

CHAPTER 2.1: ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: ASSESSING THE FIRST YEAR OF ATT ANNUAL REPORTS

Transparency and reporting are essential to the effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Without an enforcement or verification mechanism in the Treaty itself, the only means by which States Parties and civil society can be certain that a country is fulfilling its obligations, especially concerning Articles 6 and 7 regarding arms exports, is to examine what has been reported by States Parties themselves.

Article 13 of the ATT requires that each State Party submit an Annual Report concerning authorized or actual arms exports and imports. This chapter examines reports submitted by States Parties for 2015 and assesses whether the information provided is sufficient to build an accurate picture of their imports and exports during that year. It questions to what extent can these first ATT Annual Reports be used to discern what was actually transferred and to whom?

Article 2 of the ATT defines transfers as the 'activities of the international trade comprising export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering'.¹ In practice, this chapter is only concerned with exports and imports.

The deadline for States Parties to submit their ATT Annual Reports on arms exports and imports in 2015 was 31 May 2016. As of 25 May 2017, 49 States Parties had submitted a report for 2015 and made it publicly available, including two who were not legally obliged to report for that year.² Thirteen countries were still to meet their legal obligation for the previous year's Annual Reports: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Burkina Faso,

Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Malta, Nigeria, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.³ None of these countries are known to have major arms-producing industries. However, all may be importers or may export arms that had previously been imported. Most of them are located in or near areas affected by armed conflict or high levels of armed violence, including homicide related to organized crime.

This section examines what information these States Parties included in their Annual Report. In particular, it highlights the many different forms of reporting that have taken place and that may help to explain the widespread discrepancies noted later in the rest of the chapter.

USE OF THE TEMPLATE

Forty-six States Parties used the 'provisional template' circulated by the Facilitator on Reporting.⁴ France and United Kingdom did not use it, while Senegal just used the first page of the template and used its own format to report imports.⁵

The first page of the template contains a checklist that States Parties can use to indicate whether the report contains 'nil' reports on exports and imports, annual reports on exports or imports, and national definitions of categories of arms reported. The page also contains an option to mark 'yes/no' in response to whether 'some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related data has been withheld in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Treaty'.

As is shown in Figure 2.1, an apparently simple set of options has been interpreted very differently by States Parties in their first Annual Reports.

1 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 2.2 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 2.2. <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>

2 Only Slovakia has so far kept its ATT Annual Report for 2015 confidential. The analysis in this chapter concerns all reports whose stated 'date of submission' is before 25 May 2017. Five States Parties (Austria, France, Mexico, Poland and United Kingdom) did not include a date of submission in their report. As the reports were downloaded for analysis prior to 25 May it is possible that one of those five may have submitted and amended report prior to 25 May, or that a country submitted an amended report but did not alter the date of submission. If so, then the analysis in this chapter would not have taken into account such amendments. The chapter considers reports submitted by Liberia and Switzerland even though the date they became States Parties to the Treaty meant that they were not required to submit a report.

3 As of 31 May 2017. The ATT's obligations relating to arms transfers do not take effect until it has entered into force for a State Party. As such, a State Party is required to submit its first Annual Report covering the first full calendar year after entry into force of the Treaty for it ('Second Conference of States Parties Final Report', Article 25). In practice, this means that only States Parties that ratified or acceded on or after 2 October 2015 were obliged to submit a report by 31 May 2016 (in such a case the Treaty would enter into force on 31 December), and it would be required to report in 2017 on its imports and exports during 2016). Some countries submitted reports even though they were not required to do so.

4 The templates were endorsed for use by States Parties at the Second Conference of States Parties in August 2016. They are available for download in English, French or Spanish at ATT Secretariat (N.D.). 'Reports': <http://thearmstradetry.org/index.php/en/2017-01-18-12-27-42/reports>

5 The 46 States Parties that used the template are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

Figure 2.1. Check boxes at the start of the ATT Annual Report template

Contents of report (check as appropriate)		Yes	No
i)	Nil report on exports of conventional arms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ii)	Nil report on imports of conventional arms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
iii)	Annual report on exports of conventional arms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
iv)	Annual report on imports of conventional arms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
v)	National definitions of categories of conventional arms reported	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Scope of report (voluntary information)	Yes	No
In the submitted report, some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related data has been withheld in accordance with article 13.3 of the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ANNUAL REPORTS ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Of the States Parties that used the template, 40 ticked the box to declare that they had provided data on imports. Ireland also ticked the 'yes' box on imports but did not provide any data on imports. Slovenia ticked 'no' for this but did report data. Two states left the check boxes blank for imports but reported data (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Spain).

Similarly, 29 States Parties ticked the box in the template to state that they had provided data on exports and provided data.⁶ Macedonia and Mali also ticked the 'yes' box for the annual report on exports but did not provide any data on exports. Panama ticked 'no' for this but did report data. Eleven countries ticked 'no' and also did not provide data. Bosnia and Herzegovina left the boxes blank but also reported data.

Austria did not submit the first page of the template containing the check box, and France and United Kingdom did not include any such data as they did not use the template. Austria and United Kingdom did not include any data on imports in their reports, but both provided data on exports.

It is likely that, as with 'nil' reports (see the section below), the explanations for these inconsistencies concern differing interpretations or perhaps clerical error rather than any attempt to deceive. However, such a lack of clarity inhibits the utility of the Annual Reports. If it is unclear what information is included in Annual Reports, it may be difficult to discern whether a country simply did not import or export anything, or whether it has withheld data.

'NIL' REPORTS

In common with the UN Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA, see below) the ATT report template has the very useful option for states to submit a 'nil' report. This is a simple means by which a country can report that it did not export or import any arms during the previous year (something that reduced the administrative burden of reporting). However, as is shown here, the many ways in which 'nil' reports have been submitted sometimes leave more confusion than clarity.

As can be seen in Figure 2.1, States Parties can select an option to show that they have submitted a 'nil' report for exports and/or imports of conventional arms. In addition, Annexes 3A and 3B of the Annual Report template comprise a form for officials to complete when making a 'nil' report on exports and imports respectively. The form includes check boxes as to whether they have reported 'nil' authorizations or physical movement of arms (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Annex 3A (from ATT Annual Report template) Nil Report: Exports of Conventional Arms¹

Reporting country:		Calendar year:	
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The Government of _____

with reference to Article 13 (3) of the Arms Trade Treaty, hereby submits a 'nil report' for exports from territory under our jurisdiction. This report serves to conform that

<input type="checkbox"/>	No actual exports of conventional arms listed in Article 2 (1) of the Arms Trade Treaty have taken place from territory under our jurisdiction during the reporting period indicated above.
<input type="checkbox"/>	No export authorizations have been issued for conventional arms listed in Article 2 (1) of the Arms Trade Treaty during the reporting period indicated above

This nil report on exports is available only to States Parties	<input type="checkbox"/>
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1) States Parties that do not have any exports and/or imports to report should file a "nil report" clearly stating that no exports/imports have taken place in any of the categories during the reporting period. Templates for such nil reports are included in Annex 3.

6 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Sixteen States Parties checked 'yes' on the first page of the template (see Figure 2.1) to indicate that they had submitted a 'nil' report for arms exports and 24 checked 'no'.⁷ Nine did not indicate whether they had submitted a 'nil' report or not: of those, six left the options on the check box blank (Albania, Australia, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Serbia, Spain) while Austria did not include the first page of the template and France and United Kingdom did not use the template. Of the 16 that indicated that they had submitted a 'nil' report for exports, only 14 completed the form in Annex 3A of the reporting template (see Figure 2.2), with Croatia and Liberia instead ticking the box stating 'This nil report may be made publicly available' without indicating what type of information (authorizations or actual transfers) was covered by the 'nil' report.

Six States Parties checked 'yes' on the first page of the template (see Figure 2.1) to indicate that they had submitted a 'nil' report for arms imports and 34 checked 'no'. As with exports, nine countries did not indicate whether they had submitted a 'nil' report for imports (See above).

