

COVER PHOTO:

A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE WATCHES HIS ARCS OF FIRE DURING THE FINAL TRAINING EXERCISE AT OPERATION UNIFIER'S ENGINEER TRAINING ELEMENT, IN POLAND, ON 20 DECEMBER 2024.

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Control Arms Place de Cornavin 2 - CP 2097 CH-1211 Geneva 1

https://attmonitor.org/

ISSN: 3105-0530

Attribution: Please cite the work as follows: Control Arms Secretariat (2025). ATT Monitor Report 2025. Geneva. 25 August 2025.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The ATT Monitor and Control Arms wish to thank the governments of Canada and the Netherlands for their generous financial support.

The 2025 ATT Monitor Report was coordinated and edited by Andrea Edoardo Varisco. All chapters and data sets were drafted by an expert team of researchers and analysts including Natalie Bramlett, Mark Bromley, Giovanna Maletta, Sol Zoe Nottage, Rachel Stohl, Andrea Edoardo Varisco. The ATT Monitor also thanks Natalia Pollachi for writing the box included in Chapter 1 of the report. Peer reviewers provided extensive comments, feedback and suggestions during the drafting stage. They include Katherine Aguirre, León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Kelsey Gallagher, Netta Goussac, Lauriane Héau, Elizabeth Kirkham, Guy Lamb, Singo Mwachofi, Sol Zoe Nottage, Natalia Pollachi, Emma Soubrier, Andrea Edoardo Varisco and Elias Yousif. Final review and comments were provided by Hine-Wai Loose.

The 2025 ATT Monitor Report was produced with the support of Léa Mühlemann, fact-checkers Vache Hoveyan and Deborah Tasselkraut, copy editor Elizabeth Newman, and translators Marc Alba (Spanish) and Sonia Murray (French). Art direction and graphic design provided by Collected Pros Limited.



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ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data	MC	Management Committee	
AES	Alliance of Sahel States	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons	
BAFA	Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	ТоТ	Training of Trainers	
CHPL	Common High Priority List	UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and	
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations		Northern Ireland	
CSP	Conference of States Parties to the ATT	UN	United Nations	
DIEF	Diversion Information Exchange Forum	UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs	
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	UN PoA	United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons	
EU	European Union	UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms	
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	UNSCAR	United Nations Trust Facility Supporting	
GCAP	Global Combat Air Programme		Cooperation on Arms Regulation	
GECC	Global Export Control Coalition	VAWC	Violence Against Women and Children	
HRC	Human Rights Council	VTF	ATT Voluntary Trust Fund	
HS	Harmonized System	WA	Wassenaar Arrangement	
ICJ	International Court of Justice	WGETI	ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation	
IHL	International Humanitarian Law	WGTR	ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting	
IHRL	International Human Rights Law	waik		
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defense System	WGTU	ATT Working Group on Treaty Universalization	

THE ATT MONITOR PROJECT

The ATT Monitor is the de facto international monitoring mechanism for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and serves as a source of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, the ATT. Its authoritative and quantitative research and analysis serves to strengthen Treaty implementation efforts and improve the transparency of the conventional arms trade.

The project was launched in January 2015 with the support of the governments of Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The ATT Monitor produces research for its key audiences: government policymakers and export officials, civil society and international organizations, as well as the media and the general public.

The research outputs of the ATT Monitor are:

- ATT Monitor Annual Reports: the flagship publications
 of the project that take stock of existing practice, create
 greater transparency in how the Treaty is implemented,
 inform the work of the Conferences of States Parties
 to the ATT and intersessional meetings, and ensure
 accountability for Treaty commitments
- Country Profiles: published as a specific section of the annual reports, they analyze reporting and transfer practices of each reporting State Party and provide suggestions on how to improve national reporting practices
- ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard: a user-friendly tool that visually displays the distribution, dimensions, and dynamics of the arms trade based on information on arms transfers reported publicly by States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in their annual reports
- Ad hoc research: case studies, briefing papers and other ad hoc publications that focus on specific aspects of the arms trade that are of relevance for ATT States Parties
- Resources: factsheets, guidelines and materials that support effective implementation of the ATT

The ATT Monitor meets the research needs of ATT stakeholders by:

- Synthesizing information and analyzing trends and developments on ATT compliance to advance the Treaty's universalization and implementation
- Assessing standards of national reporting (Article 13) and relevant transparency commitments
- Providing country-by-country analysis on reporting and transfer practices
- Identifying patterns and trends of exports/imports of conventional arms and reporting them against ATT criteria
- Disseminating research findings in public events and making research widely available in print and online, in user-friendly formats, translating key publications into languages other than English
- Maintaining a global network of experts who contribute to ATT Monitor outputs and to the development of ATT Monitor contents through the Editorial Advisory Committee

This information is used to:

- Advance the ATT's universalization and implementation
- Identify key challenges in advancing global acceptance of the ATT's norms and its full implementation, and propose steps to address these challenges
- Provide recommendations for government policy planning and decision-making
- Provide a research-based tool to civil society for use in developing advocacy campaigns and capacity-building and training programs



STATE OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A YEAR IN REVIEW, JUNE 2024-MAY 2025

This review covers the period between 1 June 2024 and 31 May 2025, up to and including the deadline for submission of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) annual reports. It explores some key events and milestones over the past year and assesses their impacts on the overall performance of States Parties regarding Treaty universalization and compliance.

This section first takes stock of ATT universalization and implementation efforts around the world during the abovementioned period. Second, it examines compliance with a core principle of the ATT which is transparency and reporting. It then reviews the work of the ATT's intersessional process, including discussions held within the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR), and Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). The latter comprises two sub-working groups: one on the exchange of national implementation practices and another on current and emerging implementation issues.

The chapter concludes by focusing on the challenges the ATT is facing, vis-à-vis an increasing number of conflict regions in the world, a general climate of distrust and a decreased engagement with multilateral instruments.

UNIVERSALIZATION

As of 31 May 2025, the ATT Secretariat listed 116 countries as States Parties, accounting for 59 per cent of all United Nations (UN) Member States.¹ It listed a further 26 countries as Signatories. Three States, The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia, became ATT States Parties between 2024 and 2025. This is the highest number of new States Parties after three years when membership of the ATT stagnated. Table 1 shows numbers of new States Parties per year between 2015 and 2025.

Table 1 - New ATT membership by 31 May of each year

Year	Acceptance	Accessions	Ratifications	States Parties
2024-2025	0	1	2	116
2023-2024	0	0	0	113
2022-2023	1	0	1	113
2021-2022	0	0	1	111
2020-2021	0	3	1	110
2019-2020	0	3	1	106
2018-2019	0	0	7	102
2017-2018	0	2	1	95
2016-2017	0	1	6	92
2015-2016	0	2	14	85

The geographical spread of the States Parties remains uneven (see map). As of 31 May 2025, the regions with the lowest proportion of States Parties were Asia at 23 per cent (11 of 48 countries), Oceania at 40 per cent (six of 15 countries) and Africa at 57 per cent (31 of 54 countries). Europe at 93 per cent (40 of 43 countries) and the Americas at 80 per cent (28 of 35 countries) have the highest proportions of States Parties.

The ATT enjoys particularly strong support in certain subregional blocs, such as:


- The European Union (EU), with all 27 members being States Parties
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with all 12 members being States Parties³
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with 13 of 15 members (86.7 per cent) being States Parties

¹ Since Niue and the State of Palestine are ATT States Parties but not UN Members, they are not counted in this share.

² Analysis based on UN Statistics Division website, 'Geographic Regions'. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/. For more information on Treaty membership, see the ATT Secretariat website: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html?templateId=209883#.

³ On 29 January 2025, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger—withdrew from the ECOWAS, bringing the number of ECOWAS Member States to 12.

MAP OF STATUS OF ATT PARTICIPATION (AS OF 31 MAY 2025)



116

STATES PARTIES: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Palau, State of Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zambia.



SIGNATORIES: Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Eswatini, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nauru, Rwanda, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.



NOT YET JOINED: Algeria, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei
Darussalam, Cuba, DR Congo, Ecuador,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar,
Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar,
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.

UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

This year saw the eighth-funding cycle of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is intended to support national implementation of the Treaty and relies on voluntary contributions to make up its entire disbursement budget. The ATT encourages each State Party to contribute resources to the VTF. As of the Informal Preparatory meeting for the Eleventh Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP11) in May 2025, 29 States Parties had made voluntary contributions. An additional US\$159,597.65 was allocated to the VTF Outreach Programme, totalling US\$12.9m over the course of the fund's lifespan.4

The ATT Secretariat received 27 applications from 25 States Parties for 2024 VTF-funded projects and the VTF Selection Committee approved funding for 18 projects⁵ with a total budget of US\$1.6m.⁶ This marks a small decrease from the 28 project applications received for the 2023 VTF funding.⁷ Civil society organizations (CSOs) were involved in the implementation of many of these projects, which demonstrates the importance of partnerships in achieving universalization and implementation efforts.

Table 2 shows the number of applications, the number of approved projects and the total budgets for projects approved by the Selection Committee since the VTF's first year of operation.

Table 2 – Approved VTF projects and committed funding per year⁸

Year	Applications	Projects Approved	Budget for Approved Projects
2024	27	18	US\$1.6m
2023	28	14	US\$1.2m
2022	15	6	US\$612,184
2021	21	13	US\$1.26m
2020	26	10	US\$963,728
2019	39	20	US\$2m
2018	23	10	US\$834,803
2017	21	17	US\$1.3m

Other activities in support of universalization and implementation also continued this year. Mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), the EU ATT Outreach Programme and bilateral assistance initiatives continued to commit resources to channel technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties and to countries in the process of ratifying or acceding to the Treaty.



OTHER ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ALSO CONTINUED THIS YEAR. MECHANISMS SUCH AS THE UN TRUST FACILITY SUPPORTING COOPERATION ON ARMS REGULATION (UNSCAR), THE EU ATT OUTREACH PROGRAMME AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE INITIATIVES CONTINUED TO COMMIT RESOURCES TO CHANNEL ASSISTANCE TO STATES PARTIES AND TO COUNTRIES IN THE PROCESS OF RATIFYING OR ACCEDING TO THE TREATY.

⁴ Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP11 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2025. Information on file with the ATT Monitor.

⁵ VTF approved 18 projects for funding, but Benin's application was withdrawn, see ATT Secretariat website (n.d.). 'Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF). 2024 Projects'. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/voluntary.html?tab-tab2.

⁶ ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2023 - August 2024.' 19 July 2024. ATT/VTF/2024/CHAIR/804/Conf Rep. http://bit.ly/3FfAAMA, pp. 3 and 27.

⁷ ATT Secretariat. (2023). 'Report on the Work of the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for the Period August 2022 - August 2023. 21 July 2023. ATT/VTF/2023/CHAIR/770/Conf.Rep. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20 the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202022-2023_EN_corrected/ATT_CSP9_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20 the%20Period%202022-2023_EN_corrected.pdf, p.3.

⁸ Table 2 shows projects and funding that were approved by the VTF Selection Committee.

Government representatives and CSOs from around the world met at national and regional training workshops to learn more about the ATT and how to implement it in their respective countries. They discussed technical challenges, legal requirements and resources available to support national capacity-building efforts for implementing ATT provisions.

Examples of activities include:

From 25 to 27 March 2025, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) held its first workshop under the EU ATT Outreach Project IV with Ecuador, the newest partner country of the initiative. The event took place in Guayaquil and brought together over 30 delegates from both Guayaquil and the capital, Quito.9

From 17 to 18 December 2024, Expertise France organized a hybrid Training of Trainers (ToT) capacity building workshop to promote effective implementation of the ATT in Liberia,

focusing on preventing diversion. A second part of the capacity building workshop was held in-person in Monrovia on 29 to 30 May 2025. It provided participants with practical knowledge to prevent diversion of conventional arms and promote the effective implementation of the ATT.¹⁰

The ATT Secretariat reported on the regional practical reporting workshops it had held for Southern African States in Namibia and for Caribbean States in the Bahamas. The October 2024 Regional Workshop in the Bahamas provided practical training to 17 participants from ten Caribbean countries, with low reporting rates to increase reporting obligations and strengthen the compliance capacity of ATT States Parties. CSOs also conducted some activities to promote reporting in the ATT. For example, on 27 May 2025, the ATT Monitor and the Stimson Center organized an online clinic on Everything You Need to Know about ATT Reporting' to support State officials with the preparation and submission of initial and annual reports.



⁹ Newsletter. March - April 2025 | Phase IV - Vol. 1 EUP2 ATT Newsletter.

¹⁰ EUP2P ATT IV - OP - Expertise France. 13 June 2025. Libéria | Mise en œuvre du TCA: renforcer les compétences nationales pour prévenir le détournement. [Liberia | Implementation of the ATT: Strengthening national skills to prevent diversion]. [Photo with links] [Post] Linkedin. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eup2p-att-iv-op-expertise-france_tca-att-armscontrol-activity-7339205476653424641-TvG1?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_ios&rcm=ACoAAAMgaSYBH_4ulb1JayFXD-SVGf7zEcF0DJ4 and Newsletter. May - June 2025 | Phase IV - Vol. 1 EUP2 ATT Newsletter.

¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Bahamas (2024). 'Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Regional Workshop on Practical Reporting for Caribbean States held in Nassau, The Bahamas'. 7 October 2024 http://bit.ly/4jTS0MO.

REPORTING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

ANNUAL REPORTS

States Parties are required to submit annual reports by 31 May each year detailing their arms exports and imports from the previous calendar year. However, they are granted a sevenday grace period by the ATT Secretariat, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

As of 7 June 2025, 113 of the 116 States Parties were required to submit their 2024 annual reports, in line with the requirements established by Article 13.3. Of these, 50 submitted an annual report by the deadline – a compliance rate of 44 per cent. ¹³ This rate is equal to last year's on-time reporting rate.

Of the 50 annual reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat, 13 States Parties made their 2024 reports confidential, representing 26 per cent of on-time submissions.¹⁴ This marks an increase in private, on-time reporting compared to 22 percent of 2023 reports submitted on time.

Andorra, which was required to submit its annual report for the first time this year, has not done so by the 7 June deadline. The Philippines, which was required to submit its first annual report on 31 May 2024 and had not done so by last year's deadline, has submitted an on-time report for 2024 and a late report for 2023. A preliminary analysis of the contents of the 2024 annual reports can be found in Chapter 3.

INITIAL REPORTS

Article 13.1 of the ATT requires each State Party to submit an initial report to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty within the first year after its entry into force. ¹⁵ As of 7 June 2025, 113 of 116 States Parties were required to submit an initial report, of which 93 (82 per cent) had done so. ¹⁶

Two States Parties have submitted overdue initial reports since the publication of last year's ATT Monitor Annual Report: the Bahamas and Andorra, which were due to report in December 2015 and March 2024, respectively. No new ATT State Party had to submit its initial report between 7 June 2024 and 7 June 2025. The three newest States Parties—The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia—are required to submit their initial reports by 10 September 2025, 8 October 2025 and 12 January 2026, respectively.

Initial reporting compliance remains low for the Treaty's newest members. Of the eight States Parties that joined the ATT and have been required to submit an initial report since 2021, only 50 per cent (Andorra, Namibia, People's Republic of China and Philippines) have done so. An in-depth analysis of the contents of initial reports is provided in Chapter 3.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

TENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

The Tenth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP10) was conducted in-person from 19 to 23 August 2024. Ambassador Răzvan Rusu, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, served as President of CSP10. Representatives from 113 countries, comprising 93 States Parties; two States that had acceded and ratified the Treaty, but for which the Treaty had not yet entered into force; 17 Signatories and one Observer State attended.¹⁷ Other attendees included stakeholders, representatives of ten international and regional organizations, EU and UN agencies, 56 CSOs, research institutes and associations representing the industry.¹⁸ The President's thematic focus was interagency cooperation, and discussion highlighted the relevance and role of interagency cooperation for the effective implementation of the ATT provisions.¹⁹

¹² Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

¹³ This year the ATT Monitor was able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the ATT Secretariat.

¹⁴ Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia and State of Palestine.

¹⁵ Arms Trade Treaty. Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

¹⁶ ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Initial Reports. Status: as of 3 June 2025'. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/initial-reports.html?templateId=209839.

¹⁷ The ATT Monitor captures attendance at CSPs as indicated by the CSP Final Report each year. See ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Final Report'. 23 August 2024. ATT/CSP10/2024/SEC/807/Conf.FinRep. https://bit.ly/3HoYJRB, p.3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Decisions adopted included:20

- The endorsement of the proposed Voluntary Guide to implementing Articles 6 and 7 and welcoming of the draft multi-year workplan for the Sub-working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices.
- The adoption of the updated Terms of Reference for the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF).
- The welcoming of a Political Declaration for the next decade of the Arms Trade Treaty, introduced by the United Kingdom and endorsed by 72 States Parties and one State for which the ATT entered into force after CSP10.
- The decision to extend the revised ATT programme of work for an additional year, maintaining current working arrangements.
- The request to the Management Committee to conduct a formal assessment of the revised ATT programme of work.
- The request to the ATT Secretariat 'to collect genderdisaggregated attendance data during ATT Working Group and Preparatory meetings, in addition to the data collected at CSPs'.²¹
- The election of Ambassador Carlos Foradori, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN Office and other international organizations in Geneva, as President of CSP11.
- The election of Australia, Latvia, Namibia, and Republic of Korea as the four vice-presidents of CSP11.
- The selection of members of the VTF Selection Committee for two years: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
- The approval of the appointment of Mrs. Carina Solmirano as Head of the ATT Secretariat, effective from 1 December 2024.
- Scheduling of CSP11 for 25 to 29 August 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland.

ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES – INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD

Preparations for CSP11 included meetings of the Working Groups on 25 to 28 February 2025 and an Informal Preparatory Meeting on 20 to 21 May 2025.²²

The WGETI, chaired by Ambassador Markus V. Lacanilao, addressed the implementation of specific ATT articles in dedicated sub-working groups on exchange of national implementation practices and current and emerging implementation issues.²³

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices was facilitated by Mr. Edward Kawa and Ms. Essate Weldemichael of Sierra Leone. The sub-working group primarily focused on the Treaty's implementation by addressing the first two topics in the multi-year workplan: 'National control system relating to import', and 'Scope / national control list'.24 Under the first topic, measures taken by States Parties to regulate arms imports were discussed, with a focus on Article 8(2), highlighting a variety of national approaches. The second topic explored how States Parties establish and maintain a national control list, its legal basis, and how it applies to the different types of arms transfers: export, import, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering. As part of the presentations, Dr. Paul Holtom from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research outlined how a considerable number of ATT States Parties do not have national control lists. He also examined the scope of these lists, showing how these do not always include all categories of conventional arms in Article 2(1), ammunition/munitions and/or parts and components,²⁵ and highlighting how the scope of the ATT is not periodically reviewed, compared to other instruments such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).26 The discussion highlighted the importance of regularly updated national control lists to ensure that they cover all relevant items and reflect technological advancements or evolving security considerations.

²⁰ lbid., pp. 5-13.

²¹ lbid., p. 11.

²² ATT Secretariat. (n.d). 'Eleventh Conference of States Parties (CSP11) Preparatory Process'. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/csp-11-preparatory-proces.html.

²³ ATT WGETI (2025). '25 – 26/27 February 2025 WGETI Meeting: WGETI Chair Introduction Letter'. 03 February 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/808/LetterSubDocs. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGETI_CSP11_1_Chair%20Letter%20and%20Sub-WG%20Documents_EN%201/ATT_WGETI_CSP11_1_Chair%20Letter%20and%20Sub-WG%20Documents_EN%201.pdf.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 1-2

²⁵ On how ATT States Parties implement controls on transfers and exports of parts and components, see also Chapter 1 of this Report.

²⁶ Holtom P. (2025). Scope of items & national control lists. Presentation at the ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. 25-26 February 2025. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/20250224_ATT%20WGETI_SCOPE_UNIDIR/20250224_ATT%20WGETI_SCOPE_UNIDIR.pdf. ATT Secretariat (2025). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Report to CSP11. Draft'. 2 May 2022. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/811/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20 Report%20to%20CSP11_EN/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN.pdf, pp. 2-4.

The WGETI Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues was facilitated by Mr. Jason Robinson of Ireland. The sub-working group addressed the role of industry in responsible international arms trade, with a focus on stronger due diligence practices.²⁷ The second issue addressed during this session was the risk of conventional arms being used in violations of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT, including in cases of gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against women and children (VAWC).28 Delegations considered and discussed proposals to strengthen the implementation of Article 7(4), including the introduction of gender focal points.²⁹ Despite some opposition, an ad hoc discussion took place on how rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and findings of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (HRC) are taken into account in the application of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, along with discussions on arms transfers to Myanmar and Sudan.30

The WGTU, co-chaired by President of CSP11 Ambassador Carlos Foradori from Argentina, and President of CSP10 Ambassador Răzvan Rusu from Romania, focused on the implementation of the universalization workplan adopted at CSP10, with updates on efforts to expand ATT membership.³¹ Discussions covered the current status of participation, strategies for increasing membership—particularly among

Asia-Pacific and Signatory States—and national experiences with ratification, accession and domestication practices.³² Delegations discussed the draft working paper of the CSP11 President 'Universalization as a priority', and the progress in the implementation of the WGTU workplan.³³

The WGTR, chaired by Ms. Andrea Quezada from Chile, delved into the practical implementation of ATT reporting obligations.34 Discussions addressed the current state of compliance, strategies to support States Parties facing reporting challenges and national practices related to arms transfer reporting. Delegations reviewed key reporting challenges, including low submission rates and the limited use of the online reporting tool. The ATT Secretariat presented measures to improve compliance with ATT reporting obligations, highlighting initiatives such as peer-to-peer support and the role of regional reporting champions in assisting States facing reporting challenges, and the 'Voluntary Guidance on the Practice of Annual Reporting:35 The chair invited the ATT Monitor to deliver a presentation on its Arms Transfers Dashboard, which provides a graphical representation of the distribution, dimensions and dynamics of the arms trade derived from publicly available ATT Annual Reports.³⁶ In addition, the low usage of the ATT Information Exchange Platform raised questions about its relevance and future.37

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 4 and 7-8.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

³⁰ For a summary of discussions taking place during that session, see Varella, L. (2025). 'ATT Monitor, Vol. 17, No. 1. Troubling Times Require Courage in the ATT and Beyond.' Reaching Critical Will. 28 February 2025. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/att/csp11/att-monitor/17317-att-monitor-vol-17-no-1.

³¹ ATT WGTU (2025). 'Co-chair Letter and draft annotated agenda for Meeting of 27 February 2025'. 29 January 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTU/2025/CHAIR/810/DrAnnAgenda. https://bit.ly/4i93n2T, pp. 1-2.

³² Ibid

³³ ATT WGTU (2025). 'Working Group on Treaty Universalization Co-Chairs' Report to CSP11. Draft'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTU/2025/CHAIR/813/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://bit.ly/4iKIJ9q, pp. 1-4.

³⁴ ATT WGTR (2025). 'Chair Letter and draft annotated agenda for Meeting of 28 February 2025'. 29 January 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/809/AnnAgenda. https://bit.ly/42fsCdH, pp. 1-6.

³⁵ ATT WGTR (2025). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP11. Draft'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/812/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://bit.ly/3GEW1Hj, p. 2-3.

³⁶ ATT WGTR (2025). 'Chair Letter and draft annotated agenda for Meeting of 28 February 2025'. 29 January 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/809/AnnAgenda. https://bit.ly/42fsCdH, p. 1.

³⁷ ATT WGTR (2025). 'Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Chair's Report to CSP11. Draft'. 25 April 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/812/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://bit.ly/3GEW1Hj, p. 4.

The CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting was held on 20 to 21 May 2025. The chairs and co-chairs of ATT subsidiary bodies—WGETI, WGTR and WGTU—provided updates on the discussions held during the February sessions and proposed next steps. Following the ad hoc discussion in the Working Group WGETI meeting in February, States Parties discussed the possibility not to allow anymore CSOs to propose and raise topics for the ad hoc discussions. The current instructions, adopted at the Ninth Conference of States Parties (CSP9), stated that 'at the beginning of each CSP cycle and ahead of the in-person WGETI meeting, the WGETI Chair will invite States Parties and other stakeholders to raise any current implementation issue on which they seek an ad hoc discussion in the WGETI.'38 States Parties will likely take a decision on the matter at CSP11. The ATT Secretariat also presented updates on the operations of the VTF, emphasizing that the VTF can only function when adequate funding is secured and that a solid base of donors remains essential. In addition, the Management Committee (MC) and delegations discussed the assessment of the revised ATT programme of work. With informal consultations underway, the MC invited feedback from delegations to assist on the assessment and to indicate their preferred approach for subsequent CSP cycles.39

The second day included discussions on the Working Paper on the priority theme of the Argentinian Presidency on 'Universalization as a Priority', followed by an overview of the implementation of the CSP10 decisions. A presentation on the status of gender participation in ATT meetings was followed by an overview on the status of ATT finances⁴⁰ (see next section).

STATUS OF ATT FINANCES

States Parties to the ATT, as well as Signatory and Observer States attending CSPs, contribute to the costs of ATT conferences and of the ATT Secretariat. In-kind support from Switzerland has remained consistent. The percentage of the budget received, however, declined to 85.69 per cent in 2025 (as of 15 May). Similarly, the proportion of States Parties that made their payments dropped from an average of 87.47 per cent in the years 2015/16-2021 to 56.49 per cent, with outstanding contributions from 57 States, for 2025 (as of 15 May). As of May 2025, the total of outstanding contributions was more than US\$466,000. With a 5 per cent annual deficit, future operations are threatened. While guidelines for making financial arrangements were adopted by CSP7, no formal requests for financial arrangements had been submitted until May 2025.41

TAKING STOCK - ARE STATES PARTIES MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

At CSP10, ATT States Parties welcomed 'A Political Declaration for the next decade of the Arms Trade Treaty'. Introduced by the United Kingdom and endorsed by 72 States Parties and one State for which the ATT entered into force after CSP10,42 the Declaration recognized the significance of the Treaty ten years since its entry into force, recalled the object and purpose of the Treaty, and recognized the ATT as the first and 'only international treaty creating legally binding international standards to regulate the international trade in conventional arms'.43 The Declaration also acknowledged that 'there is still work to be done'.44 States Parties committed to promote universalization, to report on time, regularly, and, wherever possible, publicly, and to 'working tirelessly to fulfil the Object and Purpose' of the ATT, including 'to implement the prohibitions and obligations of this Treaty relating to international law, including assessing the potential risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law'.45

40 Ibic

³⁸ ATT WGETI (2023). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Chair's Draft Report to CSPg'. Annex D: Draft Proposal: WGETI Configuration and Substance. Paragraph 11 (g). https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSPg_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20 CSPg_EN/ATT_CSPg_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSPg_EN.pdf.

³⁹ ATT Secretariat (2025). 'Draft annotated agenda for CSP11 Informal Preparatory Meeting 20 – 21 May 2025, 10:00 -18:00 (Geneva Local Time)'. 17 April 2025. ATT/CSP11/2025/CHAIR/814/PM.DrAnnAgenda.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3FroLD6.

⁴¹ Presentation provided by the ATT Secretariat at the CSP11 ATT Informal Preparatory Meeting, May 2025. Information on file with the ATT Monitor.

