portugal reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports, as opposed to 2023, when it reported **Actual Numbers** and some **Values**.

GOOD PRACTICES

Portugal consistently disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Portugal reported both numbers and values for transfers of major conventional arms and imports of light weapons.

Portugal provided descriptions for all reported transfers of major conventional arms, as well as for imports of light weapons. It also provided comments for exports of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Portugal did not consistently tick the relevant box to indicate whether the transfer in question was authorized or actual.

Portugal could indicate clearly there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Portugal could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Portugal reported exports to 24 countries. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.
- Portugal reported the export of 31 major conventional arms valued at €27.6m (US\$29.9m), all of which were donations to Ukraine. By numbers, these exports were armoured combat vehicles (45.2 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (29.0 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (25.8 per cent).
- Portugal reported the export of 137,077 small arms. The vast majority were rifles and carbines (97.0 per cent), followed by sub-machine guns (2.9 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (0.1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Portugal were the United States (72.1 per cent), Belgium (22.5 per cent) and Spain (1.4 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Portugal reported imports from 23 countries. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Portugal reported the import of six major conventional arms valued at €144m (US\$156m). By numbers, these exports were manned combat aircraft (66.7 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (33.3 per cent). By value, these exports were manned combat aircraft (89.0 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (11.0 per cent).
- Portugal reported the import of 10,664 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (46.7 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (34.9 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (17.7 per cent). The imported light weapons were valued at €248,000 (US\$268,000).
- The main exporters of SALW to Portugal were Belgium (54.2 per cent), Austria (13.1 per cent) and Italy (8.9 per cent).

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

The Republic of Korea continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons exports.

The Republic of Korea continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms imports. It also reported **Numbers** of SALW imports but did not specify whether these were **Authorized** or **Actual**. In 2023, the Republic of Korea reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

The Republic of Korea indicated its reporting data is based on licenses granted (**Authorized**).

GOOD PRACTICES

The Republic of Korea consistently disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

The Republic of Korea clearly indicated there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

The Republic of Korea provided descriptions for all reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Republic of Korea did not tick the relevant boxes to indicate whether SALW imports were authorized or actual.

The Republic of Korea excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

The Republic of Korea could provide comments on the nature of all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- The Republic of Korea reported exports to nine countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Kenya).
- The Republic of Korea reported the export of 153 major conventional arms covering six categories. The vast majority were large-calibre artillery systems (53.6 per cent), battle tanks (36.6 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (5.2 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from the Republic of Korea were Poland (82.4 per cent), Norway (7.8 per cent) and Kenya (5.2 per cent).
- The Republic of Korea reported the export of 7,861 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. These were almost entirely assault rifles (99.7 per cent) exported to the Philippines.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- The Republic of Korea reported imports from five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- The Republic of Korea reported the import of five major conventional arms. Of these, three were MANPADS (60.0 per cent) from the United States and two were missiles (40.0 per cent) from France.
- The Republic of Korea reported the import of 601 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (83.2 per cent), followed by assault rifles (15.5 per cent) and 'other small arms' (1.0 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to the Republic of Korea were Austria (83.2 per cent), the United States (12.8 per cent) and Bulgaria (2.7 per cent).

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

2021

2022

2023

REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

2022



ROMANIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Romania returned to its 2022 practice of reporting **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports, as well as exports and imports of SALW.

GOOD PRACTICES

Romania consistently disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Romania provided both descriptions and comments for all reported imports of major conventional arms, as well as comments for all SALW transfers and descriptions for many SALW transfers.

Romania filled in the column labelled 'State of origin', thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Romania excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Romania could clearly indicate there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Romania could provide descriptions for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Romania reported exports to 11 countries. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Romania did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Romania reported the export of 21,490 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. The vast majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (85.0 per cent), followed by rifles and carbines (11.5 per cent) and assault rifles (1.8 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW exported by Romania were the United States (94.2 per cent), the Czech Republic (2.5 per cent) and Poland (1.0 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Romania reported imports from 19 countries. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Romania reported the import of 256 major conventional arms. These were missiles (78.1 per cent), unmanned combat aircraft (12.5 per cent), manned combat aircraft and armoured combat vehicles (4.7 per cent each).
- The exporters of major conventional arms to Romania were the Republic of Korea (62.1 per cent), the United States (28.5 per cent) and Türkiye (9.4 per cent).
- Romania reported the import of 14,499 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. The vast majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (61.8 per cent), rifles and carbines (37.6 per cent) and sub-machine guns (0.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Romania were the Czech Republic (46.1 per cent), Italy (14.3 per cent) and Germany (10.5 per cent).