Of the six States Parties that indicated they had submitted a 'nil' report for imports, five filled out all the forms in Annex 3B (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ireland, Samoa and Sierra Leone). Macedonia, Mali and Panama ticked the box stating 'This nil report may be made publicly available' without stating what type of information (authorizations/actual exports) was covered by the 'nil' report. Mali checked 'no' for a 'nil' report on the first page of the report and it did not submit any further data. Panama checked 'yes' for 'nil' exports on the first page of the report, but nevertheless did report some export data on small arms.

Only two countries, Samoa and Sierra Leone, reported 'nil' for both exports and imports in 2015.

REPORTING PERMUTATIONS

In all, as shown in Table 2.1, there were 12 different combinations in the 2015 Annual Reports of how officials completed the check box on the first page of the report and of what data was entered into the subsequent tables concerning imports and exports. Notably, some countries left sections entirely blank without indicating a 'nil' report, leaving it unclear whether they had not transferred anything, or whether information on transfers had not been reported.

One issue that can be identified from this table is that it appears that several States Parties wished to report no transfers of major weapons, but had imported or exported small arms and light weapons (SALW) (or vice versa). Some

countries chose to indicate a 'nil' report but also entered transfer data, while others did not indicate a 'nil' report but then entered 'nil' or 'zero' in the template concerning transfers of small arms or of major weapons.

This confusion could be addressed through an amendment to the reporting template whereby states could submit 'nil' reports on imports or exports for: (a) all weapon types, as in the current template, (b) major weapons only (categories 2a-g in the ATT), or (c) small arms only (category 2h). A country that had only imported, for example, pistols would then be able to submit a 'nil' report for imports of major weapons and provide data for imports of small arms.



SPENT AMMUNITION.

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⁷ States checking 'yes' for nil reports for exports: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mexico, Panama, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and Uruguay.

Table 2.1: Ways in which States Parties reported 'nil' reports and no transfers of major weapons or SALW


Type of reporting	Example
Checked neither 'yes' nor 'no' box for a 'nil' report, but provided data on major weapons and SALW.	Australia (exports and imports), Spain (exports and imports).
Checked neither 'yes' nor 'no' box for a 'nil' report, but provided data on SALW only.	Liechtenstein (exports and imports).
Checked neither 'yes' nor 'no' box for 'nil' report, entered 'zero' items for each category of major weapons, provided data on SALW exports and imports.	Montenegro (exports and imports).
Checked the 'yes' box for 'nil', provided data on SALW but major weapons table left blank.	Bosnia and Herzegovina (exports and imports), Croatia (exports and imports), Panama (exports).
Checked 'no' for a 'nil' report, provided data on SALW, all major weapons categories left blank.	Argentina (exports and imports), Denmark (imports), El Salvador (imports), Jamaica (exports and imports), Liberia (imports), Luxembourg (imports).
Checked 'no' for a 'nil' report, provided data on SALW, reported zeros in all major weapons categories.	Estonia (exports), Japan (exports and imports), New Zealand (exports), Panama (imports).
Checked 'no' for 'nil' report, reported data on major weapons, SALW section left blank.	South Africa (exports and imports), Uruguay (imports).
Checked 'no' for a 'nil' report but all weapon categories left blank.	Mali (exports).
Checked 'no' for 'nil' report but entered the word 'nil' in all categories of major weapons and SALW.	Sweden (imports).
Checked 'yes' for a 'nil' report for exports and for a report on both exports and imports all weapon categories in the table left blank.	Ireland (imports).
Checked 'yes' for a 'nil' report and for a report on exports, provided data on major weapons and on SALW.	Slovenia (exports).
Checked 'yes' for a 'nil' report and for a report on transfers, provided data on SALW, major weapons categories left blank.	Macedonia (imports).

WITHHELD SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Article 13.3 of the ATT permits a State Party to withhold commercially sensitive or national-security-related information from the report, and an option to declare whether information has been withheld has been included in the first page of the template (see Chapter 1 for more on how States Parties should interpret this clause). Thirty indicated that they had not excluded sensitive information. Ten indicated that they had done so – Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Germany, Liberia, Macedonia, Senegal and Sweden. (see Figure 2.3).

Nine States Parties did not state whether or not they had withheld sensitive information from their reports. El Salvador, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Poland, Slovenia and Spain left both options blank in the template. France and United Kingdom did not use the template. Austria did not submit the first page of the template. It is not known whether or not these countries withheld sensitive information.

Figure 2.3: Did countries withhold sensitive information from 2015 ATT Annual Reports?



NATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND VOLUNTARY NATIONAL CATEGORIES

As noted in the section below on cross-checking the reports, the existence of differing definitions of categories of conventional arms is an important potential reason why information provided

may differ between importer and exporter countries. However, the template usefully gives States Parties the opportunity to provide information on national definitions in Annex 2. Four states (Albania, Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland) indicated on the first page of the template that they had provided information, which was present in Annex 2 of the reporting template. Albania indicated that it uses the EU Common Military List for all categories, and New Zealand and Switzerland stated that they use UNROCA (see below) definitions for categories I-VII. Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland all provided notes on SALW. Germany declared that it only included arms made for military purposes in its national definition, and Switzerland stated that it had excluded arms made for 'recreational, cultural, historical and sporting purposes'.

A further nine States Parties indicated on the first page of the template that they had provided national definitions, but did not include any information in Annex 2 (which was either left blank or not included at all).⁸ Fourteen ticked 'no' and did not provide any information in Annex 2 of the reporting template. Eleven left the check boxes blank and did not provide any information in Annex 2.

It is unclear why the above-mentioned nine States Parties would declare that they had included national definitions but then not place any information in Annex 2. Dominican Republic and Sweden provided information on additional voluntary national categories and so they may have checked the 'national definitions' box to indicate the provision of that information. It is possible that the others may have checked the box to indicate that they use national definitions (even if the information was not provided in the report).

The template allows States Parties to include additional categories of arms not listed. Five (Dominican Republic, Germany, New Zealand, Senegal and Sweden) provided definitions of those additional categories of weapons. Germany referred to an external document but did not actually include data on voluntary national categories. Norway provided the total financial value of all ammunition exports (to 'various' recipients), but did not provide a definition of that ammunition in the report.⁹ Belgium provided extensive information on exports and imports of 'ML1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories and specially designed components' without further defining this type in the report (though the ML1 designation suggests that it is drawn from the EU Common Military List).

⁸ Belgium, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Finland, Ireland, Macedonia, Mali, South Africa and Sweden.

⁹ Norway did refer to a parliamentary White Paper scheduled to be submitted on 10 June 2016, which would presumably contain more information on its transfers. However, as of 10 June 2017 this White Paper was not available on the ATT Secretariat web site.

DEFINITIONS OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

While the different ways that an import or export can be defined is a likely explanation for some reporting discrepancies, the template provides a check box whereby States Parties can clarify whether the transfer concerns physical transfer of items across a national border, transfer of title (ownership) or transfer of control. States Parties are also given the option of providing their own description (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4. Definition of exports (ATT Annual Report template)

In this report the following definition of the term exports was used³ (check as appropriate)

Physical transfer of items across national border:	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Transfer of title:	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Transfer of control:	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please provide brief description below):	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

3) Based on UN Registry practice. An international arms transfer could mean, in addition to the physical movement of equipment to or from national territory, the transfer of title to- and control over the equipment. Other criteria are also possible. States Parties should here provide a description of the national criteria used to determine, for control purposes, exactly when an arms transfer takes place.

In addition to defining the nature of arms imports and exports, it is also important for such information to be provided by States Parties that submit 'nil' reports. For example, a 'nil' report from country A that just concerned arms crossing its national border would not cover arms supplied by country B to country A's forces stationed abroad (such as peacekeeping troops).

As with the other types of information described in this section, in many cases it remains unclear exactly what has been reported. Thirty-five States Parties provided information on their definition of exports by clicking on at least one option in the check box (see Figure 2.4). Mali, though, checked 'no' for all four options for exports (but not for imports). This suggests that the request for information was not clearly understood, which may point to the need for more explanatory notes in the template. Nine countries did not note a definition of exports (that is, all options on the check boxes were left blank).¹⁰

Forty-three States Parties provided information on their definition of imports by selecting at least one check box option provided. South Africa ticked neither 'yes' nor 'no'.¹¹

Overall, 12 States Parties (including Mali for exports) included no clarification on what kinds of arms transfer are included in their export or import reporting. This omission, including by some of the world's largest arms exporters, means that vital contextual information needed to work out what arms have been transferred to whom has been withheld.