The following States Parties endorsed the Political Declaration at CSP10: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zambia and The Gambia (for which the ATT entered into force on 11 September 2024). See ATT Secretariat (2024). 'Final report'. 23 August 2024, ATT/CSP10/2024/SEC/807/Conf.FinRep. https://bit.ly/3HoYJRB, p.10. The text of the Political Declaration can be accessed in Annex 2, Ibid., pp. 15-16.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

The events from June 2024 to May 2025 tested the Treaty, in a way that has rarely happened in previous years. Conflicts in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine continued unabated and new conflicts and tensions started or intensified during the year in several areas of the world, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen. Growing geopolitical tensions meant that world military expenditure rose to US\$2.718tn (US\$2,718bn) in 2024, the highest level ever recorded, with increases in all geographical regions of the world.⁴⁶ In parallel, the world experienced a progressive erosion of global norms. This resulted in general distrust in and decreased engagement (including financial) from multilateral instruments that brought some States, including States Parties to the ATT, to withdraw or express the intention to withdraw selectively from some international instruments such as the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴⁷

Israel's response to the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 resulted in a conflict in Palestine and several Israeli strikes in other countries in the region, including Lebanon, the other ATT State Party of the region. Israeli conduct during the conflict is estimated to have caused over 54,000 deaths among Palestinians in Gaza, the destruction of essential civilian infrastructure and included the limitation or blockade of humanitarian aid.⁴⁸ In September 2024, the UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human

Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories concluded that 'the policies and practices of Israel during the reporting period are consistent with the characteristics of genocide'.49 In October 2024, the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 denounced that 'Israel has systematically and flagrantly violated international law' and required urgent action to 'ensure the full application of the Genocide Convention and full protection of the Palestinians:50 On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for the former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and the former Hamas commander Mohammed Deif, 'citing allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity'.51 In May 2025, Israel approved a plan to capture Gaza, while the UN warned of a 'growing humanitarian catastrophe'.52

Several ATT States Parties and Signatories transferred arms to Israel in recent years. During the period 2020 to 2024, the United States, an ATT Signatory State, was the main exporter of major arms to Israel.⁵³ European countries such as Germany and Italy were also among the main exporters of major conventional arms to Israel during this period.⁵⁴ In addition, several ATT States Parties participate in the US-led 'Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program', providing parts and components for the production of the aircraft, which, according to independent sources, has been used by Israel in Gaza.⁵⁵

- 46 Liang, X. et al. (2025). 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. April 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf, p. 1.
- 47 See, for instance: Paternoster, T. (2025). 'Hungary approves bill to withdraw from International Criminal Court'. Euronews. 20 May 2025. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/20/hungary-approves-bill-to-withdraw-from-international-criminal-court; Sytas, A. and Erling, B. (2025). 'Poland and Baltic nations plan to withdraw from landmine convention'. Reuters. 18 March 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-baltic-nations-pull-out-landmines-convention-2025-03-18/; and Deconinck, C. (2025). 'Lithuania officially pulls out of international convention banning cluster bombs'. Brussels signal. 7 March 2025. https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/03/lithuania-officially-pulls-out-of-international-convention-banning-cluster-bombs/.
- 48 See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2025). 'Humanitarian Situation Update #294 | Gaza Strip'. 5 June 2025. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-294-gaza-strip; and Bennet, T. (2025), 'At least 27 Palestinians killed by Israeli fire near aid centre, Gaza authorities say'. BBC. 3 June 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2lkwz0y5n0o.
- 49 United Nations General Assembly (2024). 'Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories'. 20 September 20204. A/79/363. https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/363, p. 25.
- 50 United Nations General Assembly (2024). 'Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967**. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese. Genocide as colonial erasure'. 1 October 2024. A/79/384. https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/384, p. 31.
- 51 UN News. (2024). ICC issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and Hamas commander.' 21 November 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157286.
- 52 See Gritten, D. (2025). 'Israel security cabinet approves plan to 'capture' Gaza, official says'. BBC News. 5 May 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy04km1zk0o; and UN News (2025). 'UN warns of growing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza'. 4 May 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1162886.
- 53 George, M. et al. (2025). 'Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.
- 54 Ibio
- 55 Gallagher, K. (2025). 'Global Production of the Israeli F-35I Joint Strike Fighter'. Project Ploughshares. January 2025. https://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/F35I-Report-Jan.25.pdf, p. 13 and Gjerding, S. and Andersen, L. S. (2024). 'Danskudstyrede kampfly deltog i angreb i Gaza med store civile tab [Danish-equipped fighter jets participated in attacks in Gaza with heavy civilian casualties]'. Information. 1 September 2024. https://www.information.dk/indland/2024/09/danskudstyrede-kampfly-deltog-angreb-gaza-store-civile-tab?check_logged_in=1&kupon=eyJpYXQiOjE3MjUyNTUwMjEsInN1YiI6IjQ3Mjg3Njo4MjM1NzYifQ.7k2QM_MAdcaUS-pePhgxtQ.

During October 2024 in Sudan the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that the belligerent parties, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, 'and/or their allied militias', were 'responsible for large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law'.56 For both sides, the Fact-Finding Mission considered that there were 'reasonable grounds' to believe that they 'have committed the war crimes of violence to life and person'.57 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded 'over 28,700 reported fatalities by the end of November 2024, including over 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks'.58 At the same time, weapons and equipment also produced by companies registered in ATT States Parties have been used by belligerent parties. 59 These also included materiel originating from European States, exported to the United Arab Emirates, a Signatory State, and reportedly reexported to Sudan.60

According to the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2024 was 'the deadliest year for civilians' in Myanmar.⁶¹ A Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar published in October 2024 reported 'the failure by the Security Council to take action to stop the flow of weapons into Myanmar and reduce the capacity of the military junta to commit probable war crimes and crimes against humanity. The report praised the Government of Singapore, whose actions led to a 90 per cent reduction in the transfer of weapons and military supplies to the junta by Singapore-registered companies and called for halting the sale, transfer or transshipment of weapons, dualuse technologies and aviation fuel to Myanmar.

Analysis from the ATT Monitor 2024 annual report illustrated how some ATT States Parties have used transparency instruments like ATT annual reports to report their arms transfers to Ukraine in response to the Russian Federation invasion of February 2022. ⁶⁴ At the same time, some parts and components produced in the civilian sector for commercial uses have been incorporated in military materiel produced by Russian Federation, Iran, and North Korea and used in the conflict, highlighting a new challenge for arms control. ⁶⁵ Other conflicts intensified during the year. For instance, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the armed group M23 has advanced into the provinces of North and South Kivu since January 2025. Overall, the fighting has deteriorated the humanitarian situation in the region. ⁶⁶

⁵⁶ Human Rights Council (2024). 'Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023'.' 23 October 2024. A/HRC/57/CRP.6. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf, pp. 78-79.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

⁵⁸ ACLED. 'Foreign meddling and fragmentation fuel the war in Sudan' (12 December 2024). https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2025/sudan/.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch (2024). 'Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access to New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment'. September 2024. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/09/sudan_weapons_0924_briefing-FINAL-web.pdf.

⁶⁰ See Gadeva, E., and Peschard, Q. (2025). 'European weapons in Sudan (1/5): Bulgaria mortar shells in Darfur's desert'. France 24. 17 April 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20250417-investigation-european-weapons-sudan-part-1-mortar-shells-bulgaria; Euronews (2024). 'UAE accused of fueling war by providing weapons to Sudan's paramilitary rivals'. 19 June 2024. https://www.euronews.com/2024/06/19/uae-accused-of-fueling-war-by-providing-weapons-to-sudans-paramilitary-rivals#:-:text=0ver%2014/2C000%20people%20have%20been,to%20a%20rival%20 paramilitary%20force; and Levinson, R., and Lewis, D. (2025). 'Exclusive: UN panel investigates Emirati links to seized weapons in Darfur'. Reuters. 29 April 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/un-panel-investigates-emirati-links-seized-weapons-darfur-2025-04-29/.

⁶¹ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2025). 'Update on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar. Overview of developments in 2024'. January 2025. https://bangkok.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025-02/AnnualUpdateontheHumanRightsSituationinMyanmar2024. pdf, p. 2.

⁶² United Nations General Assembly (2024). 'Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews'. 25 October 2024. A/79/550. https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/550, p. 20.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 2 and 22

⁶⁴ Control Arms Secretariat (2024). 'ATT Monitor 2024'. Geneva. 19 August 2024. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_Monitor-Report-2024.pdf, p. 46.

⁶⁵ See Chapter 1 of this Report for additional information on this topic.

⁶⁶ Blondel, P. (2025). 'Armed groups install 'parallel administration' in DR Congo, Security Council hears'. UN News. 27 March 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/03/1161621.

In today's increasingly volatile and insecure global landscape, the ATT remains a vital international instrument. The ATT aims to '[e]stablish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms' and '[p]revent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion', for the purpose of '[c]ontributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; [r]educing human suffering'; and '[p]romoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'. States Parties shall not authorize transfers of conventional arms, ammunition/munitions, and parts and components if they have knowledge that these would be used 'in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party'.68 Prior to an export, States Parties to the ATT shall assess the potential that their conventional arms or items could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.⁶⁹ They are also encouraged to reassess export authorizations if they become aware of new relevant information and, in the past, some States Parties suspended arms transfers to belligerent parties in Yemen.

Some ATT States Parties have reconsidered some export authorizations to and imports from some belligerent States, also based on the prohibitions and export assessment criteria of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.70 For instance, Spain issued a

communiqué in February 2024 stating it has not authorized any sale of arms to Israel since 7 October 2023, denied in some cases docking permissions to some vessels carrying arms to Israel, and cancelled a contract to receive 15 million rounds of ammunition from an Israeli military firm.71 The ATT, however, does not have a mechanism to assess compliance of States Parties with their Treaty obligations, particularly in relation to the application of Articles 6 and 7 in export licensing decisions. CSOs have often filled this void. For example, in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom they have initiated legal proceedings to halt transfers of arms and parts and components to Israel.⁷² In the Netherlands, the direct supplies of components to Israel have been stopped after an Appeals Court order (with a final decision from the Supreme Court pending), but not the transfers of parts and components via other countries 'with Israel as the final destination'.⁷³

The cases illustrate the importance of discussing how the application of Articles 6 and 7 remain at the forefront of the topics debated by the WGETI, and that CSOs remain able to contribute to these debates. The Working Group could also discuss how ATT States Parties apply Articles 6 and 7 in the transfers of parts and components, and new challenges emerging in the regulatory landscape, such as the integration of parts and components produced for civilian use in military materiel. Only in this way can States Parties ensure, as stated in their Political Declaration, the Arms Trade Treaty will continue to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability, reduce human suffering, and promote cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms.

⁶⁷ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

⁶⁸ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 6 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

⁶⁹ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 7 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

⁷⁰ In addition to national and, where existing, regional regulatory frameworks. For instance, for ATT States Parties from the European Union, the framework includes the EU 'Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP'. See Zubillaga, M. M. (2024). 'Spain-Israel: The complexity of arms trade when a conflict is underway'. Universidad de Navarra – Global Affairs. 29 November 2024. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/spain-israel-the-complexity-of-arms-trade-when-a-conflict-is-underway.

⁷¹ See González, M. (2024). 'El Gobierno deniega la escala en Algeciras de dos buques con armamento para Israel [The Government denies the stopover in Algeciras of two ships carrying weapons for Israel].' El País. 7 November 2024. https://elpais.com/espana/2024-11-07/el-gobierno-deniega-la-escala-en-algeciras-de-dos-buques-con-armamento-para-israel.html; Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación de España (2024). 'Comunicado sobre la venta de armamento a Israel [Statement on arms sales to Israel]: 12 February 2024. https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/Comunicacion/Comunicados/Paginas/2024_COMUNICADOS/20240212_COMU006.aspx; Starcevic, S., and Hernández-Morales, A. (2025). 'Spain terminates Israeli ammo contract after uproar threatened to topple coalition! Politico. 24 April 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/spanish-government-terminates-israeli-weapons-contract-amid-uproar/; and The Guardian (2024). 'Spain denies port of call to ship carrying arms to Israel'. 16 May 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/16/spain-denies-port-of-call-to-ship-carrying-arms-to-israel.

⁷² Arms Trade Litigation Monitor. (n.d). 'Case overviews'. https://armstradelitigationmonitor.org/case-overviews/?jur=&loc=&rpt=84.

⁷³ Arms Trade Litigation Monitor. (n.d). 'Dutch Arms and Palestine'. https://armstradelitigationmonitor.org/overview/dutch-arms-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territories/.

⁷⁴ See Chapter 1 of this Report for additional information on this topic.

⁷⁵ ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Final report'. 23 August 2024. ATT/CSP10/2024/SEC/807/Conf.FinRep.https://bit.ly/3H0YJRB, p. 16.



THE 2025 ATT MONITOR REPORT

Chapter 1 is dedicated to parts and components. This chapter analyses the obligations and implementation challenges of Article 4 of the ATT, which focuses on parts and components. It reviews ATT requirements and how States Parties have implemented Article 4 and presents case studies on integration and re-export of parts and components and the use of civilian parts and components in military equipment. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations to improve interpretation, implementation and cooperation under the ATT.

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth look at 2023 ATT annual reports. It examines States Parties' compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and reporting that contributes to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as to a higher standard of transparency. Despite an increase in on-time reporting and a decrease in the number of confidential reports in 2023, the chapter shows that the proportion of meaningfully transparent reports fell.

Chapter 3 includes a summary assessment of 2024 annual reports and initial reports submitted on or before the reporting deadline of 31 May. The assessment also provides an analysis of reporting non-compliance, providing some recommendations to address challenges States Parties face in fulfilling reporting obligations.

The Annex includes country profiles for each State Party required to submit a 2023 ATT annual report. Each profile provides data on key reporting-practice metrics (public reporting, on-time reporting and withholding security information) as well as a summary of good reporting practice and areas for improvement. The profiles also contain a summary of transfers reported by each State Party, focusing on basic comparable information such as number and status of export/import partners.





CHAPTER 1 – PARTS AND COMPONENTS UNDER THE ATT: TREATY REQUIREMENTS, NATIONAL PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

INTRODUCTION

Article 4 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) requires that States Parties establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components. There are two main issues concerning the implementation of Article 4 by States Parties that warrant additional clarity. The first concerns the provision's scope, and the different types of transfers of parts and components that States should capture through their national arms transfer controls. In this regard, the way Article 4 is formulated does not provide a lot of detail, leaving the text open to various interpretations. The second issue concerns prohibitions and risk assessments, and how States should determine whether a particular export or transfer of parts and components should be approved or denied.

Both issues have been the subject of debate in recent years. First, the processes through which States control exports of parts and components for integration into a complete military

system for subsequent re-export have come under increasing scrutiny. A 2025 report from the UN Human Rights Council noted concerns regarding the potential conflict between the use of open licences and the handing over of responsibility for exports of complete systems to the State where the integration takes place and the risk assessment obligations contained in the ATT.² Second, parts and components manufactured in the civilian sector, and which fall outside the scope of arms and dual-use export controls, are being incorporated into the production of military equipment used in ongoing armed conflicts. This has led several States to utilize sanctions and require companies to adopt due diligence measures to prevent such transfers.

These debates warrant an examination of (i) what the ATT requires from States Parties in terms of the scope of their controls on exports of parts and components and the implementation of their risk assessment and risk mitigation measures when assessing transfers; (ii) how these provisions are being applied at the national level by ATT States Parties; and (iii) what role the ATT and its associated forums could play in enabling exchanges of national practices and promoting the adoption of strengthened controls that 'lelstablish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms' and 'lplrevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion'.3



- 1 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 4 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
- 2 UN Human Rights Council (2025). 'Impact of arms transfers on human rights. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'. A/HRC/58/41. 9 January 2025. paras 16 and 18, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/41.
- 3 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

This chapter aims to contribute to these debates. It first provides an overview of the requirements that States Parties have under Article 4 of the ATT and how they have reported applying this provision. The chapter then discusses two case studies exemplifying challenges related to the implementation of export controls on parts and components. The first case examines the regulation of transfers of parts and components that take place during the joint development, production and procurement of military systems. The second case focuses on how parts and components that fall beyond the scope of arms and dual-use export controls have been integrated into weapon systems used in ongoing armed conflicts and how States have responded. The chapter concludes with recommendations on how ATT States Parties could carry forward exchanges on how they have interpreted and implemented Article 4 and address some of the challenges created by the global trade in parts and components.

THE CONTENT AND APPLICATION OF CONTROLS ON PARTS AND COMPONENTS UNDER THE ATT

Under Article 4 of the ATT States Parties are required to 'establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered in Article 2(1).4 Article 5 of the ATT strengthens this provision, adding that a national control system regulating the transfers of items covered by the Treaty, thus also parts and components, should be 'effective and transparent'.5 Article 4 adds that prohibitions (Article 6) and export and export assessment obligations (Article 7) also apply to exports of parts and components. Article 6 obliges ATT States Parties to

prohibit certain transfers (defined by the ATT in Article 2(2) as including export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering⁶) of parts and components, and Article 7 requires States Parties to assess the risk posed by, and in some circumstances deny authorization for, non-prohibited exports.

The rationale behind the original framing of Article 4 was an attempt to prevent the circumvention of the Treaty's obligations by exporters disassembling weapons into separate parts and components for reassembly in a recipient country. This approach takes into account the reality that weapons are rarely produced as a whole by single suppliers. However, the specific risk of circumvention that Article 4 is seeking to address is, in practice, more relevant for transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) rather than the categories of major arms covered by the ATT.8 Finally, many states parties regulate a much wider range of transfers of parts of components than would be required to meet the intentions of this original framing.


Several ATT States Parties were either European Union (EU) Member States or Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Participating States when the ATT was negotiated. The WA is a multilateral export control regime that establishes common standards on arms and dual-use export controls among its 42 participating states to prevent their 'destabilising accumulations' and 'the acquisition of these items by terrorists. EU Member States and WA Participating States are required to apply controls on all items on the EU Common Military List or the WA Munitions List through their national arms export control systems. These lists, which are functionally identical, go beyond the conventional arms outlined in Article 2(1) and

- 4 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 4 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
- 5 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5 and 5(5) (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
- 6 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 2.2 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
- 7 See Casey-Maslen, S. et al. (2016). 'Parts and Components'. In Clapham A. et al. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 8 Wood, A. (2021). 'Parts and Components'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Weapons and International Law'. Cambridge: Intersentia, p. 79.
- 9 All 28 States that were EU Member States in 2013 are ATT States Parties. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland subsequently left the EU in 2020. Except for the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and the United States, all 41 States that were WA Participating States in 2013 are ATT States Parties. India subsequently joined the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017.
- 10 See the Wassenaar Arrangement website: https://www.wassenaar.org
- 11 All EU Member States are ATT States Parties. Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are WA Participating States and ATT States Parties. All EU Member States except Cyprus are WA Participating States. For additional information on the control lists see: Council of the European Union (2025). 'Outcome of Proceedings: Common Military List of the European Union' (equipment covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment) (updating and replacing the Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 19 February 2024). No. Doc. 5414/25. Brussels, 25 February 2025. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5414-2025-INIT/en/pdf; and Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat (2024). 'List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List'. Doc. WA-LIST (24) 1. Vienna, 5 December 2024. https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2024/12/List-of-Dual-Use-Goods-and-Technologies-and-ML-2024.pdf.

include extensive controls on parts and components that are 'specially designed for military use.'12 However, the option of using the EU Common Military List or the WA Munitions List as the basis for the scope of the ATT was resisted by negotiating States that were not WA Participating States or part of the EU.13

The text of Article 4 puts emphasis on the form of the export and the capability it may provide to assemble the arms categories listed in Article 2(1) without clarifying which parts and components are subject to control. This formulation leaves room for different interpretations of what falls under the scope of this provision. A narrow reading of Article 4 would imply that it only covers exports where 'all the parts and components necessary to assemble' a listed weapon are present 'in one consignment' or where these items 'are all listed or identified in a single licence application'. ¹⁴ Conversely, a broad reading of Article 4, which informs many ATT States Parties' interpretations of how to apply it at the national level, would imply that 'all important parts and components which are needed for the functions of the system as a whole should be covered', regardless of the form of the transfer.15

Regardless of whether one applies a narrow or broad reading, Article 4, by focusing on the capability of the exported items to assemble weapons listed in Article 2(1), does not encompass parts and components that are not used to assemble weapons but might be used for maintenance and repair. However, in line with Article 5(3), national interpretation of Article 4 can always go beyond what is prescribed by the Treaty. 17



- 12 See European Union (2025). 'EU Key Messages, Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Arms Trade Treaty. Geneva, 27 February 2025, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/statements-csp11WGmeets. Wood, A. (2021). 'Parts and Components'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Weapons and International Law'. Cambridge: Intersentia, p. 83. For additional information, see Council of the European Union (2025). 'Outcome of Proceedings: Common Military List of the European Union' (equipment covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment) (updating and replacing the Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 19 February 2024). No. Doc. 5414/25. Brussels, 25 February 2025. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5414-2025-INIT/en/pdf; and Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat (2024). 'List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List.' Doc. WA-LIST (24) 1. Vienna, 5 December 2024. https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2024/12/List-of-Dual-Use-Goods-and-Technologies-and-ML-2024.pdf.
- 13 Wood, A. (2021). 'Parts and Components'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Weapons and International Law'. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 77-78; Holtom, P. and Bromley, M. (2013). 'Arms trade treaty negotiations'. In SIPRI 'Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security'. Oxford University Press. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB13c10sl.pdf, pp. 428-429; Depauw, S. (2012), 'The European Union's Involvement in Negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty'. EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. Non-Proliferation Paper No. 23. December 2012. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-23.pdf, p. 12.
- 14 Casey-Maslen, S. et al. (2016). 'Parts and Components'. In Clapham A. et al. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 159.
- 15 German Federal Foreign Office (2014), 'Memorandum of the Federal Government on the Arms Trade Treaty'. 1 March 2014. p. 7.
- 16 Wood, A. (2021). 'Parts and Components'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Weapons and International Law'. Cambridge: Intersentia, p. 81.
- 17 See Casey-Maslen, S. et al. (2016). 'Parts and Components'. In Clapham A. et al. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 160, and Wood, A. (2021). 'Parts and Components'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Weapons and International Law'. Cambridge: Intersentia, p. 80.

HOW DO ATT STATES PARTIES IMPLEMENT CONTROLS ON TRANSFERS AND EXPORTS OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS?

States Parties' initial reports provide useful information on how they have implemented Article 4. As of February 2025, 70 ATT States Parties have submitted a publicly available initial report.¹⁸ Of these:

- Fifty-three States Parties indicated they have a national control list and their national control system covers parts and components. Thirty-five of these states are EU Member States, WA Participating States or both and are therefore required to use either the WA Munitions List or the EU Common Military List as the basis for their national control lists.¹⁹ Of the remaining 18 ATT States Parties that are neither EU Member States, nor WA Participating States:
 - Nine mentioned the EU Common Military List or the EU Council Common Position on arms exports which requires States to apply the EU Common Military List (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, Philippines and Serbia), the WA Munitions List (Liechtenstein) or both (the Republic of North Macedonia).
 - Nine did not mention the WA Munitions List nor the EU Common Military List (Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Monaco, Niger, Republic of Moldova, Samoa, Sierra Leone and Togo). Côte d'Ivoire and Togo reported being in the process of reviewing or developing their national controls.
- Four States Parties (Barbados, Palau, Paraguay and Uruguay) indicated they include parts and components in the coverage of their national controls but they did not have a control list or were in the process of developing one. This may be explained by the fact that in some of these states controls on parts and components are exercised through legislation on firearms ownership, SALW regulation or customs controls.

- Two States Parties (Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago) indicated they had a national control list but it did not yet cover parts and components or only applied to certain weapons (for example, SALW).
- Eleven States Parties (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, El Salvador, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Namibia, Panama, Peru, Suriname and Zambia) indicated they do not have a national control list and do not include parts and components in the coverage of their national controls.²⁰ Peru reported that it does not have a national control list, and did not respond if parts and components are included in its national controls. However, it noted that they were in the process of approving a national control list inclusive of parts and components as stipulated in Article 2(1).²¹

The available initial reports discussed above indicate that most States Parties that have adopted a national control list have included parts and components in its coverage. Some States Parties that have not reported adopting a national control list have regulated the transfer of certain parts and components covered by the ATT using other instruments. Many of the initial reports used for this overview were submitted nearly a decade ago, meaning some information may now be outdated, as additional States Parties have since adopted or implemented legislation to comply with Article 4 of the ATT.

HOW DO STATES PARTIES APPLY ARTICLES 6 AND 7 ON TRANSFERS AND EXPORTS OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS?

The question of whether States Parties apply Articles 6 and 7 to transfers of parts and components is more difficult to assess. Part of the reason is that the 53 States considered above—that is States that have reported having a national control list and that their national control system covers parts and components—have used multiple initial reporting templates (different versions of the ATT endorsed reporting template, their own templates or the ATT Baseline Assessment Project template) thus limiting comparability:

¹⁸ ATT Secretariat. (2025). 'Initial Reports', https://thearmstradetreaty.org/initial-reports.html?templateId=209839.209839. These States are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay and Zambia.

^{19 24} out of 27 EU Member States have informed in their public initial reports that they have a national control list which includes parts and components in its scope, and all of those 24 EU Member States are also WA Participating States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Cyprus, Greece and Malta have indicated their report is private. Cyprus is not a WA Participating State, while Greece and Malta are. The 11 non-EU Member States that are WA Participating States are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

²⁰ Mühlemann, L. and Nottage, S. (2025). 'Reference Table on States Parties' Initial Report Submissions: Informing Treaty Implementation Discussions'. Control Arms Secretariat. Geneva, February 2025. https://attmonitor.org/en/factsheets/.

²¹ Peru (2016). Initial Report. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/ba34e1ag-4bee-3f3b-a5d3-920c86f7db33.

- Forty-four States Parties indicated they prohibit the authorization of transfer of items covered by Article 4 in the circumstances indicated in Article 6.²²
- Forty-one States Parties reported national export controls also apply to items covered by Article 4.²³ All of these States except one (Samoa) have also reported their national control systems include export assessment criteria and a risk assessment procedure as per Article 7.²⁴ Some States Parties have also clarified in their initial reports that they require a licence for all transfers, or certain types of transfers, of all items included in their control lists (for example, Albania, Austria, Italy, Latvia, among others).

The numbers above do not include States, including major arms exporters, that have not used the ATT endorsed reporting template but which have nonetheless adopted relevant measures.²⁵ For instance, France reported applying export and transfer controls on war materiel, that is 'any system, sub-assembly, equipment, or component specifically designed or modified for military use', including 'sub-assemblies and spare parts for these war materials'. France also reported that

transfers of war materiel are assessed, among others, against its obligations under international law and the EU Common Position on arms exports.²⁶ The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) reported including parts and components in its control list. Licence applications for the export of items in the UK strategic export control list are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the UK strategic export licensing criteria.²⁷

The current ATT Initial Reporting Template, introduced in 2021, reformulated questions on transfer controls and it now asks whether States have measures in place to prevent the import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering of items covered by Article 4 in violation of Article 6.28 Of the 53 States mentioned above, four (Brazil, Niger, the Philippines and Romania) have answered positively to these questions. This information would provide a better understanding of whether States apply controls on transfers of parts and components beyond exports, and whether the application of Article 6 extends to all or some of these transfers. However, only a handful of States have either updated their initial report or used the current template.

- 22 Question 2.A of the 2021 and 2015 ATT Initial Reporting Templates. See ATT Secretariat (2021). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Reporting Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)'. 16 July 2021. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English.pdf?templateld=1577159 and ATT Secretariat (2015). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Provisional Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)', 27 August 2015. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/acgbb66f-ae48-3be2-b692-d14b2ba43619. These States are: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Togo.
- 23 Question 3.C of the 2021 ATT Initial Reporting Template. See ATT Secretariat (2021). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Reporting Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)'. 16 July 2021. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English.pdf?templateld=1577159; and Question 3.B of the 2015 ATT Initial Reporting Template. See ATT Secretariat (2015). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Provisional Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)', 27 August 2015. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/acgbb66f-ae48-3be2-b692-d14b2ba43619. These States are: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Togo.
- 24 Question 3.A (iii) and 3.A (iii) of the 2021 ATT Initial Reporting Template. See ATT Secretariat (2021). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Reporting Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)'. 16 July 2021. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English.pdf?templateld=1577159; and Question 3.A (iii) and 3.A (iv) of the 2015 ATT Initial Reporting Template (See ATT Secretariat (2015). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Provisional Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)'. 27 August 2015. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/acgbb66f-ae48-3bez-b692-d14b2ba43619.
- 25 States Parties that have used own initial reporting templates or the ATT Baseline Assessment Project template are Australia, France, Japan, Monaco, Montenegro, Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia, South Africa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 26 See France's ATT Initial Report, pp.6 and 9-12. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/4a5af1d9-15cc-3dco-998a-bd1b0a4b3133 [translation from French original text].
- 27 See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ATT Initial Report: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/8b6fb808-d6ba-324f-b3e1-d7e9d14b1c5a; 'Trade Policy Update. Statement made on 8 December 2021. UK Parliament. 8 December 2021. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-12-08/HCWS449.
- 28 Questions 4.A, 5.A, 5.B and 6.A of the 2021 ATT Initial Reporting Template. See ATT Secretariat (2021). 'The Arms Trade Treaty Reporting Template. Initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in accordance with Article 13(1)'. 16 July 2021. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English/Initial_Reporting_Template_2021_English. pdf?templateId=1577159.

Case Study 1: Integration and Re-Export of Parts and Components

The joint development, production and procurement of military equipment is emphasized in many States' national defence strategies as a means of achieving economies of scale and enabling joint operations with allied States. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has established several programmes aimed at enabling the joint development, production and procurement of military equipment.²⁹ The EU has also launched a series of policy initiatives and, more recently, established or repurposed several funding mechanisms to enable the joint development, production and procurement of military equipment by its Member States.³⁰

To support these efforts, NATO and EU Member States and other States have either created new measures, or utilized existing ones, to enable simplified export licensing procedures for transfers of parts and components associated with collaborative defence production efforts. The underlying logic is that processes of collaborative defence production require multiple cross-border movements of parts and components and subjecting all these transfers to individual export licensing procedures creates unnecessary impediments. At the national level, many States issue 'open' or 'general' licences that facilitate multiple shipments over an extended period. These licences can be used for a range of conventional arms transfers but are often employed to facilitate transfers of parts and components. In 2009, the EU adopted Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products.³¹

The Directive encourages EU Member States to use general licences to regulate certain transfers of military equipment to other EU Member States, including transfers of parts and components to defence companies 'in the context of industrial cooperation.'32 In 2024, the UK government issued 'Open General Licence (Global Combat Air Programme)' to facilitate exports of military and dual-use items connected the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) that is being jointly developed by Italy, Japan and the UK.33

EU Member States have also outlined policies to inform situations where decisions about exports of any complete military system are taken by the State where the final integration takes place. The goal is to prevent disagreements between States over whether exports of complete military systems can take place, since these could hamper defence cooperation efforts. These policies emphasize the need to apply export licensing risk assessment criteria to all transfers. However, they also indicate that in certain cases EU Member States may hand over responsibility for deciding on exports of complete systems to the State where the final integration takes place and that this might lead to different policy outcomes than would occur if they retained control. The User's Guide that accompanies the EU Council Common Position³⁴ states that in situations of integration and re-export, EU Member States 'shall fully apply the Common Position' which includes a commitment to apply the Arms Trade Treaty and other 'international obligations and commitments of Member States: 35 However, the User's Guide also notes that States may also consider a range of other factors, including 'the importance of their defence and security relationship' with the country where the integration is taking place.36

²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2024). 'NATO's role in defense industry production'. 15 July 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/topics_222589.htm.