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?					

SAINT LUCIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAMOA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAN MARINO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SENEGAL

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

Yes – On time

Was the 2024 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

✓

2021

✓

2022

✓

2023

✓

2024

✓

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X



SERBIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Serbia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Serbia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Serbia disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Serbia provided descriptions and comments for some reported transfers.

Serbia filled in the column labelled 'State of origin', thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Serbia could clearly indicate there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Serbia could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

Serbia did not tick all the necessary boxes in the 'Contents of report' section on the first page of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Serbia reported exports to 36 countries. Of these, 19 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and 11 were non-States Parties (Azerbaijan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia and Uganda) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.⁴⁸
- Serbia reported the export of 46,802 major conventional arms. These were missiles (65.4 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (34.6 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (0.02 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Serbia were the United States (30.3 per cent), Bulgaria (17.1 per cent) and Azerbaijan (13.9 per cent).⁴⁹
- Serbia reported the export of 108,520 small arms and light weapons covering 12 sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (42.9 per cent), rifles and carbines (31.0 per cent) and assault rifles (16.3 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW exported by Serbia were Austria (41.2 per cent), the United States (25.6 per cent) and Uganda (16.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Serbia reported imports from 20 countries. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-States Parties (Pakistan and the Russian Federation).
- Serbia reported the import of 24,423 major conventional arms covering four categories. The vast majority were missiles (99.8 per cent), followed by large-calibre artillery systems (0.2 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (0.02 per cent).
- The main exporters of major conventional arms to Serbia were the People's Republic of China (57.3 per cent), Bulgaria (42.5 per cent) and Pakistan (0.2 per cent).
- Serbia reported the import of 10,740 small arms and light weapons covering six sub-categories. The majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (64.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (16.5 per cent), and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (13.5 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Serbia were Montenegro (64.8 per cent), Bulgaria (14.9 per cent) and Italy (8.3 per cent).

⁴⁸ Malawi is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 9 October 2024.

⁴⁹ Serbia listed the export of 11,880 rocket bodies of missiles to the final importing state of Serbia.

SEYCHELLES

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?		2021 ☒	2022 ☒		2024 ☒

SIERRA LEONE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Sierra Leone continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports. It also submitted a 'nil' report for imports, after reporting small arms imports in 2023.

GOOD PRACTICES

Sierra Leone submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

–

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

SLOVAKIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

SLOVENIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW exports.

Slovenia reported a combination of **Actual Numbers**, **Numbers** and **Values** of major conventional arms and SALW imports. In 2023, it reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Slovenia disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Slovenia reported both numbers and values for many transfers.

Slovenia provided descriptions for all reported transfers.

In some cases, Slovenia filled in the column 'State of origin', thereby providing additional information.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Slovenia did not consistently tick the relevant box to indicate whether the transfer in question was authorized or actual.

Slovenia could clearly indicate there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Slovenia could provide comments on the nature of reported transfers.

Slovenia did not specify the currency it used to report values.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Slovenia reported exports to nine countries. Of these, three were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-States Parties (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India and Kuwait).
- Slovenia did not report the export of any major conventional arms.
- Slovenia reported the export of 177 small arms and light weapons valued at €803,000 (US\$869,000) covering four sub-categories.⁵⁰ By numbers, the majority were rifles and carbines (50.8 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (28.2 per cent) and assault rifles (20.3 per cent). By value, the majority were rifles and carbines (66.3 per cent), 'other light weapons' (25.9 per cent) and assault rifles (4.5 per cent).
- By numbers, the main importers of SALW from Slovenia were the Democratic Republic of the Congo (56.5 per cent), Austria (20.3 per cent) and Kuwait (6.2 per cent). By value, the main importers were the Democratic Republic of the Congo (67.4 per cent), Serbia (25.9 per cent) and Austria (4.5 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Slovenia reported imports from nine countries. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Slovenia reported the import of 37 major conventional arms, all being armoured combat vehicles from the United States, valued at €8.71m (US\$9.42m).
- Slovenia reported the import of 104 small arms and light weapons valued at €931,000 (US\$1.0m) covering six sub-categories. By numbers, the majority were made up of heavy machine guns (54.8 per cent), assault rifles (23.1 per cent), and rifles and carbines (11.5 per cent). By value, these were mainly heavy machine guns (85.5 per cent), rifles and carbines (10.7 per cent) and assault rifles (3.9 per cent).
- By numbers, the main exporters of SALW to Slovenia were the United States (54.8 per cent), Belgium (14.4 per cent) and the United Kingdom (7.7 per cent). By value, the main exporters were the United States (85.5 per cent), the United Kingdom (10.7 per cent) and Belgium (3.8 per cent).