TYPES OF DATA REPORTED FOR ARMS IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

This section considers the data actually reported on arms imports and exports. An Annual Report is considered here if the sections on import and export contain any data at all – that is, the tables have not been left blank or data omitted (for example, by provision of a 'nil' report that does not include any tables on imports or exports). The section does, however, cover examples of when a State Party entered 'zero' or 'nil' for all weapon categories in the table. A 'nil' or 'zero' entry in weapon-type categories does constitute the provision of data (much more so than leaving a section blank). In practice, as is shown in the above section on 'nil' reporting permutations, entering 'nil' or 'zero' in arms categories is different from a 'nil' report, in that in some cases a country may report data on major weapons and enter 'zero' for small arms (or vice versa). Reporting practices on imports and exports of SALW and on major weapons are considered separately, as in many cases States Parties had different ones for each (see also Table 2.1).

EXPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS

Twenty-nine of the 49 States Parties that submitted ATT Annual Reports for 2015 reported data on exports of major weapons. Of those, Estonia, Japan, Montenegro and New Zealand merely reported 'zero' for all categories, and Ireland entered 'nil', but none of those countries submitted a 'nil' report (see above). Panama submitted a 'nil' report but also entered 'zero' in all categories of major weapons and reported data on small arms exports. These six are not included in some of the totals shown below (for example, a 'zero' export report could not be disaggregated by import destination).

¹⁰ Austria, Dominican Republic, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Samoa, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uruguay. France and United Kingdom did not use the template and provided no information.

¹¹ A further five States Parties provided no information for different reasons: Samoa and Sierra Leone submitted a 'nil' report and did not include the section. France and United Kingdom did not use the template, and Austria did not include a section for imports in its report.

Of the countries reporting exports of major weapons, six States Parties reported data just on export authorizations and 18 reported data only on actual deliveries of arms. South Africa reported data on both authorizations and actual transfers. United Kingdom did not use the template, and its published report did not state whether the data on exports of major weapons concerned authorizations or actual exports. Similarly, Ireland, Montenegro and Panama did not indicate whether their report of 'zero' or 'nil' exports concerned authorizations or actual exports. See Table 2.2.

All 29 countries, including those that reported 'zero' or 'nil', reported the number of major weapons exported (for example, eight warships). Three also reported the financial value of those exports (Austria, Portugal and Slovenia). None reported only the financial value of exports of major weapons. Twenty-two reported data that was disaggregated by country (that is, that the quantity of arms exported to each destination was indicated).

Six States Parties reported the state of origin – i.e. where the arms had been produced – of the major weapons exported (Albania, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia). Seventeen provided a description of the major weapons exported.¹² Eleven provided additional comments, including South Africa, which notably provided the type of end-user of the arms exported (for example, police or ministry of defence).¹³ As mentioned above, such descriptions and comments are very useful when analysing export reports as they can show that apparent discrepancies are in fact due to differing national interpretations of weapon categories or of the scope of exports.

Jamaica, Mali and Lithuania did not submit a 'nil' report for exports but left blank the sections of the table covering exports of major weapons. They may not have exported any major weapons in 2015, but a blank table combined with the absence of a 'nil' report means that such an assumption cannot be certain.

Table 2.2: Exports of major weapons – 2015

Country	Actual or Authorized?	Number or Value?
Albania	Actual	Number
Australia	Authorized	Number
Austria	Actual	Both
Belgium	Authorized	Number
Bulgaria	Actual	Number
Czech Republic	Actual	Number
Denmark	Actual	Number
Estonia*	Authorized	Number
Finland	Actual	Number
France	Actual	Number
Germany	Actual	Number
Hungary	Actual	Number
Ireland*	Not specified	Number
Italy	Authorized	Number
Japan*	Actual	Number
Montenegro*	Not specified	Number
Netherlands	Actual	Number
New Zealand	Authorized	Number
Panama*	Not specified	Number
Poland	Actual	Number
Portugal	Actual	Both
Romania	Actual	Number
Serbia	Actual	Number
Slovenia	Actual	Both
South Africa	Both	Number
Spain	Actual	Number
Sweden	Actual	Number
Switzerland	Authorized	Number
United Kingdom	Not specified	Number

* Reported 'nil' or 'zero' in all categories

¹² Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

¹³ The others were Albania, Australia, Denmark, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS

Twenty-eight States Parties reported data on imports of major weapons. Of those, Costa Rica, Japan, Montenegro and Panama reported 'zero', and Sweden reported 'nil', in all categories of major weapons imports. See Table 2.3.

Nineteen only reported data on actual deliveries of arms and four just reported authorizations. South Africa provided data on both authorizations and deliveries. Costa Rica, Montenegro, Panama and Sweden did not state whether their 'nil' or 'zero' entries for all categories concerned authorizations or actual imports.

All 28 States Parties reported the number of items, and Portugal and Slovenia reported financial value as well. None reported just the financial value of imports. Twenty-three reported the number of arms imported disaggregated by exporting state (the five that did not were those that reported 'zero' or 'nil' imports).

Seven countries, Albania, Finland, Mali, New Zealand, Portugal, Serbia and Slovenia mentioned the state of origin of imports (for example, where the arms had been produced). In addition, 18 provided a description of the imported major weapons,¹⁴ and Australia, Hungary, New Zealand, Romania and South Africa provided additional comments.

Ten States Parties did not make a 'nil' report for imports but left blank the sections of the table covering imports of major weapons.¹⁵ Austria did not include a section of its report on imports of major weapons.

It is unclear whether these simply did not import any major weapons in 2016 (as is likely with, for example, Jamaica) or whether they had decided not to report imports that did occur (as may have happened with the United Kingdom).

Table 2.3: Imports of major weapons – 2015

Country	Actual or Authorized?	Number or Value?
Albania	Actual	Number
Australia	Actual	Number
Belgium	Authorized	Number
Bulgaria	Actual	Number
Costa Rica*	Not specified	Number
Czech Republic	Actual	Number
Estonia	Authorized	Number
Finland	Actual	Number
Germany	Actual	Number
Hungary	Actual	Number
Italy	Actual	Number
Japan*	Actual	Number
Latvia	Actual	Number
Lithuania	Actual	Number
Mali	Authorized	Number
Montenegro*	Not specified	Number
Netherlands	Actual	Number
New Zealand	Authorized	Number
Norway	Actual	Number
Panama*	Not specified	Number
Poland	Actual	Number
Portugal	Actual	Both
Romania	Actual	Number
Serbia	Actual	Number
Slovenia	Actual	Both
South Africa	Both	Number
Sweden*	Not specified	Number
Uruguay	Actual	Number

* Reported 'nil' or 'zero' in all categories

¹⁴ Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa and Uruguay.

¹⁵ Argentina, Denmark, El Salvador, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Ireland left the table blank and also indicated a 'nil' report and that it had provided data.

EXPORTS OF SALW

Thirty-five States Parties reported data on exports of SALW (none of which reported 'zero' or 'nil' for all categories). Of those, 11 just reported export authorizations and 21 just on actual deliveries. Austria reported on both. Bosnia and Herzegovina and United Kingdom did not state whether export data concerned licences or actual deliveries. See Table 2.4.

Six States Parties reported both the number of items reported and their financial value (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal and Slovenia). Twenty-seven States Parties reported only the number of items exported and two just reported financial values. Sweden reported the numbers of 'Recoilless rifles' and 'Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems' as being 'classified' (but reported numbers exported of other types) and also reported the financial value of exports of other types of small arms. Belgium only reported financial values.

Twenty-six States Parties indicated the number of weapons that were sent to each import destination and 33 mentioned the final importing state (the difference between the two is due to seven countries that reported an aggregate total of exports and provided a list of importers without stating how many arms were exported to each destination).¹⁶ Australia and New Zealand aggregated different types of firearms and provided the quantities exported to

each destination. Eight States Parties aggregated the destinations of exports of SALW by providing the total number exported and listing the recipient states (without specifying how many arms went to each importer).¹⁷ By just providing a list of recipients, they made it very difficult to assess the sensitivity of an export as the precise quantity exported was not provided. Croatia and Denmark only provided a total quantity of small arms exported. Croatia provided no information on importers, while Denmark identified 'Multiple importing states.' The lack of any information on importers leaves little scope for meaningful analysis of the data.