³⁰ European Commission. (n.d). 'Stronger European defence'. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/stronger-european-defence_en.

³¹ European Union. (2012). 'Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Union and the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (Text with EEA relevance)'. 13 April 2012. EUR-Lex. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CONSLEG:2009L0043:20120413.

³² European Commission. (n.d). 'EU transfers of defence-related products'. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-transfers-defence-related-products_en.

³³ United Kingdom Government. (2024). 'Open General Licence (Global Combat Air Programme)'. Department for Business & Trade. 14 August 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-general-licence-global-combat-air-programme.

³⁴ Council of the European Union. (2008). 'Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment'. Official Journal of the European Union. L 335/99. 13 December 2008. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri-CELEX%3A02008E0944-20250415. The Common Position was amended in April 2025. See Council of the European Union 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/779 of 14 April 2025 amending Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment', 14 April 2025 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/779/oj/eng.

³⁵ Council of the European Union. (2025). 'User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/779) defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment'. No. Doc. 6881/25. Brussels, 14 April 2025. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6881-2025-INIT/en/pdf, p. 10 and p. 17.

States that are participating in large scale collaborative defence production projects have also created procedures that combine elements of both the approaches outlined above. The 'Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program' was established in 2001, and involves the production of parts and components 'by a consortium of eight F-35 partner nations (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the United States):³⁷ Transfers of parts and components associated with the programme are managed through general licences and final decisions concerning the approval of any exports of complete F-35 combat aircrafts are taken by the United States, where the final assembly of most of the aircraft takes place.³⁸

States have also established agreements that are designed to apply across multiple collaborative projects. For example, the 'Agreement relating to export controls in defence matters', which was signed by France and Germany in 2019, and which Spain joined in 2021, outlines agreed rules and procedures for controls on exports of military equipment that are connected to joint production projects.³⁹ Parties to the Agreement commit to regulating exports of parts and components associated with joint production projects using simplified licensing procedures and to not oppose exports of jointly produced military equipment 'unless the transfer or export contravenes the state party's direct interests or national security.'40

These procedures and agreements have generated questions about if and how States are applying Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT on transfers of parts and components. In its January 2025 report on the 'Impact of arms transfers on human rights' the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that the use of open licences that remain valid for

several years 'could result in a situation in which the licence remains valid even when a change of circumstances would mean that exports under the licence would be unlawful under international law.'41 It also noted that arrangements in which decisions about exports of any complete system are handed over to the State where the final integration is taking place can create 'a principle of least restrictive export standards, limiting the ability of States contributing to the production of the weapon from challenging the export of the final product.'42

The specific case of the joint production of F-35 combat aircraft is currently or has been the focus of legal proceedings in both the Netherlands and the UK. The Dutch case initially focused on the role of the Woensdrecht Air Base as a distribution point for the F-35 Global Spares Pool but was later expanded to include the supply of parts and components for integration and re-export.⁴³ In both cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that the governments' failure to halt exports of parts and components that are being integrated into F-35 combat aircrafts that the United States is supplying to Israel, constitute a breach of both national export licensing criteria and ATT obligations. 44 According to independent sources, F-35 combat aircrafts have been used in airstrikes conducted by the Israeli armed forces in Gaza. 45 Both governments contested these claims. Among other things, the UK government has argued that it is 'not currently possible to suspend licensing of F-35 components for use by Israel without prejudicing the entire global F-35 programme¹⁴⁶ In June 2025 the High Court ruled that the UK government's decision to allow the export of F-35 components for use by Israel was lawful. The court substantially accepted the government's argument that a 'positive contribution to wider peace and security had to be balanced against a clear risk of the arms being used to commit

³⁷ Gallagher, K. (2025). 'Global Production of the Israeli F-35I Joint Strike Fighter'. Ploughshares. 30 January 2025. https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Global-Production-of-the-Israeli-F-35I-Joint-Strike-Fighter-Project-Ploughshares.pdf, p. 13.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

³⁹ France. (2021). 'Décret n° 2022-1103 du 1er août 2022 portant publication de l'accord relatif au contrôle des exportations en matière de défense (ensemble trois annexes), signé à Paris le 17 septembre 2021 (1) [Decree n° 2022-1103 of 1 August 2022 publishing the agreement relating to export control in defence matters (three annexes together), signed in Paris on 17 September 2021]. 17 September 2021. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000046131452 [translation from French original text].

⁴⁰ Ibid. [translation from French original text].

⁴¹ UN Human Rights Council. (2025). 'Impact of arms transfers on human rights. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'. 9 January 2025. A/HRC/58/41. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/41, p. 9.

⁴² Ibid., p. 8

⁴³ See Arms Trade Litigation Monitor. (n.d.), 'Dutch Arms and Palestine'. https://armstradelitigationmonitor.org/overview/dutch-arms-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territories/.

⁴⁴ See PAX. (2024). 'Rechtszaak tegen Nederlandse staat: stop levering voor F-35's [Lawsuit against Dutch state: stop delivery of F-35s]'. 29 November 2024. https://paxvoorvrede.nl/acties/rechtszaak-tegen-nederlandse-staat-stop-levering-voor-f-35s/; and Global Legal Action Network. (n.d). 'UK Weapons Sales to Israel'. https://www.glanlaw.org/israel-weapons-sales.

⁴⁵ Gjerding, S. and Andersen, L. S. (2024). 'Danskudstyrede kampfly deltog i angreb i Gaza med store civile tab [Danish-equipped fighter jets participated in attacks in Gaza with heavy civilian casualties]'. Information. 1 September 2024. https://www.information.dk/indland/2024/09/danskudstyrede-kampfly-deltog-angreb-gaza-store-civile-tab?check_logged_in=1&kupon=eyJpYXQiOjE3MjUyNTUwMjEsInN1YiI6IjQ3Mjg3Njo4MjM1NzYifQ.7k2QM_MAdcaUS-pePhgxtQ.

^{46 &#}x27;Statement from the Secretary of State for Business and Trade'. UK Parliament. 2 September 2024. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2024-09-02/hcws64.

serious violations of IHL/IHRL [international humanitarian law/international human rights law]'.47 Among other things, the Netherlands' government has argued that the issue concerns matters of foreign policy and it falls within the responsibility of the government to make final decisions in these areas.48 The legal proceeding in the Netherlands is ongoing at the time of writing. The authorization of licences for exports of F-35 components by Australia, Canada, Italy, and Norway has also been criticized by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and, in the case of Denmark, also been the subject of legal proceedings.49

Case Study 2: Civilian Parts and Components in Military Equipment

A key challenge that many States are confronting is the use of parts and components that have been produced by companies in the civilian sector for commercial use in the production of military equipment. These include items that are not considered 'parts and components' of military equipment nor dual-use items and are therefore not captured by national export controls. This trend has been exemplified in the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, where parts and components produced by companies in the civilian sector have been integrated in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles produced by the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea and which have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

A series of investigations during 2022 revealed that military equipment the Russian Federation was using in Ukraine included large numbers of parts and components manufactured abroad, including in States that had imposed or expanded their trade-related sanctions measures on the Russian Federation in 2014. An investigation by Conflict Armament Research in 2022 identified over 650 'unique component models', produced by 144 non-Russian manufacturers, in Russian military equipment deployed in Ukraine.⁵⁰ Examples included circuit boards, used in the satellite navigation systems and on-board computers of cruise missiles and attack helicopters. These manufacturers included 'Asian, European and US companies'.⁵¹

The Russian Federation has been using Iranian-made military equipment in Ukraine since 2022 and North Korean-made military equipment since 2023.⁵² Reports indicate that these weapon systems have also utilized parts and components produced by companies in the civilian sector. Iran is the subject of restrictions on exports of arms and dual-use goods imposed by the United States, the EU and other western states, while North Korea has been the subject of a UN arms embargo since 2006.53 However, research by the Institute for Science and International Security has indicated that Iranian-made drones used by the Russian Federation in Ukraine contain parts and components produced in States that restrict exports of arms and dual-use goods to Iran.54 Similarly, Conflict Armament Research documentation of a North Korean-produced ballistic missile used by the Russian Federation in Ukraine identified 'more than 290 components, comprising 50 unique models' as well as 26 companies headquartered outside North Korea, 'that are linked to the production of these components'.55

- 47 Wintour, P. (2024). 'UK's sale of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel is lawful, high court rules'. The Guardian. 30 June 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jun/30/uk-sale-f-35-fighter-jet-parts-israel-lawful-high-court.
- 48 Government of the Netherlands. (2024). 'State lodges appeal in cassation against judgment on distribution of F-35 parts to Israel'. 12 February 2024. https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2024/02/12/state-lodges-appeal-in-cassation-against-judgment-on-distribution-of-f-35-parts-to-israel.
- 49 See Campaign Against Arms Trade. (2025). 'Over 230 Global Organisations Demand Governments Producing F-35 Jets Stop Arming Israel, 18 Feb. 2025. https://caat.org.uk/news/over-230-global-organisations-demand-governments-producing-f-35-jets-stop-arming-israel/ and Amnesty International. (2025). 'Organisations will appeal court ruling denying admissibility of lawsuit on exporting weapons to Israel in Denmark', 14 Apr. 2025, https://www.amnesty.org.au/organisations-will-appeal-court-ruling-denying-admissibility-of-lawsuit-on-exporting-weapons-to-israel-in-denmark/.
- 50 Conflict Armament Research. (2022). 'Component commonalities in advanced Russian weapon systems'. Ukraine Field Dispatch. September 2022. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/239f756e2e6b49a5bec78f5c5248bf3d.
- 51 Ibio
- 52 See Albright, D., et al. (2022). 'Iranian Drones in Ukraine Contain Western Brand Components'. Institute for Science and International Security. 31 October 2022. https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iranian_Drones_Contain_Western_Brand_Components_FINAL_2022.pdf; and Conflict Armament Research. (2024). 'North Korean missile relies on recent electronic components'. Ukraine Field Dispatch. February 2024. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/0814c6868bbd45a98b15693a31bd0e7f.
- 53 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2024). 'UN arms embargo on Iran'. Last updated 25 March 2024. https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iran; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2016). 'UN arms embargo on North Korea'. Last updated on 7 March 2016. https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/north_korea.
- 54 Albright, D., et al. (2022). 'Iranian Drones in Ukraine Contain Western Brand Components'. Institute for Science and International Security. 31 October 2022. https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iranian_Drones_Contain_Western_Brand_Components_FINAL_2022.pdf.
- 55 Conflict Armament Research (2024). 'North Korean missile relies on recent electronic components'. Ukraine Field Dispatch. February 2024. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/0814c6868bbd45ag8b15693a31bd0e7f.

In response, States in Europe, North America and other parts of the world have sought to prevent arms manufacturers in the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea from acquiring parts and components manufactured by companies based on their territories. Thirty-eight States and one non-UN Member have joined the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC) and agreed to apply stringent controls on exports of arms and dual-use items to the Russian Federation and Belarus. ⁵⁶ To support these efforts, the United States, EU, Japan, and the UK have developed the Common High Priority List (CHPL), consisting of '50 items identified by six-digit Harmonized System (HS) Codes that Russia seeks to procure for its weapons programs: ⁵⁷

Efforts by GECC members to regulate exports of these items and prevent them from reaching the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea have faced substantial obstacles. Many of the items that GECC members are seeking to regulate and that are included in the CHPL are not included in the control lists established by the multilateral export control regimes and were therefore not subject to national export control measures prior to 2022.⁵⁸ After 2022 these items could continue to be exported to destinations that are not part of the GECC without prior approval. As a result, trading companies and distributors based in States that are not part of the GECC have been able to acquire these items from companies based in GECC members and ship them to the Russian Federation without violating domestic laws and regulations. This has reportedly been the case for

trading companies and distributors in States outside the GECC, including Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.⁵⁹

GECC members have sought to improve the effectiveness of their controls and close these loopholes by imposing restrictions on transfers of items to companies accused of knowingly acting as points of transit of transfers of controlled items to the Russian Federation. They have also tried to encourage companies operating in relevant sectors to adopt due diligence and know-your-customer procedures that would enable them to identify, investigate and address cases where intermediaries might re-export or have reexported parts and components to the Russian Federation.60 Within the EU, these recommendations have been supported by the imposition of legal obligations. Since June 2024 EU sanctions measures require EU-based exporters of high-risk items to adopt 'due diligence mechanisms' to detect and prevent cases of re-exportation to the Russian Federation.⁶¹ EU-based companies are also required to undertake 'their best efforts' to ensure that their subsidiaries based outside the EU 'do not take part in any activities resulting in an outcome that the sanctions seek to prevent.162

Despite these efforts, Ukraine has continued to find components manufactured by companies headquartered in GECC members in military equipment used by the Russian Federation. ⁶³ This has included parts and components integrated into Russia's 'Oreshnik' missile, which was first used against Ukraine in November 2024. ⁶⁴

⁵⁶ Among the 39 members that have joined the GECC, 37 are ATT States Parties: 'Australia, Canada, the 27 Member States of the European Union, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland [... and] the United Kingdom'. The remaining two members are the United States (ATT Signatory State, but no longer intends to become a party) and Taiwan (non-UN member). See: European Commission (2024). 'Preventing Russian export control and sanctions evasion: Updated guidance for industry'. Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ae2e63e2-4c4d-4f77-9757-c408ddbcede1_en?filename=240924-preventing-russian-export-control-sanctions-evasion%20.pdf.

⁵⁷ US Department of Commerce. (2024). 'Common High Priority List'. Bureau of Industry and Security. 23 February 2024. https://www.bis.gov/licensing/country-guidance/common-high-priority-items-list-chpl.

⁵⁸ See Sidley Austin LLP. (2023). 'One Year of Russia Restrictions: Six Key Trends and Lessons for Trade Compliance'. Sidley Updates: Global Arbitration, Trade and Advocacy. 22 Feb. 2023. https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2023/02/one-year-of-russia-restrictions-six-key-trends-and-lessons-for-trade-compliance.

⁵⁹ Mackinnon, A. (2024). 'Russia's War Machine Runs on Western Parts'. Foreign Policy. 22 February 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/22/russia-sanctions-weapons-ukraine-war-military-semiconductors/

⁶⁰ US Department of Commerce, et al. (2023). Exporting Commercial Goods: Guidance for Industry and Academia. Bureau of Industry and Security. 26 September 2023. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/enforcement/3336-2023-09-26-export-enforcement-five-guidance-for-industry-and-academia-priority-hs-codes/file.

⁶¹ Council of the European Union. (2024). 'Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures'. 24 June 2024. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ See War Sanctions. (n.d). 'Components in the Aggressor's Weapons'. https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/components.

⁶⁴ Cook, C. (2024). 'Russian producers of Oreshnik supermissile used western tools'. Financial Times. 27 December 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/ggobbc2f-6b6f-49go-bo22-3bf4cdogo686.

The attempt to persuade or require companies in the civilian sector to ensure that the items they are exporting are not repurposed for integration into controlled weapon systems, comes at a time when CSOs and some States have been trying to ensure that companies in the defence sector are more pro-active in adopting human rights due diligence measures. The overarching framework for these efforts is the 2011 UN 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' which asserts that businesses should have in place a 'human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights'

These efforts have led to discussions of these issues at both the ATT and the UN in 2023 and 2024.66 The cases of Iran, North Korea and the Russian Federation indicate there might be scope to expand these discussions by focusing on, and conducting outreach towards, exporting companies that do not view themselves as being part of the defence sector. This includes companies who are not exporting items that are captured by arms and dual-use export control, but whose exported items risk being repurposed as tools of armed conflict or as their parts and components. This could involve an examination of the potential to expand arms export control measures to certain transfers of parts and components manufactured in the civilian sector through the use of 'catch-all' controls and the adoption of due-diligence measures by the companies themselves.



⁶⁵ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. (2011). 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights'. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf, p. 16.

⁶⁶ See ATT Secretariat (2023). 'Ninth Conference of States Parties Final Report'. 25 August 2023. ATT/CSPg/2023/SEC/773/Conf.FinRep.Rev2. https://bit.ly/3RCiqYi; and UN Human Rights Council (2025). 'Impact of arms transfers on human rights. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'. 9 January 2025. A/HRC/58/41. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/41.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The topic of controls on parts and components has occasionally been addressed within ATT subsidiary bodies. For instance, exchanges within the ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) have supported the development of the section on national control lists in the 'ATT Voluntary Basic Guide to Establishing a National Control System' that was presented during the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP5) in August 2019.⁶⁷

The recent establishment of the WGETI sub-working group on 'Exchange of National Implementation Practices' provided an opportunity to conduct further exchanges. According to its workplan, the group addressed the topic of 'Scope / National control list' during the working group's meeting of the CSP11 preparatory process in February 2025.68 Guiding questions that accompanied this discussion included, among others, whether States Parties have included parts and components in their national control list and if these lists apply to all types of transfers.⁶⁹ The session featured experts' and States' presentations followed by an open discussion where some States shared their national practices on control lists and related challenges.⁷⁰ Relevant issues were also discussed in the meeting of the WGETI sub-working group on 'Current and Emerging Implementation Issues' during a session focusing on 'the role of industry in responsible international arms transfers'. In this context, private sector representatives noted the challenges faced by companies that 'do not produce end-use military products but rather parts and components for integration into larger systems' in terms of upholding due diligence requirements.71

However, there has been no systematic review of which parts and components States include in their national control lists and, more generally, how they have implemented Article 4. Such a review and relevant ATT discussions should also include and be linked to national implementation practices on risk assessments, since the linkages between Articles 6 and 7, and Article 4, were not systematically addressed as part of the process that led to the development of the ATT Voluntary Basic Guide on the implementation of Articles 6 and 7.72

The increased geo-political instability is leading States to raise military spending and engage more actively in joint defence production efforts. As a Treaty whose object is to 'establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms', the ATT can help globalize responsible standards in arms export controls and create assurances that all States Parties that are collaborating on a joint defence production project abide by similar standards when making decisions about exports of complete systems. The ATT could also provide a space for discussions between and among arms export, import and transit States about how to address the challenges generated by the growing use of parts and components produced in the civilian sector in the production of military equipment. In this context States Parties can compare national practices in the use of hard and soft law instruments to address these concerns and engage with companies on how to manage the regulatory challenges generated.

⁶⁷ See ATT Secretariat. (2019). 'Voluntary Basic Guide to Establish a National Control System'. Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). 26 July 2019. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP5_WGETI%20Voluntary%20Basic%20Guide%20(Annex%20A%20to%20 WGETI%20Report%20to%20CSP5)(updated%2009.09.2019)(Rev%20WA)/ATT_CSP5_WGETI%20Voluntary%20Basic%20Guide%20(Annex%20A%20to%20 WGETI%20Report%20to%20CSP5)(updated%2009.09.2019)(Rev%20WA).pdf and Holtom, P. (2021). 'Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Scope', SIPRI. August 2021. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/att_first_six_1_scope_holtom.pdf, p. 3.

⁶⁸ ATT Secretariat. (2025). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation Chair's report to CSP11'. Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). 2 May 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/811/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN.pdf, pp. 3-4.

⁶g See ATT Secretariat. (2024). 'Multi-year Work Plan for the WGETI Sub-Working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices'. Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). 1g July 2024. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_WGETI_Multi-year%20workplan%20(and%20questions)%20for%20structured%20discussions_EN/ATT_CSP10_WGETI_Multi-year%20workplan%20(and%20questions)%20for%20structured%20discussions_EN.pdf.

⁷⁰ ATT Secretariat. (2025). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation Chair's report to CSP11'. Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). 2 May 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/811/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN.pdf, pp. 3-4.

⁷¹ lbid., p. 6

⁷² Ibid. See ATT Secretariat. (2021). 'Annex A. Multi-year Work Plan for the WGETI Sub-Working Group on Articles 6&7 (Prohibitions & Export and Export Assessment)'. Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). 19 February 2021. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Annex%20A%20-%20Draft%20WGETI%20Multi-year%20Workplan%20for%20Articles%206%20and%207%20(19%20Feb%202021_cl)/Annex%20A%20-%20Draft%20WGETI%20Multi-year%20Workplan%20for%20Articles%206%20and%207%20(19%20Feb%202021_cl).pdf.

The following recommendations are proposed:

- ATT States Parties should submit, review and, where applicable, update their initial reports and use the latest version of the ATT initial reporting template. Updated initial reports could complement information shared during discussions on scope and national control lists in the WGETI, including on how States have interpreted and applied Article 4. Once this information is collected, the ATT Secretariat could conduct a more detailed analysis of how States Parties are interpreting and applying Article 4 in their national controls.
- ATT States Parties should carry out a review of the interpretation and scope of Article 4, either alone or as part of a wider review of the ATT's scope. This has been to some extent initiated by discussions on 'Scope / National control list' within the WGETI sub-working group on 'Exchange of National Implementation Practices'. These discussions could be followed up by a process of review of States Parties' national control lists to determine common approaches and gaps, identify assistance needs and develop more detailed guidance in relation to the adoption of national control lists that allow for effective coverage of parts and components. They should also be linked to discussions on 'The role of industry in responsible international arms transfers' conducted within the WGETI sub-working group on 'Current and Emerging Implementation Issues'. Specifically, CSP11 should adopt the WGETI recommendation that this sub-working group 'consider challenges related to the scope of the Treaty (categories of conventional arms) and the establishment and maintenance of a national control list, including the handling of parts and components.73 All these discussions should ideally be supported by expert inputs from research centres, CSOs and other relevant stakeholders.
- Exchange information on the application of Articles 6 and 7 to exports of parts and components. States should conduct an exchange of information, either through the WGETI or another forum, to outline how they apply Articles 6 and 7 in situations where they are

- exporting parts and components for integration into jointly produced military equipment. These exchanges should focus on cases where States either (i) issue general licences that might remain valid for multiple years, or (ii) hand over responsibility for decisions about exports of resulting complete military items to the State where the final integration takes place, particularly in cases when this State is not an ATT State Party.
- Encourage ATT States Parties to think as broadly as possible when reporting on ATT implementation measures. In addition to arms export controls, ATT States Parties should also share information on other hard and soft law measures, such as sanctions measures, catch-all controls, and due diligence requirements, they are using to control transfers of 'the broadest range of conventional arms'⁷⁴ and their related parts and components and to ensure that they are not used in ways that violate ATT provisions. States could also consider using the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) to share confidential information on cases where clandestine attempts to acquire items produced in the civilian sector for integration into military equipment have been detected and prevented.
- Advance the ATT as a forum to discuss and review efforts to prevent the diversion of civilian parts and components to military end-uses and end-users. Companies and other entities that are outside the defence sector are increasingly required to apply export controls, sanctions measures, and soft law obligations, such as due diligence obligations, to prevent the diversion of the items they are exporting to the production of military equipment. The ATT could be a space for companies and other entities to share the challenges they face in applying these obligations, engage in dialogue about the practices adopted to address them, and identify areas where additional guidance and capacitybuilding are needed. These exchanges could form the basis for a dialogue among ATT States Parties about how to ensure that items produced in the civilian sector are not utilized in the production of military equipment.

⁷³ ATT Secretariat. (2025). 'ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation Chair's report to CSP11'. Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI). 2 May 2025. ATT/CSP11.WGETI/2025/CHAIR/811/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN.pdf, p. 10.

⁷⁴ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5 (3) (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

THE IMPACT OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS DIVERSION ON THE FIREARMS⁷⁵ ILLEGAL MARKET

In several regions there is a growing trend of using diverted industrially produced parts and components to assemble privately made firearms.⁷⁶ This presents new challenges for law enforcement, for violence prevention and for implementation of the ATT, given the risk that diversion of parts and components could contribute to arming organized crime and terrorist groups. Understanding this scenario requires new resources and capacity building to investigate diverted parts and components' origins and traffickers' modus operandi.

Diversion of parts and components of firearms can be more difficult to detect since those elements are more easily concealed. Parts and components have been found in containers, vehicles and even in conventional posts and parcels, requiring additional investments to conduct detailed searches or implement wider use of scanners at border controls. The use of industrially produced parts and components to assemble firearms allows for the manufacturing of more efficient firearms in comparison with fully crafted ones, increasing their potential damage. This evolution includes high-quality counterfeit assault rifles and submachine guns that can be initially misidentified as

original. It also increases the importance of forensics labs, requiring disassembling those firearms and deeper analysis on counterfeit markings, on polymers and ink types and assembling techniques to sort those firearms and their parts and components' origins. Complete investigations become more complex, requiring mapping a new ecosystem of stakeholders and adapted frameworks to collect new information. Fighting this new threat can also demand adaptations in domestic legislative frameworks to close loopholes and provide stepping stones for investigation, for export and import controls and for international cooperation.

It is important to consider updated information on privately made firearms using diverted parts and components in the ATT framework. As a rising issue, it can especially benefit from an exchange of good practices on how States regulate the production, export and transfer of industrial parts and components, and from exchange of information on trafficking routes, typologies and techniques. Those can be encouraged in the ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), in the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF), as well as in side events and working papers. To avoid duplicating efforts, it is also advised to consult the knowledge production around the UN PoA, the Firearms Protocol and other related international instruments.

⁷⁵ The ATT scope includes small arms and light weapons (SALW). There is an overlap between the types of weapons that are included in the definition of 'firearms' and some sub-categories of SALW, particularly small arms. See Florquin, N., et. al. (2019). 'Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa'. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. January 2019. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-AU-Weapons-Compass.pdf, p. 23. Parts and components of firearms are subject to global and regional instruments, such as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol).

⁷⁶ The phenomenon importance was recognized in the Fourth UN Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects outcome document. See, United Nations General Assembly. (2024). 'Report of the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects'. A/CONF.192/2024/RC/3. 5 July 2024: https://docs.un.org/en/A/CONF.192/2024/RC/3. Examples from several regions, details on typology and on practical consequences are available at: Small Arms Survey, et al. (2024). 'The growing and multifaceted global threat of privately made and other non-industrial small arms and light weapons'. Working paper submitted at the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Tracing Instrument. New York, 17–28 June 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Programme_of_Action_on_Small_Arms_and_Light_Weapons_-Review_Conference_(2024)/SAS_ISdP_UNIDIR_WorkingPaper_PrivatelyMadeSALWvf.pdf.



CHAPTER 2 – ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 2023 ANNUAL REPORTS ANALYSIS¹

Transparency in arms transfers is a central component of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and fundamental to achieving its object and purpose.² Accurate, comprehensive and timely reporting allows confidence building, cooperation and concrete analysis of the Treaty implementation, and is an indication of a government's commitment to monitoring, oversight and accountability.

Article 13.3 of the ATT includes clear obligations for all States Parties to submit an annual report on their authorized or actual arms exports and imports by 31 May each year.³ The annual reports are crucial in enabling States Parties and other ATT stakeholders to examine whether Treaty commitments have been fulfilled. Timely and transparent reporting of all arms exports and imports is not just a formal requirement of the ATT – it is the foundation for building trust, accountability and cooperation among States Parties. When countries report accurately and openly, they contribute to global security and demonstrate their commitment to responsible arms trade. Conversely, delays, omissions or vague reports

weaken the Treaty's credibility and make it harder to assess whether obligations are truly being met. Submitting detailed, disaggregated and public reports enables meaningful oversight and helps identify risks or patterns in arms transfers. This is why compliance with Article 13.3 is a practical necessity for the ATT to work effectively.

The analysis of 2023 annual reports presented in this chapter examines compliance with Article 13.3 reporting obligations and an analysis of the States that have meaningful and higher standards in terms of transparency and detailing of their reports. The methodology by which each category is assessed is explained below.

The analysis of 2023 annual reports reveals a persistent struggle to achieve accurate, comprehensive and transparent reporting. In particular, the percentage of due annual reports submitted and the proportion of meaningfully transparent reports declined and progress on these two indicators remains insufficient.