⁵⁰ As Slovenia did not specify the currency for its reported values, the ATT Monitor assumed the values are in euros, Slovenia's official currency and its reporting currency in 2023.

SOUTH AFRICA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time ⁵¹	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Unspecified	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2016		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

South Africa's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024.

South Africa reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms exports, as opposed to 2023 when it reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers**. South Africa continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports.

South Africa continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

South Africa disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

South Africa provided descriptions for all reported transfers. It also provided comments for exports of major conventional arms and imports of small arms.

South Africa reported imports of small arms parts and components, thereby offering an additional layer of detail.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

South Africa could clearly indicate there were no reported transfers in specific categories of major conventional arms.

South Africa could provide comments for all reported transfers.

South Africa did not tick any of the boxes in the 'Contents of report' section on the first page of the ATT reporting template, and did not indicate if data was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

South Africa altered the ATT reporting template. It slightly changed the wording of the standardized ATT weapon categories and sub-categories, thereby making it difficult to understand which items fall under some of these headings. South Africa also appears to have utilized the exports section of the ATT reporting template for its submission on imports, resulting in some ambiguity in the information provided.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- South Africa reported exports to 20 countries. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and three were non-States Parties (Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Saudi Arabia) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.⁵²
- South Africa reported the export of 65 major conventional arms, all of which were armoured combat vehicles.
- The main importers of major conventional arms exported by South Africa were Kenya (40.0 per cent), Malawi (23.1 per cent) and Ghana (15.4 per cent).
- South Africa reported the export of 1,736 small arms. These were rifles and carbines (48.3 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (38.2 per cent), and shotguns and combinations reported under 'other small arms' (13.5 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms exported by South Africa were Botswana (23.7 per cent), Zimbabwe (20.7 per cent) and the United Kingdom (20.0 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- South Africa reported imports from 26 countries. Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (the Russian Federation).
- South Africa did not report the import of any major conventional arms.
- South Africa reported the import of 166,526 small arms. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (64.3 per cent),⁵³ rifles and carbines (18.9 per cent), and shotguns and combinations reported under 'other small arms' (14.0 per cent).
- The largest exporters of small arms to South Africa were Australia (11.9 per cent), the Czech Republic (10.1 per cent) and Türkiye (10.0 per cent).

⁵¹ South Africa submitted its 2024 annual report before the 7 June 2025 deadline. However, in the original uploaded version of the report to the ATT Secretariat website, every second page was missing. The ATT Monitor's analysis is based on the amended complete version uploaded in February 2026.

⁵² Malawi is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 9 October 2024.

⁵³ South Africa reported certain imports of small arms under two separate sub-categories, labelled 'revolvers and self-loading and semi-auto pistols' and 'revolvers and semi-auto pistols'. The ATT Monitor interpreted these sub-categories to fall under the standard sub-category 'revolvers and self-loading pistols'.

SPAIN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT online reporting tool		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Spain continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons exports.

Spain reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Spain disaggregated all transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Spain did not tick the relevant boxes to indicate whether imports of light machine guns were authorized or actual.