Seven States Parties reported the origin of some or all small arms that had been exported (Albania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia). 19 provided a description of the exports¹⁸ and 12 provided additional comments.¹⁹

Belgium and Japan reported all data under 'voluntary national categories' rather than the weapon-types categories used in the template. Sweden reported most data under voluntary categories. Japan used categories from the Harmonized System monitoring international trade in all products, and Belgium and Sweden used categories found in the EU Common Military List.²⁰

South Africa and Mali checked 'no' for a 'nil' report for exports (see above) but left blank the sections of the table covering exports of small arms.



¹⁶ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Ireland, Jamaica, Montenegro, Norway and Panama.

¹⁷ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Ireland, Jamaica, Montenegro, Norway, Panama and Poland.

¹⁸ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

¹⁹ France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Serbia and Slovenia.

²⁰ The Harmonized System consists of internationally standardized names and numbers used to classify goods that has been developed by the World Customs Organization and is used for payment of tariffs and collecting data used in trade statistics.

Table 2.4: Exports of SALW in 2015

Country	Actual or Authorized?	Number or Value?
Albania	Actual	Number
Argentina	Actual	Number
Australia	Authorized	Number
Austria	Both	Both
Belgium	Authorized	Value
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Not specified	Both
Bulgaria	Actual	Number
Croatia	Authorized	Number
Czech Republic	Actual	Number
Denmark	Actual	Number
Estonia	Authorized	Number
Finland	Actual	Number
France	Actual	Number
Germany	Authorized	Number
Hungary	Actual	Number
Ireland	Authorized	Number
Italy	Authorized	Number
Jamaica	Actual	Number

Country	Actual or Authorized?	Number or Value?
Japan	Actual	Both
Liechtenstein	Actual	Number
Lithuania	Actual	Number
Montenegro	Authorized	Both
Netherlands	Actual	Number
New Zealand	Authorized	Number
Norway	Actual	Number
Panama	Authorized	Number
Poland	Actual	Number
Portugal	Actual	Both
Romania	Actual	Number
Serbia	Actual	Number
Slovenia	Actual	Both
Spain	Actual	Number
Sweden	Actual	Value
Switzerland	Authorized	Number
United Kingdom	Not specified	Number

* Reported 'nil' or 'zero' in all categories

IMPORTS OF SALW

Forty-one States Parties reported data on small-arms imports (including Slovenia and Sweden, which reported 'nil' for all categories of SALW imports). Austria and United Kingdom did not include a section on imports. Italy, South Africa and Uruguay left this section of the template blank. It is not clear whether these five simply did not import any SALW or whether they withheld data. Ireland, Samoa and Sierra Leone indicated a 'nil' report and submitted no data.

Eleven States Parties reported on authorizations for small-arms imports and 26 reported on actual imports. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not say whether reported data concerned authorizations or actual imports, nor did Sweden concerning its the 'nil' entry in SALW categories. Dominican Republic and Panama reported authorizations and actual imports.

Six States Parties reported both the number of items reported and their financial value (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal and Slovenia). Thirty-four States Parties only reported the number of small arms imported, and one, Belgium, reported only the financial value. Finland stated 'N/A' for the number of imported 'Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems' and did not provide a financial value or report any data on imports of other categories of SALW. Liberia reported the number of items imported for 'Revolvers and self-loading pistols' and 'Rifles and carbines' but not for 'Assault rifles', 'Light machine guns', 'Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers' and 'Recoilless rifles'. It is not known whether the quantities of these four categories were withheld or if Liberia did not import any such weapons during 2015. Twenty-seven States Parties provided information on the quantity of arms imported from each exporting country while 14 did not. Seven only provided the total quantity

imported and a list of exporting countries (without stating how many arms were sent by each exporter).²¹ Six reported the total quantity of imported arms without stating the exporter.²² Denmark provided an aggregated total number of arms imported and reported their origin as being 'multiple exporting states'.

Twenty-two States Parties reported a description of imported SALW²³ and 14 provided additional comments.²⁴ Belgium,

Dominican Republic, New Zealand and Senegal provided data on additional national categories of SALW. Belgium used the EU Common Military List categories; Dominican Republic reported on imports of parts, ammunition and accessories; and New Zealand reported on imports of shotguns, restricted air-guns, muskets, devices for humanely killing animals and replica machine guns. Senegal did not use the template and its import data included equipment not found on the template (such as ammunition).

Table 2.5: Imports of SALW in 2015

Country	Actual or Authorized?	Number or Value?
Albania	Actual	Number
Argentina	Actual	Number
Australia	Actual	Number
Belgium	Authorized	Value
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Not specified	Both
Bulgaria	Actual	Number
Costa Rica	Actual	Number
Croatia	Authorized	Number
Czech Republic	Actual	Number
Denmark	Actual	Number
Dominican Republic	Both	Number
El Salvador	Authorized	Number
Estonia	Authorized	Number
Finland	Actual	Number
France	Actual	Number
Germany	Authorized	Number
Hungary	Actual	Number
Jamaica	Actual	Number
Japan	Actual	Both
Latvia	Actual	Number
Liberia	Actual	Number

Country	Actual or Authorized?	Number or Value?
Liechtenstein	Actual	Number
Lithuania	Actual	Number
Luxembourg	Actual	Both
Macedonia	Authorized	Number
Mali	Authorized	Number
Mexico	Actual	Number
Montenegro	Authorized	Both
Netherlands	Actual	Number
New Zealand	Authorized	Number
Norway	Actual	Number
Panama	Both	Both
Poland	Actual	Number
Portugal	Actual	Both
Romania	Actual	Number
Senegal	Authorized	Number
Serbia	Actual	Number
Slovenia*	Actual	Number
Spain	Actual	Number
Sweden*	Not specified	Number
Switzerland	Authorized	Number

* Reported 'nil' or 'zero' in all categories

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Jamaica, Macedonia and Montenegro.

22 Australia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Mali, Senegal and Switzerland. Mali reported on the origin of the arms rather than the exporter. Slovenia and Sweden reported 'nil' or 'zero' imports.

23 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Romania and Senegal.

24 Albania, Australia, El Salvador, Germany, Hungary, Jamaica, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama and Serbia.

COMPARING WITH THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Research by the ATT Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) has shown that ATT reporting has the potential to reverse a consistent decline in reporting to the UN's pre-existing transparency mechanism, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).²⁵ Twenty-five States Parties submitted an ATT Annual Report but did not submit a UNROCA report for transfers during 2015.²⁶ It appears that the Treaty has encouraged an overall increase in reporting: for example, eight States Parties that submitted an ATT Annual Report in 2016 had not recently reported to UNROCA, while Liberia submitted an ATT Annual Report in 2016 without ever having reported to UNROCA.²⁷ Among the States Parties whose ATT Annual Reports were made public for exports and imports in 2015, 12 provided information on authorizations or actual exports and/or imports of SALW despite not having a track record of providing such information to UNROCA.²⁸

REPORTED TO BOTH TRANSPARENCY MECHANISMS

Twenty-three States Parties had ATT Annual Reports for 2015 published by the ATT Secretariat and also had entries in the UN Secretary General's report collating reports to UNROCA.²⁹ They should be congratulated for their commitment to transparency by reporting to both mechanisms.³⁰

REPORTED THE SAME INFORMATION

Article 13.3 of the ATT states that reports 'submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.'³¹ In the event, only four States Parties submitted exactly the same information to both bodies (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and United Kingdom). In addition, there were only minor changes in reports submitted by another five states (Albania, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain), which probably represent corrections and revisions as new information became available (some countries with larger differences shown in the section below also had minor revisions). See Figure 2.5.