KEY FINDINGS

- Only 69 States Parties (62 per cent) required to submit a 2023 annual report did so. This is the lowest reporting rate since the process began in 2015. Among these, 49 States Parties (44 per cent) submitted their reports on time. While the overall submission rate declined, the proportion of on-time submissions rose compared to 2022, returning to levels seen in 2020–2021.
- Sixteen States Parties (23 per cent of the submitted reports) submitted a confidential annual report for 2023.
 The number and proportion of confidential reports steadily increased from three (5 per cent) in 2015 to a peak of 24 (33 per cent) in 2020. This trend began to reverse as of 2021. The number and percentage of confidential reports for 2023 is the lowest level in the last five years.
- Only 27 States Parties (24 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2023 submitted one that was meaningfully transparent. This proportion is the lowest recorded since the Treaty's entry into force.
- Thirty-eight States Parties (34 per cent) provided descriptions of some or all transfers, while 27 of the reports contained comments covering some or all transfers.
- Fourteen States Parties (12.5 per cent) required to submit an annual report for 2023 complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information that supports a higher standard of transparency.
- 1 This chapter provides an analysis of 2023 annual reports. For a country-by-country assessment of the 2023 annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat, see the Country Profiles in Annex.
- 2 One of the purposes of the ATT is to 'promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'. Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
- 3 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 and Article 13.1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate. amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf. Additionally, Article 13.1 of the Treaty asks each State Party to provide within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty an initial report to the Secretariat of measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures'.

METHODOLOGY

Annual reports were downloaded from the ATT Secretariat website for analysis on 1 February 2025. Reports later amended or submitted by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. Each year the ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the deadline for annual reports to be included in this chapter to ensure adequate time for an in-depth analysis as well as the possibility to compare findings and trends across years.

This chapter examines annual reporting trends which indicate whether States Parties reporting practices are becoming more or less transparent. It examines ATT annual reporting on three levels to evaluate whether (and to what degree) the reporting obligations and transparency objectives of the ATT have been fulfilled. ATT Monitor analysis considers whether annual reports:

- Are compliant with Article 13.3 reporting obligations.
- Are meaningfully transparent, contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty.
- Contribute to a higher standard of transparency.

For each level, the ATT Monitor established specific criteria upon which annual reports are evaluated. These criteria are provided below.

Distinct evaluation exercises were undertaken for each level of reporting to distinguish between (1) Treaty obligations (Article 13.3 reporting requirements), (2) the minimum amount of information the ATT Monitor has determined is needed for annual reports to be meaningfully transparent and to fulfil the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty (for example, public reporting) and (3) additional information that, when provided, contributes to a higher standard of transparency (for example, comments on the nature of reported transfers). The analysis of each category separately allows the examination of different levels of commitment to transparency.

Using all these criteria in one exercise to evaluate annual reports would not have produced a clear and understandable analysis regarding transparency. For example, even though an annual report submitted after the reporting deadline does not meet Article 13.3 obligations, it may still contain information that is meaningfully transparent.

The submission of 'nil' reports for exports and/or imports may also fulfil Article 13.3 reporting obligations and the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Even without transfer data and descriptions, the affirmative act of reporting

'nil'—indicating there were no imports or exports in the year—still provides a transparent view of States Parties transfer activities. By providing such a window, those that submit 'nil' reports may still have an equivalent commitment to transparency.

The analysis considers annual reports for all years, including those submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, the numbers presented in this report concerning annual reports covering the years 2015 to 2022 differ slightly from those presented in previous ATT Monitor Reports. The analysis only evaluates information provided by States Parties in annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat. It does not seek to determine whether all transfers are reported or to independently verify the accuracy of that information. As such, this analysis is not a general measure of transparency for all arms transfers.

STATES PARTIES' COMPLIANCE WITH ATT ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Article 13.3 of the Treaty requires that States Parties submit an annual report on their arms exports and imports for the previous calendar year by 31 May of each year. The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to be compliant with these requirements if:

- It is submitted to the ATT Secretariat.
- It is submitted on time (within one week of the 31 May deadline).⁴
- Includes both exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or relevant 'nil' reports indicating that no arms were transferred.

ARTICLE 13.3

Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.


In total, 112 States Parties were required to submit an annual report on their exports and imports for 2023 by 31 May 2024. Only 69 (62 per cent) did so by the ATT Monitor's 1 February 2025 cutoff date for analysis.⁵

SUBMITTING REPORTS TO THE ATT SECRETARIAT

Annual reports submitted for 2023 continued a steady downward trend in reporting. When reports submitted late for previous years are considered, the total number of annual reports submitted for 2023 (69) is the lowest since 2018. As the number of States Parties has grown, the reporting rate has declined – from 87 per cent in

2015 to 62 per cent for 2023 (see Figure 2.1). This marks the lowest percentage of annual reports due that were submitted since the ATT came into force.

The number of annual reports due for 2023 is higher than the number of those due for 2022. Gabon and the Philippines were due to report for the first time on 31 May 2024, but did not do so. Suriname submitted a report for the first time, after not having done so in previous years. Eighteen States Parties did not submit a 2023 annual report by 1 February 2025, even though they had submitted an annual report in one or more previous years. ⁶ A further 25 States Parties have never submitted an annual report. ⁷



- The following States Parties have submitted an annual report for 2023 by 1 February 2025: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay. Five other States Parties (Austria, Greece, Guatemala, Paraguay and Philippines) submitted an annual report for 2023 after the 1 February cut-off date and as of 10 June 2025, and are thus not included in the count of submitted reports. Analysis presented in this chapter has also considered reports from previous years that have been submitted late and after previous editions of the ATT Monitor Report were written. Therefore, numbers presented here for reports covering the years 2015 to 2022 are different to those presented in previous ATT Monitor reports.
- 6 Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Cameroon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Mali, Malta, Niger, Paraguay, Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Zambia. Of these, six States Parties (Austria, Greece, Malta, Republic of North Macedonia, Seychelles and Trinidad and Tobago) did not submit a 2023 annual report by 1 February 2025, after having submitted one for 2022.
- 7 Afghanistan, Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo.

Five States Parties have a mixed record and submitted a 2023 annual report, despite not having done so for one or more previous years.⁸ Sixty-four States Parties have submitted an annual report for every year that one was due.⁹

Between 1 February 2024 and 1 February 2025, the following States Parties submitted previously overdue annual reports: Brazil (2020 and 2021), Kazakhstan (2022), Malta (2018), Nigeria (2022), Republic of Moldova (2020, 2021 and 2022), and Trinidad and Tobago (2020 and 2022). The ATT Monitor commends these States Parties for fulfilling their reporting obligations. Late reporting remains valuable and contributes to the goals of transparency and accountability under the Treaty.

SUBMITTING ANNUAL REPORTS ON TIME

Forty-nine States Parties (44 per cent of due reports) complied with the Treaty obligation to submit an annual report by the 31 May deadline. The remaining 20 States Parties (18 per cent of due reports) submitted their report between the Treaty deadline and the ATT Monitor's 1 February cut-off for analysis. It is worth noting that the ATT Monitor considers on-time reporting based on the information posted by the ATT Secretariat on its website by the de facto deadline of 7 June, acting on the basis that reports were posted promptly on the ATT Secretariat's website. The number and percentage of annual reports submitted on time increased for 2023 after the lowest percentage of on-time reporting recorded in 2022, returning to the numbers and percentages of on-time reports for 2020-2021. In the submitted on time increased for 1000 per the reports for 2020-2021.


REPORTING BOTH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS COVERED BY ARTICLE 2.1

Most States Parties that submitted a public annual report complied with the Article 13 obligation to report on arms exports and imports. Chile only reported exports and did not report imports, without submitting a 'nil' report for imports. Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports. It reported some imports of arms, but also submitted a 'nil' report for imports, indicating both a 'nil' import report and a report for imports in the box related to the contents of the report. The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports and imports, but it indicated in the box related to the contents of the report that it had also submitted annual reports for exports and imports. Finland submitted only its exports report publicly. Some States Parties submitted 'nil' reports only for exports or imports and recorded this information accordingly in the box related to the contents of the report.13

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Thirty-seven States Parties (33 per cent) fully complied with their reporting obligations for 2023, compared to 35 States Parties (32 per cent) for 2022.¹⁴ They submitted annual reports to the ATT Secretariat by the 31 May deadline, and reports that were made public included data on arms exports and imports or were 'nil' reports. The 33 per cent compliance rate represents a small increase compared to 2022 (Figure 2.2).

- 8 Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Panama and Suriname. Among these States, Panama and Suriname are the only States Parties that submitted an annual report for 2023, but did not submit one for 2022. Panama resumed reporting after two years, making its first public submission since 2019.
- Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.
- 10 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, People's Republic of China, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.
- 11 Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, South Africa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 12 Control Arms Secretariat (2024). ATT Monitor 2024. Geneva. 19 August 2024. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_Monitor-Report-2024.pdf, p. 201.
- 13 Benin, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Lesotho, Peru, Republic of Moldova and Sierra Leone reported imports and submitted a 'nil' report for exports. Sweden reported exports and submitted a 'nil' report on imports. Information on States Parties that submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports is provided later in the chapter.
- 14 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.



MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

The ATT Monitor considers that, to be meaningfully transparent, a report should allow its public analysis and contain minimum significant details, as listed below:¹⁵

- 1. Be submitted and made public on the ATT Secretariat website.
- 2. Provide information that is disaggregated by weapon type.
- Provide information that is disaggregated by importer/ exporter.
- Indicate whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both).¹⁶
- Provide the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type.

States Parties can submit 'nil' reports indicating they did not export or import any arms, while still contributing to the transparency aims and objectives of the Treaty. Therefore, the ATT Monitor also considers that an annual report can be meaningfully transparent if the State Party has clearly submitted a 'nil' report on exports or imports.


IDENTIFYING MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT ANNUAL REPORTS

Based on the ATT Monitor's methodology, only 27 annual reports for 2023 (24 per cent of all reports due) met all the above criteria and were thus meaningfully transparent.¹⁷ Figure 2.3 shows the number and percentage of annual reports that were meaningfully transparent since 2015. As the number of reports due increased over the years—from 61 for 2015 to 112

¹⁵ These criteria were earlier presented in: Control Arms Secretariat (2021). 'ATT Monitor 2021', New York. 30 August 2021. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN_ATT_Monitor-Report-2021_Online.pdf.

¹⁶ An authorized export or import has been approved by national authorities, while an actual export or import concerns the physical movement of weapons or a change in ownership. Authorizations are generally granted before the actual export takes place, sometimes years in advance. For more information, see Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2019). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT: Questions & Answers'. ATT/CSP5.WGTR/2019/CHAIR/533/Conf.Rep.Rev1. https://bit.ly/3rHiE2k, pp. 11-12.

¹⁷ Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Suriname and Uruguay. In addition, Finland (exports) met the criteria for meaningful transparency. However, one of the criteria for meaningful transparency is that a State Party submits and makes its whole report public on the ATT Secretariat website. Since Finland only made its report on exports public, the ATT Monitor did not include Finland in the count of meaningfully transparent reports.



for 2023—the proportion of reports meeting the ATT Monitor's criteria for meaningful transparency decreased. The figure shows the percentage of reports that were meaningfully transparent has declined from 46 per cent for 2015 to 24 per cent for 2023. This is the lowest percentage of meaningfully transparent reports recorded since the Treaty's entry into force. The continued decrease in transparency reflects a persistent challenge in achieving accurate and comprehensive reporting among States Parties.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

As noted above, a factor for the drop in meaningfully transparent reporting is the decline in the proportion of submitted due annual reports. Another element to consider is the proportion of States Parties that do not make their reports public (these reports are only distributed among States Parties). Article 13 of the Treaty does not specify that reports should be made public, but that

they 'shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat', ¹⁸ without clarifying to whom they shall be made available. ¹⁹ However, publicly available reports create a record that civil society, media and the international community can monitor. ²⁰


Sixteen States Parties submitted a confidential annual report for 2023 (23 percent of submitted reports). Since 2021, both the number and proportion of confidential reports have declined, indicating a shift toward greater public transparency among ATT States Parties submitting annual reports. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the number and proportion of confidential reports steadily increased from three (5 per cent) in 2015 to a peak of 24 (33 per cent of the reports submitted) in 2020. However, this trend has reversed, with confidential reports declining to 30 per cent in 2022, followed by a further decrease to 16 reports (23 per cent) in 2023. The number and percentage of confidential reports for 2023 is the lowest in the last five years.

¹⁸ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

¹⁹ See for further discussion Marsh, N. and Karim A. (2015). 'Article 13: Reporting'. In da Silva, C. and Wood, B. (eds) 'Weapons and International Law: The Arms Trade Treaty'. Brussels: Larcier, pp. 213-231; Casey-Maslin, S. et al. (2016). 'The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 386-387.

²⁰ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024). Impact of arms transfers on human rights: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/56/42). https://reliefweb.int/report/world/impact-arms-transfers-human-rights-report-office-united-nations-high-commissioner-human-rights-ahrc5642-enarruzh.

²¹ Albania, Barbados, Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Senegal and State of Palestine. In addition, Finland submitted a confidential report for imports and a public report for exports.



One State Party returned to submitting a confidential annual report for 2023, after submitting a public report for the previous year (Cyprus). Conversely, three States Parties submitted a public report after their 2022 annual reports were confidential (Botswana, Madagascar and Slovenia). Finland made only its 2023 annual report on exports public, after submitting a confidential annual report for 2022. Among the States Parties that submitted an annual report for 2023, six States Parties have consistently submitted confidential annual reports for all years when these were due.²²

Seven States Parties submitted 'nil' annual reports, indicating that they had neither exported nor imported any arms in 2023.²³ The remaining 46 annual reports, which contain data on arms transfers for 2023, are assessed in the remainder of this section.²⁴

DISAGGREGATING BY WEAPON TYPES AND BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER

To be meaningfully transparent an annual report must clearly

provide information disaggregated by type of arms and by importer/exporter. Excessive aggregation of exports and imports by weapon type or by source/destination in annual reports can be an obstacle to determine what type of arms transfers have taken place.

Disaggregating transfers by category of arms

For 2023, 42 States Parties (91 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) submitted annual reports that provided information that was adequately disaggregated by categories of arms. ²⁵ Four States Parties (Australia, Belgium, Denmark and Republic of Moldova) included aggregation concerning some types of arms and not others. For example, Belgium reported some exports and imports under national categories, aggregating transfers of arms corresponding to category ML1 of the European Common Military List, which includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (0.50 inches) or less.

²² Barbados, Côte d'Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, People's Republic of China and State of Palestine.

²³ Botswana, Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Monaco, Palau, Suriname and Uruguay.

²⁴ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

²⁵ Argentina, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Disaggregating transfers by importer/exporter

Thirty-four States Parties (74 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) provided fully disaggregated information by importer/exporter.²⁶ An additional seven States Parties included adequate disaggregation by importer/exporter for some but not all categories of arms.²⁷ For example, Denmark reported small arms exports and some small arms imports to and from 'Multiple States'.

Five States Parties' annual reports did not include any meaningful disaggregation (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Norway, Panama and Republic of Moldova). El Salvador and the Republic of Moldova provided the total number of items imported in different categories of arms, and a list of exporting states. For instance, El Salvador reported a total authorized import of 435 rifles and carbines from two exporters, the United States and Israel, without indicating the numbers of arms authorized by each of the two trading partners. Costa Rica appears to have made an error by listing and aggregating trading partners for some categories of arms in the 'state of origin' column. Both Norway and Panama did not include any trading partner for their reported exports and imports (Norway reported exports and imports, while Panama only reported imports).²⁸

SPECIFYING WHETHER TRANSFERS CONCERN AUTHORIZATIONS OR ACTUAL TRANSFERS (OR BOTH)

Annual reports should also indicate whether transfers are actual or authorized, namely if transfers refer to the actual physical movement of goods or if an authorization that an export or import took place (see box). States Parties usually base their annual reports on one or other types of data - for example, on licenses issued by export control authorities or on movements of goods collected by customs authorities. It is important for an annual report to indicate the type of data because there are often important differences between the two. An authorized (licensed) export may never take place if the order is cancelled or reduced before transfer. Similarly, if authorized arms are actually transferred, these arms may cross national borders during a different reporting period to that of the authorization, even perhaps several years later. Knowing whether authorized or actual transfers are reported is vital to understanding apparent discrepancies between reports produced by different States Parties.²⁹ States Parties can decide to use different approaches in reporting actual or authorized transfers. However, the ATT Secretariat advises that, for the sake of consistency and continuity, States Parties should maintain their chosen reporting approach over time.30



THIRTY-FOUR STATES PARTIES (74 PER CENT OF PUBLIC ANNUAL REPORTS THAT CONTAIN EXPORTS OR IMPORTS DATA) PROVIDED FULLY DISAGGREGATED INFORMATION BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER. AN ADDITIONAL SEVEN STATES PARTIES INCLUDED ADEQUATE DISAGGREGATION BY IMPORTER/EXPORTER FOR SOME BUT NOT ALL CATEGORIES OF ARMS.

²⁶ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland.

²⁷ Burkina Faso, Denmark, Ireland, Jamaica, Montenegro, Sweden and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom subsequently updated its report and provided disaggregated data for all its transfers.

²⁸ Norway indicated that it excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons but did not specify if the names of the trading partners was the information that was withheld.

²⁹ Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'ATT Monitor 2017'. New York. 11 September 2017. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/EN-ATT_Monitor-Report-2017_ONLINE-1.pdf, pp.45-51.

³⁰ Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. https://bit.ly/45xWaEP, p. 13.

AUTHORIZED AND ACTUAL TRANSFERS

What is an authorized transfer?

Authorized exports and imports imply that (the competent authorities of) the State Party in question in some way permitted the export or import to take place. This generally happens in the form of an export or import licence. An authorization or licence does not oblige the importer or exporter to actually conduct the export or import in question, the conventional arms which are the object of the authorization might subsequently not (all) be physically moved from or into the national territory of the State Party during the same reporting period, and this might even never take place.

What is an actual transfer?

Actual exports and imports are those that have effectively taken place. Depending on the definitions of export and import of the State Party in question, this entails that the arms have been actually physically transferred across the national border and/or the title and control over the arms has been actually transferred.

Source: Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. https://bit.ly/45xWaEP, p. 12-13.

Thirty-one reports (67 per cent of public annual reports that contain exports or imports data) adequately indicated whether the data reported concerns authorizations or actual transfers.³¹ Ten annual reports provided an indication for some, but not all transfers³² and five did not provide information for any transfers included in their annual reports (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Panama, Poland and Sweden).

Some States Parties selected both actual and authorized for the same transfers, indicating that they categorized the same transactions under both classifications. For instance, Costa Rica reported that every transfer listed was both an authorization and an actual transfer. Other States Parties also included some transfers that were categorized as both authorizations and actual transfers.³³ The ATT reporting template allows for this approach, which may accurately reflect the situation if reports are based on two different data sources—one for authorizations and another for actual movements of armswithout discrepancies between the two. However, categorizing transfers as both an authorization and an actual transfer limits the ability to obtain information about these transfers from an annual report. To prevent potential misunderstandings, States Parties could clarify the data source through comments or, as suggested by the ATT Secretariat, submit two separate tables one for authorizations and another for actual transfers.34

INDICATING THE NUMBER OF ARMS OR THEIR FINANCIAL VALUE

The ATT reporting template includes columns for States Parties to record the number of arms exported or imported, or their financial value. This information is crucial to understand the magnitude of an arms transfer. All 46 of the annual reports containing data on transfers included the number of units or their financial value, although seven reports excluded data for specific transfers.³⁵ Four States Parties explicitly stated that this information had been withheld (Belgium, Canada, Netherlands and Sweden). For instance, Sweden classified numbers of exports of recoilless rifles and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, and Canada did not disclose the specific number of AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles imported from the United States, explaining that missile numbers were classified and that a multi-year procurement is in progress to upgrade and recapitalize part of the existing AIM-9 missile inventory. Similarly, the Netherlands reported the number of its donations of heavy machine guns to Ukraine as 'not declared'. This information conforms to Article 13.3 of the Treaty, which states that reports 'may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information', and these States Parties have clearly indicated what data/type of information was withheld.

³¹ Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), France, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

³² Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland.

³³ Denmark, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Peru, Romania and South Africa.

³⁴ Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. https://bit.ly/45xWaEP, p. 13.

³⁵ Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, South Africa and Sweden.


CHANGES IN COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY

Table 2.1 shows the percentage of public annual reports since 2015 meeting the ATT Monitor criteria for meaningful transparency. The data highlights mixed trends in transparency of arms trade reporting.

- Reports disaggregated by category of arms fluctuated over the years. In 2023, they reached 91 per cent, an increase of 10 percentage points compared to 2022.
- The proportion of annual reports providing disaggregated data by importer/exporter increased from 65 per cent in 2015 to 84 per cent in 2020. However, it has declined since then, and the value of 74 per cent in 2023 is the fourth highest value recorded.
- There has been a decrease in reports specifying whether data concerns authorizations or actual transfers, declining from 96 per cent in 2015 to 67 per cent in 2023. This is the lowest percentage ever recorded.
- Reports including information on units or financial value remained consistently high across the years. The percentage decreased from 96 per cent in 2022 to 93 per cent in 2023.
- Overall, while improvements are evident in some areas such as disaggregation per category of arms, the decline in clarity on authorized versus actual transfers reflect some challenges in maintaining transparency standards.

Table 2.1: Percentage of public annual reports (excluding 'nil' and early submissions) that meet the criteria for meaningful transparency

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Provided information disaggregated by weapon type	90%	86%	87%	85%	88%	93%	83%	81%	91%
Provided information disaggregated by importer/exporter	65%	65%	64%	71%	76%	84%	80%	72%	74%
Indicated whether transfer data concerns authorizations or actual transfers (or both)	96%	94%	91%	92%	84%	87%	74%	85%	67%
Provided the number of units or financial value (or both) for each weapon type	96%	96%	98%	94%	98%	98%	98%	96%	93%



FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND FULFILMENT OF THE ATT MONITOR MEANINGFUL TRANSPARENCY CRITERIA

Twenty-one States Parties (19 per cent of all reports due) required to submit an annual report for 2023 submitted a meaningfully transparent report on time.³⁶ This rate is higher than the previous year when 14 per cent met these criteria.

A HIGHER STANDARD OF TRANSPARENCY

The previous sections outlined the minimum reporting requirements for compliance with the Treaty under Article 13.3 and the criteria for meaningfully transparent annual reports as defined by the ATT Monitor. The Treaty encourages States to provide more information, thereby contributing to a higher standard of transparency. For example, Article 5.3 encourages States Parties to apply the Treaty provisions, including on reporting, to the broadest range of conventional arms.³⁷ The 'FAQ-type guidance document on annual reporting obligations', endorsed by the ATT Conference of States Parties, explains how States Parties are encouraged and could include in their annual reports information on a wider range of items than those set out in the eight categories in Article 2.1.38 Reports could include information on, for example, ammunition/munitions and parts and components (including exports or imports of complete conventional arms that are transferred in disassembled parts and components).39

Similarly, the reporting templates provide the possibility for States Parties to include comments on each transfer and descriptions of the arms being exported or imported. In doing so, a report can provide additional contextual information which can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, the United Kingdom reported the export of two armoured combat vehicles to Canada and used comments to clarify that they were destined to a private museum.

The ATT Monitor considers an annual report to include information that contributes to a higher standard of transparency if States Parties do at least one of the following:

- Include descriptions of reported transfers that provide details on the make, model and/or calibre of transferred conventional arms
- Include comments on reported transfers that provide details on the nature of the transfer, including end-use/ end-user information.
- 3. Include '0', 'nil', '/' or any other indication that no transfers were made in relevant arms categories and subcategories.
- Clearly indicate whether commercially sensitive or national security information was withheld or not, and, if so, what information was withheld.
- 5. Include information reported in voluntary national categories that includes arms categories covered by Article 2.1, but not explicitly highlighted in the reporting templates (shotguns, etc.).
- 6. Include information reported in voluntary national categories that includes categories not covered by Article 2.1 (ammunition, parts and components, gas-powered firearms, etc.).
- 7. Include any other type of additional information, including national reports, detailed tables or annexes with information of arms categories not covered by Article 2.1 (other type of aircraft, vessels and vehicles that fall outside the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) categories, or imaging, communications and radar items).
- 8. Include national definitions of reported categories of conventional arms.



TWENTY-ONE STATES PARTIES (19 PER CENT OF ALL REPORTS DUE) REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2023 SUBMITTED A MEANINGFULLY TRANSPARENT REPORT ON TIME. THIS RATE IS HIGHER THAN THE PREVIOUS YEAR WHEN 14 PER CENT MET THESE CRITERIA.

³⁶ Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Suriname and Uruguay.

³⁷ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

³⁸ Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. https://bit.ly/45xWaEP, pp. 14-15.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 15. See Chapter 1 for a comprehensive overview on how States Parties implement controls on parts and components, and on the relevance of these measures in current arms control debates.

DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTS

The ATT reporting template includes a column in which States Parties can give a more detailed description of the item(s) transferred. Twelve States Parties included descriptions for all the transfers they reported, 40 while an additional 26 States Parties included descriptions for at least some transfers. 41

This combined total (38 annual reports) is slightly lower than last year (39 annual reports). Descriptions provide important contextual information that can help clarify the nature of a transfer. For example, Bulgaria reported the export of 30 portable anti-tank guns to the Czech Republic, disaggregating by type and quantity in the descriptions (10 pieces of one-shot disposable anti-tank rocket launcher Bulspike-AT, cal. 72.5 mm; 10 pieces of one-shot disposable anti-tank rocket launcher Bulspike-AP, cal. 72.5 mm; and 10 pieces of one-shot disposable anti-tank rocket launcher Bulspike-TB, cal. 72.5 mm).

The ATT reporting template also includes a column for States Parties to provide comments on the transfer. Six States Parties provided comments on every transfer.⁴² An additional 21 States Parties included comments on some transfers.⁴³ The combined figure of 27 reports containing comments on some or all transfers is equal to the previous year. Comments can provide important information that can help explain a transfer. For example, Mexico uses comments to designate its arms imports based on end users, differentiating between military, security and civilian uses.

FILLING IN BLANK SPACES

While Article 13.3 of the Treaty allows States Parties to 'exclude commercially sensitive or national security information' (see next sub-section), leaving sections blank creates ambiguity. If a State Party leaves parts of its report blank, it is not possible to discern whether there were no transfers or if information has

been withheld. Twenty States Parties used symbols such as '0', '/' or '-' to indicate that no transfers of specific categories and/ or sub-categories of arms had taken place during 2023.⁴⁴ This number is an improvement from 2022, when 16 States Parties included such indications.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

The ATT reporting template provides a checkbox for States Parties to indicate whether information has been withheld for commercially sensitive and/or national security-related reasons in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty. Forty-eight States Parties either checked 'yes', 'no' or used other means to indicate whether information was withheld in their 2023 annual reports. This number was higher than the previous year, when 43 States Parties indicated that information was being withheld. In contrast, five States Parties did not provide any such indication in their 2023 annual report, making it unclear whether information was withheld. This is an improvement compared to the previous year when seven States Parties did not provide this clarification.

Eighteen States Parties indicated that information had been withheld for commercial or security reasons. Among these, four explicitly specified the type of information withheld by marking it as 'Classified' or using other explanatory notes such as 'not declared', either in relation to specific numbers, categories or sub-categories of arms, final importing or exporter states, or in the comments section (Belgium, Canada, Netherlands and Sweden). For example, Sweden classified the quantities of exports of recoilless rifles to Hungary and the United States, as well as the quantities of portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems exported to Brazil, France, Lithuania and United States, clearly marking these entries as 'Classified' in the 'numbers' column.

- 40 Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland (exports), Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.
- 41 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 42 Canada, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Panama and Peru.
- 43 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 44 Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Canada, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland used a UNROCA template for their reports. These reports did not include rows for certain categories of arms for which no transfers were made.
- 45 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland (exports), Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. Canada and the Netherlands used a UNROCA template that does not provide a box to indicate whether information has been withheld but included this information in the text of the report.
- 46 Botswana and Spain. In addition, Chile, France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland used either a national template or a UNROCA template that does not provide a box to indicate whether information has been withheld. Since these States Parties have not specified this information using other means, the ATT Monitor includes them among the States that have provided no indication on withheld information.

VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Some annual reports contain information on a wider range of conventional arms than those explicitly specified in the ATT reporting template. This information is provided under the 'others' sub-categories for both small arms and light weapons, in a section for voluntary 'National Categories', or in additional supplementary tables of data.