Spain could indicate clearly there were no imports or exports of specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving the relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Spain could provide descriptions and comments for reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Spain reported exports to 29 countries. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and four were non-States Parties (India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia).
- Spain reported the export of 37,724 major conventional arms covering six categories. The vast majority were large-calibre artillery systems (99.2 per cent), followed by armoured combat vehicles (0.5 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (0.1 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Spain were Slovakia (76.5 per cent), Ukraine (19.2 per cent) and Senegal (3.4 per cent).
- Spain reported the export of 788,722 small arms and light weapons covering seven sub-categories. The vast majority were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (98.5 per cent), followed by portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (1.4 per cent) and sub-machine guns (0.04 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms and light weapons from Spain were Ukraine (98.5 per cent), Türkiye (1.3 per cent) and Georgia (0.1 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Spain reported imports from five countries. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Spain reported the import of 130 major conventional arms. These were large-calibre artillery systems (76.9 per cent), manned combat aircraft (18.5 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (4.6 per cent).
- Switzerland (95.4 per cent) and the United States (4.6 per cent) were the exporters of major conventional arms to Spain.
- Spain reported the import of 5,962 small arms and light weapons covering four sub-categories. The majority were made up of assault rifles (91.9 per cent), rifles and carbines (4.6 per cent) and light machine guns (3.0 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Spain were Germany (92.5 per cent), the United Kingdom (4.6 per cent) and Belgium (2.0 per cent).

STATE OF PALESTINE

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	No		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✓	2021 ✓	2022 ✓	2023 ✓	2024 ✓
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ✗	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✗	2024 ✗

SURINAME

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ✗	2021 ✗	2022 ✗	2023 ✓	2024 ✗
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2023 ✓				



SWEDEN

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	Yes	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Sweden's reporting practice changed in 2024.

Sweden reported **Actual Numbers** and classified **Values** for most major conventional arms exports, as opposed to 2023, when it reported **Numbers**.

Sweden reported classified **Numbers** and **Values** of **Actual** light weapons exports. In 2023, Sweden reported classified **Numbers**, without indicating whether the transfers were **Actual** or **Authorized**.

Sweden reported classified **Numbers** of **Actual** imports of major conventional arms, as well as **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Sweden specified for which categories and sub-categories of arms information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons (numbers and values of exports of MANPADS, recoilless rifles and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems; values of exports of armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, and manned combat aircraft; numbers of imports of missiles and missile launchers).

Sweden indicated clearly there were no reported exports and imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Sweden provided descriptions for all reported exports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Sweden aggregated the recipients of light weapons exports, making it impossible to determine how many items were delivered to each country.

Sweden could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Sweden reported exports to 13 countries. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (India).
- Sweden reported the export of 20 major conventional arms. These were large-calibre artillery systems (50.0 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (45.0 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (5.0 per cent), as well as a classified number of MANPADS.
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Sweden were the United Kingdom (50.0 per cent), the Netherlands (45.0 per cent) and Brazil (5.00 per cent). A classified number of MANPADS were exported to Latvia.
- Sweden also reported the export of a classified number of recoilless rifles, as well as portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, to an aggregated list of importing States.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Sweden reported imports from one country, which was an ATT State Party.
- Sweden reported the import of a classified number of missiles and MANPADS, and withheld the exporter.
- Sweden reported the import of 7,500 assault rifles from Finland.

SWITZERLAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Switzerland's reporting practice changed slightly in 2024.

Switzerland continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports. It reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports, after reporting **Authorized Numbers** in 2023.

Switzerland reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports. In 2023, it reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports and a combination of **Actual** and **Authorized Numbers** of light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Switzerland disaggregated most reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Switzerland provided descriptions and comments for all reported exports of major conventional arms, as well as for many reported SALW imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Switzerland did not list all final importing States for its exports of armoured combat vehicles.

Switzerland could clearly indicate there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Switzerland could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

In the 'Contents of report' box on the first page of the template, Switzerland indicated it included national definitions of categories of conventional arms reported. However, it did not provide any such definitions.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Switzerland reported exports to 43 countries. Of these, 33 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and four were non-States Parties (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.⁵⁴
- Switzerland reported the export of 88 major conventional arms covering four categories. The majority were armoured combat vehicles (59.1 per cent), battle tanks (28.4 per cent) and MANPADS (6.8 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from Switzerland were Germany (36.4 per cent), Denmark (10.2 per cent) and France (6.8 per cent). For approximately one-third (36.4 per cent) of reported exports of major conventional arms, no final importing State was given.
- Switzerland reported the export of 61,238 small arms and light weapons covering eight sub-categories. The majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (67.7 per cent), sub-machine guns (15.8 per cent), and rifles and carbines (9.2 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Switzerland were the United States (83.4 per cent), Canada (6.0 per cent) and Germany (2.4 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Switzerland reported imports from four countries, all of which were ATT States Parties.
- Switzerland did not report any imports of major conventional arms.
- Switzerland reported the import of 3,075 small arms and light weapons covering six sub-categories. The vast majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (95.7 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (2.3 per cent) and heavy machine guns (1.8 per cent).
- The main exporters of SALW to Switzerland were Germany (98.0 per cent), Belgium (1.8 per cent) and Norway (0.1 per cent).