TWENTY-THREE STATES PARTIES HAD ATT ANNUAL REPORTS FOR 2015 PUBLISHED BY THE ATT SECRETARIAT AND ALSO HAD ENTRIES IN THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT COLLATING REPORTS TO UNROCA. THEY SHOULD BE CONGRATULATED FOR THEIR COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY BY REPORTING TO BOTH MECHANISMS.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REPORTS TO EACH TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM

There were large differences in the ATT and UNROCA reports of 14 States Parties. In one case there appears to be a significant error by either the country submitting the report or the body publishing the report: the UNROCA report by Hungary on imports of SALW contains the same data as the country's ATT Annual Report concerning exports of those weapons.

Four States Parties provided types of information to UNROCA that were not contained in their ATT Annual Report. Austria provided a description of major weapons that had been exported in its UNROCA report but not in its ATT report. In its ATT report, Austria also aggregated all SALW and provided a combined financial value to each export destination, and did not provide the state of origin of the arms (if not Austria). On the other hand, in its UNROCA report, Austria provides information on the numbers of revolvers and pistols exported, and where applicable information on the origin of the guns.

In its ATT report for each category of SALW, Estonia aggregated the total quantity of its imports and its exports, and provided a list of states that it exported to or imported from (so it was impossible to tell how many weapons had been exported to each listed country). On the other hand, in its UNROCA report on arms exports, individual quantities were provided for each

25 ATT-BAP (2016). 'Reviewing 2016 ATT Annual Reports on Arms Exports and Imports: Analysis and Good Practice' p. 54.

26 As of May 2017: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mali, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Samoa, Sierra Leone and South Africa.

27 ATT-BAP (2016). 'Reviewing 2016 ATT Annual Reports on Arms Exports and Imports: Analysis and Good Practice' p. 54.

28 Ibid.

29 See the 2016 UN General Assembly documents: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Report of the Secretary-General A/71/138 and A/71/138/Add.1.


30 Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Uruguay. In addition, data from France appears in a database run by UNODA, which is based on reports to UNROCA, though information from the country was not included in the Secretary General's report.

31 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 13.3 (adopted 2 April 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014)_UNTS_(ATT) Art 13.3. <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>

country that Estonia exported to and imported from. Serbia's UNROCA report contains additional comments on the context of an import or export that are not present in its ATT report. Switzerland's ATT report on imports of SALW just mentions the total imported for each category (for example, that it imported 14,671 pistols and revolvers) but it does not specify the country from which these arms were obtained. Its report to UNROCA mentioned the origin of imports, but far fewer quantities are listed. This is because Switzerland stated that its ATT report included exports of small arms to private entities, which are not included in its UNROCA report.

Eight States Parties' ATT reports contained more information than their UNROCA reports. El Salvador submitted a 'nil' report to UNROCA for international transfers of small arms, but its ATT report contains data on imports of those arms. There is no information on imports of SALW in Germany's UNROCA report, although this is present in its ATT report. Japan and Mexico's UNROCA reports did not contain information on imports and exports of SALW, while Japan's ATT report contains data on exports and imports, and Mexico's on imports. Latvia and Senegal submitted a 'nil' report on their imports of SALW to UNROCA, but included data in their ATT reports. Sweden's UNROCA report is a 'nil' entry for imports and exports of all types of weapons, but its ATT report contains data on exports of major weapons and SALW.

Figure 2.5: ATT Annual Reports for 2015 compared to UNROCA reporting



2.2: CROSS-CHECKING THE 2015 ANNUAL REPORTS: DO REPORTED EXPORT AND IMPORTS AGREE?

This section examines the trade in SALW and looks at the extent to which import and exports reports concur – for example, if one State Party reports an export of machine guns to another, does the second State Party also report the import? This analysis focuses solely on SALW as an example category to illustrate reporting issues. SALW are often noted as the type of weapon most susceptible to diversion, making accuracy and comprehensive reporting coverage particularly important.³² Explanations for the identified discrepancies between reports are provided later in this section.

This section analyses ATT Annual Reports submitted by States Parties that have been identified by the Small Arms Survey as being among the largest SALW exporters in the world.³³ It only considers an Annual Report if it included information on quantities exported that were disaggregated by weapon-type categories and by destination country (for example, that Germany exported 54 sub-machine guns to the Netherlands). These criteria limit the study to exports by 17 States Parties: Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

The ATT States Parties identified by the Small Arms Survey as significant exporters but that did not include sufficiently detailed information to be included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Sweden. These countries all aggregated data provided in their ATT Annual Reports to the extent that it was not possible to compare transactions with importers. In addition, South Africa left blank the section in the template on exports of SALW while Mexico reported 'nil' exports and so was not included. Exports by States Parties to Austria and United Kingdom could not be assessed, as these countries did not include any import data in their Annual Reports (and so such exports are not included in the statistics below).

Exports during 2015 reported by those 17 States Parties were compared with information reported by importing ones that reported data disaggregated by weapon-type categories and by exporting country (so the above export report by Germany can be compared to a report by Netherlands of a corresponding import of 52 sub-machine guns from Germany). Import reports that did not contain such disaggregated data were excluded (for example, exports to Dominican Republic were not included in the study as it only reported the total number imports for each category of small arms and did not name the exporter).

³² See, for example, Small Arms Survey (2008). 'The Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience'. Chapter 4: 'Deadly Deception: Arms Transfer Diversion'. pp. 112–53.

³³ Pavese, I. (2016). 'Trade Update 2016: Transfers and Transparency'.



**ONLY SIX PER CENT OF THE 435 EXPORTS
REPORTED BY THE 17 STATES PARTIES
CORRESPONDED EXACTLY WITH AN IMPORT
REPORT OF THAT WEAPON TYPE BY ANOTHER**

In total, 435 separate transactions were identified where an export by one of the 17 States Parties could be compared with an import reported by the other States Parties (or vice versa). Each of the transactions was examined. If a reported export corresponded exactly with a reported import involving the same type of weapon and the same country, the export report is said to have been 'mirrored' (for example, Argentina reported the export of 55 revolvers and self-loading pistols to Costa Rica, which in turn reported the import of 55 revolvers and self-loading pistols from Argentina). If the same weapon type was included in both states' import and export reports, but the quantities differed, then the transaction is said to have been 'partially mirrored' (for example, the export report by Germany of 54 sub-machine guns exported to Netherlands has been partially mirrored by the import report of 52 sub-machine guns by Netherlands).

Among the 435 identified transactions by the 17 exporters of SALW among the States Parties, only 26 could be mirrored and only a further 70 partially mirrored. In other words, only six per cent of the 435 exports reported by the 17 States Parties corresponded exactly with an import report of that weapon type by another, and in only 22 per cent was there a corresponding import of the specified weapon type (regardless of whether the quantities matched). For the other 339 identified transactions (78 per cent), a reported export had no corresponding import of a similar type of weapon and vice versa. For example, Norway reported the export of 800 Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons to Latvia, and Latvia did not report the import of any small arms or arms from Norway, nor of any anti-tank weapons from another country.

The transactions that could not be mirrored contained some striking discrepancies. Denmark and Bulgaria reported the import of, respectively, 500 and 100 heavy machine guns from United Kingdom, which did not report exporting any heavy machine guns to either country. Mexico reported the import from Italy of 2,020 Beretta 5.56x45mm assault rifles, but Italy did not report any exports of assault rifle to Mexico.³⁴

A particularly notable discrepancy exists between the Annual Reports of Poland and Czech Republic, which is shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Table 2.7 shows actual exports of SALW reported by Poland to Czech Republic. However, Czech Republic did not report any imports of SALW from Poland (despite reporting actual SALW imports from other states).

Likewise, Table 2.7 shows SALW exports to Poland reported by Czech Republic. However, Poland did not report any imports of SALW from Czech Republic (despite reporting imports from other states).

Table 2.6: Reported actual exports by Poland to Czech Republic

Type	Number of units
Rifles and carbines	5,602
Submachine guns	206
Assault rifles	10,686
Light machine guns	483
Heavy machine guns	335
Hand held underbarrel and mounted grenade launcher	155
Recoilless rifles	22
Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	5

³⁴ The report by Mexico of an import from Italy of 2,020 Beretta 5.56x45 mm assault rifles is included in the 'other' category found in the template, rather than under the category for Assault rifles, whereas Italy did not use the 'other' category. The likelihood that discrepancies are caused by differences in categorization is discussed later in the chapter.