- Twenty-six States Parties included in their 2023 annual report information on arms that are covered within the scope of Article 2 of the Treaty but are not explicitly specified in the reporting template.⁴⁷ This is higher than the previous year, when 21 annual reports contained such information. For example, South Africa reported exports and imports of shotguns to and from several countries in the 'others' small arms sub-categories, including the authorization of an export of 500 shotguns to the headquarters of the Zimbabwe Republic Police General. New Zealand also reported exports and imports of shotguns in its national categories.
- Eight States Parties reported a wider range of military equipment.⁴⁸ Such equipment is not directly covered in Article 2.1 of the ATT, which covers the scope of the Treaty, but is relevant to Article 5(3), which states that each State Party 'is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms'. For example,

- Chile reported it authorized the export of spare parts and metallic magazines for small arms to Canada. While these items are related to small arms, they are parts and components and not complete arms, and therefore not covered under Article 2.1 of the ATT. The number of States reporting such data is lower than the previous year, when eleven States Parties reported this information.
- Six States Parties (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) included supplementary tables containing additional data. Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom used a UNROCA template and included data on national military holdings (reported to UNROCA). Australia provided additional tables on aggregated small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports and on the volumes of firearms commercially imported into Australia. Japan provided additional data on its exports and imports of small arms. The number of States Parties is higher than the previous year, when five States Parties reported such information.
- Thirteen States Parties included descriptions of national definitions of arms or terms for exports and imports in their annual reports.⁴⁹ For example, Hungary states it does not have a single criterion to define exports and imports, as it depends on the transfer and destination (transfer of control, delivery verification date, leaving Hungary's territory, etc)



⁴⁷ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

⁴⁸ Chile, Costa Rica, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Moldova, Sierra Leone, Slovakia and South Africa.

⁴⁹ Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Italy, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Poland and the Republic of Korea.

systems (10.5 per cent).

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TRENDS

The following key findings summarize major trends in arms exports and imports reported by ATT States Parties that submitted a public annual report containing exports and/or imports in 2023.

Exports of major conventional arms: 113,964 major conventional arms exports were reported in 2023. Of these, 102,849 were actual transfers and 4,279 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main exported arms were missiles and missile launchers (84.6 per cent, of which 80.9 per cent were 'missiles etc.' and 3.7 were 'MANPADS'), and armoured combat vehicles (1.9 per cent).


Exports of SALW: 1,456,779 SALW exports were reported in 2023. Of these, 668,274 were actual transfers and 669,942 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main subcategories reported were revolvers and self-loading pistols (37 per cent), assault rifles (22.7 per cent), and rifles and carbines (14.9 per cent).

Imports of major conventional arms: 78,117 major conventional arms imports were reported in 2023.50 Of these, 77,856 were actual transfers and 148 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main imported arms were missiles and missile launchers (88.5 per cent), and large-calibre artillery

Imports of SALW: 560,811 SALW imports were reported in 2023. Of these, 398,392 were actual transfers and 58,752 were authorized. For the remaining transfers, States Parties did not tick or ticked both cells indicating if transfers were actual or authorized. The main sub-categories reported were revolvers and self-loading pistols (30.8 per cent), assault rifles (28.1 per cent), and rifles and carbines (15.2 per cent).

For information disaggregated by State, please refer to the Annex: Country Profiles.

Since 2024, the ATT Monitor provides a graphical and interactive representation of the distribution, dimensions, and dynamics of the arms trade, as reported by States Parties' annual reports, in its ATT Monitor Arms Transfers Dashboard. Please consult the Dashboard at: attmonitor.org/en/att-arms-dashboard. Data on transfers reported in 2023 annual reports will be included in the Dashboard by 31 December 2025.




MOST TRANSPARENT REPORTS

Similarly to previous years, no State Party submitting a 2023 annual report used all transparency mechanisms outlined in this chapter. Fourteen States Parties complied with Article 13.3 reporting obligations, provided information that goes beyond the minimum information needed to contribute to the aims and objectives of the ATT in Article 1, and provided information

that supports a higher standard of transparency. Of these, two States Parties (Canada and Peru) provided the most information in support of a higher standard of transparency. Canada provided comments and some descriptions and stated whether information had been withheld for commercial or national security reasons. Peru included comments and descriptions for all its transfers and stated it had not withheld any data.

FIGURE 2.5 - CLASSIFICATION OF ATT STATES PARTIES BY ANNUAL REPORTING PRACTICE (2023)



⁵¹ Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania and Serbia. The list excludes States Parties that have submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports.

CONCLUSION

Transparent reporting is critical to achieve the ATT's aim of promoting a responsible arms trade. This chapter has presented and analyzed the main trends in reporting for 2023. It has highlighted some positive aspects. For example, the proportion of annual reports submitted on time increased to 44 per cent in 2023 (49 States Parties) after a drop in 2022, returning to numbers and percentages of on-time reports for 2020-2021. Confidential annual reports decreased from a peak of 33 per cent in 2020 (24 reports) to 23 per cent in 2023 (16 reports). Reports that provided information disaggregated by categories and sub-categories of arms increased since 2022, reaching 91 per cent in 2023. Lastly, the percentage of states submitting public, meaningfully transparent reports on time increased from 14 per cent in 2022 to 19 per cent in 2023. However, only 62 per cent of States Parties required to submit an annual report submitted one for 2023, the lowest proportion since 2015. The overall proportion of meaningfully transparent reports dropped significantly from 46 per cent in 2015 to 24 per cent in 2023, the lowest level recorded. Finally, full compliance with all Article 13.3 obligations remains very close to the lowest compliance level recorded historically.

The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) continues to play a pivotal role in promoting transparency and strengthening reporting practices under the ATT. The 'outreach strategy on reporting' called for the identification of challenges States Parties face in reporting.52 Additionally, it encouraged States Parties and civil society organizations to organize regionally tailored informative sessions to assist national authorities responsible for reporting.53 Recently, the ATT Secretariat also undertook several initiatives to support States Parties in their reporting obligations. These initiatives include regional practical reporting workshops, the introduction of a 'Voluntary Guidance on the Practice of Annual Reporting', and the identification of some 'regional reporting champions'—Benin, France, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Romania and Sierra Leone which agreed to share their reporting focal points' details with States Parties from their regions that face reporting challenges.⁵⁴ The ATT Monitor welcomes the initiatives of the WGTR and the ATT Secretariat. In particular, supporting regional leadership and assistance in reporting transparency and facilitating peer exchanges among States would contribute to a broader culture of transparency, promote harmonization of reporting practices and support States Parties that may lack the technical or institutional capacity to meet their reporting obligations. This would enhance implementation of the Treaty, strengthen mutual trust among States Parties and contribute meaningfully to the achievement of the Treaty's objectives.



⁵² ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR). Outreach Strategy on Reporting (Annex A of WGTR Co-Chairs' Report to CSP4). Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. August 2018. http://bit.ly/3TX95uJ.

⁵³ Ibio

⁵⁴ ATT WGTR (2025). "WGTR Chair's Draft Report to CSP11.' 25 April 2025, ATT/CSP11.WGTR/2025/CHAIR/812/PM.DrConf.Rep. https://bit.ly/3GEW1Hj, pp. 2-3.



CHAPTER 3 – PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF 2024 ATT ANNUAL REPORTS AND NEW INITIAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

Article 13 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) requires States Parties to submit two types of reports to the ATT Secretariat. Article 13.1 requires States Parties to submit an initial report on measures undertaken to implement the Treaty and Article 13.3 requires States to submit annual reports on actual or authorized arms exports and imports that occurred during the previous calendar year.1 The initial report is due within one year of the Treaty's entry into force for each State Party, and States Parties are further required to report to the Secretariat, through submission of an updated initial report, on any new measures undertaken to implement the Treaty (e.g., new regulation or legislation governing a State's national control system). States Parties must begin annual reporting the first full calendar year after becoming a State Party to the ATT and continue reporting annually thereafter. Though the Treaty requires annual reports to be submitted by 31 May each year, the Secretariat provides a seven-day grace period, resulting in a 7 June de-facto yearly deadline.

Initial and annual reporting is fundamental to the ATT's ability to achieve its transparency object and purpose, as described in Article 1.² Initial reports play a vital role in monitoring and evaluating ATT implementation, providing an opportunity to explore how States Parties interpret and apply their Treaty obligations at the national level. Initial reports enable States Parties to critically examine their own existing national control architectures; learn good practices from other States Parties; facilitate assessments of regulatory, legal, or organizational gaps and subsequent assistance needs; and act as markers for Treaty compliance and impact over time. Annual reports provide important visibility into the global arms trade, acting

as a mechanism for identifying potentially destabilizing weapon accumulations and instances of arms diversion; for supporting international human rights and humanitarian law monitoring efforts; and for confidence-building among States Parties. Annual reporting is also essential for verifying Treaty compliance and assessing Treaty implementation.

This chapter provides an update on the status of ATT initial reporting, a preview of annual reporting for 2024, and an overview of States Parties' compliance with ATT reporting obligations. A preliminary assessment of annual reports submitted for the 2024 calendar year – as well as reports due in previous years that have been submitted since last year's reporting deadline – are followed with an analysis of new initial report submissions and reporting trends.

ANNUAL REPORTS

PREVIEW OF 2024 ANNUAL REPORTS

One hundred and thirteen of the 116 States Parties to the ATT were required to report to the ATT Secretariat on their 2024 arms exports and imports by 31 May. The newest States Parties – The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia – were not required to submit a 2024 annual report. As of 7 June 2025, 50 States Parties had submitted annual reports for 2024:

 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

¹ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

^{2 &#}x27;The object of this Treaty is to: Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms; Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion; for the purpose of: Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; Reducing human suffering; Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties'. Arms Trade Treaty, Article 1 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

³ The Gambia and Malawi are required to submit their first annual reports in 2026, and Colombia's first annual report is due in 2027. ATT Secretariat, 'States Parties to the ATT (in order of deposit of instrument of ratification, approval, acceptance, or accession)', as of 17 October 2024. https://bit.ly/4jBHdXD.

For methodological rigor and consistency, the ATT Monitor traditionally limits its analysis each year to the reports that are available on the Secretariat's website as of 7 June, though it is possible that reports submitted on time may not be accurately reflected on the ATT Secretariat's website. However, this year the Monitor was able to confirm the number of on-time reports with the Secretariat. Thus, this year's analysis is based upon the actual number of on-time reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat by 7 June 2025.⁴

For 2024 reports, there was an on-time reporting rate of 44 per cent. Four of the past five years have seen 44 per cent on-time reporting rates. The only exception was the 2022 report submissions, which had an on-time compliance rate of 35 per cent.

Notably, nine of these 50 on-time reporters are considered Least Developed Countries or Small Island Developing States by the United Nations,⁵ and 26 (52 per cent) are non-Western.⁶

Table 3.1 - ATT Annual Reports on-time reporting rates

Reporting Year	Number of On-Time Reports (using de facto 7 June deadline)	On-Time Compliance Rate (as percentage of reports due)
2015	30	49%
2016	31	41%
2017	37	42%
2018	46	50%
2019	37	38%
2020	46	44%
2021	48	44%
2022	38	35%
2023	49	44%
2024	50	44%



FOR 2024 REPORTS, THERE WAS AN ON-TIME REPORTING RATE OF 44 PER CENT. FOUR OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAVE SEEN 44 PER CENT ON-TIME REPORTING RATES. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WAS THE 2022 REPORT SUBMISSIONS, WHICH HAD AN ON-TIME COMPLIANCE RATE OF 35 PER CENT.

⁴ The list of States Parties that submitted on-time reports was provided through correspondence with the ATT Secretariat.

⁵ The five Least Developed Countries that submitted on-time 2024 reports are: Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Senegal and Sierra Leone. The four Small Island Developing States that submitted on-time 2024 reports are: Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Palau and Seychelles.

⁶ Argentina, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mexico, Palau, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, State of Palestine and Uruguay.

Of the 50 States Parties that submitted on-time 2024 annual reports, 13 (26 per cent) chose to report privately – meaning that these reports are available only to the ATT Secretariat and other States Parties. While this marks an increase in confidential, on-time reporting when compared to the 22 per cent of on-time 2023 reports submitted last year, it is still a welcome decline from the 32 per cent of 2021 on-time reports submitted privately.

Paraguay, which had previously submitted all its prior annual reports publicly, opted to submit its on-time 2024 and past-due 2020-2023 reports privately. In contrast, Greece – which submitted an overdue 2023 report alongside its on-time 2024 report – submitted both reports publicly after having submitted its six prior annual reports (covering the years 2017 to 2022) confidentially. Of note, Finland submitted a public 2024 report after submitting its 2023 report in a 'hybrid' format – submitting a public report on exports and a private report on imports – which marked the first occurrence of a State Party bifurcating an annual report. Finland had previously submitted a fully private report for the 2022 reporting period (after seven years of public reporting) and returned to fully public reporting this year with its on-time 2024 submission.

Some States that submitted an on-time 2024 annual report, such as Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Guatemala, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Seychelles and State of Palestine have only ever submitted private reports. However, other States that reported privately this year have histories of public reporting. Latvia and Lithuania submitted multiple public reports in their first years of ATT reporting (respectively submitting their 2015-2020 and 2015-2017 reports publicly) but have now submitted private reports for four and seven consecutive years. Georgia has submitted private reports for seven consecutive years, but its first report – covering transfers made in 2017 – was public. Similarly, while Senegal alternated between public and private submissions in its early years of reporting, it has now submitted confidential annual reports for the last seven years. Slovakia submitted a

private report this year after submitting publicly for eight years, but its first report (covering transfers made in 2015) was private. Paraguay was the only State that submitted a private report for the first time this year.

REPORTING UPDATES

A total of 43 overdue reports were submitted between 7 June 2024 (last year's de facto reporting deadline) and 7 June 2025.8 Of these reports, 25 were 2024 reports covering 2023 transfers9 and 18 were from prior years.10 Guatemala submitted six pastdue reports for 2017-2020, 2022, and 2023; Paraguay submitted four past-due reports for 2020-2023; Republic of Moldova submitted four past-due reports for 2020-2023; Brazil submitted three past-due reports for 2019-2021; both Kazakhstan and Nigeria submitted their past-due 2022 and 2023 reports; Malta submitted its past-due 2018 report; and Botswana submitted its past-due 2020 report.

With these States Parties submitting overdue reports, the number of States Parties that have submitted an annual report for every year they were required to do so has increased. As of 7 June 2025, 48 of the 113 States Parties (42 per cent) due to report had submitted all their required annual reports. This is a slight improvement from last year, when as of 7 June the full compliance rate was 44 out of 112 (39 per cent). Further, it is likely that this figure will continue to improve as more States Parties submit their 2024 reports in the coming months.

On the other hand, the number of States Parties that have not fulfilled their annual reporting obligations has remained static. As of 7 June 2025, 25 States Parties (22 per cent of the 113 due to have reported at least once) had yet to submit any of their required annual reports. This is the same in absolute numbers from this time last year, when 25 States Parties (22 per cent of the 112 due to have reported at least once) had yet to submit any of their required annual reports. However, the current

- 7 The 13 States Parties that submitted private on-time reports are: Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia and State of Palestine.
- 8 Overdue reports (covering transfers made from 2015 to 2023) that were submitted and available on the ATT Secretariat's website as of 7 June 2025 are included in this section's analysis.
- 9 The 25 States Parties that submitted overdue 2023 reports during this year's reporting period are: Austria, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, South Africa and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 10 Eight States submitted a total of 18 overdue reports spanning transfers that occurred between 2017 and 2022: Botswana, Brazil, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Malta, Nigeria, Paraguay and Republic of Moldova.
- 11 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, People's Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.
- 12 Afghanistan, Andorra, Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo.
- 13 There was a slight change in the actual States listed the Philippines was removed from the list after submitting its 2023 and 2024 reports this year, and Andorra has been added to the list after not submitting its 2024 annual report (the first report it has been required to submit since becoming a State Party).

number of States Parties that have yet to submit an annual report is still a slight improvement from 2023, when 26 States Parties had yet to submit any of their required annual reports.

While States Parties are encouraged to submit their reports on time, it is important to emphasize that overdue reports are always welcome. Even when submitted late, such reports provide valuable insights and continue to support meaningful analysis of arms trade trends and Treaty implementation. Despite the challenges posed by delayed reporting, each contribution provides more information on global arms transfers and supports fulfillment of the Treaty's object and purpose.

The only State Party required to submit an annual report for the first time this year, Andorra, has not yet reported. Andorra's non-submission highlights the importance of targeted outreach and assistance to support first-time reporters in meeting their obligations.

On a more positive note, in an intervention at the February 2025 Working Group meetings, Canada noted that it had noticed an error in its 2023 annual report and subsequently submitted an amended report to the ATT Secretariat, fixing its error. Canada should be commended for this effort, and States Parties should be encouraged to review and correct their past submissions if necessary.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Although States Parties will continue submitting 2024 annual reports in the coming months, there are useful insights that can be drawn from the reports submitted as of 7 June 2025.

Public, on-time reporters continue to prefer the recommended reporting template. Of the 37 public 2024 reports submitted by 7 June 2025, 29 States Parties (78 per cent) used a version of the recommended template, which includes the template introduced at the Second Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in 2016 and the template endorsed by the Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7) in 2021. This reflects a decrease from this time in 2024, when 32 of the 38 public reports analyzed (84 per cent) were prepared using a version of the recommended template. Similar to last year, the most popular version was the CSP7 2021 template, accounting for 28 of the 29 (97 per cent) template submissions. ¹⁴ One State Party,

South Africa, submitted its 2024 report using the previously recommended version of the template, introduced at CSP2. The ATT Secretariat's online reporting tool, which mirrors the CSP7 template, was utilized by five States Parties (14 per cent of the 37 public reports), 15 a slight increase from the four States Parties that submitted using the online template by 7 June 2024. The remaining three States Parties (Canada, Greece and Netherlands), or eight per cent of public on-time submissions, used their UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) report as their 2024 ATT annual report, which represents an increase from last year's reporting deadline when only two States Parties had submitted using a UNROCA report.

Fewer on-time 2024 public reporters submitted 'nil' reports than last year, when 13 States submitted 'nil' reports for imports, exports or both by 7 June 2024. As of 7 June 2025, seven States Parties (Benin, Botswana, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Lesotho, Peru and Uruguay) reported 'nil' for exports and three States Parties (Madagascar, Palau and Sierra Leone) reported 'nil' for both exports and imports. Of those that indicated they had submitted a 'nil' report on either exports or imports on the first page of the template, each (Benin, Botswana, Dominican Republic,16 El Salvador, Lesotho, Madagascar, Palau, Peru, Sierra Leone and Uruguay) also submitted the correct 'nil' report using Annex 3. However, some confusion seems to persist around 'nil' reporting, suggesting that more attention should be given to clarifying 'nil' submission practices. One State Party (Costa Rica) submitted a 'nil' report for exports via Annex 3 but did not indicate doing so on the first page of its report. Another three States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and South Africa) left the questions on 'nil' reporting blank, but all reported both exports and imports.

In accordance with ATT Article 13.3, States Parties are permitted to withhold commercially sensitive or national security information. The ATT annual report template allows States to indicate if they have (or not) withheld such information from their reports or provide comments in their reports on the types of information withheld. Of the 2024 on-time reporters that submitted their reports publicly, 11 States Parties (30 per cent) indicated that they had withheld information. Ten of these States Parties indicated they had withheld information by utilizing the checkbox on the CSP7 recommended template, and one (Netherlands) –

¹⁴ Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

¹⁵ Argentina, Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Spain.

¹⁶ The Dominican Republic's 'nil' report on exports is labelled as 'Annex 2' rather than 'Annex 3', but was otherwise completed correctly.

¹⁷ Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13:3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.

¹⁸ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden.

which submitted using its UNROCA report – indicated that information was withheld through comments in the body of its report. Ten States Parties indicated withholding information in their 2023 (26 per cent) and 2022 (38 per cent) on-time annual public reports. Indicating whether information was withheld is better practice than choosing not to indicate at all (and should thus be commended).

In another instance of good reporting practice, several States Parties made efforts to specify the nature of their information withholdings. In one example, Sweden marked that the number and value of recoilless rifles and portable antitank missile launchers and rocket systems it exported was 'classified', and listed the final importing States in aggregate. Poland noted that '[t]he data included in the annual report do not include... imports to Poland of certain categories of conventional weapons (I-VII) - in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty'.

Four States Parties (Australia, Belgium, Netherlands and Poland) indicated that at least some of the information withheld from their 2024 reports was in relation to their exports to Ukraine. Belgium commented that the number of AIM 9M Sidewinder missiles it exported to Ukraine was 'withheld for security reasons'. The Netherlands reported on the number, type, and model of weaponry sent to Ukraine in several instances, but did not provide the number of F-16 aircraft, missiles and missile launchers, and heavy machine guns '[d]ue to NLD security regulations'. States should periodically review the withholding of such information in past reports, and if it is not essential for such information to remain confidential, to update their reports accordingly.

States continue to provide relatively limited reporting on national categories and definitions, with only six States Parties (Belgium, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland) reporting 2024 transfers under national categories or indicating that they had reported on national definitions. Two States utilized regional or international categorization systems: Belgium continued its practice of reporting under European Common Military List 'ML1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less', and Japan continued its practice of reporting its small arms exports and imports under the International Trade Administration's (World Customs Organization) harmonized system codes. Three States utilized the national categories section of the CSP7 template to report on weapon types not included in the UN Register Categories I-VII. New Zealand reported on its exports and imports of shotguns, and both Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic reported on imports of ammunition and tear gas.

As with the practice of 'nil' reporting, evidence of confusion about national definitions and categories points to a need for further efforts of clarification and training among States Parties. Switzerland indicated that it had used national definitions in its 2024 annual report but did not report under national categories or provide information on national definitions. As previously mentioned, Costa Rica reported under nationally defined categories, but did not elaborate on definitions.

States continue to not leverage the full potential of synergies across multilateral reporting instruments. Twenty-five States Parties (68 per cent of the 37 on-time public reporters) indicated that information in their 2024 annual report submissions could be shared with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) for UNROCA reporting.¹⁹ Three States Parties submitted their 2024 ATT reports using the UNROCA template, and the remaining nine public reporters that used the recommended CSP7 template left the section blank (indicating 'no').²⁰



AS WITH THE PRACTICE OF 'NIL' REPORTING, EVIDENCE OF CONFUSION ABOUT NATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES POINTS TO A NEED FOR FURTHER EFFORTS OF CLARIFICATION AND TRAINING AMONG STATES PARTIES.

¹⁹ Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Italy, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

²⁰ Canada, Greece and Netherlands reported using their UNROCA reports. Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Japan, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and South Africa left the guestion blank (indicating 'no').

EXPORTS

- Twenty-six of the 37 States Parties that submitted on-time and public 2024 annual reports reported conventional arms exports.²¹ Of these, nine States Parties only reported small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports²² and 17 reported both major arms and SALW exports²³ (all 17 States Parties that reported major arms exports also reported SALW exports).
- Of the 17 States Parties that reported exporting major conventional arms during the previous year, three reported authorized major arms exports (Australia, Italy and South Africa), 11 reported actual major arms exports,²⁴ and one reported a combination of authorized and actual major arms exports (Belgium). Two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Finland) did not indicate whether their reported major arms exports represented actual or authorized transfers.
- All 26 States Parties that reported exports of conventional arms in their on-time and public 2024 annual reports reported SALW exports.²⁵ Of these, six States Parties reported authorized SALW exports (Australia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand and South Africa), 15 reported actual

- SALW exports,²⁶ two reported a combination of authorized and actual SALW exports (Belgium and Switzerland), two did not indicate whether their reported SALW exports represented actual or authorized transfers (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Finland), and one (Mexico) marked that each SALW export was both authorized and actual. A lack of clarity in the indication of actual versus authorized transfers continues to be a barrier to transparency.
- Twenty of the 26 States Parties that reported arms exports in their public, on-time 2024 submissions provided the number of items transferred²⁷ and six (Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Norway and Slovenia) provided a combination of value and number. For States that provided a combination of value and number, the practice varied. For example, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia provided the number and value for each of its exports, while Japan only provided the quantity of its major arms and light weapons exports but provided the number and value for its small arms exports. Norway mostly reported the quantity of its exports but added that its donated exports to Ukraine were 'Free'.



- 21 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 22 Argentina, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania and Slovenia.
- 23 Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 24 Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 25 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
- 26 Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden
- 27 Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

IMPORTS

- Thirty-four of the 37 public annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat as of 7 June 2025 reported conventional arms imports.²⁸ Of these, 16 reported both major arms and SALW imports.²⁹ 17 reported only SALW imports³⁰ and one (Finland) reported only major arms imports.
- Of the 17 States Parties that reported major arms imports, two (Italy and Peru) reported authorized imports, 13 reported actual imports, 31 one State Party (Belgium) reported using a mix of authorized and actual imports and one State Party (Finland) failed to indicate whether its reported major arms imports reflected actual or authorized transfers.
- Of the 37 public annual reports for 2024 submitted as of 7 June 2025, 33 States Parties reported SALW imports.³² Three States Parties (Belgium, Jamaica and South Africa) reported authorized SALW imports and 23 reported actual SALW imports.³³ A lack of clarity in States' reporting practices continues to hinder analysis of authorized versus actual transfers. Three States Parties (the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Peru) marked that each SALW import represented both authorized and actual transfers, and another three States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Ireland) did not indicate authorized or actual for any category of SALW import. Three States

- Parties (Dominican Republic, Mexico and Spain) neglected to indicate if transfers were authorized or actual in one category of SALW import, and two States Parties (Argentina and Slovenia) neglected to indicate if transfers were authorized or actual in multiple SALW import categories.
- One State Party (Belgium) reported differently on its major arms imports as compared to its SALW imports, reporting a combination of authorized and actual major arms imports and only authorized SALW imports.
- Twenty-five of the 34 States Parties that reported arms imports in their public, on-time submissions only provided the number of items transferred³⁴ and nine States provided a combination of value and number. Of those that reported with a combination, six (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Norway, Peru, Slovenia and Uruguay) provided both the number and value of each of their imports. Australia reported its SALW imports by quantity but reported its major arms imports with a combination of only quantity, only value, or both quantity and value. As it did for exports, Japan provided the quantity of its major arms and light weapons imports but gave the quantity and value for its small arms imports. Belgium reported the quantity of its major arms imports while only noting the value of the SALW imports it reported under national categories.



A LACK OF CLARITY IN STATES' REPORTING PRACTICES CONTINUES TO HINDER ANALYSIS OF AUTHORIZED VERSUS ACTUAL TRANSFERS.

²⁸ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

²⁹ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.

³⁰ Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa and Switzerland.

³¹ Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.

³² Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

³³ Argentina, Australia, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

³⁴ Argentina, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

UPDATES ON ATT INITIAL REPORTS

RECENT REPORTS

While no new States Parties were required to submit an initial report since last year's ATT Monitor Report (between 7 June 2024 and 7 June 2025), two States Parties submitted overdue reports. The Bahamas (report due December 2015) and Andorra (report due March 2024) had their reports uploaded to the ATT Secretariat website in September 2024 and May 2025, respectively. The ATT's three newest States Parties – The Gambia, Malawi and Colombia – are required to submit their initial reports by 10 September 2025, 8 October 2025 and 12 January 2026, respectively.³⁵

The Bahamas' and Andorra's reports illustrate the importance of submitting initial reports even when they are past due. While States Parties should be encouraged to submit their reports on time, it is never too late to submit an initial report. Of note, both the Bahamas and Andorra submitted their reports confidentially (to be discussed in further detail below).

Initial reporting compliance remains low for the Treaty's newest members. Of the eight States Parties that have been required to submit an initial report since January 2021, four States (50 per cent) have yet to do so.³⁶ A concerted effort should be made to encourage the three new States Parties to submit their reports over the next year.

NON-COMPLIANCE

One hundred and thirteen of the current 116 States Parties to the ATT are required to submit initial reports.³⁷ As of 7 June 2025, 93 States Parties have done so (according to the ATT Secretariat's website), which represents a compliance rate of 82 per cent. Overall, this year marks a four-year period of steady gains in initial reporting compliance rates, from 77 per cent in 2021 to 78 per cent in 2022, 79 per cent in 2023, and 81 per cent in 2024.

Of the 20 States Parties that have yet to meet their initial reporting obligations, all are several years past their due date. Thirteen States Parties (65 per cent of the States that have not submitted an initial report) are seven or more years late on their initial reports, 38 six (30 per cent) are between four and five years late, 39 and one country (Gabon) is less than two years past its initial reporting deadline.



³⁵ ATT Secretariat, 'States Parties to the ATT (in order of deposit of instrument of ratification, approval, acceptance, or accession)'. as of 17 October 2024. https://bit.ly/4jBHdXD.

³⁶ Afghanistan, Andorra, Gabon, Namibia, Niue, People's Republic of China, Philippines and São Tomé and Príncipe have been required to submit their initial reports since 2021. Half of these (Afghanistan, Gabon, Niue and São Tomé and Príncipe) have yet to submit reports.

³⁷ ATT Secretariat (2024), 'Treaty Status.' https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html.

³⁸ Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Mali, Mauritania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino and Seychelles.