⁵⁴ Colombia is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 13 January 2025.

TOGO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

✓

2021

X

2022

✓

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2020

✓

2022

✓

TUVALU

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020

X

2021

X

2022

X

2023

X

2024

X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons?	Unspecified – UNROCA template	What reporting template was used?	UNROCA template		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

The United Kingdom reported a combination of **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports and imports.⁵⁵ In 2023, it reported **Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and imports, as well as SALW exports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The United Kingdom disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

The United Kingdom provided descriptions for the majority of reported transfers. It also provided comments for many transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The United Kingdom could provide descriptions and comments for all reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- The United Kingdom reported exports to 66 countries. Of these, 42 were ATT States Parties, 12 were Signatories and 12 were non-States Parties (Algeria, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam) at the beginning of the 2024 reporting year.⁵⁶
- The United Kingdom reported the export of 2,989 major conventional arms covering six categories. The vast majority were unmanned combat aircraft (77.0 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (15.8 per cent) and missiles (3.1 per cent).
- The main importers of major conventional arms from the United Kingdom were Ukraine (92.3 per cent), Brazil (2.3 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (1.3 per cent).
- The United Kingdom reported the export of 55,704 small arms and light weapons covering nine sub-categories. The majority were rifles and carbines (89.3 per cent), assault rifles (9.1 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (0.9 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from the United Kingdom were the United States (71.1 per cent), Australia (10.4 per cent) and Malawi (6.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- The United Kingdom reported imports from two countries, both of which were ATT Signatories.
- The United Kingdom reported the import of 16 manned attack helicopters from the United States.
- The United Kingdom reported the import of 2,016 assault rifles from Israel.

55 The United Kingdom specified in its report that 'the data submitted reflects both actual and authorized transfers of arms during the calendar year'.
56 Malawi is listed as a Signatory State because it became an ATT State Party on 9 October 2024.

URUGUAY

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	Yes – On time	Was the 2024 annual report made public?	Yes		
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons?	No	What reporting template was used?	ATT reporting template 2021		
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY – 2024

Uruguay continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Uruguay reported **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of imports of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons.

GOOD PRACTICES

Uruguay disaggregated all reported transfers by weapon category, sub-category and trading partner.

Uruguay reported both numbers and values of imports.

Uruguay submitted 'nil' reports for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

Uruguay provided descriptions for all reported transfers. It also provided comments for imports of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Uruguay could clearly indicate that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Uruguay could provide comments for all reported transfers.

Uruguay did not specify the currency used to report values.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: EXPORT DATA

- Uruguay submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY – 2024: IMPORT DATA

- Uruguay reported imports from two countries. Of these, one was an ATT State Party and the other a Signatory.
- Uruguay reported the import of 13 armoured combat vehicles from the United States. It indicated a value of 9.07m but did not specify a currency.
- Uruguay reported the import of 259 small arms and light weapons valued at 374,000. By numbers, these were shotguns categorized under 'other small arms' (78.4 per cent) and hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (21.6 per cent). By value, these were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (58.4 per cent) and shotguns (41.6 per cent).
- By numbers, the main exporter of SALW to Uruguay was the United States (78.4 per cent), followed by Belgium (21.6 per cent). By value, the main exporter was Belgium (58.4 per cent), followed by the United States (41.6 per cent).

ZAMBIA

Was the 2024 annual report submitted?	No				
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒	2022 ☒	2023 ☒	2024 ☒
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 ☒	2021 ☒			



AN AH-64 APACHE ATTACK
HELICOPTER WITH THE ROYAL
NETHERLANDS ARMY PERFORMS
A LOW PASS NEAR REVINGEHED,
SWEDEN DURING EXERCISE
AURORA 26.

CREDIT: © NATO