Table 2.7: Reported actual exports by Czech Republic to Poland

Type	Number of units
Rifles and carbines	285
Sub-machine guns	1 240
Assault rifles	107
Light machine guns	61
Heavy machine guns	7
Portable anti-tank guns	1

When States Parties provide additional information on the context of an arms transfer, it is possible to find an explanation for such discrepancies. Unfortunately, such additional information was not provided for the transfers mentioned above (concerning Czech Republic and Poland; Denmark, Bulgaria and United Kingdom),³⁵ so the explanation for these discrepancies remains a mystery. The reason for them could be due to factors such as different definitions of an export or import (perhaps the weapons were sent to Polish or Czech troops stationed abroad) rather than criminal activity or deliberate obfuscation. Below, this chapter seeks to outline some of the possible causes of such discrepancies in reporting data.

The study then compared those 96 transactions that could be mirrored or partially mirrored and looked at the quantities that had been reported by the exporter and importer. In only 26 (six per cent) of all transactions was there a mirror; that is, the quantity reported as an export was exactly the same as that reported as an import (for example, Italy reported the export of two grenade launchers to New Zealand, which also reported the import of two grenade launchers from Italy).

The remaining 70 transactions were partially mirrored; that is, an exporter and importer each reported a transfer of the same type of small arm or light weapon, but there was a difference in the quantities reported.

- In six transactions the discrepancy was relatively minor – less than 10 per cent (for example, Switzerland reported the export of 47 'rifles and carbines' to the Czech Republic, which reported an import of 49).
- In 15 transactions the discrepancy was between 10 and 50 per cent (for example, Finland reported the export of 20 'rifles and carbines' to Poland, which reported the import of seven from Germany, a discrepancy of 35 per cent).
- In 49 transactions the discrepancy was 50 per cent or over (for example, Japan reported the export of 165 'sporting and hunting shotguns' to New Zealand, which reported the import of 10 'shotguns' from Japan).

COMPARING 'NIL' REPORTS

Not included in the above 435 transactions were instances in which a State Party reported 'nil' imports or exports (which is a declaration that the state did not transfer anything). Sixteen reported 'nil' imports or exports of SALW.³⁶ For nine 'nil'-reporting countries, there were no discrepancies concerning reports of imports and exports by others.³⁷ There were, though, discrepancies between a 'nil' report and imports or exports that had been reported by other States Parties, which concern seven (Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Samoa, Slovenia, Sweden and Uruguay).

In some instances the discrepancies are significant. Ireland indicated 'nil' arms imports (including of SALW). However, several States Parties reported exports to Ireland, including:

- US\$2,760,643 (€2,537,123) of small arms by Belgium³⁸
- 31 assault rifles by Germany
- RBS-70 anti-aircraft missile launchers by Sweden
- One sniper rifle and three sporting rifles by United Kingdom.

³⁵ Mexico provided a description of the item and the state of origin of the weapons, but that did not explain the discrepancy.

³⁶ As is shown in section above on reporting permutations, 'nil' reports were made in several different ways. The criteria used are: (a) all states that used Annex 3 of the template and did not report data on small arms and light weapons, (b) all states that ticked the box at the start of the template and did not report data on small arms and light weapons, and (c) all states that reported 'zero' or 'nil' for all small arms and light weapons categories.

³⁷ Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Liberia, Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

³⁸ Currency conversion via INFOEURO, as of May 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/contracts_grants/info_contracts/infoeuro/index_en.cfm. Belgium did not state the applicable currency in its report, but the currency was clarified in the report to the Wallonian Parliament for 2015, available at <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Wallon%202015.pdf>. Belgium reported exports of 'ML1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories and specifically designed components.'

Slovenia entered 'nil' for its imports of all categories of SALW. However, other States Parties reported exports to Slovenia including:

- 204 'SALW' and one light weapon from Austria³⁹
- US\$26,767 (€14,600) of small arms from Belgium
- An undefined quantity of revolvers and self-loading pistols from Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Ten revolvers and self-loading pistols, 68 rifles and carbines, and one assault rifle from Czech Republic
- Seven rifles and carbines from Finland
- 12 revolvers and self-loading pistols, and ten rifles and carbines from Serbia
- US\$3,631 (SEK32,119) of small arms from Sweden
- Two revolvers and self-loading pistols, and one rifle and carbine from Switzerland
- One sporting rifle and three assault rifles from United Kingdom.

Sweden entered 'nil' for all types of arms imports in its report, including 'small arms' and 'light weapons'. However, other States Parties reported exports to Sweden of the following:

- 12 small arms by Australia
- US\$798,405 (€733,761) of small arms from Belgium
- An undefined quantity of revolvers and self-loading pistols, and rifles and carbines, from Estonia
- 56 rifles and carbines from Finland
- 46 assault rifles and 30 sub-machine guns from Germany
- An undefined number of heavy machine guns by Norway
- 23 revolvers and self-loading pistols, and four assault rifles from Switzerland
- Two rifles and eight sporting rifles from United Kingdom
- Two rifles or small arms from each of Italy, Lithuania and New Zealand.

Smaller discrepancies concern the other five 'nil' reporters. Latvia reported 'nil' exports, but Lithuania reported an import of 21 rifles and carbines from the country. Luxembourg, reported 'nil' exports, but Germany and Netherlands both reported imports from Luxembourg (of five sub-machine guns and five assault rifles, and one sub-machine gun respectively). Samoa reported 'nil' imports and exports, but New Zealand reported the import of 50 'small arms' from it, and the export of one 'small arm' and one shotgun to it. Finally, Uruguay reported 'nil' exports but Belgium reported an import authorization worth

US\$157,774 (€145,000) of small arms from Uruguay, Jamaica reported the import of an undefined quantity of small arms and New Zealand reported the import of one shotgun.

EXPLAINING THE DISCREPANCIES

There may be a tendency to assume that discrepancies between reports by an exporter and importer are evidence of diversion; that is, the weapons left the exporting country and never arrived at the intended destination. It is also possible that discrepancies are due to fraud; that is, in order to avoid paying tariffs a trader will fail to declare or seek a licence for one part of a transfer. Readers may also assume that discrepancies are because some States Parties may have deliberately censored their reports in order to conceal sensitive information (perhaps without stating that they had done so).

However, the explanation for the discrepancies highlighted above is probably more prosaic and related to differing definitions and methods used in arms-transfer control and reporting systems. Likely explanations are outlined in the remainder of this section.

AUTHORIZATIONS AND DELIVERIES

ATT Annual Reports concern both authorizations (permission granted by a government to export or import) and actual movements of arms across borders. This has given rise to a situation whereby different types of data are being provided depending on what a State Party is able or willing to provide. Experience shows that there can be large differences between authorizations and actual imports or exports. This is illustrated by comparing reported SALW transfers between France and Switzerland in 2015 (see Table 2.8). What appear to be large discrepancies between numbers and types of SALW reported are likely the result of the fact that Switzerland reported export authorizations whereas France reported actual imports.

Arms are often shipped in a different year from when an export authorization was granted. Furthermore, the weapons may not be shipped at all as deals can be cancelled, or an exporter may obtain a licence for more weapons than initially ordered by the client (in case the client increases the order). Finally, some parts of the state (such as the Ministry of Defence) may not be required to seek an export or import authorization. It is therefore possible in the case of Table 2.8 that the remaining arms licenced for export by Switzerland may yet be exported in subsequent years, although there is no certainty that this will be the case. (The other explanations for discrepancies mentioned in this section may also apply, especially as France did not use the template and did provide additional information on the exports).

39 Austria reported exports of Small Arms (aggregated) and Light Weapons (aggregated), as well separate exports of Other Light Weapons (aggregated).