³⁹ Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mozambique, Niue and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Table 3.2 - States Parties with overdue ATT Initial Reports

State Party	Initial Report Deadline
Guyana	23 December 2015
Mali	23 December 2015
Saint Lucia	23 December 2015
Guinea	18 January 2016
Saint Kitts and Nevis	14 March 2016
Chad	22 June 2016
Dominica	18 August 2016
San Marino	26 October 2016
Mauritania	21 December 2016
Central African Republic	04 January 2017
Seychelles	30 January 2017
Ghana	20 March 2017
Cabo Verde	21 December 2017
Guinea-Bissau	20 January 2020
Mozambique	13 March 2020
Lebanon	06 August 2020
São Tomé and Príncipe	25 October 2021
Afghanistan	26 October 2021
Niue	03 November 2021
Gabon	19 December 2023

Despite failing to meet legally required reporting obligations in the context of the ATT, many of the non-reporting ATT States Parties have reported to other relevant instruments on elements of their arms transfer systems, including as part of voluntary reporting regimes. Of the 20 States Parties that have yet to submit required initial reports, 15 (75 per cent) have reported to the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) at least once,⁴⁰ including 11 (55 per cent)⁴¹ which have submitted a report to the PoA since 2015 – the first year of ATT reporting – and eight (40 per cent)⁴² which have reported to the PoA since their ATT reporting obligation took effect.⁴³

Although States Parties are required under Article 13.1 to 'report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate', it does not appear as though any updated reports were submitted to the ATT Secretariat since the 2024 ATT Monitor Annual Report. 44 To date, only six States Parties (Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden) have ever submitted updated reports – despite multiple States Parties having indicated at formal and informal ATT meetings that they have made changes to their national control systems since submitting their initial reports, and despite the fact that 50 per cent of current reports were submitted over nine years ago.

Updated initial reports are indicators of compliance with States Parties' international legal obligation to report to the ATT Secretariat on new measures of implementation. The Secretariat and other stakeholders should work with States Parties to clarify the process and expectations related to the updating of initial reports and provide assistance to those that submitted reports more than five years ago or that have publicly announced changes to their national control systems. A basic survey asking States Parties if they have updated their national control systems since submitting their initial reports would help the Secretariat identify which States may need support to complete updates.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING

As of 7 June 2025, 23 of the 93 initial reports (25 per cent) available on the ATT Secretariat's website are confidential. Notably, this year's two new initial reports (Bahamas and Andorra) both submitted their initial reports privately. This is in stark contrast to last year (the 2024 ATT Monitor reporting period of 7 June 2023 – 7 June 2024), when all three initial reports that were submitted (Barbados, Namibia and Philippines) were public.

⁴⁰ Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, San Marino and São Tomé and Príncipe.

⁴¹ Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique and San Marino.

⁴² Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and San Marino.

⁴³ UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, 'National reports.' UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, https://smallarms.un-arm.org/national-reports.

⁴⁴ ATT Secretariat. (2025). 'Arms Trade Treaty: Status of Reporting'. Meeting of the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. 28 February 2025. https://bit.ly/4kNRIO6.

With a quarter of total initial report submissions only available to the ATT Secretariat and ATT States Parties, it is difficult for other ATT stakeholders to evaluate national control systems, tailor support and assistance approaches, or holistically assess the standing and impact of Treaty implementation. To support fulfillment of the ATT's object and purpose, States Parties that previously submitted confidential initial reports should update their reports and re-submit them publicly, and States Parties that have yet to report should be encouraged to do so publicly.

CONCLUSION

Over the past year, there have been some positive developments with regards to ATT annual reporting. Many States submitted overdue reports, including some States which submitted multiple overdue reports and are now in full compliance with their annual reporting obligations. Most on-time reports used a version of the recommended template, which greatly facilitates cross-State analysis and aids the global community in gaining a more complete understanding of the global arms trade. Yet this year has also faced challenges to Treaty transparency: the list of non-reporting States Parties that have not fulfilled their annual reporting obligations remains relatively stagnant and new ATT

States Parties continue to struggle with reporting. In addition, lingering confusion on ATT reporting practices such as 'nil' reporting, authorized vs. actual transfers, and national categories and definitions demonstrates a need for further outreach and (re-)training.

With regards to initial reporting, the total number of submissions increased in the past year and the overall compliance rate continues to see a modest but positive upward trend. However, yearly submission rates remain low, almost 20 per cent of States Parties due to submit an initial report have yet to do so, and the majority of these non-reporters are many years past their reporting deadline. Further, the fact that only six States Parties have ever submitted updates of their initial reports, despite clear evidence that many more States have updated their national systems, demonstrates that States are not prioritizing fulfilling their initial reporting obligations.

Reporting remains a touchstone of the ATT's momentum and relevance. States Parties, the Secretariat, and other stakeholders must continue to champion ATT reporting and provide targeted outreach and support to those that require assistance.





ANNEX – COUNTRY PROFILES

This Annex examines the annual reports submitted by States Parties to the ATT Secretariat covering their exports and imports of conventional arms in 2023. An analysis is provided in the form of country profiles covering all States Parties which submitted publicly available reports in 2023. By disaggregating the analysis by country, the ATT Monitor intends to provide easy, comparable and nationally relevant findings to help inform future practice.

One hundred and twelve States Parties were due to submit an annual report for 2023 to the ATT Secretariat within one week of 31 May 2024. As of 1 February 2025, 69 had done so, of which 53 made theirs publicly available. These reports form the basis of the analysis presented here.

Annual reports are one of the key tools for transparency at the disposal of States Parties. They help build confidence between countries and enable States Parties to demonstrate their arms trade policies are consistent with their obligations in the ATT. For annual reports to fulfill this pivotal role, it is necessary that States Parties complete them in a comprehensive, accurate and public manner.

The ATT Monitor continuously builds on the findings of assessments of each round of annual reporting. The analysis here seeks to supplement and build on the baseline analysis completed by the ATT Monitor in previous reports, which includes an assessment of reporting, examples of good national practices, and interpretative and practical challenges that are common among States Parties.

METHODOLOGY

All annual reports were downloaded for analysis by 1 February 2025. Reports received by the ATT Secretariat after this date or later amended by a State Party have not been taken into consideration. The ATT Monitor establishes 1 February as the cut-off date for annual reports to be included in its report each year to ensure adequate time to conduct an in-depth analysis.

Each profile assesses a State Party's compliance with the Article 13.3 reporting obligations.

Where applicable, States Parties' reports for 2023 were compared to those submitted for 2022. This is to consider the extent to which national reporting changed since the previous year's round of annual reporting under the ATT and to assess

if the common challenges identified had changed. Reporting practices were assessed for each State Party according to key criteria identified in previous ATT Monitor reports. These criteria are:

- Submitting a report as per each State Party's legal obligation under Article 13.3
- Compliance with Article 13.3's on-time reporting obligation (within one week of the 31 May 2024 reporting deadline)
- Making a report publicly available (including withholding data for reasons of commercial sensitivity or national security and indicating where or what information was withheld)
- Providing data on both exports and imports, or submitting 'nil' reports
- Providing data that is clearly disaggregated by category of arms, importer and/or exporter, and number of items and/ or financial value, specifying whether transfers are actual or authorized.²
- Providing information that goes beyond the minimum requirements specified in Article 13.3 (for example, reporting on exports/imports of ammunition, national categories, etc).

Changes in reporting practices such as changing from authorized to actual transfers are set out in the country profiles.

Overall, each State Party's report is assessed on the extent to which its annual report contributes to or undermines the objective of increased transparency in the global arms trade. The analysis is not intended as a 'name and shame' exercise, but instead to present comparable information that is country-specific to inform policymakers and civil society, and to help support and build knowledge and capacity—particularly by highlighting good practices and room for improvement—among officials responsible for completing ATT annual reports.

Timeliness of reporting and specifically whether a State Party has met the deadline is addressed in the country profiles. The ATT Monitor considers reports to be on time if they are received by the ATT Secretariat and posted on its website within one week of the 31 May reporting deadline. Dates of submission provided by States Parties in their annual reports and the dates which they were received by the ATT Secretariat sometimes differ. The reason for the gaps between the stated and actual dates of submission is unclear.

¹ States Parties are granted by the ATT Secretariat a seven-day grace period beyond the deadline set out in Article 13 to submit their annual reports, creating a de facto deadline of 7 June each year.

² To be classified here as having provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import, a State Party must clarify if it was reporting an authorized or actual export or import (or both), provide a number or value for each item and clearly name the final importing/exporting country.

³ A complete list of States Parties that submitted timely 2023 annual reports can be found in the ATT Monitor's preliminary analysis in the 2024 ATT Monitor Report. See Control Arms Secretariat (2024). 'ATT Monitor 2024. Geneva. 19 August 2024, https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ATT_2024_Chapter-3.1.pdf, p. 200.

State Parties can submit their annual reports by using the ATT annual reporting template, the online reporting tool, their report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), a custom-made national report, or a report on conventional arms exports and imports that they submit to a regional organization.4 The ATT Secretariat and the ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) work to make improvements to the ways in which States Parties submit annual reports, including through the amendments to reporting templates and the introduction of the online reporting tool in 2018.5 The analysis notes how States Parties chose to submit their reports. It should also be noted that, under the ATT, States Parties can submit the same report they provide to UNROCA as their ATT annual report.⁶ However, there are key differences between these reports. For example, the UNROCA template does not allow countries to specify whether they are withholding data for commercial or national security-related reasons, whereas the ATT reporting template does. Therefore, in the ensuing analysis, the ATT Monitor considers this confidentiality criterion as 'Unspecified' for countries that submit UNROCA reports.7

Where States Parties included values of transfers in their reports, transfer summaries include the monetary value of their exports or imports. All values have been converted to US dollars using the XE data website's annual conversion rate for

each currency for the 2023 calendar year unless otherwise indicated. In some cases, the currency used by States Parties to report values was not specified and this is noted in the concerned profiles.

In some instances, States Parties used country codes to indicate the final exporting and importing countries. The ATT Monitor determined which countries such codes referenced by using online sources, such as the United Nations country code list, though it did not verify with each State Party whether such determinations are accurate.

In addition to assessing reporting practices, each country's profile includes key baseline data relating to the exports and imports described by States Parties in their annual reports. This data includes:

- Total number of export/import partners and their Treaty status (as of 1 February 2025)⁸
- The number and categories of major conventional arms reported, if available⁹
- The number and sub-categories of small arms and light weapons (SALW) reported¹⁰
- The principal trade relationships reported by the State Party¹¹

⁴ Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) (2022). 'Reporting Authorized or Actual Exports and Imports of Conventional Arms under the ATT. Questions & Answers', ATT/CSP8.WGTR/2022/CHAIR/734/Conf.Rep, 22 July 2022. https://bit.ly/45xWaEP, p. 9.

⁵ ATT Secretariat (2021). 'ATT Working Group on Transparency and Reporting. Co-chairs' draft report to CSP7'. Geneva. 30 August 2018, https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGTR_Co-Chairs_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP7_with%20all%20Annexes_EN/ATT_WGTR_Co-Chairs_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP7_with%20all%20Annexes_EN.pdf.

⁶ States Parties can also submit information from their ATT Annual Report to UNROCA by ticking the box: 'The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) may use the relevant information in this Annual Report as a basis for the reporting State's report to the United Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA)'.

⁷ When it can be inferred from the data in the report that some information was withheld for commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, the ATT Monitor includes this in the Good Practices section.

⁸ Where applicable, analysis includes the names of non-State Parties (and non-UN members) to make clear trade relationships that extend beyond the ATT.

⁹ Categories of major conventional arms include: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

¹⁰ Sub-categories of small arms include: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns and others. Sub-categories of light weapons include: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, mortars of calibers less than 75mm and others.

¹¹ Principal trade relationships are determined by totaling either the numbers or values of transferred items reported by each State Party, depending on which is used in each report. Where States Parties provided both numbers and values for transferred items, the ATT Monitor makes clear which was used in determining principal trade relationships.

Each profile also indicates whether an ATT annual report was submitted or not submitted for the previous five reporting years in which reports were due (only years in which reports were due are listed in each profile). Annual reports submitted before a State Party's first report was due are noted as well (*). Each profile also indicates whether reports were made publicly available (*) or kept private (*) for each year a report was submitted over the last five years.

This annex looks solely at transfer data as reported by each State Party in its ATT annual report. It does not compare the data with other relevant reporting mechanisms or findings by independent experts, media sources, national reports to parliamentary authorities, or think tanks and institutes such as

the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.¹² Integrating information from such external sources would likely paint a different picture of the global arms trade, particularly with respect to the volume of transfers between States. For the analysis conducted by the ATT Monitor and others to be as accurate as possible, it is critical that States Parties submit clear and comprehensive annual reports and consider the fulfillment of their reporting obligations as an opportunity to support the ATT's goal of greater transparency in the global arms trade. States Parties or other ATT stakeholders are encouraged to reach out to the ATT Monitor to help clarify any information presented in the profiles below.



AFGHANISTAN

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

ALBANIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X 2020 X 2021 V 2022 X	2023 💢

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA



ARGENTINA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Argentina's report changed slightly in 2023.

It reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports. In 2022, it reported **Actual and Authorized Numbers**.

Argentina reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports. In 2022, it reported **Actual and Authorized Numbers**. It reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports. In 2022, it reported **Actual and Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Argentina continued to provide disaggregated numbers for its small arms exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and exporting state.

Argentina provided descriptions and comments for all its reported imports of major conventional arms and some of its SALW imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Argentina could provide comments describing the nature of its reported exports and imports of small arms.

Argentina could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific arms categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Argentina did not provide numbers of imports of revolvers and selfloading pistols from Finland and Türkiye, and imports of rifles and carbines from Türkiye.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Argentina reported exports to nine countries in 2023. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory, and one was a non-State Party (Ecuador). Argentina did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Argentina reported the export of 25,694 small arms, all of which were revolvers and self-loading pistols.
- The main importers of small arms from Argentina were the United States (77.4 per cent), Paraguay (9.3 per cent) and Guatemala (9 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- Argentina reported imports from eight countries in 2023. Of these, five were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Argentina reported the import of a manned attack helicopter from the United States.
- Argentina reported the import of 13,571 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (41.2 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (33.4 per cent) and others (light weapons) (24.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Argentina were the United States (38.4 per cent), Italy (29.0 per cent) and Brazil (14.9 per cent).

AUSTRALIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Australia continued to report **Authorized Numbers and Values** of most of its major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Australia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms imports.

Australia continued to report **Aggregated Numbers** of firearms imports in an annex.

GOOD PRACTICES

Australia provided descriptions for its exports of major conventional arms. It provided descriptions and comments for all its major conventional arms imports.

Australia provided the value of most of its exports of major conventional arms and SALW.

Australia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports of specific arms categories and sub-categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Australia excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity and/or national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Australia continued to provide aggregated numbers and values of exports of SALW (and commercially imported firearms), making it impossible to determine which exported SALW sub-categories were destined to the different final importing States.

Australia could provide more descriptions and comments on the nature of exports and imports of SALW.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Australia reported exports to a total of 33 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and seven were non-State Parties (Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Oman, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands).¹³
- Australia reported the export of 158 major conventional arms with a total value of A\$6bn (US\$4bn),¹⁴ covering five categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were armoured combat vehicles (82.9 per cent), manned attack helicopters (13.9 per cent) and battle tanks (1.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Australia were Ukraine (73.4 per cent), United States (14.6 per cent) and Indonesia (9.5 per cent).
- Australia reported the export of 7,808 small arms with a total value of A\$15,7m (US\$10.4m).
- In terms of value, the main importers of small arms from Australia were the United States (38.4 per cent), Ukraine (25.9 per cent) and People's Republic of China (2 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- Australia reported imports from three countries in 2023. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Australia reported the import of one manned combat aircraft from the United States.
- Australia reported the import of 1,597 small arms with a total value of A\$127,679 (US\$86,971). In terms of numbers, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (96.3 per cent) and rifles and carbines (2.4 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, exporters of small arms to Australia were the United States (98.2 per cent), Italy (1.3 per cent) and United Kingdom (0.5 per cent).

¹³ Australia also reported exports to seven non-UN members (Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island and 'non-UN State (Taiwan)')

¹⁴ Currency conversion via XE.com, "A\$/US\$ 2023 Exchange Rate": https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/.

AUSTRIA



BAHAMAS


Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

BARBADOS



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BELGIUM

Yes - On time Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template Yes ATT reporting template 2021 was used? national security-related' reasons? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 2020 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2021 2022 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Belgium continued to report Authorized and Actual Numbers of major conventional arms exports. It continued to report Actual Numbers of SALW exports in 2023 and continued to report Authorized Values of exports under voluntary national categories.

Belgium reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports. Belgium continued to report **Authorized Values** of further SALW imports under voluntary national categories, as in its 2022 report.

GOOD PRACTICES

Belgium reported exports and imports of major conventional arms and SALW disaggregated by weapon sub-category and importer or exporter State.

Belgium specified where information was 'withheld for security reasons', for which arms sub-category and transfer (missiles and missile launchers exports to Ukraine), and what type of information was withheld (number).

Belgium provided comments for most of its major conventional arms and all its SALW exports.

Belgium provided descriptions for all of its major conventional arms exports and all its major conventional arms and SALW imports.

Belgium reported additional information on exports and imports under voluntary national categories, while also providing values for these transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Belgium could provide descriptions of its SALW exports.

Belgium could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Belgium could indicate whether it reported actual or authorized handheld under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers and portable antitank missile launchers and rocket systems exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Belgium reported exports to a total of 53 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 38 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and eight were non-State Parties (Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Tunisia).¹⁵
- Belgium reported the export of 124 major conventional arms¹⁶ covering three categories. The total of these were armoured combat vehicles (73.4 per cent) and battle tanks (26.6 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Belgium were Czech Republic (72.6 per cent), Germany (26.6 per cent) and Spain (0.8 per cent).
- Belgium reported the export of 6,472 small arms and light weapons.
 Of these, the majority were assault rifles (57.6 per cent), portable anti-tanks missile launchers and rocket systems (16.7 per cent) and heavy machine guns (12.7 per cent).
- The main importer of SALW from Belgium was Ukraine.
- Under voluntary national categories, Belgium also provided data on ML1 exports with a total value of €207.3m (US\$229.1m).¹⁷
- In terms of the value of arms reported under voluntary national categories, the main importers from Belgium were the United States (33 per cent), France (11.9 per cent) and Lithuania (6.5 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- Belgium reported imports from 27 countries in 2023. Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (India and Belarus).
- Belgium reported the import of 40 major conventional arms, all were armoured combat vehicles from Italy.
- Belgium reported the import of 1,305 small arms and light weapons.
 The total of these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (62.8 per cent) and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (37.2 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Belgium were Germany (98.2 per cent) and Norway (1.8 per cent).
- Under voluntary national categories, Belgium also provided data on ML1 imports with a total value of €47.6m (US\$43.1m).¹⁸
- In terms of the value of arms reported under voluntary categories, the main exporters to Belgium were the United States (24.9 per cent), the United Kingdom (16.5 per cent) and Japan (13.1 per cent).

¹⁵ Belgium also reported exports to one non-UN member (Taiwan).

¹⁶ Belgium classified its exports of missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine, so the total number of transfers is likely higher.

¹⁷ Currency conversion via XE.com, "€/US\$ 2023 Exchange Rate": https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=EUR&view=5Y.

¹⁸ Ibid

BELIZE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

BENIN



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Benin continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports. Benin continued to report **Actual Numbers** of light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Benin disaggregated numbers for its light weapons imports, both by sub-category of arms and by exporting state.

Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report.

Benin provided descriptions for all its imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Benin could provide comments describing the nature of its reported imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Benin submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

- Benin reported imports from one ATT State Party in 2023.
- Benin did not report any major conventional arms imports in 2023.
- Benin reported the import of 300 40mm grenade launchers from People's Republic of China.

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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Yes - On time Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template No ATT reporting template 2021 national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to provide **Numbers and Values** for exports and imports of major conventional arms and SALW, but it did not specify whether transfers were **Authorized** or **Actual**.

GOOD PRACTICES

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided numbers, values, descriptions, and information about importing and exporting states (and state of origin in one case) for all reported exports and imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina provided disaggregated information on SALW exports and imports in terms of numbers, values, and importing or exporting state.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Bosnia and Herzegovina could provide comments describing the nature of its reported exports and imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not specify whether it reported Authorized or Actual exports or imports.

Bosnia and Herzegovina could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

 Bosnia and Herzegovina reported exports to a total of 13 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, six were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Ethiopia and Jordan).¹⁹

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 6,383 major conventional arms with a total value of €69.6m (US\$66.9), covering two categories.²⁰ In terms of value, these were large-calibre artillery systems (96.5 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (3.5 per cent).
- The main importers were NATO/Germany (88.3 per cent) and Congo (4.5 per cent)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the export of 6,166 small arms for a total value of €10.3m (US\$11.4m),²¹ covering four subcategories. Of these, the majority were mortars of calibres less than 75 mm (94.7 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (5 per cent), and rifles and carbines (0.3 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Bosnia and Herzegovina were Germany (85.3 per cent), Congo (9.4 per cent) and Austria (3.6 per cent).

- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported imports from 14 countries in 2023. Of these, 12 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of eight major conventional arms with a total value of €334,977 (US\$370,140).²² All were armoured combat vehicles from Canada.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina reported the import of 11,819 small arms with a total value of €8.1m (US\$8.9m),²³ covering three subcategories. They were revolvers and self-loading pistols (84.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (15.3 per cent) and sub-machine guns (0.1 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Czech Republic (69.1 per cent), Croatia (8.4 per cent) and United States (6.6 per cent).

¹⁹ Bosnia and Herzegovina also reported exports to two non-UN members (NATO/Germany and 'SAD'). The ATT Monitor was unable to identify the destination 'SAD', so it has been included as a non-UN member.

²⁰ Currency conversion via XE.com, "€/US\$ 2023 Exchange Rate": https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/.

²¹ Ibid

²² Ibid

²³ Ibid.

BOTSWANA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Botswana's reporting changed in its 2023 annual report, submitting 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, after reporting privately in 2022.

GOOD PRACTICES

Botswana submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

Botswana made its report publicly available for the first time.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Botswana did not complete all boxes of the front-page' box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Botswana submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

• Botswana submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

BRAZIL

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?	Yes - On time	Was the 202	3 annual repoi	rt made public	?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which	ch reports were due?	2019 🗶	2020 🗸	2021 🗸	2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available	?		2020 🗶	2021 💢	2022 💢	2023 💢

BULGARIA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Bulgaria continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons exports.

Bulgaria continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Bulgaria provided disaggregated numbers for its SALW and major conventional arms exports and imports, both by arms category and sub-categories and by importing and exporting State.

Bulgaria included descriptions for all its reported major conventional arms transfers and most of its SALW exports and imports.

Bulgaria included descriptions under the 'others' light weapons exports category.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Bulgaria excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Bulgaria could provide more descriptions on exports and imports of revolvers and self-loading pistols and rifles and carbines.

Bulgaria could provide comments on its transfers.

Bulgaria could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Bulgaria reported exports to 30 countries in 2023. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and eight were non-State Parties (Algeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Somalia and Uzbekistan).
- Bulgaria reported the export of 1,350 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, these were largecalibre artillery systems (90.3 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (9.6 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (0.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Bulgaria were the United States (43.3 per cent), Romania (23.9 per cent) and Nigeria (14.8 per cent).
- Bulgaria reported the export of 113,198 small arms and light weapons, covering 11 sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (37.5 per cent), portable anti-tank guns (36.1 per cent), and rifles and carbines (11.3 per cent).
- The main importers of SALW from Bulgaria were Poland (31.4 per cent), United States (14.7 per cent) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (12.5 per cent).

- Bulgaria reported imports from 23 countries in 2023. Of these, 19 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Jordan).
- Bulgaria reported the import of 1,314 major conventional arms, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were largecalibre artillery systems (90.9 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (9.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Bulgaria were Serbia (68 per cent), Hungary (22.8 per cent) and Czech Republic (8.2 per cent).
- Bulgaria reported the import of 16,908 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (29.8 per cent), assault rifles (26.1 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (25.9 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Bulgaria were Slovakia (14.7 per cent), Czech Republic (13.9 per cent) and Austria (12.7 per cent).

BURKINA FASO

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 💢 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 📝 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Burkina Faso continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Burkina Faso continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Burkina Faso submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2023.

Burkina Faso provided comments describing the nature of most of its small arms and light weapons imports.

Burkina Faso provided disaggregated numbers for its SALW and major conventional arms imports by arms category and sub-category.

Burkina Faso filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on the state of origin of some of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Burkina Faso excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Burkina Faso aggregated countries supplying its SALW imports, making it impossible in some cases to determine the number of small arms that each State exported.

Burkina Faso could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of more of its reported imports.

Burkina Faso could indicate clearly that there were no reported imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Burkina Faso submitted a 'nil' report on exports.

- Burkina reported imports from 15 countries in 2023. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Egypt and Russian Federation).
- Burkina Faso reported the import of 50 major conventional arms, all were armoured combat vehicles from the United Arab Emirates.
- Burkina Faso reported the import of 142,344 small arms and light weapons covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (88.6 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (7.2 per cent), and rifles and carbines (3.5 per cent).

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CABO VERDE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X

2020 **X**

2021 🗶

2022 **X**

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

CAMEROON

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 🗸

2020 🗸

2021 **X**

2022 **X**

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2019 **X**

2020 X



CANADA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons? Unspecified – UNROCA template ²⁴	What reporting template was used? UNROCA template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Canada continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Canada continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Canada provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Canada provided comments for all its transfers. It submitted descriptions for some major conventional arms and small arms exports, and descriptions for some imports. It included descriptions of all light weapons imports.

Canada indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Canada specified where information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and for which subcategory of arms (imports of some missiles and missile launchers).

Canada clarified descriptions of the reported imports under the light weapons 'others' category.

Canada filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on the state of origin of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Canada could provide more descriptions describing the nature of all reported exports and imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Canada reported exports to nine countries in 2023. Of these, five were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Saudi Arabia).
- Canada reported the export of 690 major conventional arms, covering five categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were armoured combat vehicles (52.2 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (45.9 per cent) and battle tanks (1.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Canada were Ukraine (91.3 per cent), Saudi Arabia (5.8 per cent) and United States (0.9 per cent).
- Canada reported the export of 53,542 small arms and light weapons, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (72.5 per cent), rifles and carbines (26.4 per cent) and light machine guns (1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Canada were Ukraine (99.9 per cent) and France (0.1 per cent).

- Canada reported imports from eight countries in 2023. Of these, seven were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Canada reported the import of 42 major conventional arms,²⁵ covering two categories. These were missiles and missile launchers (73.8 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (26.2 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional arms to Canada were the United States (90.5 per cent) and Belgium (9.5 per cent)
- Canada reported the import of 58,984 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (96.3 per cent), others (light weapons) (2.3 per cent), and rifles and carbines (1.4 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Canada were the United States (91.7 per cent), Italy (5.1 per cent) and Germany (1.4 per cent).

²⁴ Canada used a UNROCA template that does not allow States to specify whether they are withholding data for commercial or national security-related reasons, but indicated in the text of the report that it withdrew some information.

²⁵ Canada classified some imports of missiles from the United States, so the total number of transfers is likely higher.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 **X**

2020 **X**

2021 **X**

2022 **X**

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

CHAD

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 **X**


2020 X

2021 **X**

2022 **X**

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?



CHILE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ Unspecified -What reporting template National template national security-related' reasons? Not indicated was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Chile's reporting changed in its 2023 annual report with the introduction of its own national reporting template.

In 2023, Chile reported **Numbers** of small arms exports and provided information on exports of parts and components. In 2022, it reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Chile provided disaggregated numbers for its small arms exports, both by weapon type and by importing state.

Chile provided numbers and descriptions for all its exports.

Chile indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Chile reported exports of parts and components.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Unlike that of the ATT's annual reporting template, the format used in Chile's national report does not specify whether transfers were authorized or actual, whether Chile has submitted a 'nil' report, and whether it has withheld information for any commercial sensitivity/national security-related reasons. In future years, Chile's national reporting format could be amended to include this information.

In its 2023 report, Chile did not include a section on imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Chile reported exports to two State Parties in 2023.
- Chile did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Chile reported the export of 630 small arms and light weapons which consisted of sub-machine guns and carbines transferred to Canada.
- Chile reported the export of 3,095 parts and components.
 The importers of parts and components from Chile were Canada (99.7 per cent) and Colombia (0.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

 Chile did not report imports of major conventional arms or small arms and light weapons in its 2023 annual report.

COSTA RICA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template No ATT reporting template 2021 national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Costa Rica continued not to report exports of major conventional arms and continued to report Authorized and Actual Numbers²⁶ of temporary exports of small arms.

Costa Rica continued to report **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

Costa Rica continued to report **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of additional temporary exports and of additional commercial imports under voluntary national categories.

GOOD PRACTICES

Costa Rica provided descriptions and comments for all its reported exports and imports.

Costa Rica reported temporary exports.

Costa Rica reported disaggregated imports of ammunition under voluntary national categories.

Costa Rica reported additional information on exports and imports under voluntary national categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Costa Rica could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Costa Rica continued to aggregate States making it impossible in some cases to determine from and to where items were imported or exported.

Costa Rica did not provide the currency of 'values', therefore it likely used the column 'values' of the transfer to indicate 'Number of items'.

Costa Rica did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

Costa Rica could indicate which exports and imports were authorized, and which ones were actual in the cases where both boxes were ticked.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Costa Rica reported exports to four countries in 2023. Of these, three were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Costa Rica did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Costa Rica reported the temporary export of 45 small arms and light weapons.²⁷ Thirteen of them were rifles and carbines. Costa Rica reported the export of the additional 32 small arms under voluntary national categories, as semi-automatic pistols (90.6 per cent of the arms under voluntary national categories) and rifles (9.4 per cent).

- Costa Rica did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Costa Rica reported imports of 7,875 small arms and light weapons. Of these, 1,553 were rifles and carbines. It reported the import of the additional 6,322 small arms under voluntary national categories, as pistols and revolvers.
- Under voluntary national categories, Costa Rica also reported the import of 16.7m units of ammunition.

²⁶ Costa Rica provided some information on transfers in the column 'values'. The ATT Monitor chose to classify Costa Rica's reporting by number rather than monetary value because the original report omitted a currency specification, and the reported figures were too low to plausibly represent financial values.

²⁷ The ATT Monitor chose to classify Costa Rica's reporting by number rather than monetary value because the original report omitted a currency specification, and the reported figures were too low to plausibly represent financial values.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X	2023 💢

CROATIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🔏 2022 🔏	2023 X

CYPRUS

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🕅 2020 🕅 2021 🕅 2022 🗸	2023 X

CZECH REPUBLIC

Yes - On time Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template No ATT online reporting tool national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

The Czech Republic continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Czech Republic provided disaggregated numbers for all its exports and imports, both by arms category and by importing and exporting state.

The Czech Republic clarified descriptions of the reported exports/ imports under the small arms and light weapons 'others' category.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Czech Republic could provide more comments and descriptions on the nature of all its exports and imports of SALW and major conventional arms.

The Czech Republic could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- The Czech Republic reported exports to 64 countries in 2023.
 Of these, 42 were ATT States Parties, ten were Signatories and twelve were non-State Parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Viet Nam).
- The Czech Republic reported the export of 3,889 major conventional arms, covering six categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were MANPADS (79.9 per cent), unmanned combat vehicles (8.4 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (5.6 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from the Czech Republic were Ukraine (89.8 per cent), United States (4.7 per cent) and Bulgaria (3.2 per cent).

- The Czech Republic reported the export of 61,118 small arms and light weapons, covering eleven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (25,6 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (24.8 per cent) and portable anti-tank guns (21 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from the Czech Republic were Ukraine (18.9 per cent), Slovakia (17.1 per cent) and Indonesia (7.6 per cent).

- The Czech Republic reported imports from 13 countries in 2023.
 Of these, eight were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Jordan and Pakistan).
- The Czech Republic reported the import of 2,160 major conventional arms items, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (97.2 per cent), MANPADS (2.3 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (0.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to the Czech Republic were Bulgaria (g2.6 per cent), Jordan (6.9 per cent) and United States (0.3 per cent).
- The Czech Republic reported the import of 2,521 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (47.8 per cent), assault rifles (28.6 per cent), and rifles and carbines (14.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to the Czech Republic were the United States (52.8 per cent), Israel (34.4 per cent) and Pakistan (6 per cent).

DENMARK



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Denmark's reporting changed in its 2023 annual report.

Denmark reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms exports, as opposed to 2022, when it reported **Actual and Authorized Numbers and Values**. Denmark reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. In 2022, it had mostly reported **Authorized Numbers**, but also reported some **Actual Numbers**.

Denmark continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports. It continued to report a combination of **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of small arms imports. It continued to report **Actual Numbers** of light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Denmark provided some descriptions and some comments of its reported exports and imports.

Denmark indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Denmark could provide more comments describing the nature of its reported exports and imports.

In some cases, Denmark aggregated importers and exporters of small arms as 'multiple states', sometimes making it impossible to determine from where these items were imported or to where they were exported.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Denmark reported exports of major conventional arms to five State Parties. It reported exports of small arms to 'multiple states'.
- Denmark reported the export of 2,715 major conventional weapons, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missile and missile launchers (99 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional weapons from Denmark were Slovakia (99 per cent) and Argentina (1 per cent).
- Denmark reported the export of 4,642 small arms and light weapons, covering three sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (65 per cent), others (small arms) (27.4 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (7.6 per cent).

- Denmark reported imports from six countries in 2023. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories. It also reported some imports of small arms from 'multiple states'.
- Denmark reported the import of 28 major conventional arms, covering three categories. These were armoured combat vehicles (71.4 per cent), manned combat aircraft (14.3 per cent) and missiles and missile launchers (14.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional arms to Denmark were Switzerland (71.4 per cent), followed by Israel and the United States (14.3 per cent each).
- Denmark reported the import of 14,020 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (48 per cent), others (small arms) (39.1 per cent), and revolvers and selfloading pistols (7.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Denmark were 'multiple states' (94.7 per cent), United States (4.4 per cent) and United Kingdom (0.9 per cent).

DOMINICA



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

The Dominican Republic continued to submit 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Dominican Republic submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Dominican Republic filled the box 'Contents of report' by stating that it had submitted 'nil' reports for exports and imports, but also annual reports on exports and imports of conventional arms.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

• The Dominican Republic submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

EL SALVADOR

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 💢 2021 💢 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

El Salvador continued to report no exports and **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no exports to report in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

El Salvador reported aggregated numbers of small arms imports, making it impossible to determine the number of small arms imported from each reported state.

El Salvador could indicate clearly that there were no reported imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

El Salvador could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of its reported imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

- El Salvador reported imports from seven countries in 2023.
 Of these, four were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- El Salvador did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- El Salvador reported the import of 3.913 small arms, covering two sub-categories. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (88.9 per cent) and rifles and carbines (11.1 per cent).

ESTONIA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Estonia's reporting changed in its 2023 annual report.

Estonia used an ATT reporting template in 2023, as opposed to 2022 when it used a national template.

Estonia reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. In 2022, it reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports.

Estonia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports. It reported a mix of **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Estonia provided disaggregated numbers for its small arms exports and small arms and major conventional arms imports, both by category or sub-category of arms and by importing or exporting State.

Estonia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific arms categories and sub-categories.

Estonia provided descriptions of all its major conventional arms imports.

Estonia provided descriptions of the reported exports/imports under the small arms 'others' category.

Estonia filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on the state of origin of some of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Estonia could provide descriptions and comments on the nature of all its reported exports and imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Estonia reported exports to five countries in 2023, all of which were ATT States Parties.
- Estonia did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Estonia reported the export of 209 small arms including rifles and carbines (51.7 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (37.3 per cent) and others (small arms) (11 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Estonia were Lithuania (51.2 per cent), Latvia (39.7 per cent) and Finland (5.7 per cent).

- Estonia reported imports from 20 countries in 2023. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Estonia reported the import of 5,977 major conventional arms, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were missiles and missile launchers (99.9 per cent) and large calibre artillery systems (0.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Estonia were South Africa (91.2 per cent), Germany (8.4 per cent) and Poland (0.3 per cent).
- Estonia reported the import of 1,890 small arms. These were revolvers and self-loading pistols (61.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (27.7 per cent) and others (10.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Estonia were Germany (31.3 per cent), Austria (23.7 per cent) and Italy (15.5 per cent).

FINLAND

Was the 2023 annual report Yes - Missed deadline Yes - Hybrid report²⁸ Was the 2023 annual report submitted? made public? Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template Yes ATT online reporting tool national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 X 2023 1//

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Finland submitted a public report on exports after submitting a private report in 2022.

Finland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and small arms exports.

Finland did not make its report on imports publicly available.

GOOD PRACTICES

Finland provided disaggregated numbers for its major conventional arms and small arms exports, both by arms category and by importing State.

Finland provided descriptions for all its exports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Finland could provide comments on the nature of all its reported exports.

Finland could make its report on imports publicly available.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Finland reported exports to 28 countries in 2023. Of these, 25 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Jordan).
- Finland reported the export of 28 armoured combat vehicles to Latvia.
- Finland reported the export of 1,410 rifles and carbines.
- The main importers of small arms from Finland were Canada (32.1 per cent), United States (22.7 per cent) and Switzerland (21.7 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

Finland reported imports privately.

FRANCE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template Unspecified -National template national security-related' reasons? Not indicated was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

France continued to report **Actual Numbers** of exports of major conventional arms and SALW.

France continued to report Actual Numbers of imports of SALW. As in its 2022 report, it did not report imports of major conventional arms.

GOOD PRACTICES

France provided clear, disaggregated data for every reported export and import.

France provided descriptions of items for all reported exports and imports. These descriptions named the type of weapons and, in some cases, provided additional details such as calibers. It also provided some comments describing the nature of some transfers.

France indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

France did not specify whether any information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

France could provide comments describing the nature of more of its reported transfers, especially of SALW imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- France reported exports to 31 countries in 2023. Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and four were non-State Parties (Indonesia, Morocco, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).
- France reported the export of 1,011 major conventional arms, covering seven categories. The majority of these were missile and missile launchers (70 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (20.9 per cent) and battle tanks (3.8 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from France were Ukraine (54 per cent), Lebanon (15.9 per cent) and Cyprus (11.7 per cent).
- France reported the export of 3,035 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (37.7 per cent), assault rifles (35.5 per cent) and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (10.4 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from France were Ukraine (56.3 per cent), United States (26.4 per cent) and Chad (4.2 per cent).

- France reported imports from six countries in 2023. Of these, five were ATT State Parties and one was a Signatory.
- France did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- France reported the import of 55,795 small arms and light weapons, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (79.5 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (17.3 per cent) and hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers (1.6 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to France were Belgium (62.6 per cent), Germany (19.8 per cent) and Austria (17.3 per cent).

ATT MONITOR 2025 ANNEX – COUNTRY PROFILES

GABON

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

91

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GEORGIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Yes - On time

Was the 2023 annual report made public?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 🗸

2020 🗸

2021 🗸

2022 🗸

2023 🗸

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2019 **X**

2020 🗶

2021 X

2022 X

2023 **X**



GERMANY

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template No ATT reporting template 2021 national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Germany continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports.

Germany continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Germany provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Germany reported temporary imports.

Germany provided descriptions of all its major conventional arms exports and imports, indicating the weapon model.

Germany provided comments describing the nature of most of its SALW imports as well as some comments on its SALW exports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Germany could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported exports and imports.

Germany could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Germany did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual exports of warships and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

 Germany reported exports to a total of 41 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 32 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and three were non-State Parties (Egypt, Indonesia and Iraq).²⁹

- Germany reported the export of 680 major conventional arms, covering five categories. The majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (73.7 per cent), battle tanks (12.1 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (11.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Germany were Ukraine (91.2 per cent), Slovakia (3.4 per cent) and Hungary (2.5 per cent).
- Germany reported the export of 57,563 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (63.8 per cent), recoilless rifles (27.9 per cent) and sub-machine guns (3.6 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Germany were the United Kingdom (27.3 per cent), Singapore (17.3 per cent) and France (17.1 per cent).

- Germany reported imports from 19 countries in 2023. Of these, 14 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Qatar).
- Germany reported the import of 276 major conventional arms items, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were missiles and missile launchers (94.2 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (5.8 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Germany were Israel (93.1 per cent), Italy (4.3 per cent) and Denmark (1.4 per cent).
- Germany reported the import of 1,574 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (51.6 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (21.3 per cent) and assault rifles (10.1 per cent).
- Germany reported 'Up to 201' temporary imports of light machine guns from the Netherlands, 'Up to 100' temporary imports of light machine guns from Norway, and 'Up to 303' temporary imports of light machine guns from Sweden.
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Germany were Belgium (58.1 per cent), Israel (13.3 per cent) and Sweden (7.2 per cent).

GHANA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X 2023 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X 2023 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

GREECE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

2019 2020 2021 2022 X

GRENADA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GUATEMALA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?					No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 💢	2020 💢	2021 🗸	2022 X	2023 💢
Were submitted reports made publicly available?			2021 X		

GUINEA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GUINEA-BISSAU

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

GUYANA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

HONDURAS



HUNGARY

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template Yes ATT reporting template 2016 was used? national security-related' reasons? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Hungary continued to report **Actual Numbers** of exports and imports of major conventional arms and SALW.

GOOD PRACTICES

Hungary provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Hungary provided descriptions for all reported exports and imports and comments for most of its exports and imports describing the type of weapon and the use of the item.

Hungary filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on the state of origin of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Hungary excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Hungary reported exports to 12 countries in 2023. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Qatar).
- Hungary reported the export of 303 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, these were largecalibre artillery systems (99 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (0.7 per cent) and manned attack helicopters (0.3 per cent).

- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Hungary were Bulgaria (99 per cent), Czech Republic (0.3 per cent) and Georgia (0.3 per cent).
- Hungary reported the export of 1,623 small arms and light weapons, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (45.7 per cent), revolvers and selfloading pistols (38.9 per cent) and mortars of calibres less than 75mm (12.3 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Hungary were the Czech Republic (35.7 per cent), Germany (18.1 per cent) and Bulgaria (15.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- Hungary reported imports from 17 countries in 2023. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Hungary reported the import of 438 major conventional arms, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were large calibre artillery systems (92.9 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (4.3 per cent) and battle tanks (1.4 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Hungary were Bosnia and Herzegovina (91.3 per cent), Germany (5.5 per cent) and Türkiye (1.8 per cent).
- Hungary reported the import of 4,621 small arms and light weapons, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (69.7 per cent), revolvers and selfloading pistols (20.6 per cent) and mortars of calibres less than 75mm (4.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Hungary were Germany (26.2 per cent), Austria (13.8 per cent) and Belgium (10.8 per cent).

ICELAND



IRELAND



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Ireland's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Ireland reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. In 2022, it reported a combination of **Authorized Numbers** and some **Values** of small arms exports.

Ireland did not tick the boxes of Authorized or Actual to report **Numbers** of SALW imports. In 2022, it only reported **Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Ireland provided some descriptions of its exports, including weapon type and nature of these transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Ireland continued to aggregate the final importing/exporting countries for most of its SALW transfers, making it impossible to determine how many items were transferred to or from specific countries.

Ireland could provide more comments and descriptions on the nature of all its reported transfers.

Ireland did not specify whether it reported Authorized or Actual exports of light weapons and Authorized or Actual imports in all categories and sub-categories.

Ireland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Ireland could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Ireland reported exports to 16 countries in 2023. Of these, 15 were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Ireland did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Ireland reported the export of 8,858 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were others (small arms) (64.1 per cent), rifles and carbines (17.7 per cent) and light weapons (aggregated) (13.7 per cent).

- Ireland reported imports from a total of eight countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, three were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Kyrgyzstan).³⁰
- Ireland did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Ireland reported the import of 5,416 small arms and light weapons.
 Of these, the majority were light weapons (aggregated) (50 per cent), others (small arms) (47.8 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (2.1 per cent).

ITALY

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT online reporting tool
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Italy's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Italy continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Italy continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms imports. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW, similarly to 2022 when it reported mostly **Authorized Numbers** of SALW.

Italy specified that its definitions of the terms 'exports' and 'imports' cover export and import licenses **Authorized** in 2023³¹.

GOOD PRACTICES

Italy continued to provide clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import, including export destination and import source countries.

Italy indicated clearly that there were no reported exports and imports of major conventional arms and SALW in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Italy could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported exports and imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Italy reported exports to 47 countries in 2023. Of these, 28 were ATT States Parties, seven were Signatories and 12 were non-State Parties (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).
- Italy reported the export of 1,086 major conventional arms, covering seven categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missile and missile launchers (86.3 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (7.8 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (4.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Italy were Hungary (54.1 per cent), Türkiye (32.1 per cent) and Belgium (4.6 per cent).
- Italy reported the export of 533,714 small arms and light weapons, covering eight sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (68.1 per cent), assault rifles (29.8 per cent), and rifles and carbines (1.1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Italy were Qatar (86.6 per cent), Morocco (6.6 per cent) and Brazil (3 per cent).

- Italy reported imports from five countries in 2023. Of these, three were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Italy reported the import of one missile and missile launcher from Israel.
- Italy reported the import of 11,761 small arms and light weapons
 covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were handheld under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (42.5 per cent),
 sub-machine guns (30.6 per cent) and heavy-machine guns (21.7
 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Italy were the United States (77.7 per cent), Switzerland (21.3 per cent) and United Kingdom (1 per cent).

JAMAICA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Jamaica's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Jamaica continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and imports. In 2022, it had also reported **Actual Numbers** of major arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Jamaica indicated that exports and imports reported in the small arms 'others' sub-categories were shotguns.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Jamaica aggregated numbers of exports and imports of small arms items by country, making it impossible to determine how many weapons were exported to or imported from each reported state.

Jamaica could provide comments and descriptions on the nature and type of weapons of all its reported transfers.

Jamaica could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Jamaica reported exports to a total of ten countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.³²
- Jamaica did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Jamaica reported the export of 239 small arms and light weapons covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (56.1 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (33.1 per cent) and others (small arms, shotguns) (7.5 per cent).

- Jamaica reported imports from a total of 13 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.³³
- Jamaica did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Jamaica reported the import of 5,646 small arms covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and selfloading pistols (66.8 per cent), rifles and carbines (21.1 per cent) and others (small arms, shotguns) (12 per cent).

JAPAN



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Japan continued to report **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms exports.

Japan continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and light weapons imports, and **Actual Numbers** and **Values** of small arms imports.

Japan continued to provide information on small arms exports and imports organized according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Codes) of the World Customs Organization.

GOOD PRACTICES

Japan provided clear, disaggregated data for all its reported exports and imports.

Japan provided descriptions for some of its reported exports and imports.

Japan included both numbers and values for most of its small arms exports and imports.

Japan indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Japan's use of HS Codes for reporting its small arms exports and imports meant that the data provided did not correspond directly to the categorization within the ATT reporting template, making it difficult to comparatively analyze its transfer data.

Japan could provide comments describing the nature of its reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

 Japan reported exports to 12 countries in 2023. Of these, nine were ATT States Parties, one was a Signatory, and two were non-State Parties (Egypt and Kuwait).

99

- Japan did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Japan reported the export of 117,311 small arms and light weapons with a total value of JP¥5.8bn (US\$41.2m).³⁴
- The main importers of small arms from Japan were the United States (63.9 per cent), Belgium (25.4 per cent) and Australia (7 per cent).

- Japan reported imports from 13 countries in 2023. Of these, 11 were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Japan reported the import of five manned combat aircraft from the United States.
- Japan reported the import of 4,044 small arms and light weapons with a total value of JP¥1.7bn (US\$12.1m).³⁵ In terms of numbers, they were coded in HS Codes covering all small arms subcategories (99.5 per cent), mortars of calibres less than 75mm (0.3 per cent) and recoilless rifles (0.2 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Japan were Italy (36.3 per cent), Germany (20.6 per cent) and United States (15.2 per cent).

KAZAKHSTAN

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X	2023 🗶

LATVIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 / 2020 / 2021 X 2022 X	2023 X

LEBANON



LESOTHO



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Lesotho's reporting changed slightly in 2023.

Lesotho continued to report a 'nil' report for exports. Lesotho reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Lesotho submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no exports to report in its 2023 report.

Lesotho provided disaggregated numbers for its small arms imports, both by sub-category of arms and by exporting state.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Lesotho declared in the 'contents of reports' box that it submitted an annual report on conventional arms imports and did not submit a 'nil' report on conventional arms imports. While it reported some imports, it also filled parts of Annex 3b of the template, related to a 'nil' report for imports.

Lesotho could provide descriptions and comments on imports of revolvers and self-loading pistols.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

· Lesotho submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

 Lesotho reported imports of four revolvers and self-loading pistols from the Czech Republic.

LIBERIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

LIECHTENSTEIN

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Liechtenstein continued to report **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Liechtenstein provided clear, disaggregated data for all its small arms exports and imports.

Liechtenstein provided comments describing the nature of all its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Liechtenstein could provide descriptions for all its reported transfers.

Liechtenstein could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Liechtenstein reported exports to two ATT States Parties in 2023.
- Liechtenstein did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Liechtenstein reported the export of three small arms. These were rifles and carbines (66.7 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (33.3 per cent).
- The importers of small arms from Liechtenstein were Austria (66.7 per cent) and Germany (33.3 per cent).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- Liechtenstein reported imports from two ATT States Parties in 2023.
- Liechtenstein did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Liechtenstein reported the import of 40 small arms, covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (85 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (15 per cent).
- The exporters of small arms to Liechtenstein were Austria (55 per cent) and Germany (45 per cent).

LITHUANIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time Was the 2023 annual report made public? No 2020 🗸 Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

LUXEMBOURG

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Luxembourg's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Luxembourg reported **Actual and Authorized Numbers** of exports and imports of SALW. In 2022, it reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Luxembourg provided clear, disaggregated data for all its SALW exports and imports.

Luxembourg provided descriptions for all its reported exports and imports.

Luxembourg filled the column on 'state of origin', providing this information in its reported exports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Luxembourg could indicate which exports and imports were authorized, and which ones were actual in the cases where both boxes were ticked.

Luxembourg could provide more comments describing the nature of its exports and imports.


Luxembourg could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Luxembourg reported exports to six countries in 2023. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Luxembourg did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Luxembourg reported the export of 31 small arms and light weapons, covering three sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (41.9 per cent), light machine guns (32.3 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (25.8 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Luxembourg were Ukraine (32.3 per cent), Paraguay (22.6 per cent) and Canada (12.9 per cent).

- Luxembourg reported imports from five countries in 2023.
 Of these, four were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Luxembourg did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Luxembourg reported the import of 340 small arms and light weapons, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (44.7 per cent), submachine guns (44.7 per cent) and light machine guns (7.9 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Luxembourg were Germany (88.2 per cent), Belgium (7.9 per cent) and Switzerland (2.6 per cent).

MADAGASCAR



ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Madagascar did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

MALDIVES

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 7.36 2020 7 2021 7 2022 7	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X 2020 X 2021 V 2022 X	2023 X

MALI

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

MALTA

MAURITANIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

MAURITIUS

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 7 2020 7 2021 7 2022 7	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X	2023 X

MEXICO

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Mexico's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Mexico continued to report Numbers of small arms exports.

Mexico reported a mix of **Numbers**, **Actual Numbers** and, ticking both boxes, **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of SALW imports. In 2022, it only reported **Numbers** of SALW imports without specifying if these were Authorized or Actual.

GOOD PRACTICES

Mexico provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Mexico provided descriptions and comments describing the weapon model and the nature of each reported export and import.

Mexico provided information on the arms model and end users for light weapons imports in the 'others' sub-category.

Mexico filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on this in its reported small arms and light weapons imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Mexico could clarify for many categories and sub-categories of SALW imports whether the imports were actual or authorized.

Mexico could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Mexico did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template in its 2023 report.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Mexico reported exports to three countries in 2023. Of these, one was an ATT State Party, one was a Signatory and one was a non-State Party (Bolivia).
- Mexico did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Mexico reported the export of 14,252 small arms and light weapons, covering two sub-categories. The majority of these were rifles and carbines (100 per cent).
- The importers of small arms from Mexico were the United States (70.1 per cent), Guatemala (28.1 per cent) and Bolivia (1.8 per cent).

- Mexico reported imports from nine countries in 2023. Of these, six were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Mexico did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Mexico reported the import of 47,358 small arms and light weapons, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (60.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (11 per cent) and assault rifles (10.8 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Mexico were the United States (35.3 per cent), Israel (20.7 per cent) and Czech Republic (19.8 per cent).

MONACO

Yes - On time Yes Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Was the 2023 annual report made public? What reporting template Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ ATT reporting template 2021 No national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Monaco submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Monaco submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

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TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

• Monaco submitted a 'nil' report for imports.



MONTENEGRO



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Montenegro's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Montenegro continued to report a combination of **Actual and Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports. It reported **Authorized Numbers** of light weapons exports, as opposed to 2022 when it reported **Actual and Authorized Numbers** of light weapons exports.

Montenegro reported **Authorized Numbers** of SALW imports. In 2022, it reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports and **Actual and Authorized Numbers** of light weapons imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Montenegro provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Montenegro filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on this in its reported transfers.

Montenegro provided detailed descriptions for all its reported exports and imports, along with some comments describing the nature of some of its imports of small arms.

Montenegro indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Montenegro excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Montenegro could provide comments describing the nature of all reported exports and imports.

Montenegro could indicate which exports were authorized, and which ones were actual in the case where both boxes were ticked (revolvers and self-loading pistols).

Montenegro did not complete all boxes of the front-page' box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Montenegro reported exports to four countries in 2023. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and two were non-State Parties (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kyrgyzstan).
- Montenegro did not report exports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Montenegro reported the export of 9.985 small arms and light weapons, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (73.1 per cent), assault rifles (25.6 per cent) and sub-machine guns (1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Montenegro were Serbia (72.2 per cent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (25.5 per cent) and Austria (1.2 per cent).

- Montenegro reported imports from eleven countries in 2023. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Montenegro did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Montenegro reported the import of 8,878 small arms and light weapons, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (61.3 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (22.7 per cent), and rifles and carbines (15.8 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Montenegro were Serbia (23.8 per cent), Slovakia (17.4 per cent) and Czech Republic (13.1 per cent).

MOZAMBIQUE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2020 **X** 2021 **X**

202

2022 X

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

NAMIBIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

No

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2021 🗶

2022 X

2023 **X**

Were submitted reports made publicly available?



NETHERLANDS

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons? Unspecified – UNROCA template ³⁷	What reporting template was used? UNROCA template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

The Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

The Netherlands continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Netherlands provided clear, disaggregated information for each reported export and import.

The Netherlands provided descriptions for the majority of exports and all imports of major conventional arms as well as for some SALW exports and imports.

The Netherlands specified in some places where information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security related' reasons.

The Netherlands filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on this in some of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Netherlands could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all reported SALW exports and imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- The Netherlands reported exports to 33 countries in 2023.
 Of these, 29 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Jordan and Kyrgyzstan).
- The Netherlands reported the export of 157 major conventional arms, all of which were armoured combat vehicles.
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from The Netherlands were Ukraine (44.6 per cent), Jordan (33.8 per cent), and United Kingdom (19.1 per cent).
- The Netherlands reported the export of 15,140 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories.³⁸ Of these, the majority were sub-machine guns (58.8 per cent), light machine guns (23.3 per cent), and rifles and carbines (10.5 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from The Netherlands were the United States (78 per cent), Ukraine (11.1 per cent) and Belgium (4.7 per cent).

- The Netherlands reported imports from 25 countries in 2023.
 Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- The Netherlands reported the import of two major conventional arms, all of which were manned combat aircraft from Italy.
- The Netherlands reported the import of 15,019 small arms and light weapons, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were sub-machine guns (31.5 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (26.7 per cent) and light machine guns (19 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to The Netherlands were the Czech Republic (36.3 per cent), Austria (24 per cent) and Germany (10.3 per cent).

³⁷ The Netherlands used a UNROCA template that does not allow States to specify whether they are withholding data for commercial or national security-related reasons, however it indicated in the text of the report that it withdrew some information.

³⁸ The Netherlands also reported exports of heavy machine guns to Ukraine but withheld the number of items; therefore, the actual number is likely higher.

NEW ZEALAND

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

New Zealand's reporting changed slightly in 2023.

New Zealand continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and **Authorized Numbers** of small arms exports and exports of shotguns under voluntary national categories.

New Zealand reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms imports, SALW imports and imports of shotguns under voluntary national categories. In 2022, it did not report imports of major conventional arms and it reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports and imports of shotguns under voluntary national categories.

New Zealand specified that its definitions of the terms 'exports' and 'imports' covers: 'Issuing of an export/import permit'.

GOOD PRACTICES

New Zealand provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

New Zealand provided descriptions of major conventional arms exports and imports.

New Zealand indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

New Zealand reported exports and imports under voluntary national categories and provided extensive information in Annex 2 to clarify specific national definitions of Category VIII weapons (SALW) and its voluntary national categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

New Zealand could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its exports and imports.

New Zealand did not specify the exporting state for one import of light machine guns, instead referring to it as 'other'.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- New Zealand reported exports to a total of 35 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 22 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and six were non-State Parties (Azerbaijan, Fiji, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Tonga).³⁹
- New Zealand reported the export of 13 major conventional arms, all of which were armoured combat vehicles to Chile.
- New Zealand reported the export of 2,857 small arms, covering two sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (87 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (13 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from New Zealand were the United States (51.9 per cent), Australia (21.6 per cent) and France (5.7 per cent).
- New Zealand reported the export of 402 shotguns under national categories. The main importers were Australia (41.8 per cent), Vanuatu (9.5 per cent) and France (8.7 per cent).

- New Zealand reported imports from a total of 49 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 34 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and eight were non-State Parties (Azerbaijan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan and Tonga).⁴⁰
- New Zealand reported the import of 22 major conventional arms, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (81.8 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (18.2 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional arms to New Zealand were Australia (81.8 per cent) and United States (18.2 per cent).
- New Zealand reported the import of 26,378 small arms and light weapons, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (77.7 per cent), others (small arms) (15 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to New Zealand were the United States (18.8 per cent), Australia (16.6 per cent) and Finland (14.9 per cent).

³⁹ New Zealand also reported exports to a non-UN member (Cook Islands).

⁴⁰ New Zealand also reported imports from a former State (Yugoslavia). In addition, New Zealand also reported the import of one light machine gun from 'other'.

NIGER



NIGERIA



NIUE



NORWAY



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Norway's reporting changed slightly in 2023.

Norway reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and reported **Numbers** of light weapons exports. In 2022, it reported **Actual Numbers** of small arms exports.

Norway reported a mix of **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of imports of major conventional arms. In 2022, it reported **Actual Numbers**. Norway continued to report **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Norway provided clear, disaggregated data on the numbers of its reported exports and imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Norway did not report exporting/importing states, making it impossible to determine from where items were imported or to which country they were exported.

Norway excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

Norway could provide more descriptions and comments on its reported exports and imports.

Norway could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Norway reported the export of 12 major conventional arms, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were missiles and missile launchers (75 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (25 per cent).
- Norway reported the export of 702 light weapons (aggregated).

- Norway reported the import of 122 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, these were missiles and missile launchers (g1 per cent), battle tanks (5.7 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (3.3 per cent).
- Norway reported the import of 4,718 small arms and light weapons, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (53 per cent), light machine guns (23.5 per cent) and assault rifles (20.1 per cent).

PALAU

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template No ATT reporting template 2021 national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2020 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2020 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Palau continued to submit 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Palau submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly it had no transfers to report in 2023.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Palau did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Palau submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

• Palau submitted a 'nil' report for imports.



PANAMA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

In 2023, Panama submitted a public report after not providing a report in 2022.

Panama reported a 'nil' report for exports. Panama reported **Numbers** of small arms imports under voluntary national categories.

GOOD PRACTICES

Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

Panama indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Panama reported disaggregated small arms imports under voluntary national categories and provided extensive information in Annex 2 to clarify specific national definitions of Category VIII weapons (SALW) and its voluntary national categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Panama did not report exporting states making it impossible to determine from where small arms items were imported.

Panama did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual imports.

Panama filled the box 'contents of report' by stating that it had submitted a 'nil' report for exports and imports, and an annual report on imports of conventional arms. In the related sections of the report, Panama reported a 'nil' report for exports, but it reported some imports while also reporting a 'nil' report for imports in Annex 3b.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

· Panama submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

 Panama reported imports of 3,591 small arms under voluntary national categories. The majority were semi-automatic pistols (73.1 per cent), semi-automatic rifles (22.3 per cent) and semi-automatic shotguns (2.9 per cent).

PARAGUAY

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were du	e? 2021 🗸 2022 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2021 X 2022 X 2023 X



PERU

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Peru continued to submit a 'nil' report for exports.

Peru reported a combination of **Authorized** and both **Authorized** and **Actual Numbers** of its small arms imports, as well as their **Value**.

GOOD PRACTICES

Peru provided clear, disaggregated data for all reported imports.

Peru provided numbers and values for all reported imports.

Peru provided consistent and detailed descriptions and comments describing the nature and end-users of all reported imports.

Peru submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no exports to report in 2023.

Peru filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on this in its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Peru ticked both Authorized and Actual boxes for most of its SALW imports. Peru could indicate which transfers were authorized and which ones were actual instead of ticking both cells.

Peru could indicate clearly that there were no reported imports in specific arms categories and sub-categories rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

· Peru submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- Peru reported imports from eleven countries in 2023. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Peru did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Peru reported the import of 23,262 small arms and light weapons with a total value of US\$32.3m covering five sub-categories.⁴¹
- In terms of values, the majority of imports were assault rifles (86.5 per cent), others (semi-automatic pistols) (6.1 per cent) and others (carbines) (4.9 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of small arms to Peru were Israel (43 per cent), Brazil (20.4 per cent) and Türkiye (16.5 per cent).

PHILIPPINES

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

⁴¹ Peru reported the majority of its exports in US\$. Currency conversion via XE.com, "PEN/US\$ 2023 Exchange Rate": https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=103740000&From=PEN&To=USD.

POLAND



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Poland's reporting changed slightly in 2023.

Poland reported **Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports. In 2022, it reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Poland reported **Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW imports. In 2022, it did not report any major conventional arms imports and reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Poland provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Poland provided descriptions of items for most exports and imports of major conventional arms, including information on weapon types.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Poland did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual exports and imports.

Poland could provide comments describing the nature of its exports and imports of major conventional arms, and descriptions and comments describing the nature of its exports and imports of SALW.

Poland could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Poland excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Poland reported exports to 14 countries in 2023. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties and four were Signatories.
- Poland reported the export of 320 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were MANPADS (53.4 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (30.9 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (13.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Poland were Ukraine (39.7 per cent), Latvia (26.3 per cent) and Norway (21.9 per cent).
- Poland reported the export of 57,613 small arms and light weapons, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (42.7 per cent), hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (19.7 per cent), and rifles and carbines (15.5).
- The main importers of small arms from Poland were Ukraine (70.3 per cent), Czech Republic (8.8 per cent) and the Netherlands (6.7 per cent).

- Poland reported imports from 19 countries in 2023. Of these, 13 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Azerbaijan and Indonesia).
- Poland reported the import of 72 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, these were missiles and missile launchers (34.7 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (33.3 per cent) and battle tanks (32 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the exporters of major conventional arms to Poland were the Republic of Korea (61.1 per cent) and United States (38.9 per cent).
- Poland reported the import of 16,745 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (41.1 per cent), rifles and carbines (36.8 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (21.4 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Poland were Norway (39.3 per cent), United States (30.5 per cent) and Türkiye (17.7 per cent).

PORTUGAL



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Portugal continued to report Actual Numbers and Values of major conventional arms exports. It continued to report Actual Numbers and some Values of small arms exports, and Actual Numbers and Values of light weapons exports.

Portugal continued to report **Actual Numbers** and some **Values** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Portugal provided clear, disaggregated data on all reported exports and imports.

Portugal provided descriptions and comments for all its major conventional arms and light weapons exports. It provided descriptions for some of its small arms exports.

Portugal reported values of all major conventional arms and light weapons exports, and for some SALW exports and imports. It also provided values when the transfers were donations.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Portugal could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported transfers.

Portugal could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Portugal could provide values for all its reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Portugal reported exports to 31 countries in 2023. Of these, 26 were ATT States Parties, four were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Kuwait).
- Portugal reported the export of 22 major conventional arms, all of which were armoured combat vehicles to Ukraine.
- Portugal reported the export of 105,091 small arms and light weapons covering six sub-categories, with a total value of €4.2m (US\$4.6m).⁴² In terms of numbers, the majority were rifles and carbines (81.5 per cent), assault rifles (8.3 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (7.6 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Portugal were the United States (65.3 per cent), Belgium (24.1 per cent) and Australia (2.7 per cent).

- Portugal reported imports from 26 countries in 2023. Of these, 23 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Portugal did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Portugal reported the import of 11,389 small arms and light weapons, covering three sub-categories, with a total value of €74,491.81 (US\$82,320.90).⁴³ In terms of numbers, these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (51.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (47.5 per cent) and sub-machine guns (0.9 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Portugal were Spain (48.8 per cent), Belgium (16.9 per cent) and Italy (15 per cent).

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

The Republic of Korea continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms and of small arms exports. In 2023, it reported **Authorized Numbers** of light weapons exports, as opposed to 2022 when no such transfers were reported.

The Republic of Korea reported **Authorized Numbers** of conventional arms and small arms imports, as opposed to 2022 when it only reported **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

The Republic of Korea provided its own definitions of the terms 'exports' and 'imports', indicating in both instances that this data is based on licenses granted (Authorized) and not on Actual transfers.

GOOD PRACTICES

The Republic of Korea provided clear, disaggregated information on its reported exports and imports.

Except in one case, the Republic of Korea provided descriptions of all its reported transfers.

The Republic of Korea indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Republic of Korea excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

The Republic of Korea could provide comments on the nature of all its reported transfers.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- The Republic of Korea reported exports to seven countries in 2023. Of these, four were ATT States Parties and three were non-State Parties (Nepal, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).
- The Republic of Korea reported the exports of 196 major conventional arms, covering four categories. The majority of these were MANPADS (39.3 per cent), large-caliber artillery systems (26 per cent), and missiles and missile launchers (25.5 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the majority of exports were to Saudi Arabia (64.8 per cent), Poland (30.6 per cent) and Estonia (3.1 per cent).
- The Republic of Korea reported the export of 13,809 small arms and light weapons, covering four sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (77.9 per cent), rifles and carbines (13.8 per cent) and light machine guns (8.3 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from the Republic of Korea were Nepal (55.4 per cent), Philippines (41.7 per cent) and Finland (2.8 per cent).

- The Republic of Korea reported imports from four countries in 2023. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- The Republic of Korea reported the import of 36 MANPADS from the United States.
- The Republic of Korea reported the import of 1,697 small arms.
 These were sub-machine guns (55 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (34.5 per cent) and assault rifles (10.5 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to the Republic of Korea were Israel (55 per cent), Austria (34.5 per cent) and United States (9.4 per cent).

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

The Republic of Moldova reported a 'nil' report for exports.

The Republic of Moldova continued to report **Actual Numbers and Values** of small arms imports

GOOD PRACTICES

The Republic of Moldova provided descriptions of the reported imports under the small arms 'others' category.

The Republic of Moldova provided both numbers and values of all reported imports.

The Republic of Moldova reported a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had nothing to report in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Republic of Moldova continued to aggregate countries supplying its small arms imports, making it impossible to determine the quantity of small arms that were imported from each country.

The Republic of Moldova could provide more descriptions and comments on imports of small arms.

The Republic of Moldova could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• The Republic of Moldova reported a 'nil' report for exports

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

- The Republic of Moldova reported imports from nine countries in 2023. Of these, eight were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- The Republic of Moldova did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- The Republic of Moldova reported the imports of 4,133 small arms with a total value of MDL 26.1m (US\$1.5m).⁴⁴ In terms of numbers, these were revolvers and self-loading pistols (81 per cent) and rifles and carbines (19 per cent).
- The Republic of Moldova reported imports of weapon parts and accessories in the sub-category 'others (small arms)' for a total of 360,42 kg and a value of over MDL 464.000 (US\$26.800).

REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA



ROMANIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons? Yes	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Romania's reporting changed slightly in its 2023 annual report.

Romania reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports, and **Actual and Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports. In 2022, it reported **Actual Numbers** of SALW exports.

Romania reported a mix of Actual and Actual and Authorized Numbers of major conventional arms imports. In 2022, it reported Actual Numbers of major conventional arms imports. It continued to report Actual Numbers of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Romania provided clear, disaggregated data on all reported exports and imports.

Romania provided descriptions on all its transfers and comments in most of its exports and imports, describing the nature of its transfers.

Romania indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in almost all categories and sub-categories of arms for which there were no transfers.

Romania filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on this in some of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Romania could indicate which exports were authorized and which were actual in the cases where both boxes were ticked.

Romania could provide comments on the nature of all its reported transfers.

Romania excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Romania reported exports to 13 countries in 2023. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Pakistan).
- Romania reported the export of 36 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, these were large calibre artillery systems (91.7 per cent), manned attack helicopters (5.5 per cent) and warships (2.8 per cent). Romania also reported these transfers in their Voluntary National Categories.
- In terms of numbers, the importers of major conventional arms from Romania were the United Kingdom (91.7 per cent), Pakistan (5.5 per cent) and Norway (2.8 per cent).
- Romania reported the export of 38,112 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (66.6 per cent), rifles and carbines (28.4 per cent) and light machine guns (3.9 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Romania were the United States (87.3 per cent), Czech Republic (10.7 per cent) and Bulgaria (1.8 per cent).

- Romania reported imports from 21 countries in 2023. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties and three were Signatories.
- Romania reported the import of 97 major conventional arms, covering six categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were armoured combat vehicles (34 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (34 per cent), and missile and missile launchers (18.6 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Romania were the United States (54.6 per cent), Bulgaria (34 per cent) and Poland (7.2 per cent).
- Romania reported the import of 10,959 small arms and light weapons. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (65.8 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (18.9 per cent) and assault rifles (6.6 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Romania were Germany (31.9 per cent), Italy (30.3 per cent) and Austria (8.5 per cent).

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X 2023 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X 2023 X 2022 X 2023 X

SAINT LUCIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAMOA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SAN MARINO



SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

SENEGAL

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?	time Was the 20	23 annual repor	t made public	?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports	vere due? 2019 🗸	2020 🗸	2021 🗸	2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 💢	2020 🗶	2021 🗶	2022 🗶	2023 X

SERBIA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Serbia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of exports of major conventional arms and SALW.

Serbia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of imports of major conventional arms and SALW.

GOOD PRACTICES

Serbia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Serbia provided descriptions and comments for some of its exports and imports.

Serbia filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on this in some of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Serbia could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported transfers.

Serbia could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Serbia did not provide descriptions of the exports reported under the small arms and light weapons 'others' sub-categories.

Serbia did not complete all boxes of the front-page' box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

 Serbia reported exports to a total of 39 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 21 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and 11 were non-State Parties (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda).⁴⁵

- Serbia reported the export of 21,765 major conventional arms, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (74 per cent) and large-calibre artillery systems (26 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Serbia were Bulgaria (45 per cent), United States (15.7 per cent) and Czech Republic (9.2 per cent).
- Serbia reported the export of 41,077 small arms and light weapons, covering ten sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (53.8 per cent), light machine guns (13.9 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (13.1 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Serbia were the United States (68.1 per cent), Nigeria (9.9 per cent) and Azerbaijan (4.9 per cent).

- Serbia reported imports from 23 countries in 2023. Of these, 18 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Belarus and Iran).
- Serbia reported the import of 6,507 major conventional arms, covering four categories. In terms of numbers the majority of these were large-calibre artillery systems (98.8 per cent), missiles and missile launchers (0.8 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (0.3 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Serbia were Croatia (98.8 per cent), Bulgaria (0.7 per cent) and Czech Republic (0.3 per cent).
- Serbia reported the import of 2,939 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (45.7 per cent), portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (26.3 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (18.7 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Serbia were Bulgaria (26.3 per cent), Italy (14.1 per cent) and Czech Republic (9.6 per cent).

SEYCHELLES



SIERRA LEONE



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Sierra Leone's reporting changed in its 2023 annual report.

Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for exports and reported **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of small arms imports. In 2022, it submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for exports, indicating clearly it had no exports to report in its 2023 report.

Sierra Leone provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported import.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Sierra Leone could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported transfers.

Sierra Leone could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

- Sierra Leone reported imports from three countries in 2023.
 Of these, two were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Sierra Leone did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Sierra Leone reported the import of 7,144 small arms and light weapons, covering three sub-categories. These were assault rifles (69.7 per cent), small arms (others, multi-purpose riot guns) (23.8 per cent), and revolvers and self-loading pistols (6.5 per cent).
- The exporters of small arms and light weapons to Sierra Leone were Bulgaria (69.7 per cent), People's Republic of China (24.9 per cent) and United Arab Emirates (5.4 per cent).

SLOVAKIA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Slovakia continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Slovakia provided clear, disaggregated data for each reported export and import.

Slovakia provided descriptions and comments describing the nature of most of its major conventional arms exports and imports as well as for some SALW exports and imports.

Slovakia indicated clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Slovakia could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its exports and imports.

Slovakia excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Slovakia reported exports to 46 countries in 2023. Of these, 37 were ATT States Parties, eight were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (India).
- Slovakia reported the export of 70,576 major conventional arms, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (99.6 per cent), battle tanks (0.3 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (0.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Slovakia were the Czech Republic (88.1 per cent), Poland (7.1 per cent) and Serbia (3 per cent).
- Slovakia reported the export of 92,712 small arms and light weapons, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were revolvers and self-loading pistols (81.1 per cent), submachine guns (9.1 per cent) and assault rifles (5.9 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Slovakia were Thailand (23,7 per cent), Austria (19,5 per cent) and Brazil (16,9 per cent).

- Slovakia reported imports from 20 countries in 2023. Of these, 17 were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (India).
- Slovakia reported the import of 60,800 major conventional arms, covering four categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missiles and missile launchers (99.5 per cent), battle tanks (0.3 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (0.1 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Slovakia were Italy (97.9 per cent), Türkiye (1.3 per cent) and Czech Republic (0.7 per cent).
- Slovakia reported the import of 14,454 small arms and light weapons, covering 10 sub-categories. Of these, the majority were hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (69.6 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (12.5 per cent), and rifles and carbines (12 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms to Slovakia were the Czech Republic (79.6 per cent), Germany (6.5 per cent) and United States (3 per cent).

SLOVENIA



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

In 2023, Slovenia submitted a public report, after submitting a private report in 2022.

Slovenia reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Slovenia reported Actual Numbers of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Slovenia provided clear, disaggregated numbers for its major conventional arms exports and SALW exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and/or exporting state.

Slovenia provided descriptions for all its transfers, including comments for all its imports and the majority of its exports.

Slovenia specified both numbers and values of all reported exports and imports.

Slovenia filled the column on 'state of origin', providing information on the state of origin of some of its reported transfers.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Slovenia could provide comments describing the nature of all its reported small arms exports.

Slovenia could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific SALW categories and sub-categories, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank. Slovenia used this practice only for exports and imports of major conventional arms.

Slovenia did not specify whether it reported authorized or actual exports of light machine guns.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Slovenia reported exports to 14 countries in 2023. Of these, ten were ATT States Parties, two were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Indonesia and Kuwait).
- Slovenia reported the export of seven major conventional arms, all of which were large-calibre artillery systems to Montenegro.
- Slovenia reported the export of 2,676 small arms and light weapons with a total value of €4.9m (US\$5.4m),⁴⁶ covering five sub-categories. Of these, in terms of value, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (95.8 per cent) and revolvers and self-loading pistols (4.2 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of small arms from Slovenia were Germany (76.2 per cent), Indonesia (15.4 per cent) and France (2.8 per cent).

- Slovenia reported imports from five ATT States Parties.
- Slovenia did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Slovenia reported the import of 2,632 small arms and light weapons with a total value of €4.7m (US\$5.2m),⁴⁷ covering three sub-categories. In terms of value, these were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (99 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (0.8 per cent) and light machine guns (0.2 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Slovenia were Germany (99 per cent), Slovakia (0.8 per cent) and Czech Republic (0.2 per cent).

SOUTH AFRICA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - Missed deadline Was the 2023 annual report made public? Yes Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ What reporting template Yes ATT reporting template 2016 national security-related' reasons? was used? Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸 Were submitted reports made publicly available? 2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 2022 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

South Africa's reporting changed slightly in 2023.

South Africa reported **Authorized and Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports, as opposed to 2022, where it reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms exports. It continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of exports of SALW.

South Africa continued to report **Authorized Numbers** of small arms imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

South Africa provided descriptions for all its exports and imports as well as comments describing the nature of all its major conventional arms and light weapons exports, and some of its small arms exports.

South Africa provided disaggregated information of all importing/exporting states.

South Africa provided descriptions of the reported exports/imports under the small arms and light weapons 'others' categories.

South Africa indicated that there were no reported exports or imports in specific major conventional arms categories.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

South Africa excluded some data for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons, but it did not specify where or what type of information was withheld.

South Africa did not report numbers for the majority of its small arms exports and none of its imports.

South Africa could provide more comments describing the nature of all its reported small arms exports and imports.

South Africa did not indicate whether the exports of some armoured combat vehicles were authorized or actual.

South Africa could indicate which exports were authorized, and which ones were actual in the case where both boxes were ticked (armoured combat vehicles).

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- South Africa reported exports to 23 countries in 2023. Of these, 16 were ATT States Parties, six were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Kenya).
- South Africa reported the export of 117 major conventional arms, all of which were armoured combat vehicles.
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from South Africa were Côte d'Ivoire (55.6 per cent), Kenya (29.9 per cent) and Thailand (5.1 per cent).
- South Africa reported the export of 2,175 small arms and light weapons, covering four sub-categories. These were rifles and carbines (76.8 per cent) and others (small arms) (23.2 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from South Africa were Zimbabwe (99.8 per cent) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.2 per cent). South Africa reported other importers, but did not report the numbers of transfers to these States.

- South Africa reported imports from 25 countries in 2023. Of these, 20 were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and two were non-State Parties (Pakistan and Russian Federation).
- South Africa did not report any major conventional arms imports in its 2023 report.
- South Africa reported imports of small arms, covering three sub-categories. While South Africa indicated the exporting states associated with these transfers, it did not provide numbers or values for these reported imports.

SPAIN

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons? Unspecified – Not indicated	What reporting template was used? ATT online reporting
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Spain continued to report **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Spain continued to report Actual Numbers of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Spain provided clear, disaggregated numbers for all its exports and imports, both by weapon type and by importing and/or exporting state.

Spain provided descriptions for some of its imports of small arms and comments for some of its exports of major conventional arms.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Spain did not specify whether any information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons.

Spain could provide descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its reported exports and imports.

Spain could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms, rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Spain did not indicate whether its exports of warships were authorized or actual.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Spain reported exports to 17 countries in 2023. Of these, eleven were ATT States Parties, three were Signatories and three were non-State Parties (Brunei Darussalam, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia).
- Spain reported the export of 353 major conventional arms, covering six categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were large-calibre artillery systems (69.7 per cent), armoured combat vehicles (17.3 per cent), and missile and missile launchers (8.2 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Spain were the Philippines (35.7 per cent), Switzerland (21.2 per cent) and Ukraine (20.4 per cent).
- Spain reported the export of 12,923 small arms and light weapons, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were handheld under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (66,7 per cent), portable anti-tank guns (28.1 per cent), and portable antitank missile launchers and rocket systems (4,3 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Spain were Estonia (73.7 per cent), Georgia (10.8 per cent) and Pakistan (6.3 per cent).

- Spain reported imports from four countries in 2023. Of these, two were ATT States Parties and two were Signatories.
- Spain did not report imports of major conventional arms in its 2023 annual report.
- Spain reported the import of 3.430 small arms and light weapons, covering five sub-categories. Of these, the majority were assault rifles (86.4 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (11 per cent) and light machine guns (1.3 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Spain were Israel (84.6 per cent), United States (12.8 per cent) and Belgium (1.9 per cent).

STATE OF PALESTINE

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?	No
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸	2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X	2023 🗶

SURINAME



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Suriname submitted a report for the first time.

Suriname submitted a 'nil' report for both exports and imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Suriname submitted 'nil' reports for both exports and imports, indicating clearly that it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Suriname did not complete all boxes of the front-page box 'Contents of report' of the ATT reporting template.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

• Suriname submitted a 'nil' report for exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

• Suriname submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

SWEDEN



REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Sweden continued to report **Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and 'classified' light weapons exports.

Sweden submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Sweden provided descriptions for all major conventional arms and light weapons exports.

Sweden specified where information was withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/national security-related' reasons and for which subcategory of arms (numbers of exports of recoilless rifles and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems).

Sweden indicated clearly that there were no reported exports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms.

Sweden submitted a 'nil' report for imports, indicating clearly that it had no transfers to report in its 2023 report.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Sweden could provide comments describing the nature of its exports.

Sweden aggregated the final importing countries of its light weapons exports.

Sweden did not indicate whether it reported actual or authorized numbers of major conventional arms and light weapons exports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Sweden reported exports to seven countries in 2023. Six were ATT States Parties and one was a Signatory.
- Sweden reported the export of 16 major conventional arms, covering three categories. In terms of numbers, these were armoured combat vehicles (50 per cent), large-calibre artillery systems (25 per cent) and manned combat aircraft (25 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Sweden were Norway (50 per cent), Brazil (25 per cent) and United Kingdom (25 per cent).
- Sweden reported the export of light weapons, all of which were recoilless rifles and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems. Since Sweden withheld the number of items involved in each transfer, it is not possible to determine how many arms were exported to each recipient.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: IMPORT DATA

Sweden submitted a 'nil' report for imports.

SWITZERLAND

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes - On time	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity/ national security-related' reasons?	What reporting template was used? ATT reporting template 2021
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

Switzerland's reporting changed slightly in 2023.

Switzerland reported **Actual Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and **Authorized Numbers** of SALW exports. In 2022, it reported **Authorized Numbers** of major conventional arms and SALW exports.

Switzerland continued to report Actual Numbers of major conventional arms imports. It reported Actual Numbers of small arms and a mix of Actual and Authorized Numbers of light weapons imports. In 2022, it reported Authorized Numbers of SALW imports.

GOOD PRACTICES

Switzerland provided clear, disaggregated data on each reported export and import.

Switzerland provided descriptions and comments of the weapon model and nature of its major conventional arms exports and the majority of its conventional arms imports. It also provided descriptions and comments for some of its SALW imports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Switzerland could provide more descriptions and comments describing the nature of all its SALW exports and imports.

Switzerland could indicate clearly that there were no reported exports or imports in specific categories and sub-categories of arms rather than leaving relevant sections of the reporting template blank.

Switzerland did not indicate whether its exports of heavy machine guns were authorized or actual.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- Switzerland reported exports to 41 countries in 2023. Of these, 35 were ATT States Parties, five were Signatories and one was a non-State Party (Qatar).
- Switzerland reported the export of 617 major conventional arms, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were missiles and missile launchers (92.1 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (7.9 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from Switzerland were Germany (92.4 per cent), Denmark (4.7 per cent) and Sweden (1.6 per cent).
- Switzerland reported the export of 29,140 small arms and light weapons, covering seven sub-categories. Of these, the majority were sub-machine guns (43.5 per cent), revolvers and self-loading pistols (21.3 per cent), and rifles and carbines (20.2 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from Switzerland were the United States (77.4 per cent), Canada (5.3 per cent) and Germany (2.8 per cent).

- Switzerland reported imports from seven ATT States Parties.
- Switzerland reported the import of 102 major conventional arms, covering two categories. In terms of numbers, these were largecalibre artillery systems (98 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (2 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main exporters of major conventional arms to Switzerland were Spain (98 per cent) and Sweden (2 per cent).
- Switzerland reported the import of 1,263 small arms and light weapons, covering six sub-categories. Of these, the majority were portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (76.3 per cent), rifles and carbines (22.3 per cent), and revolvers and selfloading pistols (0.8 per cent).
- The main exporters of small arms and light weapons to Switzerland were Sweden (43.3 per cent), United Kingdom (33 per cent) and Finland (22.3 per cent).

TOGO

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X 2023 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X 2023 X 2022 X 2023 X

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TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

TUVALU

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?

Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?

2019 X 2020 X 2021 X 2022 X 2023 X

Were submitted reports made publicly available?

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Was the 2023 annual report submitted? Yes – Missed deadline	Was the 2023 annual report made public?
Was data withheld for 'commercial sensitivity /national security-related' reasons? Unspecified – UNROCA template	What reporting template was used? UNROCA Template
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 🗸 2020 🗸 2021 🗸 2022 🗸 2023 🗸

REPORTING PRACTICE SUMMARY - 2023

The United Kingdom continued to report **Numbers** of major conventional arms exports and imports and of SALW exports.

GOOD PRACTICES

The United Kingdom provided clear, disaggregated data for all its exports and imports.

The United Kingdom provided descriptions and comments on the nature of most of its major conventional arms exports and imports and some SALW exports.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT


The United Kingdom could provide comments describing the nature of all its reported exports and imports.

TRANSFER SUMMARY - 2023: EXPORT DATA

- The United Kingdom reported exports to a total of 77 countries and non-UN members in 2023. Of these, 48 were ATT States Parties, 12 were Signatories, 13 were non-State Parties (Armenia, Bhutan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam).⁴⁸
- The United Kingdom reported the export of 1,340 major conventional arms, covering six categories. In terms of numbers, the majority of these were missile and missile launchers (38.8 per cent), manned combat aircraft (31.9 per cent) and armoured combat vehicles (14.7 per cent).
- In terms of numbers, the main importers of major conventional arms from the United Kingdom were Ukraine (44.3 per cent), Qatar (37.3 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (13.4 per cent).
- The United Kingdom reported the export of 16,292 small arms and light weapons, covering nine sub-categories. Of these, the majority were rifles and carbines (86.7 per cent), assault rifles (9.2 per cent) and sub-machine guns (2.3 per cent).
- The main importers of small arms from the United Kingdom were the United States (47.9 per cent), Germany (9 per cent) and Japan (5.2 per cent).

- The United Kingdom reported imports from one Signatory.
- The United Kingdom reported the import of 16 major conventional arms, covering two categories. These were manned attack helicopters (62.5 per cent) and manned combat aircrafts (37.5 per cent) from the United States.
- The United Kingdom did not report imports of small arms and light weapons.

URUGUAY



ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

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ZAMBIA

Was the 2023 annual report submitted?							
Were reports submitted in previous years in which reports were due?	2019 🗸	2020 🗸	2021 🗸	2022 💢	2023 🗶		
Were submitted reports made publicly available?	2019 X	2020 X	2021 X				