Table 2.8: Comparing reported imports and authorized exports in 2015 by Switzerland and France

Reported authorized exports by Switzerland to France during 2015	
Type	Number of units
Revolvers and self-loading pistols	679
Rifles and Carbines	533
Sub-machine guns	24
Assault rifles	246
Other small arms	59
Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers (less lethal)	11

Reported actual imports by France from Switzerland during 2015	
Type	Number of units
SIG 533 assault rifles	90

MISMATCH BETWEEN PHYSICAL MOVEMENT AND TRANSFER OF TITLE OR CONTROL

The ATT reporting template allows a State Party to define whether it classifies an import or export as involving a change in title (or ownership) or control, or just the arms crossing a national border (see the above section on definitions of imports and exports). These different conceptions of what actually constitutes an import or export may explain some of the discrepancies between importers and exporters.

For example, Serbia reported the export of 11,970 assault rifles and 50 heavy machine guns to Germany, none of which were reported as imports by the latter.⁴⁰ Closer examination of Serbia's report reveals that it used the 'comments' column to declare that the end-user is a US military base in Germany. This is the most likely explanation for the discrepancy, as the arms would have, presumably, been owned and controlled by United States. It is notable, though, that Germany states in its Annual Report that its definition of an import of conventional arms concerns 'Physical transfer of items across a national border' rather than a change

in title or control. So, in strict accordance with its definition of an import Germany should have reported that the arms from Serbia had entered its territory. One explanation is that Germany was unaware that the arms from Serbia had entered its territory.

Similarly, Hungary reported the import of five heavy machine guns from Norway, which did not report an export to Hungary. Hungary made extensive use of the 'comments' column and notes that the purchase occurred in 2012 and that the machine guns had been transported directly to Afghanistan (presumably to Hungarian troops stationed there), and furthermore that in 2015 five of them were sent to Hungary. Thus Norway was correct in not reporting the export in its Annual Report on 2015 (the transaction had occurred three years previously) while Hungary correctly reported that it had imported five heavy machine guns, which had ultimately been supplied by Norway.

DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF SMALL ARMS

Three of the four States Parties that have provided details of national definitions of arms included in their Annual Report state that they focus upon small arms made for military use (for example, machine guns) and exclude recreational firearms (for example, sporting shotguns); and the overall balance of reported trade suggests that others have similarly not reported on pistols, revolvers and sporting shotguns or rifles. Another explanation for discrepancies in reporting data between exporters and importers is, therefore, that one may have reported an export of a type of small arms that was not covered by the importer's definitions and thus their report (or vice versa).

For example, Netherlands reported the import of 8,997 self-loading pistols and revolvers from Germany, but Germany did not report any exports of those types of firearm to Netherlands. It is likely that the explanation can be found in Germany's clarification in its Annual Report that the definition used is 'small arms and accessories specially designed for military use' and a note specifically states that 'Revolvers and self-loading pistols are not covered by the national definition of SALW'.

It is likely that the omission of some small arms from ATT Annual Reports is widespread (see also the above section on national definitions). Most notably, shotguns are not included in the small-arms categories found in the reporting template but transfers of them are reported by some States Parties using the 'other' category.⁴¹ As per Article 5.3 of the Treaty, shotguns, pistols, revolvers and single-shot or semi-automatic rifles should be included in the scope of arms covered by the ATT.

⁴⁰ Serbia also reported the export of 12 rifles and carbines as well as four revolvers and self-loading pistols, which were not reported as imports by Germany. These arms were not reported by Serbia as being destined to a US military base.

⁴¹ It is not possible to list the States Parties that have excluded transfers of some types of small arms from their Annual Reports as the absence of data could also be due to their not having imported or exported any of them.

WITHHELD SENSITIVE INFORMATION

The ATT allows States Parties to withhold sensitive information from their Annual Report; 10 indicated that they had done so and a further nine did not indicate whether they had or not (see section above on withholding sensitive information). If the exporter withholds information and the importer does not (or vice versa), there will inevitably be a discrepancy. However, as countries have not given the reasons behind their decision to withhold information, it is not possible to point to specific cases where this is the case. Withholding sensitive information risks undermining the transparency objective of the ATT and it should only be done as sparingly as possible.

WEAPON TYPES, ENTREPÔT TRADE, CALENDAR YEARS AND ERROR

There are four further possible explanations for discrepancies that are not immediately apparent from the data and comments provided in Annual Reports, but which experience suggests may be applicable. Since the transportation of arms can take some time, it is possible that arms that leave a State Party in one year (perhaps in December) may arrive in their final destination

in the following calendar year. This means that the exporter reports the transfer in one year while the importer will report it in the following year. Second, if a State Party bases its definition of an import or export on arms that physically cross borders, then discrepancies may be due to what is known as *entrepôt* trade. This occurs when arms are shipped to a trading hub and are then re-shipped to another destination. Particularly if a country bases its report on customs data, it may record movements of arms into and out of trading hubs rather than the ultimate importer or exporter (which may have reported the transfer in a different way). Conversely the trading hub may report transfers differently from the original exporter and the ultimate recipient. Third, there may also be differences in how a State Party identifies different weapons. For example, an assault rifle is usually assumed to be capable of fully automatic fire. Nevertheless, in some cases semi-automatic rifles that otherwise resemble fully automatic assault rifles may be defined as such. Similarly, an assault rifle with a folding stock may be described as being a sub-machine gun or as an assault rifle. Finally, it is always possible that human error may account for some data discrepancies between import and export reports.



DELEGATES IN DISCUSSION AT THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ARMS TRADE TREATY, GENEVA, 22-26 AUGUST 2016.

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CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that the overwhelming impression given in the Annual Reports for 2015 is that of a lack of clarity. Practices that inhibit analysis include the following.

- Excessive aggregation, such as providing the total quantity of arms exported or imported without stating how many were exported to, or imported from, individual countries.
- Leaving sections of the report template blank without further explanation.
- Not reporting data on imports at all.
- Not including in the report transfers of some types of small arms (such as pistols, shotguns and non-automatic rifles).

There were also differences in how States Parties reported, with many permutations on how to report 'nil' exports and imports, different definitions of an import or export, or whether data concerned licences to export/import, or actual movements of arms across borders. These differences make it difficult to compare data from one report with another.


In particular, a comparison of data on imports and exports shows that it is very rare that SALW reported as having been exported by one country are also reported as having been imported by the claimed recipient.

There are several explanations for the widespread discrepancies between reporting of imports and exports, but the main conclusion is that the 49 States Parties that submitted a publicly available report covering imports and exports in 2015 each reported them in different ways. This is a consequence of each having developed its own national transfer-control and record-keeping system.

A natural response to the plethora of different styles and methods of reporting might be to demand compulsory adherence to templates supported by detailed rules on how to report. However, some countries have stated opposition to such a proposal.

Furthermore, the main problem is not that States Parties are unwilling to report comparable information, but that they are unable to do so due to national transfer-control systems using very different legal definitions and record-keeping methods. Reform takes time and, more importantly, diverse bureaucratic procedures may well reflect the different needs of various countries.

An alternative solution is for States Parties to be encouraged to provide as much information as possible via the existing templates, which provide ample opportunity for them to include information on transfers. There are several examples in this chapter of clarifications included in reports that have explained apparent discrepancies (especially additional comments and national definitions of weapon types). Research on the arms trade often resembles attempting to complete a jigsaw puzzle with pieces that are blank on both sides, and half of which are missing. The provision of more information by States Parties in their reports would help to complete the jigsaw.



MILITARY POLICE AT COMPLEXO DO CAJU, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL.

CREDIT: LUIZ BALTAR/ANISTIA INTERNACIONAL



THE OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION GIVEN IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS FOR 2015 IS THAT OF A LACK OF CLARITY

2.3: 2016 ANNUAL REPORTS: PRELIMINARY REVIEW

ATT Annual Reports are due on 31 May every year. A detailed analysis of ATT Annual Reports is not practical within the short time period before the CSP is held, particularly as a significant percentage of States Parties have in the past submitted their Annual Reports after the deadline has passed.⁴² The preliminary review in this chapter summarizes key data from the Annual Reports for 2016 exports and imports of States Parties that have submitted within a week of the 31 May 2017 deadline. It is anticipated that more States Parties will have submitted their Annual Reports before CSP 2017.

A detailed assessment of the contents of 2016 Annual Reports will be provided in next year's ATT Monitor report.

ARTICLE 13.3

Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC REPORTING

Public reporting will be critical for the ATT's long-term success. Only with greater transparency will states and civil society observers be able to verify adherence to the Treaty's obligations as well as its object and purpose, and build confidence in the Treaty itself. The ATT Monitor has demonstrated the high level of existing public reporting to other mechanisms relating to the arms trade by States Parties and Signatories – indicating a widespread acceptance of public reporting as a norm.⁴³

Once the Treaty has entered into force for a new State Party, that state is obligated to submit a report covering the previous calendar year by the next May deadline. In practice this means that if a State Party had ratified or acceded to the Treaty on or prior to 2 October 2015, the ATT would have entered into force (after 90 days) prior to 1 January 2016, and so that State Party should have submitted a report on its imports and exports during 2016 by 31 May 2017. **Seventy-five States Parties were due to submit annual transfer reports by that deadline.**⁴⁴

ATT Annual Reports build confidence between countries, promote greater transparency in the arms trade and enable States Parties to demonstrate that their arms-trade policies are consistent with their obligations in the Treaty (especially Articles 6 and 7).

To provide the most useful information, States Parties should report on both authorized and actual exports and imports of conventional arms. Article 13.3 requires that States Parties report on exports and imports of equipment specified in Article 2.1. It is important that reporting states recognize that Article 13.3 only outlines the minimum expectations for States Parties, and that under Article 5.3 they are all encouraged to apply the provisions of the Treaty to the broadest range of conventional weapons.

2016 ANNUAL REPORTS

The following is an analysis of ATT Annual Reports for exports and imports during 2016 that were published on the ATT Secretariat web site as of 7 June 2017 (one week after the deadline set out in Article 13).

Thirty-two States Parties had submitted an Annual Report by 7 June 2017, with 30 of these made publicly available and published online by the ATT Secretariat:

Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece,⁴⁵ Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

⁴² The ATT Monitor's own production schedule presents an unavoidable structural incompatibility given the time constraints established by the two fixed points of the 31 May reporting deadline and the dates of the annual Conference of States.

⁴³ Control Arms Secretariat (2016). 'ATT Monitor 2016'. New York. 22 August 2016. pp. 98–101. See also Control Arms Secretariat (2015). 'State Positions and Practices Concerning Reporting and the Arms Trade Treaty'. ATT Monitor. <http://controlarms.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/02/States-Practices-PT1.pdf>

⁴⁴ The 75 States Parties that had ratified or acceded to the Treaty on or prior to 2 October 2015 are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

⁴⁵ Greece submitted a report even though it was not obliged to do so.

As of 7 June 2017 only one State Party (Senegal) had submitted an Annual Report with a preference that it would be posted only on the restricted area of the ATT website. Uruguay indicated that parts of its Annual Report for 2016 would remain confidential.⁴⁶ Uruguay has since committed to making its full report publicly available, but has not done so as of 7 June.⁴⁷

This means that 94 per cent of States Parties that met the deadline have made their Annual Report for 2016 publicly available, a strong affirmation of the norm towards greater public reporting on the arms trade.

The number of States Parties that had submitted and made public an Annual Report by 7 June 2017 is virtually the same as at a similar point in 2016.⁴⁸ With an additional 12 States Parties due to report this year, it should be anticipated that the rate of compliance would have increased.

Twenty States Parties met the deadline in both years and should be congratulated for their demonstrable commitment to transparency in the arms trade.⁴⁹

Greece submitted an Annual Report for 2016 even though it was not obliged to do so (it ratified on 29 February 2016).

Overall, **only 41 per cent** of States Parties that should have reported on their exports and imports by 7 June 2017 actually did so.

Experience suggests that more Annual Reports will be made available in the coming months.⁵⁰ However, States Parties are legally obligated to meet the reporting deadline of 31 May and it is not sufficient to provide reports months or even potentially years later, thus reducing opportunities for public scrutiny and greater confidence building.

Table 2.5: 2016 Annual Reports submitted publicly (as of 7 June 2017)

Region	States Parties due to Report by 31 May	States Parties that have submitted reports	Regional reporting rate
Africa	13	2	15%
Americas	20	2*	10%
Asia	1	1	100%
Europe	37	24**	65%
Oceania	4	1	25%

* Uruguay kept the import section of its Annual Report confidential although committed at the Third Preparatory Meeting for CSP 2017 to make their full report public.⁵¹

** Including Greece, which was not due to submit an Annual Report this year.

Table 2.5 shows the regional distribution of the 30 States Parties that had submitted and made public an Annual Report for 2016 by 7 June 2017.

Concerning the content of the Annual Reports that were made fully public online, the following observations can be made.

- Six States Parties declared that sensitive information had been withheld (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Uruguay), and two (El Salvador, Spain) did not indicate whether or not such information had been withheld. At the same stage last year, the number was seven States Parties.
- All States Parties reporting by 7 June 2017 used the reporting template recommended at CSP 2016.⁵²

⁴⁶ As of 6 July 2017 Uruguay's Annual Report for 2016 included a note that the import section may not be made publicly available

⁴⁷ Control Arms (2017). 'Third Informal Preparatory Meeting for the 2017 Conference of States Parties. Geneva, Switzerland, 1 June 2017'. <http://controlarms.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/07/3rd-PrepCom-Report.pdf>

⁴⁸ The 2016 deadline for the ATT Monitor was slightly later at 15 June.

⁴⁹ The States Parties that met the legal reporting deadline in both 2016 and 2017 are: Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

⁵⁰ An additional 20 Annual Reports for 2015 were published after the 15 June 2016 – the deadline used in last year's ATT Monitor.

⁵¹ Control Arms Secretariat (2017). 'Third Informal Preparatory Meeting for the 2017 Conference of States Parties. Geneva, Switzerland, 1 June 2017'. <http://controlarms.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/07/3rd-PrepCom-Report.pdf>

⁵² At this stage in 2016, four States Parties used their own reporting template. Of the four that used their own template, United Kingdom has changed to the official template, Senegal has made its report confidential, and Australia and France had not submitted reports in time for the deadline.

- Four States Parties provided in the annex in the template information on national definitions of arms covered by the Annual Report (Albania, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland). Two (Sweden, New Zealand) also provided definitions of additional equipment types used in the Annual Report.
- Five States Parties (El Salvador, Latvia, Luxembourg, Sierra Leone, Uruguay) submitted a 'nil' report, indicating that they had not exported any arms during 2016. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina also ticked 'nil' for exports, but provided information of exports of SALW.

EXPORTS

- Twenty States Parties reported on exports of major weapons.⁵³ Of those, four reported on authorizations (Greece, Italy, South Africa, United Kingdom) and 17 reported on actual exports. South Africa reported on both. All of them reported the number of major arms exported. In addition Portugal and Slovenia also reported the financial value of exports.
- Twenty-five States Parties reported data on exports of SALW.⁵⁴ Of those, nine reported data on authorizations,⁵⁵ and 14 reported data on actual exports.⁵⁶ Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Africa did not indicate whether the data they reported concerned authorizations or actual exports.
- Nineteen States Parties only reported the number of SALW exported.⁵⁷ Belgium reported on only the financial value. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Sweden reported on both.

IMPORTS

- Nineteen States Parties reported imports of major conventional arms.⁵⁸ Of these, 16 reported just on actual imports, while Belgium and Italy reported on authorized imports. South Africa reported on both, while Greece did not tick either box, leaving it unclear. All reported the number of items imported.
- 25 States Parties reported imports of SALW. Of these, 14 reported on actual imports,⁵⁹ nine reported on authorized SALW imports.⁶⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina left both boxes blank, while Japan, which reported its small arms imports as an attachment, did not specify whether they were authorized or actual.
- Of the 25 States Parties that reported on SALW imports, 21 reported the number of items imported.⁶¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Lithuania and Slovenia reported both the number and financial value of their SALW imports for 2016.

53 States parties that reported exports of major weapons are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

54 States Parties that reported data on exports of small arms and light weapons are: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

55 States Parties that reported data on authorizations of exports of small arms and light weapons are: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

56 States Parties that reported data on actual exports of small arms and light weapons are: Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Japan is assumed to have reported actual exports as it uses Harmonized System categories, which concern actual exports reported via customs.

57 Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

58 Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

59 Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

60 El Salvador, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland.

61 Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland.